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Any society requires that its young be brought up both to live well themselves, and to 
assist and allow others in the society to live well. In a pluralistic and dynamic society, 
moral persons must be thoughtful; flexible or steadfast when morality requires it. 
Through moral education, schools help their students develop into moral persons. 
Given that living morally requires a complex mix of moral beliefs, judgements, 
dispositions and actions, no single pedagogy will be adequate to the task. This thesis 
considers one pedagogy - the Community of Inquiry - and develops a philosophical 
underpinning for its use in moral education. This justification will show that, under a 
particular characterization of morality and moral development, certain capacities 
essential to moral personhood are best developed through the classroom use of the 
community of inquiry. 
Humans come into the world with genetic predispositions which unfold in 
transformative interaction with the world: physical and - most importantly - social. 
Through these, the basis for morality and many other capacities are laid. Chief 
amongst these is the ability to reason. I argue for a broad based conception of 
reasonableness, which encompasses five aspects: critical, creative, committed, 
contextual and embodied. The development of reasoning in social interaction creates 
persons who can think for themselves through their connection to others. Autonomy 
is not a cutting off from connection, but an ability to operate competently within 
intersubjectivity. 
The teacher's role in cultivating reasonableness and autonomy can be elaborated 
through consideration of Habermas' theory of communicative action. I develop a 
notion of pedagogic action that amalgamates the goal directed strategic educational 
action of the teacher with the essentially communicative and discursive action through 
which it must be achieved. 
If education is to produce moral persons, we require an account of morality at which 
to aim. I consider the strengths of Aristotle's virtue ethics, and show that its account 
of moral development - through habituation - is more reflexive than is commonly 
thought. Yet, it lacks a detailed account of reflection, and I turn to Habermas' virtue 
ethics - flawed as a complete meta-ethical system - to provide this, and to inject a 
dynamic for moral progress. 
Finally, I argue that the Community of Inquiry, being a discursive pedagogy, 
develops the aspects of reasonableness, and builds communicative autonomy in 
students as they reflectively assess their moral habits and decide in community how to 
become the sort of person they want to be. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In the lives of children between the ages of four and sixteen or eighteen, schools loom 
large. Almost all children must attend school for about six hours a day, five days a 
week, for a considerable part of the year. The school is Western civilization's major 
institution of socialization. Of course, many other institutions have an impact on 
children's lives, most notably the family and the mass media. Influences from these 
other institutions can work in harmony with the school, or somewhat at loggerheads. 
In the life of a society, the induction of the young into the society also looms large. 
Particularly in a modern pluralist society, we are faced with twin dangers: the collapse 
of society if we fail to equip our young to fit in and take on the burdens of maintaining 
society; or the raising a completely conformist and unthinking new generation unable 
to adapt in the face of diversity and change. The major challenges facing the present 
day West spring from rapid changes and increasing globalization, both leading to all of 
us continually facing what Robert Hughes dubbed "the shock of the new." 
Part of the rapidly accelerating rate of change in society is due to the spread of 
education, particularly in science and technological fields. A more highly educated 
populace has produced a stunning array of advances across many domains. Standards 
of living for the ordinary populace in the developed West are far superior to those of 
the bulk of humanity across all of history. Yet these advances are not an unmixed 
blessing. Technology and its associates have brought with it dangers that range (for 
the masses) from nuclear destruction to ecological catastrophe to military annageddon, 
and (for individuals) from the prolonging of life without hope for the very sick to ruin 
induced by economic rationalism. 
These are well worn observations, and it is just as common to observe that it does little 
good, or rather great harm, to give children an excellent education in science, 
mathematics, language and so on, if they do not also gain the moral vision to make not 
just effective decisions, but wise ones as well. Increasingly, calls are made for 
schools to do more in moral education and in the closely related field of citizenship 
education. Yet, opinions differ markedly on what constitutes good moral education, 
both in terms of what will actually make a difference (the question of effectiveness) 
and what difference ought to be made (the question of correctness). 
This thesis is an exploration of the philosophical underpinnings for one part of the 
moral educational effort. I will maintain that classroom discussion has a vital role to 
play in moral education. We shall see that there are strong theoretical and empirical 
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grounds for the use of discussion, but that the mode of discussion is also important, 
and the teacher has a critically important part to play in fostering that mode. 
1.1 Background: Approaches to Moral Education 
Some argue that moral education is not a task for the school at all: it is a task for 
parents (Beck, Crittenden et al. 1971, 4). Such a position draws a sharp distinction 
between the school's role of intellectual education, and the home's role of moral 
training and character building. In times not too far past, the home was assisted in this 
task by the church. This fact emphasizes the close relationship that was seen between 
morality and religion. For many, morality was just a matter of heeding God's law. 
In the United Kingdom, the state run school was recruited into this enterprise under 
the 1944 Education Act. Religious Education was, until the Thatcher/Baker Education 
Reform Act of 1988, the only compulsory subject in state funded schools. In 
Australia, and even more so in the USA, the situation was different. Religious 
Education classes in Australia were run by outsiders, not teachers, due to a strong 
feeling that the state ought not to support a particular religion. In the USA, the strong 
separation of church and state kept churches even more at arm's length, so that 
schools and teachers were often urged to be careful to be value-free, and leave moral 
education to families and churches. Even when schools were to be involved in moral 
education, it was to be kept carefully neutral (Raths, Harmin et al. 1978). 
Despite these different national policies, the upshot was nevertheless similar. 
Classroom teachers by-and-large felt that it was not their task to be involved in moral 
education. The task could be safely left to others: parents, churches, religious 
education teachers (Elias 1989, viii). In the eyes of some, this has led to recent 
problems. With the increasing breakdown of the family through higher divorce rates, 
and the decline in church attendance, they argue, the influences of the family and the 
church on the moral development of children has decreased. Religious Education 
classes, always somewhat marginalized, have become even more sidelined and 
ignored, they say, and hence standards of public morality have been falling (Straughan 
1988, 1-2 summarizes this view). It is, of course, very difficult to prove anything in 
this highly complex and contested area: any claim that standards are falling rests on 
establishing first exactly which standards are right, and why (Straughan 1988, 4-6). 
Indeed, a case can be mounted for the opposite view: that moral standards have been 
rising. Considering practices that were thought uncontentious in the past - taking 
children away from Aboriginal families; turning a blind eye to domestic violence and 
child abuse; treating women, the disabled and many others as second class citizens; 
acceptance of drunken driving; the White Australia policy and so on - others argue that 
2 
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our society is more caring and more socially just than it was in the past. Social justice, 
environmental sustainability and democratic values have been so much to the forefront 
of public moral thinking in the last decade that they are labelled "core values" in the 
Studies of Society and the Environment learning area National Statement for 
Australian schools (AEC 1994). 
Whether it is true or not that moral standards have been falling or rising, they have 
certainly been changing, and the moral certainties of the past have come increasingly 
under question. When combined with increasing globalization and population 
mobility, this means that children in the West are growing up in more morally complex 
times. 
The linking of moral education to religious education, and more broadly, morality to 
religion, may well have led many to conflate the two. As religious belief waned in the 
last few decades, those who took it that morality is equivalent to God's law would 
have concluded that, if they no longer believed in God, then there was no real need to 
believe in a moral code either. In the Euthyphro, Socrates recognized the possibility 
that belief in the gods is not necessary to morality, for any gods worthy of worship 
will decree what is antecedently moral. It seems wise, in a time of decreasing 
religious commitment, not to tie moral education to religious education. 
I don't wish to enter into the debate as to whether the West is in moral decline or 
revival, which is, as I have indicated, highly contentious. Wherever the truth lies, it is 
nevertheless true that schools have been widely urged to reconsider their role in moral 
education (Elias 1989; Havel 1995). The Common and Agreed National Goals for 
Schooling in Australia (the "Hobart Declaration") includes the goal "6. To develop in 
students... j. a capacity to exercise judgement in matters of morality, ethics and social 
justice" (cited in Macintyre, Boston et al. 1994, 190). Given that moral conduct 
(involving moral judgements) is needed in all the various facets of human endeavour, 
it seems foolish not to address moral issues in all areas of education, rather than to 
consign moral education to a single subject. But what sort of moral education? And 
to what end? 
To give a detailed answer to these questions would be a large undertaking. Many 
different moral education programs have been used, many more suggested. Yet, if we 
look at the philosophical underpinnings to which these programs appeal, then we may 
be able to use a broader brush. 
If we turn our attention away from moral education programs, towards philosophical 
accounts of morality, it might seem that we have gained little, for there are also many 
3 
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philosophical positions. Singer's (1993) edited volume A Companion to Ethics has 
10 chapters on different moral philosophies, ranging from egoism to Kantian ethics to 
virtue theory. We can make a little progress, however, if we consider what role 
reason plays in each philosophical account. Using this criterion, it is possible to set 
up a continuum from accounts, like Kant's, in which morality is the product of pure 
reason, to accounts, like Ayer's emotivism, where reason plays no part at all in 
marking out the moral. We can see that moral education programs also fall along the 
same spectrum, with Kohlberg's moral dilemma based program at the rational end 
(Power, Higgins et al. 1989), and Values Clarification at the non-rational end (Raths, 
Harmin et al. 1978). 
In Kohlberg's scheme, moral development is a progression towards a Kantian view. 
As children attain higher stages of moral development, their moral judgements become 
more rational, and are based upon more rational grounds. At the highest stage (Stage 
6), moral judgements are Kantian, based on the dictates of Pure Reason and aimed 
solely at justice. Moral development just is the increasing rationality of moral 
judgement. 
In the Values Clarification movement, on the other hand, there are no rational bases 
for our values. We just have our values, and moral development consists in becoming 
clearer about what they are. We must reach down to the depths of our being and 
discover what our true values are. Values Clarification is non-judgemental about the 
values of others for, according to proponents of this methodology, there are no 
grounds for criticizing them. 
Taking moral education programs from either end of this spectrum highlights one of 
the dilemmas of modern Western societies. In our pluralist democracy, strong beliefs 
in the need to deliver justice to all co-exist with a commitment to tolerance of the 
diversity within our society. These two values do not sit easily with each other. 
Kohlberg's account of moral development deals easily with justice, but at the cost of 
relegating many aspects that we think of as moral (notably, care for those close to us) 
to a realm other than morality. Values Clarification deals with tolerance equally easily, 
but leaves us entirely without resources for enforcing just outcomes against the wishes 
of others. 
Yet we do have moral intuitions that both values are important. It is in trying to 
remain faithful to both that many of the dilemmas of moral education arise. If 
tolerance is given too much importance, to the detriment of justice, the charge can be 
made that society will break down, lacking the sort of cohesiveness that any society 
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needs to survive. If justice is overemphasized, to the detriment of tolerance, we face 
the charge of privileging the values of the powerful over those of the minorities. 
Neither side is without resources for refuting these charges, of course. The accounts 
can be made considerably more subtle than this, in both cases. In part, I am 
caricaturing the positions to make these points. Yet the caricatures are not too 
distorting, for the underlying philosophical doctrines for each position lead to these 
difficulties. The Kohlbergian account rests on an objectivist foundation, while Values 
Clarification rests on a relativist one. Objectivist meta-ethical positions are notorious 
for having difficulties dealing with diversity, whereas relativist ones cannot provide 
any moral reasons for asserting the correctness of any particular position outside the 
group to which the relativism is indexed. 
These two position also have implications for how we ought to treat children at 
different ages. As we shall see in Chapter Five, Kohlberg's account implies that 
children do not act for moral reasons until they are well into their teens, if at all. 
Nevertheless, they do go through four premoral stages, and reasoning with them at 
the level of a stage one higher than their present stage will assist them to develop to the 
next stage. Although we must reason with children, according to Kohlberg, we do 
not use moral reasons until they are at least to stage 4, because they will not be capable 
of assimilating the reasoning. In Values Clarification, on the other hand, there is only 
a minor role for reason at any age, as it is restricted to working out what one's values 
are. The source of values is not clear: it may be due to habituation within a culture, or 
it may be that values are deep personal attributes. 
This last observation leads to the acknowledgment of another aspect of moral 
development: habituation. In Kohlberg's scheme, habituation into a moral culture is 
merely an early distraction, heavily influenced in any case by the limitations on the 
child's (pre)moral thinking. As the child progresses through the stages, only those 
habitual aspects of morality which accord with practical reason will be retained. As I 
have noted, Values Clarification is ambivalent about the role of habituation but, if it 
does have a major role, the values habituated in early life may be modified by 
clarificatory processes, but they are unlikely to be lost. In Chapter Four, I will 
consider two accounts of moral development - Aristotle's virtue ethics and Habermas' 
discourse ethics - that give habituation an important role as the truly moral basis for 
moral development, accepted in the moral actions of the young, but able to be 
modified or even overthrown under the influence of practical reason at a later time. 
Clearly, the philosophical account we have of reason will be influential in determining 
the nature of the meta-ethical view we use to guide moral education, but both in turn 
5 
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shall also have an impact on the methods we use to achieve the end of producing moral 
persons. This study aims to clarify the philosophical positions that lend credence to a 
particular practical method for moral education in schools: the community of ethical 
inquiry. 
1.2 The Purpose of this Study 
I will develop a philosophical underpinning for the use of a specific type of discussion 
in moral education. In order to do this, I will examine a number of philosophical 
issues that impinge on moral development. But it should be noticed that I do not 
merely develop a philosophical position and then apply it to education (particularly 
moral education) and childhood. Rather, as we shall see throughout this thesis, my 
position will be that, although philosophical positions can certainly guide us as 
teachers of the young, consideration of the young can also guide us as philosophers. 
Many of the philosophical positions to be surveyed are flawed because they largely 
consider persons as already formed, and neglect (to a greater or lesser extent) what is 
to be a becoming-person. And this is precisely what a child is: a becoming-person. It 
is, of course, what adults are too, although many adults are further along the journey 
than many children. Kanniloff-Smith (1992, 26) makes the claim that 
a developmental perspective is essential to the analysis of human cognition, because 
understanding the built-in architecture of the human mind, the constraints on 
learning, and how knowledge changes progressively over time can provide subtle 
clues to its final representational format in the adult mind (italics in original). 
Exactly the same sort of developmental, dynamic perspective is essential in 
philosophy, if we are to reach philosophically sound conclusions. 
Part I of the thesis is concerned with the developmental and pedagogical foundations 
on which to base moral education. In Chapter Two, I consider the genetic or 
biological substrate available for moral development, and begin to explore the 
complexity of biological and social factors in interaction. In Chapter Three, the focus 
of attention is on reasonableness, the name I give to a richer and thicker conception of 
rationality which, as we have seen, is an important enabling capacity for ethical 
development. After considering the Kantian origin of the concept of autonomy in 
§3.2, I begin the task of reconceptualizing autonomy in the light of my discussion of 
reasonableness. Chapter Four will consider the work of Habermas on communicative 
action, and use the insights of his account to study how it is that teachers can assist 
their students to develop both reasonableness and autonomy. This will enable us to 
revisit autonomy, and characterize it in a way that avoids the common charge that it 
ignores interpersonal relationships and interdependency. 
6 
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In Part II, I turn to a consideration of the target that we have in moral education. In 
Chapter Five, I consider Aristotle's virtue ethics and map out its strengths, before 
identifying a weakness: the lack of a detailed account of the place of discourse in moral 
development. For this, I explore Habermas' discourse ethics in Chapter Six, 
identifying the strengths it has, and the reasons why it cannot serve as a meta-ethical 
theory on its own. In Chapter Seven I map out a meta-ethical account that draws on 
Aristotle and Habermas, and can serve to provide guidance for a program of moral 
education. 
Drawing upon the conclusions of Parts I and II, I address the implications for the 
classroom in Part DI Chapter Eight looks at the general role of the school in moral 
development, and introduces the community of inquiry. In Chapter Nine, I look in 
particular at the role of the community of ethical inquiry, showing why this 
methodology can play a vital role in moral development through its encouragement and 
strengthening of reflection. Chapter Ten addresses the practical implications in the 
classroom. Finally, Chapter Eleven sums up the arguments advanced in the thesis as 
to why discussion in a community of inquiry ought to form a central part of any 
program of moral education. 
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Part I: Reason and Autonomy: Developmental 
and Pedagogical Foundations 
Chapter Two: Biological Realism 
In writing a thesis concerned with the moral education of human beings, it is as well 
to start by considering just what a human being is. This is, needless to say, an 
exceedingly complex question, and I shall by no means attempt a full answer to it, 
though parts of an answer will appear at various junctures throughout the thesis. 
Nevertheless, I wish to start by emphasizing one important point: human beings are 
living animals, and thus have a particular biological instantiation. This seemingly 
obvious point has nevertheless been ignored (or at least, given scant attention) by 
some of history's most famous philosophers, and the outcome has been some 
philosophically misleading conclusions (see, especially, §3.2 on Kant). 
Consequently, I shall start my thesis with a consideration of the biological reality of 
humanity. 
Baler (1985, 5), in a discussion of human capabilities, makes the following 
comment: 
The inheritance includes 'reason,' a product of animal intelligence plus culture-
facilitated self-consciousness, and it includes other such joint mental products of 
equal importance. 
By the phrase "animal intelligence," Baler means to indicate that inheritance of 
reason we have from our evolutionary history. Such an inheritance places limits on 
the possibilities of being human. We are not infinitely malleable beings, able to be 
constructed in any way at all by placing us in a suitable social environment. We 
bring into the world a body (which includes a brain) that has been shaped by 
evolutionary pressures over at least 3 billion years. Cosmides and Tooby (1994) 
point out that reason, at least for the higher primates including the early hominids, 
evolved in an environment where social ties were of vital importance, and that: 
the adaptive problems posed by social life loom large. Most of these are 
characterized by strict evolvability constraints, which could only be satisfied by 
cognitive programs that are specialized for reasoning about the social world. This 
suggests that our evolved mental architecture contains a large and intricate 'faculty' 
of social cognition. (53-4) 
Nevertheless, neither Baier, nor Cosmides and Tooby, mean to say that we are 
determined by what we bring into the world as a result of our evolutionary 
inheritance. This is clear from the emphasis that Baler puts on "culture-facilitated 
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self-consciousness." Like Baier, I believe that many of our capabilities are "joint 
mental products," involving biological and social interaction. 
Clark (1998, 81) reminds us that our evolutionary inheritance of reason was selected 
for under conditions that require quick action-oriented solutions to environmental 
problems in real time. Hence, he claims, we should be wary of considering this 
inheritance in too unitary a way. "Biological reason," he later claims (179), "often 
consists in a rag-bag of 'quick and dirty' on-line stratagems." The extent to which we 
can believe in the unity of reason will be addressed at several later points in this 
thesis (see especially §3.126 and §6.2322). 
In this section, I wish to explore the notion that, while humans are complex and 
wonderfully adaptive beings, their adaptability is somewhat constrained by their 
evolutionary history. Just how constrained, and just what warrant this gives us for 
basing philosophical arguments on "human nature" is, of course, a very contentious 
issue. This I shall also explore. 
The body, inclusive of the brain and central nervous system, is so constructed that it 
reacts in certain ways to the world of experience. Some of these reactions are pure 
reflexes and have very constrained outcomes, such as the walking and rooting 
reflexes of the neonate, or (even more so) the beating of the heart. Others are largely 
reflexive - e.g. the fight or flight reaction that floods our body with adrenalin, 
producing familiar bodily reactions, emotions, feelings and thoughts. Although 
largely automatic, this reaction can certainly be modified and perhaps even 
overcome by training. Yet others such as empathy for others are more subtle - they 
give us more of a nudge than an imperative order - but they are nevertheless there. 
Reactions of this final type are flexible and plastic, so that through attention, training 
or social pressures they can be modified to a greater or lesser extent. Nevertheless, 
they are also subject to constraints built into them by evolution. Flanagan (1991, 41- 
42) refers to these inbuilt reactions as natural traits, which: 
turn up in some recognisable form regardless of cultural context and historical time, 
and therefore lie closer to our basic biological and cognitive architecture than... the 
more socially constructed traits... Legitimate contenders... include the six basic 
emotions of anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness and surprise...; the perceptual 
input system...; the propositional attitudes (but not their contents); biological sex, 
sexual desire, hunger, thirst, linguistic capacity, and the capacities to be classically 
and operantly conditioned, to reason, and to remember.... Natural traits of some sort 
or other constitute the raw material on which all our determinate and socially 
various traits are in part constructed. 
Damon (1996) emphasizes the importance of considering these natural traits when 
investigating moral development. 
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Yet biological processes are central to moral growth: There are key natural 
dispositions that direct early moral reactions and set parameters for later social 
influence. Any model of moral growth must define the interplay between natural 
moral dispositions such as empathy and the social influence that transforms these 
dispositions into stable systems of moral obligation. (200) 
Emotional proclivities towards pro-social behaviour appear so early that 
psychologists now believe them to be inborn. The most unambiguous of such 
proclivities is a cluster of emotional reactions known as empathy and sympathy. 
These interpersonally oriented affective states create in the child a sense of shared 
responding that links the child psychologically to others. (204-205, original italics) 
To argue that such natural traits exist is one thing. To determine what they are is 
another. Flanagan makes an attempt to identify what he calls "legitimate 
contenders" in the passage just cited, while Damon adds empathy and sympathy, but 
two things can be said about this list. Firstly, the case for each item on the list must 
be an empirical one. Although it is possible to construct such a list sitting in an 
armchair, the warrant for the place of each rests on grounds that Flanagan identifies 
as "turning up in some recognisable form regardless of cultural context or historical 
time." Consequently, such fields of study as anthropology, history and cross-cultural 
psychology must be consulted to provide the evidence to substantiate each claim. 
Secondly (a point that Flanagan makes in his book), disentangling the biological 
from the socially constructed inputs into natural traits is an exceedingly difficult 
task. As soon as any biological trait is exhibited (in many cases, even before that), it 
will be subject to social reaction and shaping. Damon says, "The child's developing 
characteristics turn into a kind of 'second nature' that is built upon a dynamic 
interplay between natural events and social influence" (ibid., 208). Thus they are 
seldom if ever seen in their pure, biological forms. Any attempt to tease out just 
which components are biological from those that are socially constructed is a 
delicate reconstructive task. 1 
It is well beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake the task of listing, elucidating 
and defending the natural traits, or of disentangling the biological from the social 
inputs. It is important to point out, however, that the existence of such constraints on 
humans must be taken into account in all areas of philosophical inquiry concerning 
human beings. Just as it would make no sense to invent a sport that required humans 
to lift twenty tonne weights unassisted, it makes no sense to construct a 
philosophical position that makes impossible demands on human capacities. 
Flanagan makes this point, in the context of moral theory, with his Principle of 
Minimal Psychological Realism: "Make sure when constructing a moral theory or 
1 Despite the widespread usage of "nature" and "nurture" to mark this distinction, I note that there is 
nothing unnatural about the influence of culture. As Cosmides and Tooby (1994, 42) point out, such 
dichotomies as evolved/learned, genetic/environmental, biological/social are false dichotomies. In 
§7.24, I will explore natural traits (or "human universals") in further detail. 
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projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and behaviour 
prescribed are possible, or perceived to be possible, for creatures like us" (op. cit., 
32). 
In taking into account the natural traits, we need to be aware that there are two ways 
in which such traits can be of philosophical interest. Firstly, as Flanagan points out, 
they impose constraints on us, by making some things impossible. Secondly, they 
may play a more positive role by imposing certain ways of seeing or doing things 
upon us, from which we cannot escape. In the next two sections, I shall explore each 
of these in turn. 
2.1 Negative constraints 
It seems we must grant that human capabilities are, in some sense, fixed by the 
evolved human architecture in a way that makes some things impossible to us. We 
are just not built so as to be able to do them. A philosophical thesis which requires 
us to be able to do something that we are not, as a matter of fact, able to do must be 
false. This is the point of Flanagan's Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism. 2 
Of interest here are those systems of which we can conceive, but which we could not 
live up to. This is possible in two ways: we might be capable of following the 
system, but only imperfectly and to a limited degree, because full compliance 
requires superhuman abilities, or we might be totally incapable of living up to the 
system in any way, because the system requires that people operate in a way in 
which they simply cannot operate. A system of the first sort may set us an ideal 
which can act as some sort of guide to us. A system of the second sort may also set 
an ideal, but if it is one that is based on a picture of human beings that is seriously at 
odds with the way we are, then it sets an ideal that not only can't be lived up to, but 
at which we ought not even to aim, or try to instantiate in even an incomplete way. 
The question of ideals will be an important one in this thesis, for many philosophical 
systems, especially meta-ethical ones, do set up ideals. It will prove to be important 
to identify the nature of each of the ideals that I discuss. If an ideal sets a standard of 
perfection, towards which we ought to strive, even while we realize that we are 
incapable of ever reaching it fully, then we can be happy to be guided by such an 
ideal. It is quite a different matter if the ideal sets us on the wrong path altogether. 
But it would be simplistic to set this up as a sharp dichotomy for, as we shall see, it 
2 To say that some things are impossible for us to do raises the possibility that there are some things 
are literally inconceivable to us. It may be that there are systems of reasoning or morality that are 
quite beyond our comprehension. But, if this is true, then it is pointless to speculate about what they 
might be like, for even such speculation is beyond us. 
11 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 2. Biological realism 
is quite possible that an ideal should require that we try to approach it up to a certain 
(quite possibly not very determinate) point, after which further approach becomes 
counter-productive. I shall illustrate this by reference to rationality. 
Reason, or rationality, is an ideal that will be discussed in several places (e.g. §3.1, 
§3.22, §6.23) in thiS thesis. It is clear that humans do not reason perfectly at all 
times. Hence, it might seem a good idea to develop a philosophical account of ideal 
reason, towards which we can strive. In judging the nature of this idealization, we 
can consider whether we become better reasoners by more closely approaching it. 
Consider this situation: two people are walking through a dry sclerophyll forest on a 
sunny day. Both know that tiger snakes live in such forests, and that they like to 
warm themselves on flat rocks when it is sunny. Both recognize the type of forest 
they have entered. The first draws the conclusion from these bits of knowledge that 
one ought to be wary when crossing flat rocky areas; the other doesn't. Hence the 
second person is bitten by a tiger snake, while the first, having reasoned better, spots 
and avoids one. We recognize that the first person reasoned better in this case. 
From such considerations, we might set up as an ideal of reason that good reasoners 
draw all the conclusions that are implied by their beliefs. But, as Cherniak (1986, 
12-16) points out, ideal rationality must not require human beings to expend large 
effort on tasks with minimal survival payoff at the expense of important tasks. 
Clearly, avoiding being bitten by a poisonous snake has survival value, but it would 
be absurd for us to draw every conclusion available to us about the animals and 
plants in the forest, their likely locations at this time of day, where we could find 
them if we wanted to, what they would be doing, what the effects would be on every 
other plant or animal, and so on. 3 We would not take a step. There are infinitely 
many conclusions that could be drawn from a human belief set, and we cannot be 
more rational if we draw them all. We only need to draw those that are relevant and 
important within the context we are in to be rational. Drawing too many becomes 
irrational. The ideal rationality of perfect epistemic agents "has seemed a 
profoundly inapplicable idealization, not just a harmless approximation of actual 
human rationality" (Cherniak 1986, 134). 
• The negative constraints inherent in our existence as embodied human beings thus 
limit the set of possibilities for ideals in many areas. According to Flanagan (1991, 
Chapter 1), modern findings on human nature show that there is a vast but not 
limitless possibility space over which human personality can range, and that these 
limits must also constrain our philosophical conclusions. 
3 And I have failed to mention the inferences about what is happening in many other places at this 
time, on a day such as this, etc., etc. 
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2.2 Positive nudges 
But there is a further point to make. The existence of natural traits may not only 
negatively constrain what is possible, it may also provide positive input into the 
social traits that can be constructed. This second point is stronger and more 
contentious than the first negative one. Rather than just ruling out certain 
components of human endeavours, it rules them in. 
The positive guidance thesis can be asserted in two versions: a stronger and a 
weaker. The stronger asserts that our biological inheritance makes certain ways of 
being in the world mandatory - although it does not tell us just how bounded these 
are, or how deep they lie in our being. The weaker asserts that it is difficult not to be 
made to see the world in certain ways, but leaves open the possibility that we can, 
through socially mediated processes, overcome this biological direction. Cosmides 
and Tooby (1994, 64) can be seen as supporting this stronger version in the 
following passage: 
These circuits inject certain recurrent concepts and motivations into our mental life, 
and they provide universal frames of meaning that allow us to understand the 
actions and intentions of others. Beneath the level of surface variability, all humans 
share certain views and assumptions about the nature of the world and human action 
by virtue of these universal reasoning circuits. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) summarizes a considerable body of research that identifies 
some possible candidates for the stronger claim, a selection of which are: we must 
see the world as consisting of objects (67); we must assume certain patterns are faces 
(119); and (in one that has an obvious moral import) we must "attend... differently 
to the mechanical and the human worlds... understand[ing] others as subjects" (121, 
original italics). 
Of course, as Cosmides and Tooby point out (1994, 66), if the strong claim is true it 
will be difficult, maybe even in some cases impossible, to even recognize that these 
biases are at work. Even in cases (like those above) where it is suspected, to 
establish the strong claim will need considerably more empirical research. 
Karmiloff-Smith only endorses the weaker claim that we are inherently predisposed 
to see the world in certain ways, but says that through a process of redescription of 
our representations of the world, and through making these redescriptions 
themselves the subject of reflection, we can modify these views (1992, Chapter 7). 
We can find support for the weaker claim in Clark's (1998, 155-157) idea of 
partially programmed solutions - that is, cases where the child's initial program is 
set up by evolution precisely so as to allow bodily dynamics and local 
environmental contingencies to help determine the course and the outcome of the 
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developmental process. Partial programs would thus share the logical character of 
most genes: they would fall short of constituting a full blue-print of the final 
product, and would cede many decisions to local environmental conditions and 
processes.... The idea of a partial program is thus the idea of a genuine 
specification that nonetheless cedes a good deal of work and decision making to 
other parts of the overall causal matrix. (original italics) 
A partial program does not enforce a certain way of being in the world, but it does 
predispose the child to a range of particular outcomes. Exactly which outcome 
eventuates is influenced by contextual matters, including in many cases the social 
context. In the case of outcomes to do with thinking, I shall explore the roles of 
context and embodiedness further in §3.124 and §3.125 respectively. 
The weaker claim is equivalent to claiming that there are default ways of making 
sense of the world, including the social world, hardwired into us. These 
predispositions are not rigid, and we can replace the default in the presence of 
sufficient evidence that we need to do so. As I shall explore further in §3.124, both 
these positive nudges and the negative constraints identified in §2.1 help to situate us 
in the world, and hence have moral import. 
2.3 Constraints and Commands 
It appears that we can assert that there is (most likely) a larger possibility field in 
such human endeavours as reason and morality than are capable of being instantiated 
by humans. This is because the way humans are biologically constituted both 
negatively restricts what humans can do, and positively guides them towards certain 
ways of being in the world. 
To make the case that certain evolutionarily developed traits are an essential part of 
our make-up does not help us either to identify those natural traits, nor, even if we 
had a list, to designate, say, which of them push us towards morally praiseworthy 
action, which push us towards immoral actions, and which have no moral 
implications at all. Clearly, some of the candidate natural traits put forward by 
Flanagan are implicated in morality (anger, for example). But is not a 
straightforward matter to say that a natural trait like anger is clearly an immoral 
impulse, for anger can be implicated in morally good actions, such as anger at 
injustice. Indeed, it may be that any of the natural traits may push either way. So, 
although we can say that the natural traits provide a substrate for morality, they do 
not do so in any straightforward way. Even such a trait as fellow feeling or 
sympathy can be a ground for immoral action, as Hume recognises. Sympathy 
might lead us to favour those who are close to us, to the moral detriment of others, 
and so it needs to be corrected for bias to produce the steady or general point of view 
that Hume identifies as moral (Baier 1985, 159-60). 
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Such a correction needs to be guided by a concept of the moral, and if this is not 
available as one of the natural traits, as I have been arguing, then it must be a 
construction of the "culture-facilitated self-consciousness" that forms the second part 
of the joint production team referred to in the Baier quote at the start of this chapter. 
Similar arguments apply to any of the human capabilities I have been considering. 
In summary, I have been making the point that any discussion of the way humans are 
situated in the world cannot merely take account of the ways in which society has 
shaped us. Nor can it appeal solely to a picture of immutable human nature. Both of 
these need to be taken into account, both singly and for their interactional effects. If 
Enlightenment accounts have tended to be based on descriptions of the natural 
Reason, or moral sense or suchlike intrinsic to human beings, then some post-
modern accounts (e.g. Lyotard, 1984) seem to have lost sight of the fact that humans 
come into the world with certain genetically endowed features, that they are situated 
not just socially and linguistically, but also in their bodies. These bodies have a 
given structure and a developmental potential; a very plastic one, of course - one that 
can be influenced greatly by social factors, and can be constructed in many different 
ways in response to the expectations and beliefs of self and others. Nevertheless, 
development in certain ways is ruled out, and certain other features of developmental 
paths are either required, or strongly selected for, by biological factors. 
I shall be developing accounts of several human capabilities (reasonableness, 
emotions, morality) and in each case, the account will draw upon the two aspects 
identified here: the biological substrate which places certain constraints and guides 
on the capabilities, and the environmental and social factors that shape their 
development. In the latter category, my main focus will be on discussion. However, 
identifying and characterizing the biological inputs is, as I have indicated, a matter 
for detailed, exhaustive and difficult empirical study. Since I am neither equipped to 
do that, nor have it as the central concern of my work, I shall often pass over any 
such account. Rather, I shall try to elucidate the nature of the social influences on 
these capabilities, particularly those that are mediated through explicit discursive 
practices. 
2.4 The nature of evolutionary "essences" 
To claim that certain features have been "bred" into us by our joint evolutionary 
history may be taken as making an essentialist claim about human beings. Yet 
precisely what is claimed in a rejection of essentialism is far from clear. Arguments 
from natural traits have been used to justify many less than salubrious, not to 
mention false, claims. Crude examples include the natural inferiority of people with 
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non-white skins and the irrationality of women. Any account of the biological basis 
for human capabilities that entails such claims must be false. Yet the position that 
takes the other extreme is equally implausible. It sometimes seems to claim that we 
merely need to impose a totally different upbringing on a generation of children, and 
we can make people whatever we want them to be. There is no underlying humanity 
with which we need to deal. 
To tread a middle path on this matter is to take seriously the importance of both the 
biological and the social. As Aristotle (1980) says in relation to the moral, "Neither 
by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are 
adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit." (1103a25). Of 
course, to advocate a path between the extremes of the mountains and the sea is not 
to say whether we should be walking in the foothills, on the beach or on the plains 
between them. Again, Aristotle makes it clear that the discovery of the mean in the 
virtues is not a matter of the geometer's rod - the mean can lie closer to one extreme 
than the other. 
In subsequent chapters, I shall deal with discourse - one of the major means for the 
social formation of human capabilities. Firstly, I will discuss a few features of the 
biological input to our capabilities that will dispel some of the cruder versions of 
essentialism - a fixed, narrow and inflexible characterization of human nature - and 
hence of rejections of essentialism. 
The biological bases for our capabilities were shaped by evolution. As such, they 
must, either now or in the past, have bestowed on us (as a species) some sort of 
advantage in survival (or at the very least have been associated with some such 
advantage). Thus, for example, it seems that they must be tied quite closely to our 
species' degree of gregariousness, and that a species that had adopted a much more 
solitary (or more connected) biological lifestyle would have somewhat different 
biological substrates. As in all things bequeathed to us by evolution, they differ in 
detail from one of us to another (not everyone's eyesight is the same, either). So 
while one person is prone from birth to express anger more readily, another isn't - 
and this is not to say that the first ends up being more irascible than the second, for 
the social modifications of the natural traits can either reinforce or counteract them. 
For a good summary of the implications of evolution as a basis for human 
capabilities, see de Sousa (1987, 80-82). 
Although biological inheritances underpin all our subsequent competencies, 
immediately we are born they begin to be overlaid with cultural interpretations and 
modifications. Indeed, at least some of these biological inheritances have been 
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"designed" by evolution to facilitate enculturation, for "without universal reasoning 
instincts, the acquisition of one's 'culture' would be impossible, because one wouldn't 
be able to infer which representations, out of the infinite universe of possibilities, 
existed in the minds of the other members of the culture" (Cosmides and Tooby 
1994, 72). Neither are they transparent to us. Being at the heart of the way we are 
situated in the world (see §3.124 for further discussion), it is more likely that they 
are amongst those features of us which are most taken-for-granted, most hidden from 
us. And being, in some sense, inbuilt into the way we are, they are deeply 
inarticulable, at least until we engage in a good degree of self-reflection. This 
combination of initial and ongoing haziness with the impossibility of separating 
them out from the social overlays makes it difficult to pin them down clearly. 
At least in the case of the three sorts of capabilities with which I am most concerned 
(reason, emotion, morality), these biological inheritances have irreducibly social 
aspects. That is, their specific features have been heavily influenced by our 
evolution as social beings. This is not a Lamarckian point; rather, it is to say that, 
given the gregarious lifestyle developed by humans, certain interpersonal features 
will be advantageous to individuals, making them more likely to survive and 
reproduce. A strictly solitary species would, for example, seem to be totally unable 
to evolve any reactions that might be said to be moral while, I argue, reason and 
emotion would be quite different from their human instantiations. Of course, this is 
linked to the fact that a purely solitary being would also be unable to evolve a 
number of other important human characteristics, notably language. We need to 
note here that the capacity to learn a language itself seems to be built into the genetic 
makeup of humans (Chomsky 1968). 
I will argue subsequently that one (but by no means the sole) key element of the 
social construction for all these capabilities is the internalization of paradigm 
scenarios, or roles. According to de Sousa (1987, 332), "Like language, these roles 
are learned in the context of human intercourse and therefore vary significantly from 
one culture to another. But like language they are learned on the basis of 
indispensable biological foundations." It is in this way that we can account for both 
the core universality of these capabilities over all humans, as well as the social 
variability. 
2.5 From the biological to the social 
I have argued in this chapter that, as biological human beings, we enter the world 
with certain biologically determined traits that both limit how we are capable of 
being in the world, and positively encourage us to develop in certain ways. None of 
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this argument serves to fix the way human beings must be in any narrow sense: there 
are still a large range of potentialities across a vast possibility space for human 
development. The exact characteristics and capabilities that will be developed in any 
given individual depend on a myriad of factors, including the broad cultural setting, 
the family, the specific events experienced, the decisions and judgements that the 
individual makes and so on. Thus, while there is plenty of room for diversity, there 
is not infinite room. 
In the next two chapters, I will turn the main focus of my attention away from this 
biological substrate, and explore the philosophical underpinnings for two key 
characteristics of the ethical agent: reasonableness and autonomy. Nevertheless, the 
embodiment of humans, and the implications that this carries for philosophical 
accounts I will be developing, will enter into the argument at various junctures. 
In §3.1, I will develop an account of reasonableness that goes beyond the critical and 
creative aspect commonly attributed to reason or rationality. It is because reason and 
rationality have been implicitly treated as attributes of decontextualized, 
disembodied "reasoning machines" that the three further aspects of reasonableness 
which I identify have been somewhat neglected by many educational theorists. If we 
take seriously the fact that persons are biological entities, then we cannot ignore the 
place of the emotions, context and embodiedness in reasoning. 
In §3.2, I start by looking at the work of Immanuel Kant, the philosophical source of 
much of the narrow account of reason and persons, with particular emphasis on his 
account of autonomy. Autonomous beings, in Kant's account, largely abstract from 
their embodiedness and hence must make judgements that contain no hint of 
commitments that spring from their contextual situation in the social world. 
Towards the end of that section, I will begin to develop a reconceptualization of 
autonomy that does recognize the situation of biological and social beings. 
Chapter Four shall, through a consideration of the work of Jurgen Habermas, 
investigate the communicative component of the development of reasonable persons, 
particularly with reference to the classroom and the position of the teacher. Using 
this basis, I will revisit the concept of autonomy and further refine it. 
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Chapter Three: The Ethical Agent - Reasonable and Autonomous 
Consider a person acting in the world in a way we consider to be ethically correct. In 
everyday life, we would ascribe to that person ethical agency. In other words, we assume 
that the site of the ethical judgement that led to that action is that individual, and hence 
we ascribe moral praise to them. Lying behind this folk ascription are two key ideas: that 
persons freely choose to do as they do (i.e. they are autonomous) and that they choose to 
do so (at least, when they act intentionally) for good reasons (i.e. they are reasonable). 
The Kohlbergian project, with its paradigm of moral judgement as an individual making a 
principled choice between the two horns of a moral dilemma, well captures this sense. I 
shall subsequently argue that, although the Kohlbergian picture captures well the sense of 
reasoned, autonomous choice, it is not on its own an adequate characterization of ethical 
agency. The accounts of rationality and autonomy that underpin it are too narrow. In this 
chapter, I shall map out an expanded rationality, which I will label "reasonableness," and 
begin to reconceptualize autonomy. 
Ranged against this folk analysis of ethical agency is a view which sees the individual as 
merely being the implementor of a judgement made elsewhere, for example, by the 
environment in which the individual is situated (Skinner 1971). Such an analysis might 
be supported by the often repeated assertion by individuals that they feel they "had no 
choice" in acting morally (Damon 1996), although we will subsequently see (§5.2) that 
there are alternative explanations for this feeling, based in the moral character of the 
individual. 
Of course, no individual makes a moral judgement free of any influence from the 
community in which they live. Indeed, the thrust of this thesis is that living and 
interacting in a community is an essential element in the development of a moral and 
ethical individual. But it does not follow that because the individual could not have 
become a person, an ethical agent, without the community, then the individual is nothing 
more than that community. Pettit (1993, Part II: Mind and Society) argues persuasively 
for individualism (as opposed to collectivism). Individualism, he says, is the doctrine that 
individuals do have true intentionality which is not overridden by social regularities, 
although it is consistent with there being social regularities. This intentionality underlies 
individual actions, including the making of judgements. A belief in individualism is not 
inconsistent with holism, by which Pettit means the doctrine that the ability to display 
intentionality depends on thought, which in turn depends on membership of, and 
development within, a community. 
On this account, then, when action is taken, it is taken by the individual. This does not 
exclude the possibility that some morally evaluable actions of individuals are made non-
intentionally (say, from a habit that has been inculcated by the community, and never 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 3. The ethical agent: reasonable, autonomous 
consciously considered by the individual) and hence do not involve the individual acting 
as an intentional moral agent. I take it that not all intentional actions are immediately 
preceded by judgements, but that judgement must have been implicated in the action at 
some stage. For example, an action may be the result of a habit that one at some time in 
the past decided consciously to cultivate. Now, though one performs the action in 
suitable circumstances without deliberation and judgement, from habit, the action is 
nevertheless intentional. 
Individuals do intentionally make ethical judgements. Sometimes these judgements are 
followed by actions that flow from the judgements. Ethics requires both a "foundation" 
in the humanity shaped by evolution, and discursive involvement with others in 
community. In this section, I intend to concentrate on two necessary conditions of being 
an ethical agent. 
The first attribute can be highlighted by considering the following scenario: a young man 
is faced with the decision as to whether to register for a conscription ballot. In reaching a 
judgement about what to do, he engages in many activities. For example: he sits and 
thinks hard about the issues; he consults a variety of sources, written and oral, to ascertain 
certain facts; he discusses his options with many people, considering their advice and 
deciding what influence it will have on his own views. All of these activities involve him 
in trying to make sense of the various factors which will go together to influence his final 
judgement: whether or not to register. 
If we compare his situation to that of a dog about to be "conscripted," we can see that the 
young man not only has a choice, he has the wherewithal to make that choice, in a way 
that the dog does not. How are we to make sense of the ability of this young man to reach 
such a decision? What sort of characterization are we to give to this capacity? Some of 
the differences between the dog and the young man that might account for this can be 
captured in the following words and phrases: rationality, emotional complexity, 
imagination, the complexity of representation of the environment and the self, discursive 
engagement. Do all of these have a part to play? Are there perhaps other factors? How 
do they fit together? In §3.1, I will develop a notion of reasonableness to capture this 
capacity. 
Let's consider again the contrast of the young man and the dog. Suppose they are both 
picked up and taken to an Army barracks, to be forcibly conscripted into the Army, under 
the laws of the country. Suppose that they both find a way to escape, and do so. What 
would be the attitude of the Army in either case? In the case of the dog, they would most 
likely either let it go ("We can always get another dog"), or they would recapture it and 
put it in a better enclosure. Unlike the man, however, they would not consider that the 
dog bore a moral responsibility for the escape. The young man, however, would find 
himself on trial. This would reflect the Army's conviction that his escape was 
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intentionally decided upon by him as an individual, acting on his own behalf and bearing 
responsibility for that judgement and action. 
This sense of being an authentic source of judgement and action which has, in the past, 
been described using the word autonomy, forms the substance of §3.2. The concept of 
autonomy has increasingly come under attack of late for its extreme individualism and 
denial of human connectedness; an attack which §3.242 below outlines in further detail. 
While agreeing that there are problems with the concept and the role it has played, I will 
nevertheless argue that autonomy does play a crucial role in ethical agency. I shall 
explore its roots in the works of Kant, before drawing on the conception of 
reasonableness developed in §3.1 to make a first pass at reconceptualizing autonomy. 
Chapter Four will continue the task through a consideration of the actions of the teacher 
in the classroom. But first, let's turn our attention to reasonableness. 
3.1 Reasonableness 
Humans are, above all, thinking beings. That our enhanced ability to think is what sets us 
apart from the "lower animals" is a commonplace. Just what this enhanced ability is, 
however, has been analysed in a variety of ways. Unfortunately, different analyses have 
not used words or terms in consistent ways. Thus, humans are called the "rational 
animals," yet just in what rationality consists has been characterised in a myriad of ways. 
Similarly, "reason," "reasonableness," "critical thinking," "ratiocination" and other terms 
have been used to capture this capacity. Sometimes two different terms are used to mean 
roughly the same thing (§6.231 documents Habermas' interchangeable use of "reason" 
and "rationality"); at others, the same term is used by different authors to mean wildly 
different things. In the narrowest sense, rationality can be defined as the use of formal 
logic or, more commonly, informal logic. "Critical thinking" has, by some, been 
expanded so much as to denote all cognition and much that is affective as well (e.g Siegel 
1988, see also § 3.11). "Reason" has been defined as in exclusive opposition to the 
emotions, or to be that which harnesses the emotions, or to take in the emotions as an 
integral part: each of these stances is illustrated in §3.1231. Many authors use one or 
more of these terms without much attempt to characterize them at all. 
Yet it does not seem possible to extricate ourselves entirely from this verbal thicket by 
slashing away the terms altogether. They signify, like all philosophically interesting 
terms, essentially contested notions. In talking about the aims of education, it is 
necessary to use them, but it is wise to try to indicate the sense in which they are to be 
used. 
I shall argue that the key guiding intellectual aim of ethical education is to produce (in the 
words of the title of Pritchard's 1996 book) Reasonable Children. It is interesting that 
Pritchard, despite the title, offers no definition of reasonableness, confining himself to "a 
rough demarcation." 
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"Reasonableness" seems a promising term to capture the ability that I am targeting for 
several reasons. Firstly, it denotes an inherently consensual idea (though I don't wish to 
suggest by this that only, or even all, ideas about which a consensus has been reached are 
reasonable - rather, that reasonableness has at its base the attempt to explore the 
possibility of consensus). We talk naturally of reasoning with others, while we are more 
likely to be rational about, or critical of, others. Secondly, it seems to have a less heavy 
reliance on logic, and create more room for affect, than "rationality" or "critical 
thinking": it makes more sense to ask a hard-hearted person to be more reasonable than it 
does to ask them to be more rational or critical. Thirdly, it seems to create more room for 
multiple acceptable outcomes. "The rational solution" seems more natural, whereas "a 
reasonable solution" comes more easily off the tongue. 
"The concept of a 'reasonable person' lies at the heart of Philosophy for Children," say 
Splitter and Sharp (1995, 6), "and, arguably, of education itself and the ideal of 
democracy. Reasonableness itself is a rich, multi-layered concept." They continue by 
pointing out that reasonableness is linked to, but goes beyond rationality, which they 
characterize as "all-to-often rigid, exclusively deductive, ahistorical and uncreative." In 
addition, they note that reasonableness is social, that it is not just process oriented 
(requiring sufficient knowledge or content as well), and that it has a "dispositional 
component... [that] helps to bridge the notorious gap between thought and action" (ibid). 
In this section (§3.1) of my thesis, each of these factors will be revisited as I develop an 
account of the concept of reasonableness, explicating the aspects I see it as having. In 
§3.2, I will tie this conception of reasonableness to an account of autonomy. But before 
that, I will make a brief survey at some previous characterizations of reasonableness and 
its close cousin, critical thinking. 
3.11 Reasonableness and Critical Thinking 
Partly due to Passmore's influential 1972 article, the teaching of Critical Thinking 
become a popularly espoused aim of education over the past decade or two (e.g. Siegel 
1988; Facione 1989; McPeck 1990). However, what is actually meant by "critical 
thinking," and how wide a variety of thinking types the phrase subsumes, are both highly 
contested issues. In reaction to attacks on Critical Thinking for being too narrow, linear 
and logical a conception (e.g. de Bono 1985), the characterization has been widened to 
Critical and Creative Thinking by some theorists (e.g. Lipman 1991; Boostrom 1992), or 
even to include Caring Thinking as well (Lipman 1995). My primary aim in this section 
is to develop a theoretical account of the aspects of thinking and, although occasional 
reference will be made to the educational implications, I will defer a detailed exploration 
until Part III. 
The adjective "critical" has a perfectly good use, which is weakened by using it to try to 
cover too many things, and this is what the Critical Thinking movement often seems to 
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do. For example, in the taxonomy of Ennis (1987), "critical" is made to cover, among 
other things, sensitivity and dispositions to think. What Critical Thinking theorists are 
particularly interested in, it seems to me, is thinking that is done, in Stebbing's (1939) 
words, "to some purpose"; that is, purposive thinking. Hence, I am excluding from 
consideration thinking that seems not to have any particular purpose, such as 
daydreaming, musing, free-associating and so on. I don't want to make too much of this 
distinction, though. I realize that such seemingly aimless thinking might serve purposes, 
such as helping in creative thinking. 
The phrase "Critical Thinking" can be ambiguous, in that it can be used to label thinking 
that is praiseworthy for its quality (i.e. it is being used evaluatively), or thinking that is 
characterized by certain procedures (i.e. it is being used descriptively). In education, 
teachers are trying to improve thinking, and to say that one is teaching "critical thinking" 
is usually taken to mean that one is teaching thinking that is evaluatively good. It needs 
to be pointed out that critical thinking can be done well or badly, to good ends or bad. In 
what follows, I do not here mean to imply that all purposive thinking, or any particular 
aspect of it, is necessarily evaluatively good. My intention is to analyse the aspects of 
reasonableness, regardless of whether they are well used or not. In other words, I will 
take as my main aim in the rest of this section a descriptive, rather than evaluative, 
account of reasonableness. 
Of course, since in education we wish to strengthen and improve thinking and 
reasonableness, this aim shall sometimes enter into the discussion. Often, to attribute 
reasonableness to a person is to make a positive evaluation of their thinking. Given any 
particular example of thinking, it can be asked: "Was this thinking good?" If this 
question is answered in the negative, then (taking the evaluative sense of reasonable) the 
thinking did not exhibit reasonableness. Of course, the judgement of reasonableness is 
itself open to critique. Further, the word "good" is in need of some unpacking. How high 
a standard does it set? Real people who are constrained by limitations on processing and 
memory capacity, in real contexts where full information about both the situation and the 
possible consequences is not available, are not capable of ideally optimum performance. 
The standards need to be set in ways that take these limitations into account (Cherniak, 
1986). 
In addition to clarifying the standards of performance, the unpacking also needs to make 
clear the criteria for ascribing a positive evaluation. One of the differences between the 
connotations of the terms "rationality," "critical thinking" and "reasonableness" that I 
mentioned above was that we tend to expect critical thinking to converge on a single 
rational right understanding, whereas it makes more sense to talk of a range of reasonable 
interpretations. The criteria for reasonableness will not amount to hard and fast rules for 
deciding if a conclusion is reasonable. Lipman (1991, 16) makes the point that, on 
questions that have to do with human conduct, especially ethical matters, we cannot deal 
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with matters "with the precision characteristic of science. Approximations are needed... 
We must be content to reach an equitable solution, not necessarily one that is right in all 
details." It is possible for reasonable people to agree that a number of options, not all of 
them compatible, are reasonable. Equally, it is possible for reasonable people to disagree 
about what would count as reasonableness. Compared to rationality, then, reasonableness 
is fuzzy. The terms "critical thinking" and "rationality" tend to lead us to expect that, for 
even humanistic questions, there exists a single right answer if we only had long enough 
to find it. I will address this question as it arises in the work of Habermas in §6.22. 
3.12 The Aspects of Reasonableness 
I propose that reasonableness, when looked at from a number of perspectives, reveals five 
aspects: critical, creative, committed, contextual and embodied. Roughly speaking, they 
address the calculative, the imaginative, the affective, the situated and the whole body 
aspects of thinking. An autonomous thinker will be one who is capable of accessing each 
of the aspects, and of coordinating them, in a manner appropriate to the situation. 
Because of the large amount of attention that has been lavished on the first two aspects 
(and not because they are not important), my account of the first two will be relatively 
brief, and I will concentrate on the latter three, relatively neglected, aspects of thinking. 
I want to make it clear that I am not claiming there are five types of thinking. Any 
specific example of thinking will exhibit each of the aspects, though to greater and lesser 
degrees. For example, work that we might think is purely creative, like writing a poem, 
reveals each of the aspects. To illustrate, we see its critical aspect in the judgements 
involved in choosing one word over another, its committed aspect in the impetus to write 
it at all, its contextual aspect in the choice of content for the poem or indeed in access to 
the genre of poetry writing, and its embodied aspect in the metaphoric projection of 
image schemata (Johnson 1987, Introduction, see §3.125). 
Indeed, because the aspects are merely analytic, and not separate thinking types, it is often 
hard to unentangle them. Embodied thinking involves the physical correlates of 
emotional states, the emotions we feel are shaped by the context of a situation we are in, 
the judgement that we are in a particular situation involves critical inferences and so on. 
The question of the symbiosis between the several aspects will be further addressed in 
§3.126. 
One important point to make about the interrelation of the five aspects is that it is often 
the case that thinking which is dominated by one aspect can be turned upon thinking 
heavy with another aspect, or even the same aspect. Thus we can be critical about our 
critical thinking, or creative about our committed thinking and so on. This reflexivity of 
thinking is often called metacognition, and is important in improving thinking. The 
important role of metacognition will also be taken up in §3.126. 
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Thinking, both during the course of and at the end of an inquiry, issues in judgements 
(Lipman 1991, 65). Judgement also contains an admixture of the critical, creative, 
committed, contextual and embodied aspects. Judgements that are explicit, conscious and 
reflective tend to be those that contain a stronger element of the critical aspect of 
reasonableness. It is probably for this reason that critical thinking has received greater 
attention than the others. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that judgements with any 
balance between the aspects can be correct or mistaken. 
3.121 The Critical Aspect 
Critical thinking has received a great deal of attention. As we saw above, some members 
of the Critical Thinking movement have characterised critical thinking in a very broad 
way, to take in thinking that primarily displays what is here called creative or committed 
thinking as well. However, it seems to me that this is a mistake. One important reason is 
that the word "critical" carries too many connotations to make it desirable to broaden it 
like this. For example, it carries a connotation of over-zealous negative fault finding. 
While giving us pause, such a connotation could be lived with because the word is 
commonly used in other senses as well. Nevertheless, in talking about critical thinking to 
those (parents, some teachers, community members, school students) for whom this 
connotation may be at the forefront of the mind, it would pay to be explicit that this is not 
what is meant. 
More importantly, the etymologically central connections of the word "critical" are to 
"critique" and "criteria" (Lipman 1991, 116). Indeed, the word "critical" is so tied to 
"critique" and "criteria" that it seems to broaden it beyond those links, into dispositional 
or imaginative thinking, is to dilute the term too much. Hence, in this work, I will take it 
that thinking displays its critical aspect in that it takes what is presently given or proposed 
and examines it for consistency, the correctness of moves made, the assumptions on 
which it rests, the implications that may be drawn from it and so on. 
The critical aspect to thinking, on this account, does not supply new material to the 
inquiry, but merely draws out (and makes judgements on) that which is inherent in the 
material already present. Indeed, to the extent that finding assumptions or implications 
requires an imaginative act, then these acts involve the supplementation of the critical 
aspect of thinking by the creative aspect, while the need to actually want to find the 
assumptions or implications requires input from the committed aspect. This only goes to 
emphasise that any particular act of thinking can almost always be considered from each 
of the aspects. 
Matthew Lipman, in Thinking in Education (1991), advances critical thinking as one of 
the two components of higher order thinking - the other being creative thinking. Critical 
thinking he defines as "thinking that (1) facilitates judgement because it (2) relies on 
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criteria, (3) is self-correcting, and (4) is sensitive to context" (1991, 116). 1 The link of 
critical thinking to criteria is made clear in this definition, as is that to critique - not just of 
the content of the thought but also of the thinking itself - through self-correction. Also 
evident (both here and in Lipman's definition of creative thinking to be presented later) is 
the important role of context in thinking. Later, I will make the case that we ought to 
separate out a contextual aspect of reasonableness. 
Because critical thinking has been very widely analysed, I will not spend a lot of time in 
this thesis developing my own analysis. Different authors come up with different lists of 
abilities, skills, dispositions, competencies and so on. There are two comments to make 
about these lists. 
Firstly, although these lists differ in detail, there is a great deal of commonality between 
them. Different conceptual schemata of critical thinking each have their own strengths 
and weaknesses and a "perfect" scheme is probably impossible to construct. As I have 
discussed elsewhere, on the basis of an empirical study into the analysis of thinking-in-
action in a classroom, the elements of good thinking probably intertwine, rather than form 
a neat hierarchy (Sprod 1994c), and this makes extricating them very difficult. A list 
loses the dynamic interplay and contextual deployment of the elements. Nevertheless, 
listing elements of critical thinking is useful for diagnostic and analytic purposes, and 
each of the lists can contribute to these tasks. 
Secondly, the lists of most authors go beyond what is called the critical aspect to 
purposive thinking in this work. Take, for example, the list of Ennis (1991, 8-9). Ennis 
provides a "working definition" of critical thinking: it is "reasonable reflective thinking 
that is focused on deciding what to believe or do," and he provides a list of 12 
dispositions and 16 abilities that characterise the ideal critical thinker. As an example, the 
dispositions include "to take into account the whole situation." Such a disposition (like 
all dispositions) clearly goes beyond the critical aspect of thinking: it includes the creative 
aspect in that it requires the exercise of imagination about what might form part of the 
total situation beyond the immediately obvious; and it requires a desire to look at further 
evidence - involving the committed aspect. Indeed, the disposition as stated by Ennis is 
quite impossible. The "total" situation is beyond the capability of any real agent to 
comprehend (Chemiak, 1986); a rational agent must be able to make decisions about 
when the amount of information collected and considered is sufficient for reasonable 
judgement, and this process goes beyond the critical capability. As shall be discussed in 
further detail below, the emotions play an important part in these saliency decisions (de 
Sousa 1987). 
1 It is worth noting that Lipman has subsequently added 'caring thinking' to the two above, and now 
describes them as aspects and not components of higher order thinking (pers. comm.). 
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For another example, take Ennis' ability "to ask and answer questions of clarification 
and/or challenge." While such questions may involve merely identifying the logically 
puzzling parts of a statement, such as that it involves a contradiction, it is much more 
often likely to be the case that such questions require an imaginative or creative ability to 
make connections beyond the given. Equally, there is a desire that lies behind 
puzzlement, and this lies in the committed aspect to thinking. Each of Ennis' abilities 
likewise needs more than the mere capacity to carry it out - it is easy to imagine a person 
who has these abilities but never uses them. 
Glaser (1998, Chapter 1) presents a detailed survey of a number of the key players in the 
Critical Thinking movement. As I did above, she characterizes Ennis' view as "skills 
plus dispositions," and contrasts this with Paul's "skills plus traits of mind" account and 
Siegel's "skills plus character" view. 2 As I have stated, it is not my intention to either 
survey these accounts in any detail (Glaser's work is well worth reading for this), or to 
develop a fuller account of the critical aspect to thinking. However, I think it fair to say 
that each of the extensions beyond skills, and Glaser's own extension to a consideration 
of identity and the critical thinker, illustrate that there is much more to reasonableness 
than merely being able to critique. 
3.122 The Creative Aspect 
One of the clearest indicators of good thinking is that the thinker can go "beyond the 
information given" (Bruner 1974). Purely critical thinking would be unable to do this, as 
it is deployed on the information that is either explicitly or implicitly present. Indeed, 
such a point makes it clear that thinking confined solely to the critical aspect is virtually 
impossible: all thinking requires input from each of the five aspects. For example, the 
blending of the critical and creative aspects in all thinking is well caught by Lipman 
(1991, 68): 
There are those for whom good critical thinking is represented by an extreme of analytic 
precision or logical rationality; others may maintain that really good creative thinking is 
represented by an extreme of pure intuition or imagination. Nevertheless, if we examine 
the documents that are considered major products of critical intelligence, we find them 
shot through with creative judgement. If we examine the works of art that are highly 
esteemed, we are struck by the amount of sheer knowing and thoughtfulness they contain, 
not to mention their obvious craft and calculated organization. 
Again, there is a considerable literature on creative thinking, though it is not, perhaps, as 
voluminous as that on critical thinking. Hence, I have no more intention of developing an 
account of creative thinking than I did in regard to critical thinking. I shall restrict myself 
to a short survey of a few authors. 
Lipman (1991, 193) has a definition for creative thinking - "thinking conducive to 
judgement, guided by context, self-transcending, and sensitive to criteria" - which echoes 
2 Glaser herself draws on distinctions made by Siegel (1988, 1-31) in this account. 
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to some degree that which he gave for critical thinking. Critical thinking, he says, aims at 
truth, whereas creative thinking aims at meaning. Both, therefore, aim at types of 
judgement, while the other three features are informative in delineating the differences 
between the two aspects. Firstly, criteria play a more directive role in critical thinking, 
which relies on them, as opposed to the creative aspect of thinking, which is merely 
sensitive to them. Secondly, both the critical and creative aspects of thinking are 
connected to the context, which (as I shall explicate in §3.124 below) I shall discuss as a 
distinct aspect of thinking. In Lipman's view, context places constraints on the critical 
aspect of thinking, but it provides positive impetus to the creative aspect. Finally, critical 
thinking, as critique, focuses thinking more narrowly towards the acceptable, while 
creative thinking is expansive and, to echo Bruner, goes beyond by seeking 
transcendence. 
Hence we can see that some of the ways in which thinking displays its creative aspect are 
that it provides new material for the thinking to grasp, widens the domain of thinking, 
presents to the mind that which cannot be directly experienced but must be imaginatively 
constructed and creates links between objects of knowledge previously thought to be 
separate. By loosening the procedural bounds of critical thinking, it enables more 
intuitive processes to play a part in thinking. But before continuing to the three aspects 
of reasonableness that I contend have been somewhat neglected, I wish to highlight two 
further points concerning the creative aspect to thinking. 
The first concerns guiding metaphors for the critical and creative aspects of thinking. 
Bearing in mind that the two aspects are always blended in any real example of thinking, 
we can nevertheless see that engaging in thinking in which the critical aspect of thinking 
is to the fore can be seen as something like writing a set of instructions for a well 
understood task, whereas thinking in which the creative aspect is predominant is more 
like telling a story. In the former, the task is mostly to be clear and to get the instructions 
to fit together properly. The nature of the task compels the nature of the instructions to a 
high degree. In constructing a narrative, however, there is certainly a need for 
connectedness - we cannot just put anything next - but there are also many degrees of 
freedom. The connections need, under some description, to make sense within the greater 
context, but there are many types of connection. In the instructions, the connections are 
literal, explicit, but in the narrative they can be drawn from the many literary devices: 
metaphors, analogies, word associations, rhymes and others. 
The second is to note that any discussion of the creative aspect to thinking, especially in a 
thesis with a focus on ethics, would be incomplete if it did not draw on Johnson's (1993) 
Moral Imagination. Johnson clearly maps out the important place of creative, 
imaginative thinking in our moral lives and moral theories. He says: 
Moral understanding is in large measure imaginatively structured. The primary forms of 
moral imagination are concepts with prototype structure, semantic frames, conceptual 
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metaphors, and narratives. To be morally insightful and sensitive thus requires two things: 
(1) We must have knowledge of the imaginative nature of human conceptual systems and 
reasoning.... (2) We must cultivate moral imagination by sharpening our powers of 
discrimination, exercising our capacity for envisioning new possibilities, and 
imaginatively tracing out the implications of our metaphors, prototypes and narratives. 
(198) 
Further, Johnson makes it clear that one of the key moral sentiments, empathy (about 
which I will say more in discussing the committed aspect to thinking) is not just a matter 
of fellow feeling or emotion, but also requires the ability to imaginatively project 
ourselves into the place of another. It is, he says (ibid., 200) "a blending of feeling, 
imagination and reason," and hence (in my terms) involves the committed, creative and 
critical aspects of reasonableness. Indeed, given that empathy requires a great deal of 
sensitivity to the context within which our fellows find themselves, as well as an ability to 
project our whole selves, not merely our thoughts, it will also involve the contextual and 
embodied aspects (as Johnson - see his 1987 - is well aware). 
I shall further draw on Johnson's account of the place of imagination in moral thinking, 
and explicate a number of the notions that have been merely indicated here, throughout 
the remainder of this thesis (see, for example, §3.1253, §6.232 and §7.24). 
3.123 The Committed Aspect 
A person may be capable of drawing the most obscure implications from a set of 
information, or of dreaming up the most ingenious of conjectures, yet seldom or never do 
either. Thus, characterisations of the good thinker usually place a heavy emphasis on the 
dispositions required, yet little is said about the sources of these dispositions. I assert that 
it is the committed aspect of thinking that provides the motivation, the engagement of the 
thinker, and the committed aspect arises in the affective domain. This is not a common 
view, however, and before expanding on it, I shall first have to tackle the opinion that 
emotions are the enemy of good thinking. Then, to clear the way for the reinstatement of 
the emotions into purposive thinking, it will be necessary to examine the nature of the 
affective domain. 
3.1231 Emotional and Rational Thinking 
Critical (or rational) thinking is not uncommonly contrasted with emotional thinking. To 
those who make this distinction, rational thinking is good, because it is clear, cool, calm, 
considered; emotional thinking is bad because it is muddled, hot-tempered, agitated, 
rushed. Objective thinking is seen as detached from human desire and emotion, even 
from individual particularities. Linked to such a dichotomy of reason 3 and emotion is a 
view of "the passions" as something that happens to us, not something we control; of 
emotions as violent disturbances of our normal smooth running. Such a view has been 
3 In this section, "reason" is often used as Hume does, in the sense of unemotional, or anti-emotional, 
rationality. It can, instead, be used in a much wider sense, to encompass purposive thinking with all its 
aspects, while "rationality" is reserved for this narrower meaning. 
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influential in the history of philosophy, versions of it having been advanced by Plato, 
Descartes, Kant and many others. 
Hume (1740/1972, 154-5) points to the ubiquity of this view: 
Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat 
of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so 
far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates..... The eternity, invariableness, and 
divine origin of [reason] have been displayed to the best advantage; the blindness, 
unconstancy and deceitfulness of the [passions] have been as strongly insisted on. 
Hume's discussion of the relation of reason and the passions urges "the fallacy of all this 
philosophy, [by] endeavour[ing] to provefirst, that reason alone can never be a motive for 
any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of 
the will" (154). In his conclusion to this passage, he famously asserts that "reason is, and 
ought only to be, the slave of the passions" (156). While this argument clearly reverses 
the evaluative polarity of the "unruly passions" view, and links the possibility of reason to 
the passions, it does not seem to deny a clear distinction between the two: they stand in a 
master-slave relationship. I shall argue for a modified Humean view: that rationality (in 
the guise of the critical aspect) and emotions (in the guise of the committed aspect) are 
both essential elements of purposive thinking. 
This "divine reason/deceitful passions" view has by no means disappeared since Hume's 
critique. Many more modern books on clear thinking recommend the separation of the 
rational and the emotional. For example, Jepson (1952) says of emotional values that 
"where the facts are in dispute there is no room for them; they cloud and confuse the 
issue, they effectually beg the question, they disclose prejudice," while Reichenbach 
(1968) claims that: 
the scientific philosopher does not want to belittle the emotions, nor would he like to live 
without them...but he refuses to muddle emotion and cognition, and likes to breathe the 
pure air of logical insight and penetration. 
A closer analogy for the argument being advanced in this work is a symbiotic 
relationship, where the two (together with the three other aspects of thinking) are 
inextricably interlinked. In many cases of symbiosis, an attempt to separate out the two 
life forms leads to the death of both, their interpenetration is so complex. The unravelling 
that is attempted in these sections is analytic, but I would assert that any real separation of 
the aspects of thinking into discrete episodes of purely critical (or whatever) thinking 
would be just as likely to lead to the death (or, at the very least, the disabling) of each of 
the aspects of thinking. 
This is not to claim that the emotions never interfere with clear thinking, rather that since 
they are always involved, the proper approach is to acknowledge this and include it in our 
reflexive approach to improving our thinking. A greater understanding of such an 
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approach can be seen in the discussion of clear thinking presented by Beardsley (1965, 
30): 
Clear thinking will be promoted if we can keep the question, "Is such-and-such a 
religion?" as distinct as possible from the question, "Is such-and-such desirable?"... It is 
possible to apply a word according to objective criteria that are independent of the 
speaker's positive or negative attitudes, as such examples as "mother" and "flag" show. 
The question is whether common usages are reasonably fixed and clear-cut and whether, 
when decisions have to be made, the advantages of deciding on one definition rather than 
another are substantial and plain. Having said this much about the importance of seeking 
neutral definitions for words having strong emotional associations, we must go on to 
admit, and indeed emphasize, that emotional and valuational attitudes do indirectly affect 
decisions to adopt or reject definitions under consideration. It is part of intellectual 
integrity to acknowledge that this is so and to try to show as openly as possible where it 
seems to have occurred. (30) 
Stebbing (1939) puts the case even more clearly. 
I do not in the least wish to suggest that it is undesirable for us to be set on thinking by 
emotional considerations. On the contrary, nothing else will suffice to make us think to 
some purpose. Nor do I wish to suggest that the presence of a strong emotion is 
incompatible with thinking clearly. Certainly, the more strongly we feel the more difficult 
it is to take account of what is alone relevant. But the difficulty may be overcome, 
provided that we also desire to reach sound conclusions.... I would say... that it is not 
emotion that annihilates the capacity to think clearly, but the urge to establish a conclusion 
in harmony with the emotion and regardless of the evidence. This urge is incompatible 
with the impartial weighing of evidence which is an essential condition of ascertaining all 
the relevant facts and deducing the conclusions from these facts alone. 
Even Beardsley and Stebbing, however, with their use of phrases such as "objective 
criteria," "impartial weighing" and "relevant facts" skate over issues such as the place of 
emotions in influencing what are chosen to count as criteria and facts and the relative 
weight to be given to conflicting criteria and facts. The unproblematized use of such 
phrases assumes the possibility of purely rational objectivity, created through abstracting 
and idealizing an individual, an issue which shall be further explored in §3.2. It is not 
that emotions can be relegated to being merely the impetus for thinking, or considered as 
another outside factor that we need to allow for in correcting rational thinking. Emotions 
are essential to the engagement of thinking. To expand on this point, I shall need to have 
an adequate account of the emotions themselves. 
3.1232 The Affective Domain: Emotions and their Origins 
Jaggar (1992) has questioned whether all the elements of the affective domain are 
sufficiently alike so as to be considered a natural kind. She points out that the wide 
variety of emotions (instancing the distances between fright and long term dedication; 
trained aesthetic response and hunger; intense, focused experiences and moods), and the 
role of social and cultural influences in constituting the emotions, both undermine the 
suggestion that they can. 
Jaggar deliberately spread her net widely: she concedes that some people might not 
include such feelings as hunger, or moods, in such a list. Nevertheless, she uses the term 
"emotions" to cover this wide variety. Solomon (1983, 132) also takes a widely inclusive 
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stance, claiming that "there are three fundamental species of passions": emotions, moods 
and desires. For the most part, I shall follow these authors by using the term emotion as a 
blanket term. 
Given the wide variety of entities to be taken in under the blanket, it is not surprising that 
there are many theories on the origins, objects and classification of emotions. For 
example, de Sousa (1987) draws on seven modern theories of emotion in constructing his 
own theory. His account of the objects of emotions lists eleven distinct types of object. 
Solomon (1983) describes each emotion in terms of thirteen categories, while Haugeland 
(1985) uses seven categories of types of feeling, each distinguished on six criteria. Such a 
need for complex descriptions once again underlines the heterogeneity of emotions. I 
won't develop and defend a classificatory scheme for the emotions, merely note the 
complexity of the task. I will, however, outline an account of their origins without, for 
lack of space, attempting to defend it. This account draws in part on the work of all three 
authors mentioned above, and will be suggestive for the place of emotion in education. 
The first major source of emotions is biological (§21 to §2.4). Emotions are clearly 
linked to physiological events: we have direct experience of these, at least in the case of 
the violent emotions, such as the "flight or fight" reaction to danger, triggered by the 
release of adrenalin. The ability to measure physiological changes that occur 
concurrently with emotional changes led William James to postulate that emotions were 
nothing but the special perception of the physiological changes. A number of difficulties 
(notably the inability to locate any mechanism for the perception, and the finding that 
closely similar physiological arousal can be accompanied by quite different subjective 
experiences of emotion, even in the same subject) have meant that this project failed. 
Such phenomena as sexual arousal, triggered in part by the pheromones and by innate 
reactions to certain visual stimuli, show that in some cases at least the bases for emotional 
reactions are inherently linked to biology even when the subject of the emotion gives a 
quite different account of the base. Damasio (1996) refers to such biologically hard-
wired reactions as the primary emotions, locating the neural site in the evolutionally old 
brain. They must have been shaped by evolution and be coded for in our genetic makeup. 
In his Chapter 4, de Sousa conducts a detailed investigation of the evolutionary basis of 
emotions. He makes a number of important points: We cannot assume that, because 
emotions are biologically based (via evolution), then all humans must have the same basic 
emotional responses. Evolution creates (and relies on) genetic variation within species. 
Further, despite the variation in modes of expression, the experiencing of emotion seems 
to be universal (see also §7.24), and hence it is unlikely that emotions in general were, at 
the time they evolved, maladaptive (this implies neither that emotions are the optimal 
solution to the problem they arose to solve, nor that they are necessarily beneficial in 
particular cases). If emotions are adaptive, they must have had at the time of their 
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selection (and quite possibly still) a biologically useful function, or be side effects of 
some other useful function. 
The second important source of the emotions is social. While a core repertoire of 
emotional types seems to be pretty much universal, the experience of emotion - both the 
specific social circumstances that trigger particular emotions and the modes of expressing 
emotions - are much more variable and tied to culture. As the anthropologist Lutz (1988, 
5)) says: 
The claim is made that emotional experience is not precultural but preeminently cultural. 
The prevalent assumption that the emotions are invariant across cultures is replaced here 
with the question of how one cultural discourse on emotion may be translated into 
another.... The concepts of emotion can more profitably be viewed as serving complex 
communicative, moral and cultural purposes rather than simply as labels for internal states 
whose nature or essence is presumed to be universal. 
These are Damasio's secondary emotions, linked inextricably with social and experiential 
factors. Inextricably, because they are not merely the product of the evolutionally new 
areas of the brain, but involve the brain sites implicated in primary emotions as well. 
Damasio (1996, 126) says: "The neurophysiological base of these added strategies is 
interwoven with that of the instinctual repertoire, and not only modifies its use but 
extends its reach." 
Two particular types of event play a critical part in the establishment of appropriate ways 
and occasions to experience and express emotions. Firstly, as children grow they observe 
others around them express emotions in response to the situations in which they find 
themselves. These scenarios become internalized as paradigms for the children's own 
emotional reactions. Secondly, and by no means independently, children engage in social 
interaction on the subject of emotions. Older others give commentaries on emotional 
reactions the child sees, reinforce the appropriateness or otherwise of the child's own 
reactions and enter into dialogue with children on the subject of emotions. 
Obviously, it is not always the case that these two types of event mesh: it may be a case 
of "do as I say, not as I do." Nor are the models and pointers received from different 
people always in harmony. Nevertheless, children grow up with both a rich source of 
emotional paradigms, and with the knowledge that emotions are negotiable, that they can 
be modified, suppressed or enhanced in response to reasoned input. They learn that 
emotional displays have effects on the world and can either help or hinder in the 
achievement of goals. Much of the cognitive side of emotions comes, it therefore seems, 
from this social negotiation (by no means solely verbal) of the manner of expression and 
appropriateness of emotional acts. 
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3.1233 Emotions, Desires, Values and Commitments 
The close link between emotions and desires extends the import of emotions into values 
and commitments. Each of these three - desires, values and commitments - while not 
being identical to emotions, contains an essential emotional element. 
Solomon (1983, 134) perceptively claims that "the relationship between the emotions and 
desires is extremely complex, and distinguishing them is not always easy." Leaving aside 
"primitive desires" arising from drives such as hunger, he states that "the desires that 
structure [a person's] life are... built upon an emotional infrastructure." Later in his 
book, however, Solomon seems to take a somewhat different view. He says: "I have 
argued that every emotion is also an ideology, a set of demands, 'how the world ought to 
be.' It is not only an interpretation of our world but a projection into its future, filled with 
desires which sometimes become intentions and commitments" (277). By way of 
contrast, de Sousa (1987, Chapter 8) prefaces his discussion of the time indexing "by first 
narrowing [his] focus from emotions in general to desire," explaining that his "excuse... 
is that desire itself has an emotional aspect, a phenomenological face separable from its 
functional link to action." There are several views of the relationship of emotions and 
desires expressed in these quotes: that desires are built on emotions, that emotions are 
filled with desires, that desires are a species of emotion, and that all desires have 
emotional aspects. My claim is that a desire always contains an irreducible element of 
emotion and that (pace de Sousa), it is the emotional attachment that provides the 
motivational flavour to a desire. 4 
It might be argued that some desires are purely rational, emotionally neutra1. 5 Such 
reasoning sweeps the emotional aspect under the carpet rather than demonstrating its 
inapplicability. Emotion is necessary for motivation. As Hume (1739/1962) says, reason 
alone cannot compel anything. It is the fact that the emotional aspect in cases like this is 
not violent that enables us to think that it is rationality that provides the impetus. 
4 One distinction between a desire and an emotion is that a desire must have a propositional content, 
whereas this is not essential in an emotion. That is, if I desire, I must desire that the state of affairs 
described by some proposition be met. If I desire a new pen, then I desire that I own a new pen. On the 
other hand, if I am proud of my pen, then the emotion of pride is tied directly to the pen itself, and not to 
some state of affairs. Of course, I might be proud that I own the pen, so an emotion can have propositional 
content, but it need not have. In a desire, I am not indifferent to the propositional element, as I might be in 
the case of a belief. I can believe that this pen is new without feeling anything for the pen at all: I might just 
be acknowledging that it meets the criteria of "newness" in pens. If I desire that particular new pen, though, 
I am emotionally committing myself to the pen to at least some extent. My future emotional state will be 
better if the propositional part of the desire comes to be. Of course, the desire can be strong or weak, the 
likelihood of it coming about can be high or low. If the satisfaction of a weak desire is highly unlikely, my 
emotional attachment can be very small, so that my future emotional state is unaffected by my not obtaining 
the pen. Nevertheless, if against the odds I did obtain it, there would certainly be an emotional effect. 
5 An example of such an argument: a dispassionate survey of the options available to me leads me to 
rationally decide that I ought to desire a new pen. My old pen has just run out of ink, I have an imminent 
need to write, no-one present has a pen to lend me, I am standing next to a store selling pens, I have the 
money. These facts, the argument goes, through the pure logic of the situation, mandate that I will desire a 
new pen. As I argue in the main text, the judgement that a new pen ought to be desired does not, without an 
emotional element, motivate the actual desiring. 
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There are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they be real passions, 
produce little emotion in the mind.... When any of these passions are calm, and cause no 
disorder of the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason... (ibid., 
158) 
Indeed, the calm emotions are the longer lasting, the ones that structure our world and our 
actions within it, that provide us with our general "strength of mind" (ibid., 159). In a 
"storm" of violent emotion, the strong, reactive, "irrational" emotions can cause us to take 
actions which, after later reasonable reflection in which the calm emotions infuse our 
reflection, we recognise as showing poor judgement (being unreasonable). Nevertheless, 
the person who draws on their strength of mind, their settled emotional dispositions, and 
resists the temptation to be swept away by the violent emotions is not acting 
unemotionally, but rather in response to one of a set of competing emotions. 
So emotions are an essential element of desires: all desires have emotional aspects. But 
Solomon claimed that something like the reverse is also true: that all emotions are filled 
with desires. Emotions do not just concern the way things are presently seen to be, but 
are also about the way we think things ought to be, or want them to be. We do not just 
neutrally describe a world unconnected to us; we live in that world and the way of it is 
intimately connected to the way we are. This is a two way influence: we are the way we 
are because of the world we live in, but the way that world is for us is a function of the 
way we are. Our emotions are an essential element of the way we are and of how we are 
in the world. In this, I am anticipating the fourth aspect of purposive thinking - the 
contextual aspect - which is closely linked to the committed aspect through the role of 
emotions in situating us within the world. 
A relatively coherent pattern of our desires and preferences is what creates value in our 
lives. 6 As Nussbaum (1997) argues, emotions are eudaimonistic: concerned with our 
flourishing and hence what is important and valuable in our lives. This is not something 
that the critical aspect to thinking can supply on its own: as Solomon (1983, 126) says, 
"any attempt to break away from the passions, to become purely 'objective,' is already to 
leave behind all question of value and of meaning." 
The route from emotions through desires and preferences to values leads on to 
commitment - that which aligns us with particular attitudes, causes and/or actions. Hume 
is right: it is the settled emotions, that have become like second nature to us through long 
usage which provide our habitual attitudes and orientation to the world - and they have 
come to resemble the dictates of reason. Of course, because an attitude is settled does not 
mean that it is correct or defensible. Yet, though such attitudes and commitments 
resemble rational beliefs so strongly, it is seldom rational argument that can change them 
6 Though this might look like a radically individualistic account of value, the pattern of our emotions, 
desires and preferences itself is heavily influenced by both genetic and social factors, as already discussed. 
This ensures that human values are not radically individualistic, but it does also explain some individual 
differences. 
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- the emotions again need to be involved, often in a more violent form than the settled 
commitments they are to replace. Emotionally charged experiences make more converts 
than logical argument. 
Yet even logical argument will not be pursued without the emotions. As Stebbing says, 
nothing but emotion will suffice to coirunit us to thinking to some purpose. This is the 
first and primary commitment - to thinking purposively - that must predate any 
considered judgements and actions in the wider world. When we are committed to our 
thinking, it is because of the emotions that underpin it. Without any emotion, there would 
be no commitment. And without any commitment, there would be no reason for thinking 
rather than not thinking, or for thinking this way rather than that. We must be committed 
to rationality to imbue our thinking with its critical aspect; we must be committed to 
imagination or curiosity to imbue it with the creative aspect. 
Damasio (1996) provides empirical backing for this claim. He carefully documents cases 
of specific lesions to the brain that have resulted in the simultaneous, and seemingly 
intimately connected, strong inhibition of the ability to feel emotions and an inability to 
plan rationally, or to coordinate and follow larger (particularly social and personal) goals. 
Interestingly in these cases, it is not that the subjects lose the ability to carry out, on 
request, such underlying reasoning tasks as generating response options to everyday 
social situations, considering consequences, conceptualizing the means to achieve social 
objectives, predicting likely outcomes, or even of achieving normal levels of moral 
reasoning as assessed by Kohlbergian tests. It is at higher levels, such as being able to 
place different values on options and outcomes, and in being motivated to carry out the 
conclusions reached, that they fail. In other words, their thinking can be critical and to 
some extent creative without being reasonable, precisely because their emotional capacity 
is damaged, and so their thinking lacks commitment. 
Those who denigrate emotional thinking certainly exhibit strong commitment to 
rationality - yet it is the emotions that generate this commitment. Without commitment, 
we might allow our thoughts to wash over us, but we would lack the drive to turn them in 
a particular direction. Purposive thinking therefore requires a committed aspect to mesh 
with the critical and creative aspects. The committed aspect goes beyond the motivation 
of thinking itself: it plays a vital role in linking the products of thinking to action, and this 
is the next issue to be addressed. 
3.1234 Judgements and Actions 
If the only role of committed thinking was to get the critical and/or creative aspects of 
thinking started and to keep it going, then the emotions could be banished from the 
substantive thinking to follow. To come to a rational judgement - say, about what I ought 
to do in a particular situation - does not entail that I actually carry out that action. Logical 
conclusions from admitted premises carry no imperative weight; nor do creative solutions 
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to perplexing problems. There is a need for the will to carry judgements through to 
action: a will that again arises in the emotion-based committed aspect of thinking. In this 
subsection, I will explore the connections between emotions, judgements and actions. 
Thinking issues in judgements (Lipman 1991), but judgements can vary in many ways. 
They can be reflective or instantaneous; sound or unsound; primarily critical, creative, 
contextual or embodied; implemented or ignored. Emotions just are a particular form of 
judgement, says Nussbaum (1997): they are evaluative judgements about things of 
importance to us, which acknowledge our neediness and incompleteness before elements 
of the world that we do not completely control. 
Similarly, Solomon (1983; 1988) has argued that emotions are judgements and, further, 
that all judgements necessarily involve the emotions: 
The judgments that constitute emotions must be understood as (1) particular acts of 
judgement, not just the affirmation of certain propositions, (2) systems of judgments, not 
single judgments, (3) essentially and not contingently tied to their expression, (4) 
"dispassionate" only in peculiarly pathological or philosophical circumstances, (5) tied to 
desires in a non-causal way and (6) sustaining rather than simply initiating, structural 
rather than disruptive. I will not attempt to establish a sharp distinction between emotional 
and 'dispassionate' judgments, however, for... I believe that virtually all of our experience 
is to some degree 'affective', and even our most dispassionate judgments... can be 
adequately understood only within some larger emotional context. (Solomon 1988, 184) 
In these characterizations of the types of judgement that we call emotions, neither 
Nussbaum nor Solomon is claiming that all emotional judgements are good, sound 
judgements: on the contrary, any judgement can be unsound. This is the type of emotion 
seized on by those who wish to contrast "bad emotion" with "good rationality." Unsound 
emotional judgements tend to be sudden, unreflective and agitated, though examples such 
as people "working themselves into a self-righteous anger" show that these are not 
necessary conditions for poor emotional judgements. But then, "dispassionate" critical 
cognitive judgements need not be sound either: witness the concentration camp guard 
who reasons that orders from superiors must be obeyed, for such is the analytic nature of 
orders, superiors and subordinates, but who suppresses the emotions aroused by carrying 
out the orders. The question of the soundness of emotions as judgements is treated 
extensively by Solomon (1983, Chapters 12-14), and any education for reasonableness 
must assist children to be able to assess them. 
Several features of Solomon's account above point to the role of emotions in linking 
judgement and action. He rightly points out in (1) that emotional judgement is more 
active than a neutral affirmation of "the facts" - we commit ourselves to feeling emotions, 
as further emphasized by point (3). Nussbaum (1997, 245) also asserts that "judging [is] 
dynamic, not static." In carrying our judgement from the mental world into the physical, 
there is an impetus towards further action not inherent in the more purely belief oriented 
judgements. Point (5) emphasizes the intimate connection of emotions and desires 
expounded above - and desires are archetypically motives for action. Finally an emotion 
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(particularly as settled emotion) is typically longer lasting than a thought, and this 
supports point (6) in its claim that emotions sustain our actions and structure our way of 
life. Solomon later expands on this point: 
The context of an emotion is not just a cognitive context, but an active context in which 
we are engaged in a world that we care about. To insist on a concept of cognition (or 
judgment) that is essentially divorced from all such care and concerns is not only to adopt 
a wholly demeaning conception of emotion; it is also to accept a wholly useless concept of 
cognition and judgment. (op.cit., 188) 
Commitment, based on emotions and desires, motivates our thinking, as we saw in the 
previous subsection. It is that same impetus that leads to engagement in the world. 
Emotions provide the attachment - the connection - between judgements and actions. Our 
emotional reactions are formed (through the construction of paradigm situations) in 
engagement in the world and they are played out through similar engagement. 
Solomon uses the word "care" twice in the quote above to mark this attachment. Lipman 
(1995; 1997) has added caring thinking to the twin pillars of thinking - critical and 
creative - advanced in Thinking in Education (Lipman 1991). In his characterization, 
caring thinking is an aspect of higher-order thinking. He describes it as having at least 
four varieties, which overlap and may not be exhaustive. The first is valuational thinking, 
which pays attention to what matters in particular perspectives; the second is affective 
thinking, where emotional reactions play the role of cognitive judgements about 
appropriateness and justification. Thirdly, there is active thinking, exhibited in looking 
after (caring for) another, which can be protective or interventionist. One of its 
manifestations lies in respect for persons: an attitude or a disposition that we bring to our 
thinking that predisposes us to be careful'(care-full) of the others with whom we interact, 
so as to take their views into consideration, not put them down, support them even if we 
attack their arguments and so on. Finally we have normative thinking: thinking about 
what is and what should be, linking the desired with the desirable. This is commonly 
done through inquiry, emphasizing the reflective component. This normative element, 
Lipman claims, is always cognitive and inseparable from the other elements of caring 
thinking. In the next subsection, I will explore the relationship between care, caring 
thinking and the committed aspect of thinking. 
3.1235 Care and Caring Thinking 
We have seen that Solomon and Lipman single out care as being important in our 
engagement in the world. Yet care is a complex notion. In general, to care is to be 
affected emotionally. A distinction can be drawn between two primary senses of caring, a 
distinction which is sometimes marked by prepositions: caring for and caring about.7 In 
the first case, if we care for someone or something, then we take a positive attitude 
7 Unfortunately, it is not the case that the two senses of care are always marked by the prepositions 'for' and 
'about', nor is it the case that when the prepositions are used, they always mark the same distinction. 
However, I shall use these formulations as a shorthand marker. 
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towards them or it. We are "for" them. However, to care about something or someone 
may not imply a positive attitude. If I care about the rising cost of living, this doesn't 
imply that I am in favour of the rising cost of living. All it implies is that the issue of the 
cost of living matters to me; I am not indifferent towards it. We cannot, on the basis of 
the phrase "care about" alone, decide whether the attitude is for or against. The contrast 
can be illustrated by the difference in meaning between the following two comments: 
1. I don't care for your attitude towards my dog. 
2. I don't care about your attitude towards my dog. 
In the former comment, the speaker is clearly disapproving of the attitude in question; 
whereas in the latter, the speaker is, as the phrase goes, "beastly careless" - the attitude in 
question is not a matter of interest, whichever way it goes. 
"Care for" is often used to imply more than just a positive orientation, but to include 
positive actions as well. It is easy to see that the positive orientation is linked to the 
active "looking after," for generally when we look after someone, it is because we also 
have positive feelings for them. Nevertheless, to complicate matters, in institutional 
settings one who "cares for" another may do it solely for the pay, and not "care about" 
them at all - or "care about" them negatively. It is curious to note that Lipman (1995), in 
his own discussion of the "caring for" and "caring about" distinction (he associates them 
with active valuation and affective valuation respectively), paints care as solely positive 
and supportive, yet we have clearly seen that care can be negative. 
One thing that both the "care for" and the "care about" senses have in common is that 
they both support the contention that emotions are an essential element connecting 
judgements to actions. Whether we "care for" or "care about" a critical or creative 
judgement, the emotional involvement implied by either provides an impetus to action. 
Which sense of care is more appropriate to its use in describing an aspect of thinking? If 
we turn to the emotions that support the movement from judgement to action, we find that 
they are not all positive towards, and supportive of, others. Strawson (1974) provides a 
list of emotions that play such a role - resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, love and hurt 
feelings - while Damon (1988) identifies (partly on the basis of his consideration of 
empirical studies) empathy, sympathy, admiration, self-esteem, anger, outrage, shame and 
guilt. 8 
So, to label the affective aspect of thinking "caring thinking" may be seen as trading on 
this equivocation concerning "care." Clearly, thinking that is motivated by, say, 
resentment can be caring thinking in the "caring about" sense. Yet if we talk about caring 
thinking, others can take us to be drawing on the "caring for" sense and implying that all 
8 It is worth noting that the context for both Strawson's and Damon's list is moral judgement and action. 
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affective thinking is positive, a position Lipman often seems to take. "Caring thinking" 
may avoid the connotations of "emotive thinking" or "emotional thinking" - both of 
which are liable to fall prey to the charge of irrationality that Hume attacked - but "caring 
thinking" is prone to misunderstanding on the other side. Just as I wish to avoid the 
implication that all thinking that draws on the critical or creative aspects must be good, I 
think it wise to avoid the same connotation in the present aspect. Hence the choice of the 
term "committed thinking," for this aspect of thinking can commit us to both good and 
bad thoughts and actions. Committed thinking engages us with the world and others: we 
care about them. 
This is not to say that it is not important to teach children to care for each other in their 
thinking - of course, it is. But that is to talk to the ways in which the aspects of thinking 
ought to be used, rather than to analyse what the aspects are. 
3.1236 Committed to Thinking 
There is another role for the committed aspect to play in our thinking. This is the 
reflexive one: we need to be committed to the thinking itself. Another way to express this 
is to say that we need to care for our own thinking - for the correctness of the critical 
thinking, for the inventiveness of our creative thinking, for the richness of our contextual 
thinking, for the connectedness of our embodied thinking and for the appropriateness of 
our selection and integration of the "tools" from the different aspects. 
Like other aspects of self-care, the pride we take in our own thinking is intimately tied up 
with the self-regarding emotions. This is not, however, the whole story. Much of our 
thinking, especially as we are learning to think better, is done in dialogue, so other-
regarding emotions also come into play. A joint commitment to the quality of the group's 
thinking is necessary, and it is clear that this is more likely the more emotionally 
comfortable the group is. We cannot easily separate commitment to the group from 
commitment to the thinking of the group. 
In a sense, we are talking about faith and faithfulness. There is simultaneously a faith in 
the power of thinking to help us to achieve our aims, and a commitment to the 
improvement and self-correction of that thinking. These two strands do not always pull 
in the same direction. In the former we believe that our present thinking is adequate to 
the task, so that we put our trust in it as it is. In the latter, our faith is in thinking in 
general, if only we use it properly - a recognition that our present mode of thinking may 
not be ideal leads us to seek to improve it. Yet there is no ideal way to think - the 
complexity and richness of thinking ensures that many approaches may be reasonable. So 
whatever particular style of thinking we use, we must have faith in it, whilst also seeking 
to improve it. This faith is a type of commitment, and it rests on the values and therefore 
the emotions that we bring to it. Yet faith goes beyond the emotions, to the way we live 
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in the world, and hence also draws upon the contextual aspect of thinking as well. It is to 
this that I now turn. 
3.1237 Emotions and the "Frame Problem" 
The committed aspect of thinking may be involved in yet another role. One of the major 
problems in accounts of thinking has been what is called the "frame problem" (e.g. 
Pylyshyn 1987). In order for thinking to be good, it needs to take account of relevant 
information, and to exclude irrelevant information. The problem that arises is this: how 
can thinking know that information not immediately present to it (i.e. not in short term 
memory) is either needed, or is not needed, if it doesn't have the access to it to determine 
that? One of the major roles of emotion, de Sousa (1987, Chapter 7) suggests, is to solve 
the frame problem. Emotions allow certain information and connections to be 
highlighted, and others to be neglected, in a process he calls establishing salience. In 
other words, thinking is committed in one direction over another. Though I think de 
Sousa's claim overstates the role for emotions, I shall explore the connection between the 
committed aspect to thinking and the frame problem. This subsection will lead us 
naturally into a more promising solution to the frame problem - the contextual aspect to 
thinking. 
When critically studying information, it is possible to draw many, indeed infinitely many, 
inferences from it. Employing the creative aspect of thinking, it is also possible to intuit 
many, possibly infinitely many, ways in which the information might be interpreted or 
linked to other information. Looking for relevant information stored in long-term 
memory, it is possible to examine for applicability a huge number of facts. As Cherniak 
(1986) points out in his account of minimal rationality, any thinker attempting to obtain 
all possible information is such ways would soon run out of resources - time and working 
memory. They would lapse into paralysis, continuing to think but not getting anywhere, 
somewhat like a time-sharing computer system that "threshes" when too many demands 
are placed on it. In the computer case, a program module is needed that allows it to 
commit itself to certain tasks at the expense of others. According to de Sousa (1987), 
emotions have evolved to play their part in directing attention, picking out what to 
concentrate on and what to ignore. 
They do this, he says, by "mimicking the informational encapsulation of perception." 
Here, he is referring to the way, say, the attention of sight is concentrated on a focal point, 
with only subsidiary awareness of the periphery, but always able to be switched on the 
receipt of cues, such as certain types of movements in that peripheral field. Emotions, he 
claims, tip the balance between conflicting motivational structures. Given the limits on 
our time, resources and rationality, evolution has provided us with emotions as the 
mechanism we finite creatures need for terminating such searches. The two "New 
Biological Hypotheses" advanced by de Sousa (1987) sum this up: 
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New Biological Hypothesis 1. The function of emotions is to fill gaps left by (mere 
wanting plus) "pure reason" in the determination of action and belief, by mimicking the 
encapsulation of perception: it is one of Nature's ways of dealing with the philosophers' 
frame problem. 
New Biological Hypothesis 2. Emotions are species of determinate patterns of salience 
among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies. 
What are we to make of this claim? It is true that emotions do direct salience: we are 
hypersensitive to clues of danger when we are fearful, for example, or far more ready to 
notice unusual connections in our knowledge when we are curious. Of course, the 
emotions do not always appropriately limit and direct our attention. We can be too angry 
to notice that the person at the focus of our anger wronged us inadvertently, is upset and 
is trying hard to make it up to us; we can be too grief-stricken to see that Perseus is on the 
ship with the black sails; or we can be too happy with our lover to recall an important 
appointment. 
Thus, emotions are not a fool-proof solution to the framing problem. Only avoiding 
framing altogether by a complete search of our knowledge and the environment, together 
with perfect critical evaluation would even come close to perfection - and we have seen 
that such an approach is impossible for us. But are emotions the best, or even the only, 
strategy available to us? 
Earlier in this section, I argued that paradigm situations are central to the emotions, 
drawing there on de Sousa's account. In §5.1, I shall argue that they are also central to 
morality. But while paradigm situations are important in both these areas, this is because 
we frame all our experience in term of situations - as will be argued in §3.124. Emotions 
clearly have a role to play in the constitution of situations, but it seems to be claiming too 
much to place the whole burden for framing on them, when other aspects of situations are 
also important. It is because emotions, seen as paradigms, are species of situations that 
they can be taken to help solve the frame problem. 
3.124 The Contextual Aspect 
Thinking takes place in a context. At a surface level, this is obvious enough - a thinker 
has to think about something. Although, in education, teachers often say that they are 
concerned with teaching process rather than content, all that this can mean is that, while 
they are concerned to ensure that particular processes are learned, they are not concerned 
about the specific content through which they are learned. Almost any old content will 
do. It is often also assumed that the context of thinking is only superficially important: it 
can be easily stripped away from the decontextualized thinking skills once they are 
established, so that they can be used in all sorts of other contexts. The CoRT programs 
(de Bono 1985), for example, rely on exercises that use contents that vary, seemingly at 
random, from skill to skill. According to Hennessy (1993), there is little evidence to 
support the transfer of domain-general skills following the use of CoRT. Indeed, in 
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general, approaches to the teaching of thinking that, like CoRT, rely heavily on 
decontextualized skill training have not been particularly successful in creating such 
general, transferable skills (McMillan 1987; Pascarella and Terenzini 1991, see §10.221). 
On the other hand, McPeck (1990) claims that thinking skills must be learned in the 
content area in which they are to be used. He points to the fact that brilliant thinkers in a 
certain field seldom seem to be universal geniuses - commonly they are no better than 
others when they are out of their area of expertise. As we shall see in §3.1242, research 
on novices and experts, as well as on situated cognition, seems to lend support to such 
claims. This is an important debate, with many implications for the teaching of thinking 
and, indeed, for the nature of reasonableness. Though I shall return to it in §3.1245 (see 
also §10.221), I need first to conduct a closer investigation of the idea of context and the 
role it plays in purposive thinking. 
To concentrate, as the above argument does, only on the content of thinking supplies a 
very thin context. Thinkers who grapple with the same content area differ in their 
personal histories, their life situations, their physical surroundings, their hopes for the 
future, their emotional states, their interests, their reactions to those they are working 
with, their prior beliefs and concepts, their social status, their gender, their embodiment 
and in many other ways. This rich context goes far beyond mere content. Theories of the 
rational agent and of decontextualized thinking ignore all these factors. Like emotions, 
contextual factors are seen as impediments that need to be overcome, neutralized or 
bracketed, in order that good thinking can happen. This section will examine the position 
that, far from being impediments, contextual factors have an essential role to play in the 
constitution of purposive thinking. The first task, therefore, is to make it clearer what 
these factors are that go together to make a context. 
3.1241 What Constitutes Context? 
I have argued that the content of thinking (actual and potential) is insufficient to define its 
context. In order to explicate what context is, it is worthwhile taking a detour to look at 
the problems computer scientists have had with creating adequate context for computer-
based thinking (or Artificial Intelligence). Proponents of Good Old Fashioned Artificial 
Intelligence (GOFAI) (Haugeland 1985) assumed that the context of thinking is 
sufficiently defined by the sum total of the propositions (or "facts") with which the 
thinking may be concerned, with the process of thinking being described by a set of 
domain-general rules for manipulating them (Dreyfus 1992; Clark 1998). 
Haugeland (1979) surveys a number of "holisms" - contextual factors that do not seem 
easy to capture in a list of propositions and rules - that a computer would need to master 
before it could be said to "understand" natural language. The first - intentional 
interpretation - involves the computer reacting sensibly to inputs in a way that could lead 
to an outsider attributing beliefs and intentions to it. A good chess program can achieve 
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this, within its restricted domain. The moves it makes might lead an outsider to say that it 
believes that its queen is under attack, and intends to save it by mounting a counter-
attack. To a large extent, this holism could be met by a computer that displayed merely 
the critical aspect to thinking - the application of rules to facts about the positions of the 
pieces. 
Haugeland's second level - common-sense holism - involves the interpretation of 
ambiguous texts through a common-sense knowledge of related facts. It seems, on the 
surface, achievable by a machine which has all the possible common-sense connections 
between facts programmed into it - the connotations,, the odd bits of knowledge that come 
with a word and so on. Computer scientists have tried to achieve it using structured 
information stores accessed according to inference rules (Dreyfus 1992) and, in small 
domains, this approach is quite successful. However, the sheer complexity of real world 
contexts means that the search involved in checking which common-sense tidbits are 
relevant to extracting meaning in this case must either be arbitrarily terminated or expand 
to take up inordinate amounts of computing time. People do not engage in large amounts 
of processing in these situations, yet they are able to disambiguate such examples much 
more efficiently than computers that arbitrarily terminate. Hence, people must have a 
different approach. 
This problem can itself be subsumed under the next level - the situational. Although it is 
difficult for a rule-based computer program to discover relevant common-sense 
connotations and implications of words, the meanings lent to whole phrases and sentences 
by their situational setting is even more intractable for computers. We all know the 
feeling of being bemused by what someone has said, having interpreted the situation to be 
of one sort, only to realise that it is a different type of situation after all. Given our 
misinterpretation, we have failed to "make the connection" - one that seems obvious once 
the situation is clear. Once we have a grasp of the situation, we know what is and isn't to 
be expected within it and how different actors might be interpreting it. The step up in 
processing demands on a GOFAI computer from the common-sense ambiguity makes 
these problems harder for computers, but people find it easier to carry out a common-
sense disambiguation once there is a situation to work in, not harder, even though they 
have to make sense of the situation as well. 
Yet even these situational sites are importantly influenced by the next level again - the 
existential, where we have knowledge of what it is for both ourselves and others to be 
actors in the world. Haugeland says: 
A single event cannot be embarrassing, shameful, irresponsible or foolish in isolation, but 
only as an act in the biography of a whole historical individual - a person whose 
personality it reflects and whose self-image it threatens. Only a being that cares about who 
it is, as some sort of enduring whole, can care about guilt or folly, self-respect or 
achievement, life or death. And only such a being can read. (631) 
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For GOFAI computers to have this, they need to store a huge amount of autobiographical 
material - but this material is not them; it is information, as it were, about some third 
party, that needs to be accessed anew each time there is a different situation of which to 
make sense. This creates a representational bottleneck that blocks any possibility of fast, 
real-time responses (Clark 1998, 21). 
Haugeland has been talking about computers and reading: I am interested in people and 
their place in the world. If we consider the world as text, how do we read it? Like 
computers, people have memories. But to discover what sort of person I am, I do not 
need to sift through my memories to find out. I already am that person, and this is present 
to me immediately in the form of my sense of self. I experience the world through my 
sense of self: I do not neutrally gather information, and later juxtapose it with facts about 
me. Who I am has an important impact on what I experience, let alone how I go on to 
make more detached sense of it. That the emotions have a role in setting the existential 
context is obvious from Haugeland's comment. I do not reconstruct myself anew in 
relation to every new piece of information - my self is what I bring to that information 
already; and my self has been constituted by my history, place in society, personality, 
genetic makeup, present disposition and future aspirations, all in mutual interaction. 
Attention to the lessons of studies of child development (Clark 1998, Chapter 2) show 
that, as we learn about the world, we do not do so through thinking that is carried out 
alongside, but separately, from our interaction with the world. Neither infants, nor we, 
gather information neutrally from the world, think about it, then having decided, act on 
the world. Rather, we engage in "action loops," in which thinking about the world and 
acting in the world are inextricably linked. Our knowledge is tied closely to our action in 
the physical world (ibid., 37-39), and is often not available to us if the action we intend to 
take is different. Indeed, our embodiment in the world is also important here, as I shall 
explore in §3.125 on the embodied aspect to reasonableness. Clark (ibid., 47) says: 
In place of the rational engine cogitating in a realm of detailed inner models, we confront 
the embodied, embedded agent acting as an equal partner in adaptive responses which 
draw on the resources of mind, body, and world. (47) 
Reference to infants reminds us that we come into the world "always already" situated 
within it (§2.4). This is due to the fact that each of us is the product of several billion 
years of evolution, which has equipped us with in-built hardware and software, purposely 
designed to immediately make some sense of our environment. Cosmides and Tooby 
claim (1994, 66): 
Intuitively, we are all naive realists, experiencing the world as already parsed into objects, 
relationships, goals, foods, dangers, humans, words, sentences, social groups, motives, 
artefacts, animals, smiles, glares, relevances and saliencies, the known and the obvious.... 
But to produce this simplified world that we effortlessly experience, a vast sea of 
computational problems are being silently solved, out of awareness, by a host of 
functionally integrated circuits. These reasoning instincts are powerful inference engines, 
whose automatic, non-conscious operation creates our seamless experience of the world. 
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This is not to say that we come into the world understanding our situation completely: 
there is still much learning to do, and a good deal of plasticity is built into the system so 
as to enable us to adapt to the many variant situations in which we might find ourselves 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 4-6). Yet while we are plastic enough to learn whichever human 
language is spoken in our environment, we are nevertheless hardwired to learn language 
(ibid., Chapter 2), and while we can learn the uses and peculiarities of many particular 
objects, we cannot but see the world as consisting of bounded, cohesive, rigid objects 
unable to affect each other without touching (ibid., 67). 
So when, in §3.1243 below, I talk of being placed in a "totally unfamiliar situation," we 
need to be aware that this situation will be only relatively unfamiliar, for we will still 
comprehend it as consisting of objects, agents, goals and all the rest of the entities 
mentioned above by Cosmides and Tooby. Brown (1991, 3-4) retells a delightful story 
from Clifford Geertz' fieldwork in Bali. Geertz, after making a great deal of the 
strangeness and difference of Balinese culture, then recalls how he and his wife gained 
the confidence of the villagers. They were watching an illegal cock-fight when the police 
arrived. The Geertzes reacted to this exactly as the Balinese villagers did, by scattering, 
and found themselves elaborately and conspiratorially play-acting an ethnographic 
interview with a villager when the police came checking. Brown comments that, for all 
this to happen without any pre-planning or communication, the Geertzes and the villagers, 
for all their differences, must see the physical and social world in broadly similar ways. 
Talking of his own fieldwork, Brown (ibid., 151) notes: 
Although I started my work with an assumption of cultural difference... it is clear that the 
rest of the assumptions [I made] are about human psychology: what people in general are 
prone to do (enjoy praise, dislike blame), and what people under specified conditions will 
do. Respectively, I had assumed unrestricted and implicational universals. I didn't examine 
these assumptions carefully for the same reasons that Geertz didn't examine the behaviors 
he described in order to explain how he had obtained rapport with the Balinese 
villagers...: because I had no realization of anything that needed explanation. That this 
said something about the scope and content of human nature - and about the limits of 
cultural relativity - never crossed my mind, as perhaps it rarely crosses any 
anthropologist's mind. 
This background, consisting of assumptions that are initially provided for us by our 
biology, and subsequently greatly enhanced by our experience and learning in the world, 
is what allows us to be "always already" situated in the world. 
3.1242 The Situation: Artisans and Apprentices 
One of the common analogies for the thinker's wherewithal is the toolldt. Critical 
Thinking theorists may talk about the skills, capacities and/or competencies of the thinker 
as being the tools of thinking, able to be taken out and used effectively as needed. 
Lipman (1991, 187) points also to the fact that these tools need to be used artfully (as by 
an artisan) as well - that the appropriate tool must be chosen at the appropriate time, that 
this choice must fit into a sequence of tool use in which each tool complements the 
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others, and that the sequence must be guided by criteria appropriate to the task. This 
raises the question of how it is that the thinker knows which tool to use at any specific 
moment. The same question arises in regard to the knowledge that the thinker needs to 
draw on. Such coordination is indeed essential, but before considering it further, I'll take 
a closer look at the use of an individual tool. 
Heidegger (1962) and Polanyi (1958) have employed a tool analogy to illustrate this 
situatedness. They claim that we are situated in the world like an artisan in a workshop. 
As we use our knowledge of the world, the artisan picks up a tool that lies close at hand 
and uses it to accomplish a task. The way in which the tool is used is important. If the 
artisan is experienced and skilled, the tool is not used as a separate entity in the hand 
according to an explicit set of rules. Polanyi says: 
The aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are 
not known as such to the person following them. (49, italicised completely in original) ... 
Rules of art can be useful, but they do not determine the practice of an art; they are 
maxims, which can serve as a guide to an art only if they can be integrated into the 
practical knowledge of the art. (50) 
Rather, the tool is used as an extension of the body. The user "indwells" in the tool in the 
same way they do in their own body - it is, in Heidegger's phrase, "ready-to-hand." To 
become conscious of the tool is to become self-conscious, in the discomfited sense 
(Polanyi talks of stage-fright), and to be unable to wield the tools in the same, effortlessly 
skilled way. The artisan becomes the apprentice again, rule-bound and clumsy. 9 For an 
apprentice in training, all attention (Polanyi calls this "focal attention") is on the tool 
itself and the rules of the art. The artisan, by way of contrast, has moved to a new 
"operational plane" where the task is seen differently - the tool itself receives only 
"subsidiary attention," while the artisan's focal attention has moved to higher level tasks, 
such as envisioning the finished product. When instructing an apprentice, many artisans 
can recall the rules, often with difficulty, but many can't. The great artisan is not always 
the great teacher - and much of the teaching is done by example and guided practice, 
rather than explicit instruction. Polanyi says: "An art which cannot be specified in detail 
cannot be transmitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can be passed 
on only by example from master to apprentice" (53). 
I referred above to a tool that lies close at hand. A well organized workshop will have the 
needed tools close at hand, because the situation - the making of furniture perhaps - 
requires that they be there. In a different situation - a boat-builder's workshop, say - 
some of the same tools would be there, but some of them would be different. Just so for 
9 My favorite personal example of this is the occasion in my basketball career when I suddenly thought 
about which foot I took off from in doing a lay-up. For a while, I was unable to do a lay-up smoothly - I 
kept tripping over my feet. It was only cured when I went alone to the gym and drilled lay-ups until I had 
once again forgotten which foot to use, and my feet had remembered. Even now, when coaching beginners, 
I advise them to drill lay-ups until their "feet think for themselves" - then all they have to think about in a 
game is whether to go for the lay-up or not. It is hardly surprising that both this example and the example 
of the tool are physical skills - I will address the embodied aspect of thinking later. 
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the thinker, according to Heidegger. We recognize the situation that we are in - it has 
usually been developing around us, and often been shaped by us. The situation is 
constituted not just by the physical and social surroundings, but also by our goals, our 
hopes, our concerns, and what we read of the goals of others. Then we lay out the tools 
(the thoughts, the facts, the emotions, the cognitive moves etc) that are appropriate to the 
situation - or would it be more accurate to say they come laid out with the situation? This 
is the question I will address next. 
3.1243 The Situation: Whole-part and Part-whole 
The puzzle at the conclusion of the previous subsection can be restated: which comes first 
- the particulars or the holistic situation (or perhaps they come together)? This question 
of the order can be posed in two different settings: that of the learner and that of the adept. 
If we are placed in a totally unfamiliar situation, then we are in the position of the learner 
who has yet to learn anything. As the situation is unfamiliar, it is clear that we cannot 
make sense of it in terms of the sort of situation it is. This would seem to imply that it is 
the particulars in the situation that we must first apprehend. However, many of the 
particular "tools" we need will not themselves be available to us because, as Dreyfus 
(1992, 255) says, the "individual features get their significance in terms of an 
underdetermined anticipation of the whole." If we don't comprehend that whole, we 
don't see the import of the individual features. 
Such a situation is common if we travel or, even more so, if we start to live in another 
country: it is known as culture shock. When we experience strong doses of culture shock, 
we are not only at a loss to know what the social situation is that we find ourselves in, we 
also find it very difficult to "tune into" the cues and components of the situation in order 
to start to make sense of it. Take the following situation.lo A newly arrived Asian man 
approaches the counter in an Australian Government Department. Reading the situation 
as one of authority-submission, he keeps his eyes politely focused on the counter as he 
makes a request concerning a form for his elderly and frail mother. The clerk, reading the 
situation as one of information gathering from a client, reads the averted eyes as 
indicative of an attempt to mislead. He insists that the mother, disabled as she is, come in 
and fill in the form herself. The supplicant, reading great disrespect for the elderly, 
becomes angry just as the clerk, sensing a possible attempt to defraud, also gets angry. 
Communication totally fails. 
As we learn more, these particulars become part of our focal attention, and so are the first 
things that are seen as we enter the situation. We make sense of the situation haltingly 
and inefficiently - the clerk who gets some training in cultural awareness is acutely aware 
of averted eyes, while the acclimatizing Asian man learns to check carefully the intent of 
101 am indebted to Anna Majdanska for this example. 
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references to his parents. But as the situation becomes more familiar, the particulars 
begin to simultaneously take on more meaning and be relegated to subsidiary attention. 
One day, maybe, the clerk finds himself averting his own eyes when talking to a visiting 
Asian dignitary, or the Asian man jokes unselfconsciously with workmates about his 
mother. The unfamiliar object becomes a familiar tool: "Every act of personal 
assimilation by which we make a thing form an extension of ourselves through our 
subsidiary awareness of it, is a commitment of ourselves; a manner of disposing 
ourselves" (Polanyi 1958, 61). 
Finally, we become an adept. The situation is now so familiar to us that we "live in it." 
At this stage, we can turn our focal attention onto the situation as a whole, with all the 
skills and tools that we learned present in subsidiary attention - they become, in Polanyi's 
words, not the object but the instrument of our attention. Hence, to concentrate more 
fully on the holistic situation is not to have the particulars disappear, but to sharpen our 
(subsidiary) awareness of them at the same time. While for the learner, the particulars are 
the way into the situation, for the adept, they are part and parcel of it. 
The above characterization is probably too simplistic, making as it does a sharp divide 
between a fragmented learner's world and a holistic adept's world. In reality, we are 
placed somewhere along a continuum between the two in many situations. When we feel 
most at home, when we live in the situation most fully, we are not only most in tune but 
also the most unaware of the (possibly questionable) assumptions on which we rest. And 
this is most clearly so when we consider our lives as a whole: 
The actual foundations of our... beliefs cannot be asserted at all. When we accept a certain 
set of pre-suppositions and use them as our interpretative framework, we may be said to 
dwell in them as we do in our own body. Their uncritical acceptance for the time being 
consists in a process of assimilation by which we identify ourselves with them. They are 
not asserted and cannot be asserted, for assertion can only be made from within a 
framework with which we have identified ourselves for the time being: as they are 
themselves our ultimate framework, they are essentially inarticulable. (Polanyi 1958, 60, 
italics in original) 
Of course, as the phrase "for the time being" shows, this does not mean that we cannot 
dig down, problematize and investigate parts of this framework from within the 
framework (see §4.123 for a Habermasian account of this problematization). It is the 
framework as a whole which is beyond articulation. 
An adept of a craft has been through a long apprenticeship, immersed in the workshop. 
Just as this adept feels "at home" in the workshop, in life, we seldom find ourselves in a 
totally alien situation. In our "learning" - our engagement in the social world - we have 
been in many a similar situation. Therefore, the tools that we lay out ready-to-hand are 
those that we have found useful before, that we have seen other, more competent, artisans 
use in the past, or that we have used jointly with others, thus making them our own. But 
they are not laid out once we recognize the situation, because it is through them that we 
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can make such a recognition, and it is through the situation that the tools have meaning 
and purchase. They come together as a package. If we change situations, we are 
translated to a different workshop, and the tools that are ready-to-hand also change. 
I have returned to the metaphor of the workshop and talked above about changing from 
one workshop to another. There is probably need for a word of warning here concerning 
the workshop analogy. In the real world, we can walk out of one workshop into another - 
and they can be quite different places. This seldom happens in our metaphorical 
"workshops": usually, the workshop metamorphoses around us, partly in response to our 
actions and partly due to other reasons. Of course, it can happen that we are catapulted 
from one workshop into a quite different one - the example of culture shock discussed 
above springs to mind. But usually this is not the case. 
In relation to the workshop analogy, two broad questions arise. Firstly, if situations are 
workshops, how small are they? To extend the metaphor, do we have a different 
workshop for making chairs from the one we use for making stools, or do we only have a 
different workshop when the objects are described at higher levels - say, furniture and 
boats. Another way of putting this is to ask, how similar do workshops need to be before 
we can use the same tools? How different before we need a new set of tools? This is a 
concern about the distinctness and scope of situations. I will address these questions in 
§3.1244. 
Secondly, we can ask whether there are tools that are useful in all workshops, or a large 
number of workshops. Do they need minor, or even major, tinkering to make them useful 
in other workshops? This concern is about transferability across situations and is 
addressed in the literature of domain-specific vs domain general skills (see, for example, 
Rogoff 1984; Alexandra and Judy 1988; Perkins and Salomon 1989). While it is 
dangerous to generalize in this contested area, it does seem that both domain-specific and 
domain-general skills exist, and that it is possible to generalize the former by widening or 
merging the "workshops" in which they are used. I will support this claim in §3.1245. 
3.1244 Different Workshops: How Big and Distinct are They? 
Of course, as indicated above, metaphors like this are bound to break down. If we visited 
the site of many different workshops - a factory, say - we would most likely find a 
building with many rooms or, if it were an open plan site, there would certainly be many 
discrete spaces dedicated to different "work-spaces." Situations are not like that: we 
seldom walk out a door into a new situation - one situation is much more likely to evolve 
into another. Similarly, rooms don't overlap (or if they do, the overlap is static), whereas 
the broader situations we commonly find ourselves in can have features drawn from a 
number of apparently disparate smaller situations, thrown together in non-systematic 
ways. 
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I can be in one situation - say, the well-known restaurant scenario - when I see a good 
friend laughing and joking with someone I know she despises, or the waiter turns out to 
share my interest in football, or my companion suddenly turns pale and faints, or... Each 
of these new situations involves quite different knowledge, skills and abilities from the 
restaurant situation, but the intersection of the two creates a new and different context. It 
is not that I have to act, now, according to the restaurant context and, then, according to 
the other, but that many appropriate responses take the combined context into account. 
Further, the new, composite situation is subsumed under broader situations - say, how to 
act in public - and eventually under the broadest situation of all - how to live in the world. 
In our everyday life we are, indeed, involved in various "sub-worlds" such as the world of 
the theater, of business, or of mathematics, but each of these is a "mode" of our shared 
everyday world. That is, sub-worlds are not related like isolable physical systems to larger 
systems they compose; rather they are local elaborations of a whole which they 
presuppose. (Dreyfus 1992, 14) 
Bearing these difficulties in mind, let's return to the issue of the distinctness and scope of 
situations. The issue raises empirical questions. To what extent do people "wall off' 
different situations? Do they have one way of coping with a particular situation which is 
quite different from the way they cope with apparently related situations? How related do 
situations have to be before they are conceived of as variations on the same situation, 
rather than as distinct situations? These are difficult questions to answer, as people do not 
explicitly identify situations as they enter them - rather, they find themselves immersed in 
them. Like the fish that would be the last to discover water, people must work hard to 
delineate the situations in which they find themselves. Such knowledge may perhaps 
come more easily to an outside observer. 
One area of empirical research that might help elucidate these questions is research into 
children's understanding of simple, everyday science phenomena'. Children, like adults, 
act in the world on the basis of their understanding of the situation in which they find 
themselves. It has been long noted by teachers that many children's apparent 
understanding of such simple phenomena as light and vision or moving objects do not 
square with the scientific explanation. For example, children will talk about sight 
travelling from the eyes to the object the eyes see, or of the need to keep pushing an 
object in space to keep it moving. A research program has emerged to study such 
misconceptions (or alternative conceptions). A number of researchers have noted that the 
context of the way children are asked about these sorts of phenomena can markedly affect 
the explanations they give. 
These explanations seem to arise out of children's mental "paradigm situations." 
Repeated experience of a particular phenomenon, probably reinforced by the way others 
talk about it, creates an understanding of the way a small fragment of the world is. The 
parallels to the situations I have been considering is striking. Such research is at an early 
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stage, however, and there does not seem to be a generally agreed term to cover these 
fragments. Claxton (1991) calls them "minitheories" and states that: 
it is the norm in mental organisation for knowledge and skill to be stored together in 
purpose-built packages, which have evolved to meet the range of demands which can be 
expected in a particular type of situation or 'scenario'. This combination of content, 
context, purpose and process into flexible bundles of localised competence is the primary 
format of the mind. Far from being the neat, coherent unitary sort of theory to which 
science proper aspires, the mind-scape of the child is patchwork and piecemeal. (86) 11 
Using the term "phenomenological primitives" (or p-prims), diSessa (1988, 50) 
characterises what appear to be the same constructs as a "visual and inarticulate ability to 
judge plausibility," and goes on to say: 
though it gives signs of being quite robust, intuitive physics is nothing much like a theory 
in the way one uses that word theories in... science.... Instead, intuitive physics is a 
fragmented collection of ideas, loosely connected and reinforced, having none of the 
commitment or systematicity that one attributes to theories. 
The same, or very similar, mental constructs have been identified by Hammer (1996), 
who also calls them p-prims; Yates et al. (1988), who use the term "prototypes"; and 
Millar and Kragh (1994), who use the term "context-specific reasoning." One of the 
seven "memory elements" White (1988) identifies, namely "episodes," seems to have 
similar properties. 
All these authors attribute these constructs to repeated common perceptual experiences, 
and ignore the influence of linguistic or cultural factors, which must also play an 
important role (Lynch and Jones 1995). These prototypes (as I will call them here) are 
said to be accessed by context (or sometimes analogy), after which they are mentally run 
to produce predictions. 
An example drawn from work on how children make predictions about mirrors, in which 
I was involved, can illustrate just how restricted these prototypes can be. 12 In 
investigating the way children and adults made predictions concerning using a mirror (in 
some cases, to direct a torch beam onto a picture; in others, where to position oneself 
relative to a mirror in order to see an oblique object), we found that our subjects 
commonly drew on one of five different prototypes, each of which had several 
implications: 
1. The "seeing yourself in a mirror" prototype. 
la Mirrors see what they face. 
lb Mirrors "point at" what they face. 
11 1t is interesting to note that Claxton's first sentence claims that "scenarios" are the "norm in mental 
organisation," but that by the last, he is confining this claim to the child. I would agree more with the first 
claim. 
12 I must acknowledge my coworkers on this project - Kevin Collis, Brian Jones, Jane Watson, Sharon 
Fraser - who contributed greatly to the data gathering and the analysis. 
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lc To see what is in a mirror, you have to be in front of the mirror yourself. 
id If you can see something in a mirror, the mirror is "pointing at" it. 
le You need to be adjacent to an object to see its reflection. 
2. The "image as a picture on the mirror" prototype. 
2a If you can see the face of the mirror, you can see the image that it has 
captured. 
2b If the mirror's face can "see" the object, it can capture its image. 
2c The object projects its image - if it misses the mirror, then no image appears 
on the mirror. 
3. The "mirrors bounce light" prototype. 
3a Mirrors can take light around corners. 
3b Mirror turns light reliably, but no apparent rule to decide how much - use 
trial and error to find right angle of mirror. 
4. The "object and observer symmetry" prototype. 
4a Mirror must be "balanced" between source and object (eye and object). 
4b More explicit use of angles: e.g. billiard ball analogy. 
5. The "mirrors redirect active sight" prototype. 
5a Sight bounces off mirrors. 
5b Line of sight: light and sight, though different, travel the same path; e.g. if 
you can see object in mirror from the source point, then the source will light 
up the object. 
Not only did all our subjects (child and adult) initially explain their predictions by appeal 
to one of these prototypes, many of them were happy to jump from one to another 
depending on the context of the question. As the respondents received feedback from the 
trials of their predictions, the context within which they were thinking about the task 
changed accordingly, incorporating the new information. Very few of them tried to look 
for a coherent prototype or situation into which all of their intuitions fitted: it did not 
bother them that consecutive statements drawing on different prototypes were 
contradictory. Even the subject who held an honours degree in science operated (in the 
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context of our investigation) by jumping from prototype to prototype. It could not be 
said, however, that these subjects had any difficulty using mirrors in the real world. 
I have recounted this research in some detail because it implies that the boundaries of the 
situations that we find ourselves in can be very narrow. It might be thought that 
experience with mirrors is a very constrained type of situation - it is certainly many levels 
of complexity below the restaurant situation - yet it seems that our intuitive understanding 
of even such a constrained field can be highly fragmented. 
However, it is also instructive to consider those who did have a coherent prototype for 
mirrors. One of our subjects was a 13 year old, who appealed to a "balance" prototype 
and stuck to it despite changing contexts. His initial statements were quite vague and 
"non-scientific," but as he was interviewed, he unpacked these ideas through several 
versions, each more "scientific" than the former, until his explanation was essentially 
identical to that taught in schools (though he didn't use the school jargon). My 
interpretation is that he had been through a process of making the rules that govern light 
and mirrors explicit (brought them to focal attention), but that once he has understood 
them, they have been relegated to subsidiary attention. What remains available 
immediately to focal attention (in a mirror context) is a slightly fuzzy holistic prototype. 
Yet this "mirror situation" is able to be unpacked, when needed, into the explicit rules 
once again - rules that are generally not needed to make sense of mirrors, but which are 
available when the attention paid to mirrors increases. 13 
Tytler (1994), discussing the mixing by experts of explanations at both the rule-bound, 
formal science level and the prototype level, conunents: 
In many cases these multiple explanations represent the intelligent use of conceptions as 
tools... Such notions [what I am calling prototypes] have a role for the experts as adjuncts, 
sometimes cues for more complete explanations. The appearance of these notions in 
everyday language... represent a broader cultural input into the status of these ideas in 
both novices' and experts' minds.... Even for experts, the achievement of powerful, 
consistent ideas is only a part of the story of the growth in understanding, for more 
primitive ideas live on in parallel with these. (346) 
Education, then, has an important role to play in how individuals frame situations - a 
number of prototypes can be brought together and "reframed" as a single new prototype, 
or seen to be "life-world summaries" of formal scientific accounts. The scope and 
distinctness of a situation is not fixed, but is able to be expanded through reconsideration 
and reconstruction, including explicit rule learning. A number of situations, previously 
considered to be discrete, can be subsumed into a new situation of broader scope. 
Presumably this process is one of the more important in enabling us to learn and to 
become experts. 
13 The analysis here bears considerable similarity to Karmiloff-Smith's (1992, 17-26) account of 
representational redescription (§3.231), in that we have several explicitness levels of knowledge about the 
same phenomenon. See also her account of the "child as physicist" in her Chapter 3. 
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3.1245 Different Workshops: Taking Tools with Us 
The second question raised by the idea of different workshops was that of the 
transferability of tools across workshops. If tools are tied to the workshop within which 
they are found, then it seems that their use must be learned anew in each new context. 
The terminology used in discussing this issue varies quite a lot: I shall talk in terms of 
domain-specific (workshop tied) and domain-general (workshop portable) competencies. 
After an initial survey of biologically given domain-specific tools, I will assume in this 
subsection that the domain-specific tools to be discussed are ones that have been 
constructed through learning within a context. 
Many of the domain-specific tools we have are hardwired native modules provided to us 
by evolution, such a edge-detectors for the visual field (Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 1-4). 
Some, maybe many, of these modules are "informationally encapsulated," meaning that 
they are forever closed to cognitive introspection (only their output is available). Clearly, 
such domain-specific modules can never be made domain-general. Karmiloff-Smith 
(ibid., 4-5), however, argues that many domain-specific tools are "modularized as 
development proceeds," built on "initial biases or predispositions that channel attention to 
relevant environmental inputs, which in turn affect subsequent brain development." This 
dynamic view of domain-specific modules also allows that, for some at least, the 
representations of the world they contain can be redescribed and made more domain-
general (ibid., 18). 
It has been argued that there are only domain-general cognitive competencies. Piaget, the 
most influential supporter of this view, asserted that when new cognitive competencies 
are gained (in Piaget's terms, a new stage is entered), they apply globally, to all contexts 
(see §3.23 for further discussion of Piaget). His explanation for decalage, the failure of a 
child to use the competencies demonstrated in one domain in others, was that they were 
still present, but merely obscured by unfamiliar content or contexts. However, this view 
is probably in terminal decline for, as Karmiloff-Smith (1992, 11) says, "Piaget's strong 
anti-nativism and his arguments for across-the-board stages no longer constitute a viable 
developmental framework." 
Rogoff and Lave (1984, 3) have edited a book of essays on the contextually situated 
nature of everyday cognition. In the book's introduction, Rogoff summarizes one of the 
main implications of the essays it contains: context is an integral part of cognitive 
competency, not a nuisance variable. She says: 
Evidence suggests that our ability to control and orchestrate cognitive skills is not an 
abstract context-free competence which may be easily transferred across widely diverse 
problem domains but consists rather of cognitive activity tied specifically to context.... 
This is not to say that cognitive activities are completely specific to the episode in which 
they were originally learned or applied. In order to function, people must be able to 
generalise some aspects of knowledge and skills to new situations.... [There is a need to 
focus] on determining how generalisation of knowledge and skills occurs. 
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Rogoff is, of course, correct that it cannot be the case that cognitive competency is 
uniquely tied to a particular context. If this were the case, then it would be impossible for 
humans to make any radically new intellectual discoveries, or to teach themselves about 
new areas. These abilities rely upon domain-general cognitive activity. Nevertheless, her 
final call for better understanding of how such generalization takes place is important. It 
is a call that is echoed by Alexandra and Judy (1988, 382). In their review of novice-
expert studies; they say, "What seems obvious to us from this review is that the 
investigation of the interaction between domain specific and strategic [i.e. domain-
general] knowledge is very much in its infancy" and give a long list of inadequacies in 
present research. 
Nevertheless, Alexandra and Judy summarize some of the findings that seem to be 
reasonably well supported. People need to know some domain-specific facts before 
domain-general competencies can be applied, but then such domain-general competencies 
do contribute to using and acquiring further contextual facts and skills. As the domain-
specific knowledge and competency increases, however, the nature of strategic processing 
changes, and domain-specific processes become more important. Experts do have 
specialized knowledge and skills that work better than generalized approaches. The 
extent to which this happens depends on the nature and structure of the domain and the 
task: highly structured or rich domains call more on specialized domain-specific 
competencies and knowledge, whereas it is easier to cope in simple domains by using 
general competencies. Finally, those who perform best are those who can see how both 
domain-specific and domain-general competencies are related across different tasks and 
domains. Such an understanding is built through stepping back and making these 
competencies themselves the subject of study - that is, through metacognition. Since all 
the aspects of reasonableness are involved in metacognition, I shall return to this in 
§3.126. 
Studies such as those reviewed by Alexandra and Judy seem to paint a picture of two 
sorts of tools. The domain-general tools are flexible in that they can be applied to many 
situations, but the price they pay is that they are not especially well suited to particular 
tasks. Domain-specific tools, on the other hand, are highly specialized and so well suited 
to their particular domains, but unable to be used easily in different situations. A further 
point remains. Several domain-specific tools might differ in detailed applicability, yet 
more detached reflection might indicate that they are based on, and do the same general 
task as, a domain-general tool. Lying behind this assertion is the question as to whether 
context can be widened in this way, so that apparently distinct situations come to be seen 
as, in important ways, the same situation. 
If I push the tool analogy a little further, I can illustrate this point. A spanner set will 
contain a large number of fixed size spanners, each of which can be used to tighten or 
undo a nut or bolt of a particular size. A shifting spanner, on the other hand, can be 
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adjusted to fit all of these but it will more often slip off, because it isn't really possible to 
get it to stay as rigidly tight on a nut as a fixed spanner - there is more play between the 
jaws. Nevertheless, the fixed and shifting spanners accomplish the same basic task. If 
the analogy holds sufficiently - if, for example, cases of inference in science, history, art 
and mathematics can be considered as being as alike as several different sized bolts - then 
we can see an argument for the construction of better domain-general tools. 
Our experience seems to tell us that the tools of the mind are unlike the spanners in this 
respect: the mind can remake a tool more easily than a fixed spanner can be remade. If a 
thinker can come to see that several different tools are doing the much the same task in 
different domains, then they can construct a generalized tool that has applicability not 
only across those domains, but also potentially in others yet to be considered. Karmiloff-
Smith (1992, 17-26) argues that such representational redescription is the means by which 
domain-specific competency can be transformed into domain-general competency. 
Perkins and Salomon (1989) argue that this will not happen unless the conditions for 
generalizing are in place. 
Much of this subsection has tended to conflate the "tools in the workshops" with the 
critical aspect of thinking. This is partly because much of the work in this area has 
concentrated on critical thinking to the detriment of the creative, committed and 
embodied aspects of thinking. The points made, however, can be generalized to these 
three aspects as well. 
Thinking has been taken by many to be a purely mental activity, yet the analogy of the 
use of tools suggests the impossibility of divorcing the physical and the mental in the act 
of thinking. It is to the inherently embodied nature of thinking that I now turn my 
attention. 
3.125 The Embodied Aspect 
3.1251 Perception and Skilled Motor Activity 
Perhaps the best place to start in a discussion of the embodiedness of thinking is with 
practical examples. In looking at a rock, say a chunk of granite, in order to identify the 
minerals present, the physical act of seeing the mineral and the mental act of inferring 
from what is seen to the identity of the mineral are inextricably merged. Without seeing 
it in the right way, the identification is difficult to impossible - quartz looks too much like 
some of the feldspars. A knowledgable person holds and manipulates the rock in a 
different way from the novice - the rock is held in a particular orientation to the light, and 
is rocked slightly, so that the light can reflect "rollingly" off the conchoidal fracture of 
quartz, or "flash" off the cleavage planes of the feldspar. Telling this to the novice is not 
sufficient for them to be able to do it - they need to also have their attention directed and 
to practice this holistic ability to see/infer. 
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Another anecdote on this last point. When I was doing my Geology degree, I studied ore 
deposits. Identification of ore minerals in polished section was a major part of the 
practical exam, but in the prac sessions, I found that I could not distinguish one from 
another, despite closely reading their descriptions. In a panic that I would fail the prac 
exam, I spent many hours over the microscope, looking at labelled specimens and 
studying the descriptions. One day, I realized that I could now reliably identify them, but 
when I tried to explain how to a friend, I could only echo the differences referred to in our 
notes - differences that now jumped out at me, but which I had been completely unable to 
see before. There was no change in my explicit knowledge, but I had learned how to 
see/infer. 
The gaining of expertise in the ability to see/infer within specialist areas is a well studied 
phenomenon. Larkin et al. (1980), for example, cite their own previous studies that found 
that chess masters & grand masters recognize perhaps 50 000 chess board patterns, the 
equivalent (they say) of the vocabulary of a college graduate. Clark (1998, 14), citing 
robotics research, claims that "there is no clear dividing line between perception and 
cognition, no point at which perceptual inputs are translated into a central code to be 
shared by various onboard reasoning devices." Rather, perception, cognition and action 
in the world are tightly tied together in "action loops" (ibid., 36). 
I have used the phrase see/infer to emphasize that perception is not a separate business 
from cognition. The inferences in everyday perception are either hard-wired, or so 
completely automatized that we do not realize that the inference is being done - we accept 
our perceptions as given (Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 67). When we learn specialist 
perception, like that of the geologist or the chess master, the inferences become, for a 
while, explicit and difficult. Soon, however, they too are automated and we forget that 
we are doing them. This is one of the difficulties of the teacher - remembering again 
what it was like not to be able to see. There are two parts to this special vision - the first 
is learning what to direct your attention towards and is reasonably articulable, but the 
other is just "being able to see it" and is much harder to make explicit (see the analysis of 
the synthesis of recognition in Kant 1965). Sellars points out that "instead of coming to 
have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the 
ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing" (1963, 
176, completely italicized in original). 
Perception is just one example of thinking-in-action. A broader example is skilled motor 
activity. I have referred above to the use of physical tools: as Polanyi and Heidegger 
point out, these tools become extensions of ourselves, and we can think/act through them. 
I have also touched on sports, where sportspersons think with their mind/bodies to solve 
difficult problems in real time. Only the very highest level strategies ever make it to 
explicit consciousness as these problems are solved, but the skilled performances of the 
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lower level building blocks which make these high level solutions work have required 
considerable explicit input for their mastery. 
Yet it might be thought that while the embodiedness of perception and motor activity are 
relatively uncontentious and well argued, more "abstract" types of thinking are not 
embodied. Is all thinking embodied? My answer is "yes" and I will argue for this 
conclusion by considering the role of the social in the development of thinking, then the 
place of the body in the mind and in the physical world. 
3.1252 Social Appropriation of Thinking 
Picture in your mind a person thinking hard. How do you know that they are thinking? 
Perhaps you have pictured Rodin's The Thinker, or a person striding up and down a room 
striking their fist on their palm, or someone staring unfocused into the distance. Baron-
Cohen (1995, 105) reports on studies asking people to choose pictures that show someone 
thinking: 
When a person's eye direction does not appear to be directed at any external object in 
particular - for example, when a person's eyes are directed upward and away from us but 
there is no external target in that part of the person's visual field - we rapidly infer that the 
person is thinking about something unobservable. This mentalistic inference is also drawn 
effortlessly by young children. 
These and other physical behaviours commonly accompany thinking and, indeed, form 
part of the thinking; according to Baron-Cohen, we are turning our gaze, and hence our 
attention, inward. The behaviours are tied to the need to turn attention to the task in hand, 
or to provide an outlet for the committed emotional side of the thinking. The fact that we 
recognize such behaviours and can infer from them not only that the person in question is 
thinking, but also often something of the nature of their thoughts, suggests that they are 
more than just accompanying behaviours. They seem to form part of the act of thinking 
itself. 
Why might such publicly expressed behaviours form part of thinking? I will argue that 
this is because thinking itself (or at least the large superstructural refinement of the hard-
wired basis of thinking) is learned through being publicly expressed. In this, I draw on 
the work of Vygotsky (1981, see also §3.234): 
Any function in the child's [higher mental] development appears... first... on the social 
plane, then on the psychological plane. ... children... use the same forms of [thinking] 
behaviour in relation to themselves that others initially used in relation to them. (Quoted 
in Kohlberg 1987, 197) 
Thinking on the social plane has to be physically expressed: both through speech and 
through associated body movements - especially of the eyes and (to a lesser extent) of 
other parts of the face. Baron-Cohen (1995, 114) lists 17 "mentalistic interpretations" 
which can be read from the eyes, some of which are primarily emotional, but others of 
which "describe 'speech acts' that the eyes can convey." In the course of internalizing 
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this behaviour, the child not only learns (as an apprentice) how to better carry out mental 
activities, but also internalizes the physical behaviours that accompany, and hence 
become part of, the public thinking. Such psychological work reinforces the 
philosophical conclusions reached by George Herbert Mead, and by Wittgenstein in his 
famous argument against the possibility of a private language. 
The insight that the natures of public argumentation and private thinking are identical is 
much older than Vygotsky, Mead or Wittgenstein. Billig (1987) quotes Isocrates: "the 
same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ 
also when we deliberate in our thoughts" 14 ; and Francis Bacon: "[we use the same 
processes] in argumentation, where we are disputing with another...[as] in meditations, 
when we are considering and resolving anything with ourselves" 15 , to similar effect. 
Vygotsky, Mead and Wittgenstein, however, go beyond the observation of their identity 
to the claim that it is precisely by participation in the public discourse that the ability to 
engage in private cogitation is constructed. 
The child's experience of listening to others articulate their thinking in discourse, of 
haltingly beginning to enter into it, of having more able others support their attempts, of 
gradually being able to construct more and more of the argument on their own as such 
"scaffolding" is gradually withdrawn, all takes place in context. Hence it is tied to the 
context - the physical arrangements of the participant's bodies, the emotional and social 
attributes of the situation, the goals and intentions of the interlocutors, and so on - and 
the child will have difficulty in separating out what is essential and what is superficial. 
Of course, this experience is built up over many instances, and some superficial aspects of 
the contexts and behaviours may not be included into the child's construction of the 
competencies because they are not regularly exhibited in the social situations. But many 
bodily cues and dispositions are so closely tied to the mental contents of certain types of 
thinking that it requires conscious effort to separate them off from the thinking. It is for 
this reason, for example, that deception is difficult - the embodied behavioural aspect of 
deceptive thinking can "give the game away." 
Indeed, we can go back further than this. The ability to engage in certain sorts of 
thinking, which are absolutely central to social interaction (and hence to ethical thought), 
depends critically on inferences from embodied actions to thought. I am referring here to 
what is commonly called the theory of mind: the attribution to others of intentional 
mental events. The ability to think about, and act within, the social world is constructed 
on this. Baron-Cohen (1995, Chapter 4) asserts that we can only build a theory of mind 
through certain inferences from bodily-based action to mentally-based understandings. 
These inferences are innate, and spring from our biological and evolutionary inheritances 
(see §2.4). Firstly, we infer from self-propelled motion to goals and intentions, so that, 
14 Antidosis, 256 
15 Of the Dignity and Enhancement of Learning, 1605 
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for example, we infer from a person moving towards an object that they want the object. 
Baron-Cohen calls this the intentionality detector. Secondly, an eye-direction detector 
enables us quickly and easily to detect eyes, to compute whether those eyes are directed 
towards or away from us, and to infer that the possessor of those eyes sees whatever their 
eyes are directed towards. The inferences from these two body/thought combinations can 
then act as input into the third module: a shared-attention mechanism, which establishes 
that we are having the same experience as another person, and hence allows the 
construction of triadic representations, when we have beliefs about the intentions of the 
other towards an object. Right at the basis of our ability to understand others, therefore, 
is our ability to read embodied behaviour as implying mental states. 
In this subsection, I have suggested two ways in which publicly observable bodily 
behaviour inherently forms an aspect of our thinking: through the appropriation of 
physical mannerisms to form part of thinking; and through the hardwired inferences from 
bodily cues to mental events. Yet there is another way, at least as important as the 
construction of a theory of mind, in which our embodiment thoroughly permeates our 
thinking. 
3.1253 The Body in the Mind 
Johnson (1987) has argued in his The Body in the Mind that our experience of being 
embodied is absolutely fundamental to our ability to think and know. His argument is 
that our embodied existence equips us with image schemata (analogous in certain ways to 
emotional paradigms), which he describes as recurring dynamic patterns in perceptual 
interactions and motor programs. They provide fundamental ways of thinking about the 
world, such as up and down, near and far, force and resistance. These are knowledge of 
the world, but they are not propositional in any standard sense of the word; rather they are 
partly visual, partly kinaesthetic representations of the way we are in the world (which 
can also, particularly as we grow, add emotional, historical, social and linguistic 
dimensions in complex interactions). These provide the Background (in the terms we 
have been using, the situation or the context) for further, possibly more propositional, 
knowledge, formed by metaphorical projection: the use of patterns from one experience 
domain to structure another. Thus there is a physical, embodied basis that underlies and 
constrains all conceptual understanding, as well as our imagination. 
While Johnson refers to a number of empirical studies of language use and reasoning to 
support his contentions, additional support comes from two quarters. The first has 
already been alluded to: the studies into children's understanding of everyday phenomena 
which show that they reason by reference to paradigm scenarios which bear a striking 
resemblance to image schemata. Secondly, Damasio (1996) presents evidence from 
neurophysiological studies that show that it makes little sense to talk of the brain, separate 
from the rest of the body, as the seat of the mind. The brain and the rest of the body, he 
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says, form an indissociable integrated organism which reacts to the environment as an 
ensemble. In other words, the parts of the brain that deal with data from the rest of the 
body do not treat it merely as input for subsequent separate processing, but involve the 
whole body at all stages in the activity of "reasoning" itself. The physiological operations 
that underlie what we call the mind are derived from this structural and functional 
ensemble. What Damasio labels the "somatic image" - our background sense of the state 
of our body - forms an essential component of all reasoning. He says: "It is not only the 
separation between mind and brain that is mythical: the separation between mind and 
body is probably just as fictional. The mind is embodied, in the full sense of the term, not 
just embrained" (118). 
In this discussion, I have emphasized primarily only one direction of influence - from the 
body to the mind. Given this chapter's focus on thinking, this is not too surprising. Yet, 
as Damasio's phrase "indissociable integrated organism" indicates, we could equally well 
talk of the enminded body, assuming we could tolerate the barbarism of this neologism. 
Perhaps a better phrase is the "encultured body." The operations and understandings of 
the mind radically affect the body too - in the way that it is held, the gestures it makes, the 
feelings it feels in response to specific circumstances and so on. Thoughts and body 
states are caught in an intricate feedback ensemble, which make it appropriate to talk of 
the organism as a person, rather than a mind in a body (Strawson 1964). 
3.1254 Embodiment in a Physical World 
In the previous subsection, I argued that it is not enough to recognize that the mind exists 
in the physical setting of the brain, but that it is permeated by its setting in the whole 
body. This, however, is not to go far enough. The body/mind itself does not exist in a 
vacuum, or even just in a social world (§3.1252). It exists in the physical world and, just 
as Vygotsky demonstrates that the boundaries between individual minds are blurred in 
social interaction (see also §3.23), our bodies are not sharply individuated from the 
physical world. To give but two examples, the atmosphere interpenetrates out lungs, and 
the tools that we find ready-to-hand extend our bodies into the physical world so that, to 
use Heidegger's (1962) example, we locate our point of consciousness when we hammer 
in a nail at the face of the hammer (see §3.1242). Without the Vygotskian social 
interaction we could not think, but equally, without being immersed in, and interacting 
with, things themselves, we would be incapable of thought (Westphal 1998). 
Westphal (1998, 26) argues that "we humans are only capable of self-conscious thought if 
we in fact experience a world structured by events and objects with identifiable 
similarities and differences"; a world with a certain sort of continuity and variety; in other 
words, an intelligible world. Many things make up this world: some are inanimate 
objects; some are animate entities. Some do and some do not use language. Information 
from these things that arrives at our sense organs does not carry a label to say whether it 
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comes from a thinking, a merely animate or an inanimate object, and we begin to 
categorize that information on the basis of similarities and differences. Recognition of 
which differences and similarities are relevant is genetically coded, as we saw in §2.4. 
Cosmides and Tooby claim (1994, 66): 
Intuitively, we are all naive realists, experiencing the world as already parsed into objects, 
relationships, goals, foods, dangers, humans, words, sentences, social groups, motives, 
artefacts, animals, smiles, glares, relevances and saliencies, the known and the obvious.... 
But to produce this simplified world that we effortlessly experience, a vast sea of 
computational problems are being silently solved, out of awareness, by a host of 
functionally integrated circuits. These reasoning instincts are powerful inference engines, 
whose automatic, non-conscious operation creates our seamless experience of the world. 
The sense of clarity and self-evidence they generate is so potent it is difficult to see that 
the computational problems they solve even exist. As a result, we incorrectly locate the 
computationally manufactured simplicity that we experience as a natural property of the 
external world - as the pristine state of nature, not requiring any explanation or research. 
Since these "inference engines" have evolved through the interaction of the bodies of our 
ancestors in the physical world, and now allow us to situate ourselves "seamlessly" within 
that world (§3.124), then our thinking must inherently be coloured by the fact that we are 
physically embodied within this physical world. 
Clark (1998, 47), as we have seen in §3.1241, argues that both philosophical and 
empirical evidence (largely from robotics research) points to an account of an "embodied, 
embedded agent... thaw[ing] on the resources of mind, body, and world." Since, on his 
account, much of thinking is built through physical interaction with, and scaffolding 
from, the physical world (see §3.126 for more detail), then the specific characteristics of 
the body inevitably enter into such thinking. Indeed, Clark's inclusion of both body and 
world remind us that the aspects of thinking I have been discussing in these last five 
sections are not independent of each other. I will now look more closely at how they 
interrelate. 
3.126 Aspectual Symbiosis 
As I have already mentioned, treating the aspects of reasonableness separately, as I have 
done so far, risks conveying the impression that thinking can be critical, or creative, or 
committed and so on. This would be unfortunate, as any particular specimen of thinking 
must combine the different aspects. Of course, in considering a specimen of thinking, it 
may make sense to concentrate on one of the aspects more than the others. So, if we are 
looking at, say, the thinking involved in solving a mathematical problem, it might well be 
that the critical aspect of the thinking is of the greatest interest, while when we are 
considering how to convince a reluctant friend to join us in an outing, we may turn our 
attention more towards the committed aspect. 
However, even in the broad areas of these examples, we can readily see that the other 
aspects are involved and may, in particular circumstances, take on a higher profile. Take 
the extraordinary experience I once had of teaching mathematics to a boy who was 
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considered very slow. I soon found out that he had not learned how to subtract if 
borrowing was needed, because he did not understand place value properly. Yet, when I 
saw him playing the darts game "301," 16 I was astounded to see him effortlessly add the 
scores of three darts and subtract them from the current total. Clearly, in the classroom, 
his obvious antipathy to mathematics, and the strange context meant that the committed 
and contextual aspects to his thinking ensured he could not handle a task that, from the 
critical point of view, was identical in form to (and easier in detail than) the dart game 
task. Indeed, if (as seems likely) the mere thought of maths made him feel sick, then the 
embodied aspect was heavily involved as well. 
To turn to a completely different example, we might look at the thinking-in-action that is 
done by an accomplished sportsperson. The aspect of thinking that might seem to 
dominate in this situation is the embodied aspect. Certainly the sportsperson thinks 
through the body. However, if the thinking-in-action is to be good, each of the other 
aspects of thinking must play a role. Good sportspersons are creative players, but this 
does not entail just doing the unexpected, for the unexpected move to make may also be a 
poor move. Critical judgement is needed to decide which of the possible unusual moves 
is likely to be successful (and, indeed, when the expected move is the best). This critical 
judgement always arises in a context, so, for example, the player who will attempt one 
move in the dry will seek another if it is wet. Motivational factors, calling on the 
committed aspect of thinking, are notoriously crucial in determining the quality of 
sporting thinking-in-action. Many more examples of the interrelationship of the aspects 
of reasonableness could doubtless be advanced, but these will suffice to make the point. 
I have already referred to Vygotsky's (1962) work on the scaffolding of thought in 
§3.1252, and I shall return to it in more detail in §3.23 and §8.23. In those sections, 
however, I shall be concentrating, as Vygotsky himself did, on the scaffolding available 
from linguistically based social interaction. Clark (1998, 33) reminds us that scaffolding 
for thinking is provided by a much wider variety of structures: 
Most of these strategies [to bring coherence to our thinking] involve the use of some type 
of external structure or 'scaffolding' to mold and orchestrate behavior. Obvious contenders 
are the immediate physical environment.., and our ability to actively restructure that 
environment so as to better support and extend our natural problem-solving abilities. 
These strategies are especially important in child development. Less obvious but crucially 
important factors include the constraining presence of public language, culture, and 
institutions, the inner economy of emotional response, and various phenomena relating to 
group and collective intelligence. Language and culture, in particular, emerge as advanced 
species of external scaffolding 'designed' to squeeze maximum coherence and utility from 
fundamentally short-sighted, special-purpose, internally fragmented minds. 
In Clark's list, we find thinking is supported by both the physical and the cultural context, 
and by our own emotional responses, while in the last subsection, I quoted Clark on the 
16 In 301, each player starts on that score and, throwing three darts in a turn, races to zero. To start requires 
scoring a "double," then subsequent scores are subtracted from the remaining total. The final dart must also 
be a double that reduces the total to zero (i.e. if 32 is the current total, the player must throw a double 16). 
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place of embodiment in thinking. Since all these supports are often co-present, it is not 
surprising that any resultant coherent critical and/or creative thinking will also entail an 
admixture of these three aspects of reasonableness. 
Of course, one of the most powerful features of thinking in humans is the ability to turn 
thinking back on itself - often referred to as metacognition (§3.1245). In taking our 
thoughts - that is, our mental representations - as the objects of further thinking, we can 
redescribe them, making them more explicit and hence more powerful (Karmiloff-Smith 
1992, 15-26; Clark 1998, 207-211). Since each of the aspects of reasonableness has its 
own particular contribution to thinking, these contributions can be enhanced when one 
aspect is turned on another, as, for example, if we think creatively about our committed 
thinking, or critically about our contextualized thinking. Karmiloff-Smith (ibid., 17) 
argues that 
Development and learning, then, seem to take two complementary directions. On the one 
hand, they involve the gradual process of proceduralization (that is, rendering behavior 
more automatic and less accessible). On the other hand, they involve a process of 
'explicitation and increasing accessibility (that is, representing explicitly information that 
is implicit in the procedural representations sustaining the structure of behavior). 
The latter process is carried out through meta-cognitive processes and, as she says, 
increases the accessibility of thoughts. These, of course, include processes as well as 
contents, and so metacognition enhances the transfer of competencies across contexts (see 
§ 9.1 and §10.221 for further discussion of this point). 
Donaldson (1978, Chapter 7, also 123-127) argues that disembedded thought - thought 
that has been "prised out of the old primitive matrix within which originally all our 
thinking is contained" (ibid., 76) - is essential for operating fully within our society. In 
disembedded thought, the constraints that can be laid on thought by particularly the 
contextual, but also to some extent the committed and embodied, aspects of 
reasonableness are loosened, so that transfer of thinking can be enhanced. 
I have used the metaphor of symbiosis in the heading to emphasize that the aspects are 
not merely contingently combined in thinking, but rather that each has its own essential 
element to add to the rich capability that we refer to as reasonableness. It also implies 
interdependence, so that while one aspect helps another, that aspect itself can turn back to 
assist the first, to the greater advantage of reasonableness as a whole. Thinking that lacks 
any one of discrimination, imagination, motivation, situational location or physical 
instantiation is not possible for creatures such as us. 
3.13 Reasonableness and Moral Education 
In this first section of Chapter Three, I have developed an account of reasonableness 
which is considerably richer than most conceptions of critical thinking. By shifting the 
emphasis away from the critical aspect (important as it is), my account redirects attention 
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to several important features of good thinking, particularly if it is to be considered in 
relation to moral education. 
A multi-aspectual account is less likely to lead us towards the dubious assumption that, if 
only we could think clearly enough, we would all have to come to a common conclusion. 
If reasonableness has multiple inputs, and is always dependent on contingent factors such 
as the context in which it is used (which may well appear differently to different 
conversational partners), the commitments of those partners bring to the conversation and 
the way that they are embodied in the world, then reaching consensus is obviously going 
to be a more difficult task that if we can assume that all partners have a single-
dimensional critical capacity. We shall see in §3.2 that Kant's conception of reason 
explicitly excludes the committed, contextual and embodied aspects of reasonableness, 
and that this leads him into advancing a characterization of autonomy that I will argue is 
seriously flawed. Attention to the empirical and theoretical literature of developmental 
cognitive psychology, particularly from within the Vygotskian tradition (§3.23) will 
provide well-documented mechanisms for the growth of reasonableness in all its aspects. 
Of course, this is not to say that consensus is not ever possible, nor that it might not, in at 
least some circumstances, be a good idea to try to bracket the differences between the 
conversational partners (§7.24). We might even, as Habermas does, argue that in the 
ideal speech situation, such differences would be laid aside and that, hence, we must 
always enter discourse with the counterfactual goal of reaching consensus. In §4.1, my 
conception of reasonableness will be used to augment a modified Habermasian account of 
the pedagogic action of a teacher in a classroom, and this in turn will inform my 
reconceptualization of autonomy. 
In Chapter Five, I will turn my attention to moral theory, and §5.2 will examine 
Aristotle's virtue ethics. Practical reason plays an important role in virtue ethics, and I 
will demonstrate that Aristotle's account of it is in considerable agreement with 
reasonableness, particularly in the importance it places on context and emotion. 
However, Aristotle does not provide us with an adequate account of the development of 
practical reason throughout childhood, and I will claim that this is because he has little to 
say about dialogical interaction. For this, I shall return to Habermas' views in more detail 
in §6.23, and show that, although his insistence that reason and normative correctness 
must always be approached dialogically does introduce a place in moral decision for 
commitment, context and embodiment, in the end he does not take their implications 
seriously enough. I will distinguish three types of rationality in Habermas' work - 
presuppositional, situated and ideal - and argue that we can, with some minor 
modifications, equate Habermas' situated rationality with reasonableness. 
Subsequently, in Part III, I shall have frequent recourse to the account of reasonableness I 
have developed in assessing the implications for the classroom. I shall argue that the 
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development and use of reasonableness is a central feature of the community of ethical 
inquiry, and I shall explore the role it plays in the conduct of inquiry, the building of 
virtue, the linking of judgement to action, the avoidance of indoctrination and shallow 
ethical relativism, and the transfer of thinking across contexts, amongst other themes. 
3.2 Autonomy 
At the beginning of this chapter, I claimed that there is an interdependence between 
reason and autonomy. Roughly speaking, to be morally autonomous is to be an ethical 
agent, bearing responsibility for one's actions, and this requires reasonableness: the 
wherewithal to act in a way that can be supported by reasons. Alternatively, we can look 
at the interdependence from the other side, in recognizing that to be reasonable requires 
the ability to choose between reasons, an ability which is especially important in the light 
of a multi-aspectual account of reasonableness. But this ability to choose between reasons 
is itself essential to the ability to choose reasonably which action to take: which is just 
another way of characterizing autonomy. 
Both autonomy and reasonableness are clearly implicated in education. At least in 
Western societies, amongst the goals of education are the formation of persons who are 
both autonomous and reasonable. These personal qualities are required by a democratic 
system that places responsibility on each individual. What is less clear is which roles 
reasonableness and autonomy play during schooling. Since very young children are 
neither fully reasonable nor fully autonomous, educators need to be clear about both what 
the targets of reasonableness and autonomy actually are, and how they can assist children 
to reach these targets. 
Like much of Kant's thought, just what Kant intended by the term "autonomy" is open to 
much interpretation and some confusion. I will not become embroiled in close textual 
analysis in trying to come to terms with Kant's intentions: rather, I will survey some of 
the competing definitions supplied by Kant and interpretations by commentators and try 
to identify some of the key features, relevant to my own interests, that they share. In 
particular, I shall concentrate on the accounts of the nature of reason 17 that underlie 
Kant's autonomy. Given that the two concepts are so interdependent, the considerable 
difference between Kant's and my account of reason will be reflected in differences in the 
way autonomy is seen. 
In §3.21, I will firstly look at how Kant conceives of reason and the links between reason 
and autonomy, before pointing out the important divergences between Kant's reason and 
my reasonableness. One of the key problems I shall identify in Kant's work is a lack of 
attention to how reason develops in the growing child. I will then look in §3.22 at the 
17 The words "reason" and "rationality" seem to be used pretty much interchangably in Kant and the 
commentaries on Kant. I shall generally take them to be the same, and use "reason" and its derivatives in 
most of what follows. 
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interpretation of Kant as a constructivist advanced by O'Neill (1989), which offers some 
resources for taking the development of reason and autonomy more seriously. We shall 
see that there are a number of ways of talking of reason as constructed, not all of which 
can be applied to the developing child. Thus, I will turn in §3.23 to the evidence 
available from developmental psychology. Finally, §3.24 will begin on the task of 
reconceptualizing autonomy. 
3.21 Kant on Reason and Autonomy 
In Kant's eyes, humans are rational beings, "distinguished from animals by the fact that 
practical reason rather than instinct is the determinant of our actions" (Korsgaard 1996, 
110-111). Every action, if it is not to be random, must have a cause which can be 
subsumed under a law, and the will is the cause of action in rational beings. But a 
rational will must be a free will, and a free will must be autonomous; that is, "not 
determined by any external force, even your own desires" (Korsgaard 1996, 25). As Kant 
says, autonomy is "the property the will has of being a law to itself (independently of 
every property belonging to objects of volition)" (Groundwork , 440, 108, quoted in 
Allison 1996, 134). Allison (ibid, 135) glosses the parenthetical phrase as referring to 
"reasons to act that... stem (even indirectly) from its needs as a sensuous being." 
Autonomy, says Caygill (1995, 88, quoting Kant in Groundwork, 442,46) is based on "the 
rational concept of perfection as a possible effect of our will" - that is, based on an ideal 
of perfection only, not connected in any way to the agent's particular embodied existence 
or experience. 
In summary: for Kant, autonomy requires that emotions, desires and inclinations form no 
part of moral reasoning, and that the reasons involved (if action is to be autonomous) are 
unconnected to the embodiment or situatedness of a sensuous being in the world. 
3.211 Reasonableness Compared to Kantian Reason 
As we have seen above, reason and autonomy are tightly linked in Kant's account. He 
picks out humans as being reasonable and autonomous (in contrast to animals, which are 
neither). His claim is not that persons are always rational and autonomous, since we can 
be misled into heteronomous actions through our desires, but that humans are capable of 
reasonable, autonomous action when we freely choose to follow the moral law. 
It can be readily seen that Kant's account of reason is markedly different from the one I 
developed in §3.1, and that this difference consists in the positive exclusion from reason 
by Kant of my final three aspects of reasonableness (the committed, contextual and 
embodied aspects). Since Kant's account of autonomy rests heavily on this 
characterization of reason, that account, too, abstracts from emotion, situatedness and 
embodiment. This makes moral action into a solitary activity, in which the moral agent 
merely considers rationally the moral law, and chooses to follow it. 
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However, the moral law refers to "universalizability." It has the hypothetical form "if 
there are others, then I ought to treat all alike." Moral reasoning, at least at the level of 
maxims and the moral law, is something that can be carried out in complete isolation 
from others, and even if no others actually exist. For many feminists, communitarians 
and neo-Aristotelians, the idea that the core of moral reasoning is the solitary, rationalistic 
contemplation of abstract principles seems deeply counterintuitive. They feel, and I agree 
with them, that if morality is about anything, it is about actual interpersonal relations and 
hence must arise through, and be rooted in, such relations: relations with real, flesh-and-
blood, particular others. Benhabib (1992, 50) puts it like this: 
The moral self is not a moral geometrician but an embodied, finite, suffering and emotive 
being. We are not born rational but we acquire rationality through contingent processes of 
socialization and identity formation. Neo-Aristotelians as well as feminist theorists have 
argued that we are children before we are adults, that as human children we can only 
survive and develop within networks of dependence with others, and that these networks 
of dependence constitute the "moral bonds" that continue to bind us even as moral 
adults.... This 'rationalist' bias of universalistic theories in the Kantian tradition has at 
least two consequences. By ignoring, or rather by abstracting away from the embedded, 
contingent and finite aspects of human beings, these theories are blind to the variety and 
richness as well as the significance of emotional and character development... This 
neglect of the contingent beginnings of moral personality and character also leads to a 
distorted vision of certain human relationships and of their moral texture. Universalist 
and proceduralist ethical theorists often confuse the moral ideal of autonomy with the 
vision of the self 'as a mushroom.' 18 
That morality cannot be cast as the calculations of a separate, unencumbered, narrowly 
rational thinker has two implications: firstly, Kant's account ignores the very important 
question of how it is that babies develop towards becoming reasonable and autonomous 
beings; and secondly, autonomy cannot be construed in a solitary fashion. Benhabib is 
making a claim about the importance of social bonds in the formation of persons capable 
of reasoning and morality. Development does not take place in a social vacuum, and the 
contextual, embodied and affective aspects of social settings are by no means neutral in 
the development of reasonableness. As Benhabib says, we are dependent on others, not 
merely for our physical survival, but also for our rational and moral development. I shall 
turn in §3.23 to a consideration of the evidence from developmental psychology for this 
claim. 
This anticipates the thrust of Chapters Four and Six, which will look at Habermas' neo-
Kantian attempt to place discursive engagement with others at the centre of autonomy and 
meta-ethics. In the next section, however, I will concentrate on Benhabib's other major 
point, and look a little more closely at the place of the development of reason in a Kantian 
account of autonomy. We will find in §3.221 that O'Neill's attempt to take seriously the 
construction of reason under a Kantian account will give us pointers towards a sounder 
account of autonomy. 
18 Benhabib's reference to the self as a mushroom is an allusion to a passage in Hobbes (1966, 109): "Let 
us consider men... as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full 
maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other." 
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3.22 The Development of Reason 
A traditional interpretation of Kant (see, for example, Broad 1978; Schneewind 1992; 
Allison 1996) is that reason seems to be something that "finite rational beings" just have: 
an a priori attribute of humans. The nature of the reason that finite rational beings have 
can be seen in Schneewind's (1992, 316-318) account of Kant on the holy will. 
According to Kant, a holy will is a fully rational being. Hence, the holy will recognizes 
the moral law (since it is the product of practical reason) and, lacking any contrary, non-
rational influences, necessarily obeys the moral law. Finite rational beings also legislate 
the moral law for themselves. However, they sometimes do not take the right action, 
because they are finite: they have desires, preferences and emotions (among other 
factors). Finite rational beings can only be moral if they recognize that they ought to do 
what the holy will must do. 
Both the autonomy and the reason of finite rational beings play important roles in Kant's 
morality. Finite rational beings could acquire knowledge of the moral law in two ways: 
they could be told what the moral law is and that it holds for them; or they could have 
legislated the moral law for themselves through their reason. In the first case, the 
decision to follow the moral law would be made heteronomously and thus could not be a 
moral decision. Hence for Kant, only autonomous, reasoning beings can understand 
morality at all (to be able to know what the holy will must do, and therefore what one 
ought to do). Humans, as finite rational beings, therefore have perfect rationality 
tempered by their finitude (desires etc), rather than being finite in their rationality.I 9 
19 Chemiak's (1986) work on minimal rationality calls into question the supposition that the rationality of a 
finite being would be just a more limited mirror of the rationality of an unlimited being. For example, he 
argues that it is rational for a finite being to accept that some of its beliefs will be false, given the time and 
effort required to root out such false beliefs when compared to the penalty for holding them. Such an 
acceptance would clearly be irrational in an unlimited being, for whom time and effort are no problem. 
Equally, it would be irrational for a limited being to make even a small fraction of the sound and feasible 
inferences from its belief set, given the paralysis that would result, but not so for the holy will. The desires 
and preferences of the limited rational being enter inherently into this sort of rationality. In deciding in 
which areas of our knowledge it is worth investing a lot of effort to track down false beliefs, or when it is 
essential to draw more inferences, the agent must make judgements of importance and immediacy. These 
judgements can only be based upon what matters most to the agent - something that is governed by desires 
and preferences. A holy will has no desires and preferences, and no need to make such decisions. So even 
the core rules of rationality differ between limited rational beings and holy wills. Chemialc calls into 
question even the possibility of defining the rationality of a holy will: "For we have found that there seem 
to be remarkably few a priori constraint on a rational agent's deductive abilities. An agent must only be an 
adequate logician; beyond generalizations about human psychology, there seems to be no transcendentally 
'right' kind of logician" (48). Formal reasoning systems are not an idealization of the actual techniques 
used by humans who are acknowledged to be thinking and acting reasonably. The finite individual's reason 
is not that of the transcendental being. It seems that Kant has misconceived the relationship between a 
"finite rational being" and a holy will. The two cannot be, as he requires, beings with equivalent reason, but 
with the former limited by alien desires and preferences. Kant would have the adjective "finite" modify 
"being," not "rational," yet humans must have limitations that apply to their rationality itself. Kant's 
account assumes an objective reason, that is identically available to all. Humans, with their desires and 
preferences, cannot have such reason. 
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What is not clear in this account is the place of children. Are all children (as humans) 
both autonomous and possessors of innate reason? Kant makes it clear that even if finite 
rational beings are autonomous, that does not mean that they always act autonomously or 
rationally - they are often lead by their limitations to act heteronomously. The limitations 
most commonly cited are desires and preferences, but other aspects, such as lack of 
experience or possibly continuing brain development, may mean that, although children 
also have innate reason and autonomy, they are limited in their ability to access or apply 
them. Thus the inability of young children to reason correctly and act autonomously can 
be explained, and does not count as a counterexample to Kant's thesis. 
This account would maintain reason and autonomy as attributes of all humans, even 
children. Development then would be a case of overcoming the limitations that block 
reason and autonomy. Yet such an account seems to be at odds with our experience of 
child development and education, where it seems that children are actually learning how 
to reason, rather than how to avoid limitations. I shall turn in §3.23 to empirical 
evidence that supports this claim. Before I do, however, I shall turn my attention to a 
more recent interpretation of Kant that claims he supported a constructivist view of 
reason. 
3.221 A Constructivist Version of Kant 
O'Neill (1989) has defended an unorthodox anti-foundationalist and constructivist 
account of Kant's practical philosophy. Her interpretation is at odds with most 
commentators, who have taken Kant to base his practical philosophy on a priori reason, 
as we have seen above. However, O'Neill points out that Kant's overall project is usually 
taken as (successfully) demonstrating the inadequacy of foundationalist metaphysics, 
while having surreptitious recourse to it in his practical philosophy. She takes seriously 
the possibility that Kant held to anti-foundationalist views throughout, and develops her 
account on that basis. Her interpretation seems to rest heavily on the following quotation, 
which appears three times in the first three chapters of her book (pp. 15, 37 , 57) . 20 
Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism... Nothing is so important 
through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from this searching 
examination, which knows no respect for persons. Reason depends on this freedom for its 
very existence. For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the 
agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or 
hindrance, his objection or even his veto. (Critique of Pure Reason, A73818766) 
Reason is no longer a priori, a given that we can build on. Rather, reason is a 
construction in which all (or, in Kant's day at least, all educated men) can and indeed 
should help. In further support of her claim, O'Neill refers to Kant's writings on the 
history of reason, and to the very idea of a critique of reason, for the word "critique" 
20 This passage anticipates the approach of Habermas, who has drawn heavily on the Kantian tradition: see 
§6.23. As in Habermas' account, the existence of other persons is central to O'Neill's reconstruction of 
Kant. 
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implies a finding of weaknesses and the attempt to improve ("Critique of reason is only 
possible if we think of critique as recursive and reason as constructed rather than 
imposed," p 27). In a claim that echoes my position in Chapter Two, she says that Kant 
holds that the roots of reason lie in the "cunning of nature," which provides "just enough 
[reason] for the most pressing needs," before social and cultural development takes over 
(quotes are Kant's, from O'Neill 1989, 39). Kant was optimistic that the task of finding 
the most pure, best reason would not take long - "before the end of the present century" 
he wrote in 1780 (quoted in di Giovanni 1992). 
I think there are pressing problems with this interpretation of Kant. There are a number 
of ways in which we can interpret the phrase "the construction of reason." Firstly, we 
need to make a distinction between the construction of reason itself and the construction 
of an adequate account of reason, and I think that the passages to which O'Neill appeals 
to support her constructivist account can be best read to support the latter. As I have 
pointed out in §3.124, we are able to do many things without being able to give anything 
like a full account of how we do them. If reason is innate, then while that means all 
humans are "rational beings," it does not imply that all humans can describe and explain 
their reason. Once we realise this, we can see that Kant, in the passages quoted by 
O'Neill to support her interpretation, is merely arguing that it is our human account of 
reason that needs to be constructed. The task for which he calls upon others to assist him 
is this descriptive and explanatory task, not the construction of reason itself, which he 
takes to be in some sense innate. 
Even if I am wrong about this, there are further ambiguities. The construction of reason 
itself (rather than an account of it) can be considered historically, as a production of 
humanity, or personally, as an individual attainment. 21 Again, the Kantian passages upon 
which O'Neill relies support the former interpretation, seeming to say little about the 
growth of reason in persons. Yet, if the capacity to reason and act autonomously was 
constructed historically in humans (as I think we must agree it was), then there are some 
problems with O'Neill's account of the interactions between reason and autonomy. 
Reason, says O'Neill in one place, is based on freedom and autonomy. 
This gap [between reason and autonomy] is to be closed not by establishing that human 
beings are rational, and then proving that they are free and hence also (given the analytic 
argument) autonomous. Kant's strategy is the reverse.... Only autonomous, self-
disciplining beings can act on principles that we have grounds to call principles of 
reasoning. Reason has no transcendent authority; it can only be vindicated by critique, and 
critique itself is at bottom no more than the practice of autonomy in thinking. Autonomy 
does not presuppose but rather constitutes the principles of reason and their authority. (57) 
211 do not wish to imply by the phrases "personal construction" or "individual construction" that the 
construction of reason is something that people can do on their own, in social isolation. Indeed, I will argue 
just the opposite. These phrases are meant to draw a distinction between reason in Popper's Third World 
sense (the joint historical product of many thinkers - here called historical construction) and reason as it 
becomes constructed in an individual's thinking repertoire. 
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Now, there are problems seeing how the concept of self-legislation can lead to the myriad 
of skills, abilities, capacities and capabilities that we call reason, even if reason is 
restricted in the Kantian way to rationality. However, I shall pass over those, for only a 
few pages earlier, O'Neill seems to be saying that autonomy is based on reason: 
We can begin to see why, if autonomous action is to be independent of everything 'alien,' 
it must be action determined by reason. Independence from 'alien' causes, taken strictly, 
must be independence from contingent or variable events, including those that are 
intimately part of agents. Such events depend on the play of natural forces or (possibly) on 
random occurrences, and so ultimately on indisputably 'alien' causes. Maxims of 
autonomous action, by contrast, must hold equally for all rational agents, whatever their 
peculiar contingent and variable characteristics, and so must be universalizable. Their 
authority, if they have any, cannot derive from any contingency of human life but only 
from the requirements of reason, whatever those may be. (54) 
In this passage, O'Neill seems to be saying that autonomous action can only be action 
determined by reason and, further, that maxims of autonomous action must arise from the 
requirements of reason. In two (connected) ways, then, reason predates autonomy. For 
without the underpinnings of reason, no action can be autonomous. 
This apparent contradiction could be resolved by recourse to Allison's Reciprocity 
Thesis; that autonomy and reason reciprocally imply each other (Allison 1996, Chapter 
9). This account might be sustainable on an a priori account of reason, where reason and 
autonomy are all or nothing affairs. Difficulties arise if reason is constructed; particularly 
if it is not just constructed jointly over historical time by adult thinkers, but also 
individually over a lifetime by embodied growing children. Autonomy can only support 
reason if it is already present, and vice versa. Of course, we might consider some sort of 
cyclical bootstrapping mechanism (and this is indeed similar to the account that I will 
subsequently develop), but this would seem to have the consequence that children could 
not be morally accountable until both reason and autonomy have been constructed, for it 
is not until then that they can self-legislate the moral law. Moral development reduces to 
a one-off moment of self-legislation. Indeed, it is a clear consequence of Kohlberg's 
Kantian-based account of moral development that children are pre-moral until this 
"moment of enlightenment," as I will discuss in §5.1. 
O'Neill's further claim in this passage is that Kant needs reason to be a single capacity, 
shared by all rational beings. Only then can it be said that a decision made on the basis of 
reason alone is autonomous. This is because if reason differed from agent to agent, then 
what reason commanded in one agent would be contingently different from what it 
commanded in another agent, and hence their actions would be heteronomous. 
Yet, if O'Neill is committed to the individual construction of reason, the current 
construction of reasoning available to an individual is dependent on contingent factors, 
and Kant's argument shows us that the individual is heteronomous. Constructions can be 
more or less completed and, further, the construction need not proceed following an 
identical plan in all cases, as it involves input from five different aspects (§3.12). The 
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only escape from this conclusion seems to be to understand reason and autonomy as 
relatively minimal constructions, a subset of the agent's total construction, so that it may 
be that all (normal) adult humans have completed the task. If all human agents of the 
requisite age had already constructed the required subsets of reason and autonomy, they 
may be able to impose the moral law on themselves. Just how an agent would know 
precisely which subset of reason ought to be accessed in order to do the self-legislating is 
not clear. 
A minimalist position on reason in itself is problematic, as the argument that Kant mounts 
in order to support his contention that all humans, qua rational and autonomous beings, 
impose the moral law upon themselves is long and complex; highly unlikely to be able to 
be followed, let alone autonomously initiated, by the vast majority of those whom he 
claims have done so. He does not claim that in order to impose the moral law on oneself, 
it is necessary to work through this reasoning: it is merely necessary to be autonomous 
and capable of rationality. Yet, exactly how this self-legislation is achieved without 
following his argument is unclear. 
Of course, we can ask at this point which we should abandon: the construction of reason 
or the Kantian account. I shall argue that, as we have good grounds for believing that 
reason is personally constructed, then it is Kantian notions of reason and autonomy which 
need to be abandoned. I have already developed an account of reasonableness in §3.1 that 
takes account of aspects of reasonableness that are not merely ignored, but positively 
excluded, by Kant. It is time now to look at the empirical evidence about how such 
reasonableness could be constructed by developing children. Then, equipped with a 
better characterization of reasonableness and its construction, I will turn again to 
autonomy. 
3.23 Evidence from Experimental Developmental Psychology 
To say, as I said in Chapter Two, that certain features of the brain and its operation are 
present at birth is not to say that human reason is already fully formed. On the contrary, 
there is still much work to do before a child can be said to be reasonable. This is the 
social and experiential superstructure of reason and, as I stated in the previous subsection, 
it further ensures that reason is not universally identical. In this section, I will survey 
some of the research into how children's reasonableness grows and develops. The main 
thrust of this section will be that the major mechanism for the development of 
reasonableness is Vygotskian learning. 
The Vygotskian learning framework is a version of genetic epistemology, originated by 
Piaget. Vygotsky's major work, Thought and Language (1962), begins with an explicit 
reaction to Piaget. In its broad sense (that is, not used purely as a name for Piaget's 
research program), genetic epistemology is concerned with the origins and development 
of both children's knowledge itself and children's ability to acquire knowledge as they 
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mature and grow. Since almost all modern work on cognitive developmental psychology 
arises either as a continuation of, or in reaction to, Piaget's claims, I will first outline the 
key features of his account. The summary of his work that follows depends heavily on 
Donaldson (1978, 129-146). 
I referred above to the superstructure of reasonableness. There are two aspects to this 
superstructure: the social, which relies on interaction with other humans, and the 
experiential, which relies on an individual's solitary attempts to make sense of the world. 
Clearly, such a division is somewhat arbitrary, as social interaction is mediated through 
the world, and experiential exploration is often carried out socially. Nevertheless, the 
division may stand for the time being in order to make a few points. 
Experimental study of the experiential exploration of the world, and its connection to the 
construction of reason, has been most famously carried out by Piaget. Although Piaget 
took some interest in the development of specific concepts (or bits of knowledge), 
particularly in his 1929 The Child's Conception of the World (Solomon 1994, 2-3), the 
main thrust of his work was to explicate how children gained the ability to gain 
knowledge. In other words, he was more interested in the cognitive strategies available to 
children at different ages, and how they came about, than he was in studying what 
children learn. 
Piaget characterizes a human as a self-regulating system that builds models of the world 
and how it can be interpreted. When such a model is adequate to experience, the person 
is in equilibrium. Further activity, however, will throw up experiences that do not neatly 
correspond to that model. This dissonance can result in action of one of two kinds: either 
the person can see a way to incorporate the new experience into the broad models - 
knowledge webs or cognitive tools - already being used (assimilation); or they will realise 
that is cannot be fitted in without changing the model (accommodation). In most cases, 
both processes are at work together. 
One of Piaget's key claims is that part of the model is the inventory of intellectual tools 
used to deal with the experiences: that is, reason. When the presently held set of tools is 
seen to be inadequate to deal with experience any more, then reason can be reconstructed 
through accommodation. Piaget claims that when these reconstructions take place, the 
child enters a new stage, where new reasoning tools become available and are potentially 
useable across the whole range of the child's interaction with the world. Thus, Piaget's 
theory is often known as a Stage Theory. Examples of such tools include reversibility 
and decentration, but the details of Piaget's stages are not important here. 
Piaget's theory has increasingly come under criticism in a number of respects. It is as 
well to be careful here, however, as the theory was constructed over more than 50 years, 
and there are apparent internal contradictions in his writings. Further, there is good 
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evidence that his theory was being adapted towards the end of his life to accommodate at 
least some of the objections (Fosnot 1993). The four points in Piagetian theory (as 
generally understood) that I think are the weakest are: 
1. the monolithic stage theory implies that all reasoning is domain-general. 
Current evidence is that reasoning is context sensitive. This question of transfer 
across domains was addressed in §3.1245, and I shall return to in §10.221, so I 
shall merely note here that Kanniloff-Smith's (1992, 11) judgement is that 
"Piaget's... arguments for across-the-board stages no longer constitute a viable 
developmental framework." 
2. the role of social interaction is downplayed in comparison to the role of solitary 
thought. This point is perhaps the most controversial, for it is relatively easy to 
find passages in Piaget's writings that support either the contention that social 
interaction is of minimal importance, or that it is of great importance. 
3. language is confined to the role of representation and reporting, never given a 
role as a source of thought. 
4. learning is said to be different from, and to follow after, development. Thus, 
education becomes largely a matter of watching for cognitive development 
before introducing new, more demanding material, rather than creating the 
conditions to encourage development through new learning. 
3.231 Social Interaction 
Donaldson (1978, 145) points out the interaction between numbers two and four: 
For [Piaget] 'learning' is by no means synonymous with 'development'. Rather, he tends 
to equate 'learning' with the acquisition of knowledge from some external source - that is, 
he contrasts it with acquisition as the result of one's own activities. 
Solomon (1994, 3) quotes Piaget writing dismissively in the foreword to a book by his 
collaborators (Inhelder, Sinclair et al. 1974, who had tried to see if learning could 
accelerate cognitive development): "bits of learning are not development." She notes that 
Piaget (not surprisingly, given this opinion) was not very interested in teaching, and 
records that he rejected attempts by Bruner to interest him in educational work. 
Even in as social a field as moral development, Piaget (1977) thought that the actual 
development of a cognitively different moral capacity is the result of "intelligence 
working on moral rules as on all other data by generalizing them and differentiating 
between them" - a personal and internal action. He tied such development to a domain-
general entry into a higher stage, where reciprocity has developed: "Autonomy therefore 
appears only with reciprocity, when mutual respect is strong enough to make the 
individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be 
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treated" (both quotes from 189, my italics). It is worth noting the similarities with Kant's 
account of the moral law - treating others as one wishes oneself to be treated - as 
something that must be imposed by a solitary thinker from within. This is not 
coincidence, for Piaget's work draws explicitly on Kantian philosophy, and this Kantian 
lineage reappears in Kohlberg's neo-Piagetian account of moral development (see §4.2). 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992, 17-26) presents a neo-Piagetian account of development that 
renounces global stages. Nevertheless, her model of "representational redescription" is 
largely internally driven. She claims that knowledge can be represented in one of four 
formats. The first is an intuitive format, where information is encoded in procedural 
form, not available for any use outside the module. Subsequently, children feel a drive to 
understand their knowledge, and redescribe the representation into successively more 
explicit formats, available more generally. While this model accounts for domain 
specificity, and later domain generality, of knowledge better than Piaget's model, 
Kanniloff-Smith still pays little attention to the social element in the acquisition of 
knowledge and cognitive competency. It rates a single mention in her book - in relation 
to social development. To be fair, she claims that this is "partly because a number of 
developmental theories.., have in my view given too much weight to social interaction at 
the cost of neglecting important endogenous factors" (ibid., 122). 
Vygotsky (1962, 23) puts his finger on the second problem when he says that "the 
developmental uniformities established by Piaget apply to the given milieu, under the 
conditions of Piaget's study. They are not laws of nature but are historically and socially 
determined." He continues by pinpointing the key respect in which the conditions of 
Piaget's studies were limited: they did not involve studying children in social interaction. 
In such a milieu, Vygotsky (1981) finds a different process of cognitive development: 
Any function in the child's [higher mental] development appears... first... on the social 
plane, then on the psychological plane. ... children.., use the same forms of [thinking] 
behaviour in relation to themselves that others initially used in relation to them. (quoted in 
Kohlberg and Wertsch 1987, 197) 
In Thought and Language, he puts this in perhaps simpler terms: "What the child can do 
in cooperation today, he can do alone tomorrow" (Vygotsky 1962, 104). Like Piaget, he 
stresses the importance of challenging the thought of children as a means to improve it. 
But while for Piaget the challenges come, especially before about age 12, from the child's 
interaction with the world, Vygotsky sees a much greater role for language and social 
interaction. Forman and Cazden (1985) expand on Vygotsky's thesis as follows: 
Each child learns to use speech to guide the actions of his or her partner and, in turn, to be 
guided by the partner's speech. Exposure to this form of social regulation can enable 
children to master difficult problems together before they are capable of solving them 
alone. More importantly, experience with social forms of regulation can provide children 
with just the tools they need to master problems on their own. ... When they can apply 
this social understanding to themselves, they can then solve, independently, those tasks 
that they had previously been able to solve only with assistance. 
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Piaget, whose clinical interviews were conducted almost exclusively with children on 
their own, misses (or possibly underemphasizes) two essential points: that children, in 
verbal interaction with others, are capable of participating in better thinking than a single 
one of them alone can manage; and that children construct their reason from their 
experience of the thought processes of others as expressed in discussion and social 
interaction (and not simply through development and physical experiences). Empirical 
evidence to support these conclusions continues to mount (Donaldson 1978). Tizard and 
Hughes (1984, 126), on the basis of transcripts of children's conversations, point out that 
"by the age of three or four... dialogue is as important as physical exploration" in the 
construction of reason. 
After presenting his own empirical evidence to support the view that young children learn 
how to reason from a contradiction in this way, Lawson (1990, 550) addresses the 
educational implications: if "one views development as a consequence of the 
internalization of the patterns of social (verbal) discourse, then a failure of the classroom 
to engage students in such discourse would deprive them of opportunity to develop the 
reasoning patterns in question." 
3.232 The Role of Language 
Rather than giving language merely a representational and reportative role as Piaget does, 
Vygotsky argues for a close connection between thought and language that, once 
established in early childhood, leads to a greater empowerment of both. The 
communicative role of language, he argues, is prior to its representational role. The 
phenomenon of self-directed speech - the habit young children have of talking to 
themselves as they accomplish tasks - is interpreted differently by Piaget and Vygotsky. 
The former takes it as a sign of the egocentrism of the young child and its disappearance 
as a waning of egocentrism: hence, he calls it egocentric speech. Vygotsky interprets it as 
a reproduction by the child of the sort of commentary that others, usually adults, have 
used to accompany shared tasks, and the disappearance as the transformation into "inner 
speech" or verbalized thought. Language and thought are thus intimately intertwined. 
Later, further internalization of dialogical interchange is the basis for the development of 
reasoning, as the child incorporates reasoning capabilities used in the social setting. 
Mead, working independently in the USA, came to similar conclusions to Vygotsky. 
Kohlberg and Wertsch (1987) summarize Mead's findings: "The basic mechanism that 
makes the socialization of thought possible... is the process of dialogue" (209). 
"Cognitive self-guidance speech and hence inner speech or verbal thought... must 
develop out of a prior dialogue mode" (214). Sellars goes even further, claiming that 
"the ability to have thoughts is acquired in the process of acquiring overt speech and that 
only after overt speech is well established, can 'inner speech' occur without its overt 
culmination" (1963, 188). In this, he seems to deny that any thought takes place at all 
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before the onset of language acquisition, but it is as well to recall that Sellars restricts 
"thought" to propositional thought, in a way that neither Vygotsky nor Mead do. 
3.233 Learning and Development 
According to Vygotslcy, if we study the development of cognitive capacities in social 
settings, we find a very different relationship between learning and development. He says 
that, "since instruction given in one area can transform and reorganise other areas of child 
thought, it may not only follow maturing.., but also precede it and further its progress" 
(Vygotsky 1962, 96). In other words, learning does not just wait on cognitive 
development, as Piaget asserts, it also often leads to development. Learning and using 
language plays a central part in this process: 
Thought development is determined by language, i.e., by the linguistic tools of thought 
and by the sociocultural experience of the child.... The child's intellectual growth is 
contingent on his mastering the social means of thought, that is, language.... [When the 
child learns to talk] the nature of the development itself changes, from biological to 
sociohistorical. Verbal thought is not an innate, natural form of behaviour but is 
determined by a historical-cultural process and has specific properties and laws that 
cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech. (ibid., 51, original italics) 
Kohlberg and Wertsch (1987, 197), in a thoughtful comparison of Piaget and Vygotsky, 
recognize that the latter "emphasised that the developmental analysis of higher mental 
processes must begin with an examination of their linguistically mediated social origins." 
If we want to know how the ability to think develops and improves throughout childhood, 
we need to concentrate on the social linguistic interchanges between children and others. 
The key Vygotskian insight is that children can engage verbally in a social group in forms 
of reasoning that are not yet available to them individually, and that it is precisely this 
engagement that enables children eventually to use those forms of thought. Vygotsky 
uses the term "zone of proximal development" to label this conceptual and reasoning 
space in which children can operate with help from a group, but are not capable of 
operating in on their own. 
Thus, there is solid empirical and theoretical support from developmental psychology for 
the view that reason is constructed. Piaget provides evidence for the role of assimilation 
and, especially, accommodation in interaction with the world in this process, while 
Vygotsky emphasizes that children can, in a social situation, work beyond their individual 
competencies, and that the subsequent internalization of these competencies means that 
the construction of reason involves a primary role for social dialogue and language. 
3.234 Vygotsky and the Aspects of Reasonableness 
So far I have referred to cognitive capacities in general, claiming that Vygotslcian learning 
applies to the development of reasonableness. Given the multi-aspectual nature of my 
account of reasonableness, it is important to make clear that Vygotsky does not construe 
rationality narrowly, encompassing merely what I have called the critical aspect of 
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thinking. My focus below will be on the aspects of reasonableness, though I shall also 
appeal to a Vygotskian analysis of the acquisition of virtue in §5.22. Vygotsky says: 
The fruitfulness of our method may be demonstrated also in other questions concerning 
the relations between consciousness as a whole and its parts.... We have in mind the 
relation between intellect and affect. Their separation as subjects of study is a major 
weakness of traditional psychology since it makes the thought process appear as an 
autonomous flow of "thoughts thinking themselves," segregated from the fullness of life, 
from the personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses of the thinker. Such 
segregated thought must be viewed as either a meaningless epiphenomenon incapable of 
changing anything in the life or conduct of a person, or else as some kind of primeval 
force exerting an influence on personal life in an inexplicable, mysterious way... By the 
same token, the old approach precludes any fruitful study of the reverse process, the 
influence of thought on affect and volition... Every idea contains a transmuted affective 
attitude towards the bit of reality to which it refers. (1962, 8) 
In this, we can see that Vygotsky gives an account of what I have called the committed 
aspect of thinking, together with the contextual aspect. Indeed, as he argues here, it is the 
fullness of life - the context in which we live - that links the emotions to the contents and 
processes of thought. But there is also an essential place in Vygotsky's scheme for the 
creative aspect of thought, again linked to the context in which thoughts form and evolve: 
Concept creation is a creative, not a mechanical, passive process... a concept emerges and 
takes shape in the course of a complex operation aimed at the solution of some problem... 
the mere presence of external conditions favoring a mechanical linking of word and object 
does not suffice to produce a concept. (54) 
In arguing that concept formation is a complex and ongoing process, Vygotsky provides 
supportive grounds for Johnson's (1993, 90-99) prototype account of concepts, an 
account that I shall return to, particularly in §6.2322 and §7.24. 
a concept is more than the sum of certain associative bonds formed by memory, more than 
a mental habit; it is a complex and genuine act of thought that cannot be taught by drilling 
but can be accomplished only when the child's mental development itself has reached the 
requisite level. At any age, a concept embodied in a word represents an act of 
generalization. But word meanings evolve. When a new word has been learned by the 
child, its development is barely starting... as the child's intellect develops, it is replaced 
by generalizations of a higher and higher type - a process that in the end leads to the 
formation of true concepts. ... Practical experience also shows that the direct teaching of 
concepts is impossible and fruitless. (82) 
Concepts form in multiple contexts, evolve with age and use, take on characteristics 
rooted in the settings in which they form and metamorphose, generalizing from those 
contexts but retaining the marks of their genesis. Thus concepts are key carriers of the 
contextual aspect of reasonableness. 
3.235 Development, Reasonableness and Autonomy 
In this section, I have outlined the evidence that reasonableness is constructed in social 
interaction with others. This, especially when taken in conjunction with the multi-
aspectual account of reasonableness developed in §3.1 and reinforced above, 
demonstrates that Kant's account of reason as rationality, shared by all humans, cannot be 
the basis for an account of autonomy. I will now turn to a first pass at taking account of 
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social interaction in characterizing autonomy. Following this section, in Chapter Four, I 
will look at Habermas' neo-Kantian theory of communicative action that emphasizes the 
importance of social interaction through discourse, considering its implications for the 
classroom. This, we shall find, can overcome the lack of a developmental element in 
Kant's account of autonomy, but will itself need to be modified somewhat in §4.2, where 
I shall present my full version of autonomy. 
3.24 A Reconceptualization of Autonomy  
3.241 Thinking for Oneself 
It is a commonplace that thinking for oneself is a good thing. Thinking for oneself is 
taken to be a hallmark of autonomy. Yet it is far from clear that those who endorse 
"thinking for oneself' as an aim have thought through properly what it means. Let's look 
at an example. 
Jackson (1994), in a chapter entitled Approaches to Learning Ethics tells a story taken 
from Arnold (1888, 205) about Mary Shelley. Upon being given the advice to "send [her 
son] somewhere where they will teach him to think for himself," Shelley replied "Oh, my 
God! teach him rather to think like other people!" Jackson comments: 
Thinking for oneself rather than thinking like other people, that is the question. Most 
ethics educators will say they want students to think for themselves. Independence and 
autonomy are often cited as moral imperatives... If ethics educators value autonomy, then 
let us take advantage of the research into teaching and learning.., to advance towards it. 
(179) 
I am not saying that thinking for oneself is worthless and that people ought rather to 
thoughtlessly parrot others. If this was Mary Shelley's meaning, then I don't agree with 
her.22 However, there are three points to be made. The first is that the dichotomy posed 
by Jackson was not thinking for oneself vs thoughtlessly espousing the thoughts of others, 
but rather thinking for oneself vs thinking like others. The second is that there is no 
mention of the quality of thinking, just who is doing it. Thirdly, it is impossible to think 
for oneself about everything that one is to accept as knowledge. 
3.2411 Thinking for Oneself vs Thinking Like Others 
One is not autonomous if one accepts, without thought, the thinking others have done. 
But there is no necessary dichotomy between doing one's own thinking (considering, 
weighing, exploring etc) about an issue, and coming to the same conclusion that everyone 
else who has thought carefully about that issue has come to. Indeed, if many have 
thought about an issue and come to a particular conclusion, then the fact that an 
individual, based on their own thinking, comes up with another conclusion is a prima 
facie case for rejecting that conclusion. Of course, if cogent reasons can be given for 
22 Since Mary Shelley, author of Frankenstein, was the daughter of Mary Wollstonecraft (A Vindication of 
the Rights of Women) and William Godwin (Political Justice) and wife of poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, all 
(for the time) notorious free-thinkers, she may have had good reason for her remark. 
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accepting it and rejecting the consensus, this individual thinking will be exceptionally 
valuable, but it is not the mere fact that it has been thought about individually that makes 
it so. Original thinking that "breaks the mold" is always valuable, but not all 
idiosyncratic thinking is valuable. 
3.2412 The Ouality of Thinking 
This is where the second point bites. Thinking for oneself is of little value unless the 
thinking is of sufficient quality. Quality thinking is not something that takes place 
according to idiosyncratic rules or processes. Rather, it is thinking that can be judged to 
be good against certain criteria. These criteria must be public, and the judging potentially 
so. Thus, in order to think well for oneself, one must, by and large, think like others who 
also think well. This is not to say that all good thinkers think the same thoughts: we can 
make a process/content distinction here. Good thinking utilizes good, standard processes 
(which may be algorithms or heuristics), but can be applied to new content, or old content 
in a novel way, to come up with new conclusions. Equally, an individual can string 
together thought processes which are common in an idiosyncratic yet valid way. The 
generative rules that cover logic and language allow creativity of this sort within rule 
bound behaviour - rules which are publicly available to all. 
We have to be careful here. If we take the lessons of Cherniak (1986) to heart, then there 
is no ideal rational procedure mapped out in advance for dealing with a particular 
information set (drawing all possible inferences from that set, for example). To attempt 
to proceed according to some such notion of pure rationality would be a waste of 
resources and hence irrational. Good thinking is an art, not merely a matter of following 
strict algorithms. Like art, it does require mastery of techniques which may themselves 
be largely algorithmic, but it also requires much more - for example, nuanced and situated 
judgement about which algorithms, if any, to apply in which contexts. 
Nothing said above is meant to rule out the possibility of individuals discovering for 
themselves, for example, new ways of constructing arguments in logic, or a valuable new 
heuristic to use in a certain context. Such breakthroughs, if entirely new, are very rare - 
and even so would need to be assessed against public criteria. This is to say that the rules 
and criteria for good thinking are themselves not fixed. They can become the content of 
thinking, and they may be able to be improved, if the argument for a better rule or 
criterion can be sustained by good thinking. The.content/process distinction is useful, but 
it is not set in concrete. Further, this process of validation is public and consensual, not a 
matter of thinking for oneself. 
Further, it has to be recognized that thinking is not merely about facts. We apply our 
thinking to our values, our personal, social and cultural beliefs as well as our factual 
knowledge, and we do it from within the context in which we are situated. Even factual 
knowledge is not universally shared, not even amongst those who are in close proximity. 
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Given this variety in starting points, it is not surprising that two equally competent 
thinkers, perhaps even using the same thought processes, will not necessarily come to the 
same conclusions. 
3.2413 Testimony 
The third problem with lauding thinking for oneself was hinted at when I characterized 
thinking for oneself as "considering, weighing, exploring etc." If we are not 
thoughtlessly to take on the thoughts of others, does this imply that we need to carefully 
consider, weigh and explore every thought that others express to us? Such a model of 
thinking for oneself would be impossible. Given the large proportion of our thoughts 
which we take on trust from others with whom we interact, such a task would be 
paralysing. Rather than needing to rethink and validate all knowledge offered by others, 
thinking for oneself is often more about evaluating the conditions of trust. Is this person 
generally trustworthy? Are they likely to be trustworthy on this particular point? Under 
what circumstances should I reopen the question of validity for knowledge that I took on 
trust earlier? We need to be wary of asserting that thinking for oneself requires global 
scepticism of others, cutting ourselves off from reliance upon them (Code 1991). In 
many cases, we must think like others in the absence of any good reason to do otherwise. 
This point cuts deepest when we consider how it is that we learn what good thinking is, 
rather than just considering content knowledge. Young children are as yet incapable of 
evaluating the adequacy of the procedures of reasoning that are used by more capable 
others in their social setting. They must take them on trust if they are to become capable 
of reasoning at all. Eventually, as they are becoming more competent reasoners, they will 
be able to reflexively turn the tools of reason back onto themselves, but this cannot be 
done at every stage. 
3.242 Autonomy, Heteronomy and Dependence 
In considering the three points above, I argued that there is an important sense in which 
thinking for oneself is thinking like other people, provided the other people concerned are 
good thinkers. Due to the support that the products of thinking receive through the 
collaboration of others, we have to be especially vigilant of our own thinking when it 
doesn't issue in generally accepted conclusions. To do this requires us to be clear that our 
own thinking is of the highest possible quality, but the only test of this is a public one, 
against public criteria. Indeed, to become capable of such reasoning requires a 
dependence on the testimony of others, not only for content, but also with regard to 
process. 
Autonomy would certainly require thinking for oneself, so we need to be careful in our 
characterization of exactly what this means. I have argued that it does not mean that we 
must cut ourselves off from all influence by, and dependence on, others. To do so, I have 
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argued, would be to risk either never being able to become reasonable in the first place, or 
falling into unreasonableness. Such considerations indicate that a distinction can be 
drawn between heteronomy - being governed by others - and dependence on others. It is 
only through dependence on others that we can learn to think well for ourselves, and only 
by becoming able to think well for ourselves that we can approach autonomy. 
The Kantian conception of autonomy excludes any hint of dependence, not only on 
others, but also on one's own desires, preferences and emotions. This view arises out of a 
tradition of analysis that takes as its starting point the fully grown up, competent person, 
usually male, whose rationality is identical to that of others, being in no way contingent 
on a developmental life history amongst others. Thus Hobbes (1966,109) says: 
Let us consider men.., as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like 
mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other 
That such an idealization of persons is a sound philosophical launching pad continues to 
be asserted in the neo-Kantian work of the present, such as that given by Rawls (1973, 137- 
9) in his description of persons in the original position: 
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or status; nor does he 
know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and 
strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the 
particulars of his rational plan for life, or even the special features of his psychology such 
as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism.... As far as possible, then, the 
only particular facts that the parties know is that their society is subject to the 
circumstances of justice and whatever this implies.... It is clear that since the differences 
among the parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational and similarly 
situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. Therefore we can view the choice in 
the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at random. 
Kant, Hobbes and Rawls, as we have seen, rest their philosophical arguments on solitary 
individuals, abstracted very much from ordinary life. This position can be traced back to 
Descartes (1984), sitting alone in his armchair, pondering what he could believe in and 
coming to the conclusion that the only certainty lay inside his own head. This Cartesian 
legacy, and the characterization of autonomy it spawned, have increasingly come under 
siege. 
3.3 Towards a New Understanding of Autonomy 
Many post-modernists, conununitarians and feminists have attacked autonomy, casting it 
as an Enlightenment concept, a notion that denies human connectedness, an idealization 
of an educated Western male that ignores culture and excludes most of humanity. The 
feminist attack, for example, claims that autonomy has been conceptualized in a way that 
privileges males above females. Thus, Young (1997, 124) discusses: 
personal autonomy, a sense of self confidence, and inner direction, as well as the ability to 
be reflective, not swayed by immediate impulse or blind emotion in the making of 
political argument. Paradoxically, such autonomy and personal independence is thought to 
require the loving attention of particularist mothers who devote themselves to fostering 
this sense of self in their children. Attentive love disqualifies the nurturers of the 
individuality and autonomy of citizens from the exercise of citizenship, however, because 
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the character of mothers tends to be emotional and oriented to particular needs and 
interests instead of to the general good. 
This is how Haste (1996, 51), speaking on behalf of communitarians, puts it: 
People simply are not solitary beings capable of 'autonomous reasoning' from behind a 
veil of ignorance, or in a state of suspended objectivity from one's cultural context. It is 
meaningless to talk of people 'stepping outside' or 'transcending' their culture and time, 
however 'rational' they try to be. Therefore it is pointless to make autonomy an ideal 
either as a personal quality or as a form of reasoning. 
In Young's and Haste's comments, it is notable that precisely the neglected aspects of 
reasonableness that are highlighted. Young refers to love and nurture, both clearly 
connected to the committed aspect of reasonableness, while Haste refers to cultural 
context and time, factors that are covered by the contextual aspect of reasonableness. 
Yet, as I have argued in the introduction to this chapter, in order to account for our sense 
that we are moral agents, who do make moral decisions and engage in moral acts for 
which we bear moral responsibility, a concept that involves something like moral 
autonomy is essential. The challenge, therefore, is to develop an adequate account of 
autonomy; one that, far from denying dependence and development, writes them centrally 
into the concept. Young and Haste provide hints that part at least of the answer lies in a 
reconstruction of reason that recognizes that reasoners are not disconnected, dispassionate 
and disembodied individuals, but must reason from a position in which real flesh-and-
blood persons with desires and emotions are inherently situated within a community. In 
the first section of this chapter, I have delineated a richer multi-aspectual conception - 
reasonableness - which is capable of describing the way the sorts of people alluded to by 
Young and Haste actually reason. 
In the second section of the chapter, I turned to Kant, briefly outlining his account of 
reason and the showing how it inevitably leads to the sort of conceptualization of 
autonomy that Young and Haste have attacked. Subsequently, I surveyed O'Neill's 
attempt to reinterpret Kant's doctrines in such a way that avoided the charge that Kant 
considers reason to be a given, that all humans always have, but which, for obscure 
reasons, children are unable to exercise. This constructivist account I showed ultimately 
fails, not least because it fails to pay proper attention to the construction of reason in the 
individual. This alerted us to the need to pay closer attention to developmental questions 
in the construction of reasonableness and autonomy. 
In this passage from Morgan (1996, 249), we see an approach that takes on board the 
need to recognize attachment and goes part way towards a reconstruction of the notion of 
autonomy: 
Autonomy does not imply extreme individualism or independence from community, but 
merely that one's relations with other people and one's position in society itself are 
matters for self-reflection. 
85 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 3. The ethical agent: reasonable, autonomous 
This characterization does to some extent recognize connection. It is, however, a 
connection that seems to arise out of a self already capable of self-reflection. It does not 
pay any attention to how it is that one becomes capable of such self-reflection. It leaves 
open the question as to whether one is always capable of it, but needs to exercise it in 
order to become autonomous, or whether such a capability is itself constructed through 
interdependence. In §3.23, I showed how the work of Piaget offered a number of insights 
into the development of reason, but that it, too, being based on Kantian foundations, relies 
too much on the solitary reasoner. In the work of Vygotsky, we found a developmental 
psychological program that looks to social interaction directly for the roots of the 
development of reason. Vygotslcian learning, involving embodied persons in specifically 
situated communal dialogue, permeated not only with reasons, arguments and 
speculations, but also with emotions, commitments and desires, provides for the richness 
necessary for the development of reasonableness. 
This has allowed me to make a first pass at reconceptualizing autonomy. In §3.24, I 
looked at the notion of thinking for oneself, demonstrating that it does not imply 
individualistic thinking, but thinking that must both arise, and be judged, in community 
with others. 
In order to complete the task of reconceptualizing autonomy, which will form the final 
section of the next chapter, it will be necessary to look further into the conditions under 
which reasonableness can arise. First, I will look at a neo-Kantian program that takes the 
issue of interdependence seriously, breaking away from the monological reliance on a 
single agent as the basis for theorizing. This is the work of Habermas on communicative 
action. This work will allow us to explore the extent to which Kantian insights into 
autonomy can be rehabilitated. In the course of the exposition of Habermas' project, I 
will explore the ways in which his account of communicative action can be combined 
with the developmental perspective identified in this chapter. In particular, I shall 
concentrate on a modification to his classification of types of action, to take account of 
pedagogic action: action in which the dialogical partners are not all already competent 
reasoners. For, as we have discovered of Kant in this chapter, and will discover of 
Aristotle in Chapter Five, by concentrating on finished humans - adults - Habermas' 
philosophical project has both remained incomplete and lapsed into error. It is a common 
failing in the philosophical tradition that theorizing has paid insufficient attention to 
childhood. 
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During the survey of reasonableness and autonomy in the previous chapter, two 
points became increasingly obvious. The first is that if we are to make proper sense 
of what it is to be reasonable, we need to consider reasonableness in a rich 
contextualized setting in which real thinking and feeling people interact and 
communicate. The second point is that the best place to look at this is not in the 
"market place," where many adults have already become somewhat reasonable and 
autonomous, but in places where young children are developing reasonableness and 
autonomy. Given my aim - to look at moral education - it becomes obvious that the 
place on which to focus my attention now is the classroom, and the activity taking 
place within the classroom on which to focus is dialogue which genuinely involves 
the students as well as the teacher. 
But first, as I indicated at the end of the last chapter, I will introduce and explicate a 
neo-Kantian philosophical position that will give me a theoretical basis of analysis of 
classroom dialogue. This is Habermas' theory of communicative action. 
4.1 Habermas' Classification of Dialogical Action and the Classroom 
The theory of communicative action is Habermas' attempt to explain how modem 
human rationality and action arise through the medium of language. Habermas' 
theory is, as we shall see both here and in Chapter Six, a neo-Kantian project which 
takes more account of the place of human interaction and the "linguistic turn" in 
philosophy. As in Kant's work, ideals play an important part for Habermas: in 
particular, the concept of an ideal speech situation plays an important role in the 
theory of communicative action. 
Since this theory has been developing over many years in many works, it is not 
always easy to come to grips with either its details or its current manifestation. As a 
consequence, both communicative action and the ideal speech situation have been 
presented in many different (and not always compatible) guises by different writers 
seeking to apply Habermas' insights to particular disciplines. 
4.11 Critical Theory and Education 
Education is one such field. Given the importance of language and communication 
in education, a number of attempts have been made to co-opt Habermas' theory for 
educational ends. Broadly speaking, these attempts to develop a "Critical Theory of 
Education" fall into two (somewhat overlapping) schools. The first draws on 
Habermas, usually in conjunction with other members of the Frankfurt School and 
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various post-modernist writers, to design specific classroom materials and 
approaches that promote broadly political objectives. This field is often called 
"Critical Literacy" (see, for example Lankshear and McLaren 1993; Hamston 1995; 
Pitt, Tugwell et al. 1995; Morgan 1996), and I do not intend to discuss it here. 
The second approach has been aimed at characterizing classroom dialogue (or, more 
broadly, educational action in general) as an instance of communicative action, with 
the aim of reconceptualizing all such dialogue in Habermasian terms. Often the aim 
here is also reform: such dialogue is to be critically analysed from the Habermasian 
point of view and improvements made. Such improvement is less commonly aimed 
at explicitly political content, as in Critical Literacy, but rather at a reinvigoration of 
the forms of educational dialogue (admittedly, often with some political 
implications). Two influential writers in English in this field are Young (1988; 
1988; 1990; 1992) and Blake (1995). This discussion has been going on in the 
continental (largely German) literature for over twenty years, but unfortunately little 
of this work has been published, or even summarized, in English (see Masschelein 
1991; and Peukert 1993 for exceptions). This is the field in which I will operate, with 
a particular focus on the classroom. I have explained above why I think that the 
focus of this work ought to be on discussion within the classroom. I do not wish to 
imply by this that classroom dialogue is all that education is about: clearly there are 
many other important aspects, but I shall not address them here. 
Given the multitude of interpretations of Habermas, I shall begin by sketching in the 
key relevant features of his theory of communicative action (Habermas 1981; 1990) 
as I take them. In this somewhat simplified account, I draw on Braaten (1991), 
Horster (1992), Benhabib (1992), White (1988) and Thompson (1981) in addition to 
those mentioned in the previous paragraph for assistance in interpreting Habermas. 
In §4.13, I will outline a plausible application of Habermas' account to classroom 
dialogue, while in §4.14, I will critically evaluate its adequacy, leading to the 
conclusion that certain specific features of educational action provide difficulties for 
a straight Habermasian analysis of classroom dialogue. Thus I will discuss a further 
characterization of action - pedagogic action. 
4.12. The Key Features of Habermas' Account 
One of the difficulties in getting the key features of Habermas' account of 
communicative action straight is the specialized terminology he uses: terms neither 
have their commonly understood senses nor are used consistently. Here are three 
examples. Firstly, what I will refer to below as "success-oriented action" seems also 
to be called, at different places in his works, "purposive-rational," "means-end," 
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"instrumental" or "strategic" action in response to shifts in context. Secondly, he 
calls his overall theory "a theory of communicative action," yet one of the specific 
types of action it describes is also called "communicative action" (I believe this 
feature alone accounts for a good deal of misunderstanding). Finally, Habermas 
reserves the relatively common term for focused interactive talk in general - 
"discourse" - for a very specific purpose, to be explained in §4.123. To avoid 
confusion, I will use the term "dialogical action" to cover Habermas' general sense 
of communicative action, and "dialogue" for focused interactive talk in general. 
In the account that follows, I identify four key terms in the theory. The first three 
refer to specific types of dialogue (or other action) - "success-oriented action," 
"communicative action" and "critical discourse" - that can be, and commonly are, 
used in everyday life. The fourth, the "ideal speech situation," refers to an explicitly 
counterfactual situation, unachievable in practice. This contrast between the 
practical and the in-principle unachievable ideal is a source of some confusion in the 
interpretation of Habermas, as we shall see. It can also be a target for some 
important criticisms. 
4.121 Success-oriented Action 
In success-oriented action, people act as individuals aiming for the success of their 
own actions, without attempting to coordinate their purposes and ends with others. 
Habermas (1981, 285, Figure 14) distinguishes strategic (social) from instrumental 
(non-social) action, though this distinction is not strongly maintained in his 
subsequent discussion. Strategic action is further subdivided into open and 
concealed (Figure 18, p 333); he offers no discussion of the open category in the text, 
presumably because his greatest interest is in a critique of the way concealed 
strategic action works in modem society. 
Given Habermas' lack of explication, how are we to understand open strategic 
action? In strategic action, goals are not open to question - merely the means to 
achieve the goals. Open strategic action presupposes agreement (at least, for the 
present) concerning the relevant set of transparent goals, facts and values. Open 
strategic action, then, appears to be open in something like this sense: the intentions 
of those taking the action are not manipulative (i.e. designed to achieve a goal which 
needs to remain secret for its success), but rather aimed at achieving a generally 
accepted goal. This goal has been previously considered (though not necessarily by 
the participants in the action) and is not, for the present at least, thought worthy of 
further discussion. The goal is, however, either potentially open to discussion at a 
level different from that at which the action is taken, or could be opened to 
discussion at the present level under particular circumstances. 
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Much of Habermas' discussion of success-oriented action draws on the theory of 
speech acts developed by Austin and Searle. In that theory, a distinction is drawn 
between the illocutionary force of a speech act, in which the speaker acts in saying 
(and so, according to Habermas, the purpose is manifest in what is said), and 
perlocutionary force of a speech act, in which the speaker brings about actions by 
saying. "Perlocutionary acts constitute a subclass of teleological actions which must 
be carried out by means of speech acts, under the condition that the actor does not 
declare or admit to his aims as such" (Habermas 1981, 292). Young (1988) points 
out that Habermas (1981, 298-303) distinguishes between three types of perlocution. 
In type 1 perlocutions, the speech act appeals to known normative contexts of 
legitimate authority, so, for example, a train conductor who shouts "Fares, please" 
makes a claim for action on the part of passengers. Type 2 perlocutions appeal to 
known sanctions within the power of the actor, so that a bouncer at a nightclub who 
asks you to leave implicitly backs up the request with a threat of violence if you 
don't comply. In type 3 perlocution, the speech act uses deceit with hidden aims, 
such as when a child says "Look over there," so an adult's attention is diverted so 
that the brussels sprouts can be fed to the dog. Young claims that Habermas 
excludes type 1 perlocutions from concealed strategic action, presumably thus 
characterizing it as open strategic action - an analysis which agrees with that in the 
previous paragraph. 
Often, one actor will be in a position of socially sanctioned authority in order to 
facilitate the achievement of collective aims. Such open strategic action may, in the 
interests of efficiency or even sheer achievability, be acceptable and appropriate. For 
a police officer who is directing traffic around an accident site to discuss the 
purposes behind these actions with every passing motorist would interfere with 
achievement of the desired outcome of keeping the roads negotiable. Hence 
motorists generally trust police to have good reasons for redirecting traffic, even if 
they cannot see it. Open strategic action is of great interest in education: teachers 
often seek to find the best way to achieve curricular goals that have been externally 
set for students. 
In concealed strategic action, on the other hand, one participant has goals that are 
hidden from other participants for manipulative purposes. The most direct example 
is when a dialogue partner uses words to induce a false understanding about the aims 
of the conversation in other partners, thus leading them to do as the manipulator 
desires. A police officer may lead motorists to believe that traffic redirection is due 
to an accident, when the aim is rather to keep witnesses away from an illegal police 
operation, or to allow space for disarming of a terrorist bomb without creating 
90 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 4. Pedagogical action/autonomy 
widespread panic. As the second outcome of this example shows, even concealed 
strategic action does not always lead to consequences that are not in the interests of 
the deceived party, though the first shows that it certainly can. 
Habermas does not claim that all success-oriented action is to be avoided: on the 
contrary, he claims that it plays an important role in many areas (e.g. scientific 
research, achievement of socially mandated aims). It is the use of success-oriented 
action in situations where communicative action or critical discourse ought, in the 
interests of all concerned, to be used to which he objects: "all three rationality 
complexes... have not found a balanced institutional embodiment in... modem 
societies" (1981, 273). For example, Australian social workers in the past attempted 
to create a better future for mixed race Aborigine/white children by taking them from 
their Aboriginal mothers and placing them with white foster families. This was a 
bureaucratically decided solution to the problem of improving the life prospects of 
certain people, not one negotiated in a political arena that included effective 
involvement of all affected. He refers to this extension of success-oriented action to 
situations in which it is inappropriate as the "colonization of the life-world." 
Success-oriented action (open or concealed) is, for reasons of practicality, 
widespread. Nevertheless, the aims of such actions, even when they are taken in 
what is perceived to be the best interests of all concerned, can be opened to question. 
This questioning can be initiated by either the participants themselves, or by those 
beyond the situation, such as general citizens. If such questioning is never allowed, 
then success-oriented action often leads to oppression. When questions that go 
beyond the means to achieve ends are raised, dialogue needs to move to another 
level, that of communicative action. 
4.122 Communicative Action 
According to Habermas' account of communicative action, the parties in such a 
conversation seek to exchange information, convey experiences and/or clarify 
meaning through hermeneutical inquiry, coming to a common understanding against 
a background of assumed facts (truth claims) and values (claims of nonnative 
rightness). Communicative action thus does not merely employ means-ends 
rationality, but aims at reaching intersubjective understanding. Communicative 
action allows, inter alia, for the goals of success-oriented action to be called into 
question, and for the establishment of common goals. 
In policing, for example, someone might ask whether police should be spending 
more time walking the beat, rather than directing traffic. While such a discussion 
takes place against a background of shared assumptions about the value of both a 
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police presence on the streets and of traffic control, and of facts concerning street 
policing and traffic direction, then the dialogue is conducted within the domain of 
communicative action. 
Similarly, if a number of participants in a dialogue are jointly trying to make sense of 
each other's positions on some question, they enter into a hermeneutical circle of 
inquiry, where each attempts to "merge horizons" with the others. Such an inquiry 
creates a shared intersubjective grasp of reality and society which can both result in 
the incorporation of the participants into the community (socialization), and lead to 
some flexibility in communal understanding (change and innovation). 
In communicative action, it is assumed that participants meet four conditions: they 
(1) use language correctly: (2) are sincere; (3) speak the truth; and (4) conform to 
accepted social norms. Speakers may, however, be mistaken, and it can also happen 
that, due to ideological or hegemonic factors in society, all participants in a dialogue 
may accept falsehoods. Any such claim can be called into question. It is Habermas' 
claim that the attempt to come to agreement about the answer to such questions is a 
different form of dialogical action: critical discourse. 
4.123 Critical Discourse 
Critical discourse is the attempt to reach consensus about contentious claims for 
normative correctness or truth: 
Under the heading 'discourse,' I introduced the form of communication 
characterized by argumentation in which validity claims that have become 
problematic are made the subject of discussion and are examined relative to their 
legitimacy. In order to entertain a discourse, we must in a sense step out of 
behavioral and experiential contexts; here we exchange not information, but rather 
arguments that serve to establish (or reject) problematic validity claims. (Habermas 
1971, 130-1; translated and cited by Horster 1992, 31) 
Each dialogue proceeds in the context of implicit background claims of normative 
appropriateness and truth ("behavioural and experiential" in the quote above). The 
dialogue could not get started without this, and most such claims are accepted by the 
participants in the dialogue. Nevertheless, these claims can be called into question - 
not all at once, but piecemeal. When a truth or a normative claim is questioned, the 
participants can try to justify or redeem (respectively) the validity of the claim: that 
is, to reach, through argumentation not directly aimed at action, an understanding 
about the truth or falsity, appropriateness or inappropriateness of the claim. 
Theoretical discourse is critical discourse centred on truth claims. The aim of 
theoretical discourse is to justify the validity of the truth claim by reaching 
consensus. Habermas offers a model for such justification, drawing on the work of 
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Toulmin (Habermas 1981, 24ff; Thompson 1981; Horster 1992, 36-8). When an 
assertion is questioned by the dialogical partner, data (for events: causes; for actions: 
motives) must be offered, supported by a warrant in the form of empirical 
uniformities or hypothetical laws, that have the backing of observations, assessments 
or other empirical evidence. It is in negotiation of these proffered grounds for belief 
that the truth claim is established or rejected. This judgement is in itself provisional: 
when the participants in the theoretical discourse reach consensus as to the validity 
of the claim it recedes into the background, though it may be challenged again in the 
future. 
The attempt to redeem the validity of claims about normative appropriateness (that 
is, practical discourse) follows a similar pattern. Once again, the participants in the 
discourse strive for consensus when a normative command or prohibition is 
questioned. The data in this case take the form of the grounds for the judgement, 
which must be warranted by behavioural or evaluative norms or principles, 
themselves backed by reference to needs, values, consequences and ramifications. 
Again, consensus is provisional. 
Critical discourse requires one to distance oneself from the implicit background that 
underpins our situation in the world (Heidegger 1962). It requires a degree of 
reflexivity in order to be able to problematize the taken-for-granted. (It is worth 
noting that Habermas' insistence on dialogue rather than monologue springs in part 
from the need for other points-of-view to facilitate distancing and problematizing). 
And while the raising of contested validity claims merely requires a capacity to 
express interests, the redeeming of these claims in critical discourse also requires a 
degree of sophistication in reasoning, so as to be able to adduce data, advance 
warrants and support them with backing. All these are relatively high level 
capacities which draw upon a considerable degree of intellectual prowess. 
Habermas claims that truth (in theoretical matters), correctness (in practical matters) 
or even rationality itself just is what would be agreed upon by an ideal speech 
community in the ideal speech situation and, moreover, that the legitimacy of 
discourse itself depends on the presupposition of the ideal speech situation. 
4.124 Ideal Speech Situation 
Unlike the three types of dialogue we have been considering, the ideal speech 
situation cannot be entered; it is counterfactual. It is Habermas' description of: 
the general pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation [i.e. critical discourse]... [an 
attempt] to reconstruct the general symmetry conditions that every competent 
speaker must presuppose are sufficiently satisfied insofar as he intends to enter into 
argumentation at all. Participants in argumentation have to presuppose in general 
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that the structure of their communication, by virtue of features that can be described 
in purely formal terms, excludes all force... except the force of the better argument 
(and thus that it also excludes.., all motives except that of a cooperative search for 
the truth). From this perspective, argumentation can be conceived as a reflective 
continuation, with different means, of action oriented to reaching understanding [i.e. 
of communicative action] (1981, 25, italics in original). 
First, there are conditions of participation. Benhabib (1992) captures these in two 
universal pragmatic moral rules: universal moral respect (everyone has the right to be 
included in the discourse) and egalitarian reciprocity (there is an equal right to make 
assertions, ask questions of others, introduce new subject matter, call the validity of 
claims into question and so on). For an alternative formulation, see White (1988, 
56). Second, four conditions must be met: 
1. each person speaks intelligibly - that is, their assertions accord with the 
rules of language; 
2. each person taking part in the conversation is sincere; 
3. assertions made about the existence of certain states of affairs are true; 
4. assertions made conform to socially expected standards appropriate to the 
interpersonal context in which they are made. 
It is important to note that the ideal speech situation does not spell out the necessary 
conditions for critical discourse, for several reasons. Firstly, the ideal speech 
situation is counterfactual whereas critical discourse frequently occurs in reality. For 
example, the former requires the presence of all possible speakers, whereas critical 
discourse may involve only a few speakers. Secondly, the ideal speech situation 
requires the four conditions listed above to be met, while critical discourse occurs ' 
precisely because at least one participant has explicitly questioned whether one of 
them is being met. Nevertheless, although critical discourse explicitly fails to meet 
the conditions of the ideal speech situation in these (and other) ways, it still requires 
its anticipation. 
Before expanding what is meant by such an anticipation, it is worth noting that the 
emphasis on finding a single consensus on matters of truth and validity can be 
questioned (Benhabib, 1992). There is a lively discussion in the literature as to 
whether Habermas' ideas can be adequately modified to take account of diversity 
(see, for example, many of the contributions to Meehan 1995), and I shall return to 
this matter in §6.2322. 
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The concept of an ideal speech situation needs to be treated carefully. Its 
counterfactual nature clearly points to the Kantian roots of Habermas' account, and it 
is well to remember how Kant treated such transcendental ideas. He did not, of 
course, discuss the particular issue of the ideal speech situation, but his comments 
about transcendental ideas in general will help us to see Habermas' drift. Here is 
Kant's own warning about their use: 
Transcendental ideas have their own good, proper and therefore immanent use, 
although, when their meaning is misunderstood, and they are taken for concepts of 
real things, they become transcendent in their application and for that very reason 
can be delusive. (Kant 1965, 532, A643/B671) 
Kant cautions us that transcendent ideas, ideas that arise from consideration of the 
logical conditions which must hold in order to make our experiences possible, should 
not be mistaken for a description of a real object. So, if the ideal speech situation is 
not to be taken for the concept of a real dialogue, then how is it to be interpreted? 
Again, according to Kant: 
[Transcendental ideas] have an excellent, and indeed indispensably necessary, 
regulative employment, namely, that of directing the understanding towards a 
certain goal upon which the routes marked out by all its rules converge, as upon their 
point of intersection. This point is indeed a mere idea, a focus imaginarius, from 
which, since it lies quite outside the bounds of possible experience, the concepts of 
the understanding do not in reality proceed... (533, A6441B672) 
Transcendental ideas, Kant argues, have an imaginary, counterfactual focus, not an 
achievable one, but that they can assist us by regulating what we do set out to 
achieve, as guiding epistemic principles. The ideal speech situation, then, is to 
"direct our understanding" rather than to be taken as a real achievable model for 
dialogue. Habermas (1992, 144) clearly has this in mind: 
The idealizing presuppositions of communicative action must not be hypostatized 
into the ideal of a future condition in which a definitive understanding has been 
reached. 
In the following passage (where the principles in question are those of the 
homogeneity, variety and affinity of the appearances), Kant provides three ways in 
which the ideal speech situation might regulate discourse. 
The remarkable feature of these principles.., is that they seem to be transcendental, 
and that they contain mere ideas for the guidance of the empirical employment of 
reason - ideas which reason follows only as it were asymptotically, i.e. ever more 
closely without actually reaching them - they yet possess, as synthetic a priori 
propositions, objective but indeterminate validity, and serve as rules for possible 
experience. They can also be employed with great advantage in the elaboration of 
experience, as heuristic principles. (545, A6631B691) 
I will elucidate the meaning of each of the three aspects Kant mentions by seeing 
how each applies to Habermas' ideal speech situation. Kant's first way concerns 
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"guidance of the empirical employment." Applied to dialogue, this implies that each 
time we enter into speech, we not only should try to approach the ideal speech 
situation as closely as possible, but also need to presuppose (in the absence of 
counter evidence) that others involved are doing so: that is, we must enter dialogue 
in trust. Each dialogue is, if not deliberately distorted, a striving towards perfection, 
but is limited by contingent factors so that it can never "actually reach" that goal. 
Given the contingent facts about our world (e.g. our mortality, our limited reason), 
then this approach will not in fact be very close. I shall call this way of considering 
the role of a regulating ideal the "existential aspect." 
When we consider the conditions of the ideal speech situation as "synthetic a priori 
propositions... [which] serve as rules for possible experience," then we begin to see 
their role as preconditions for speech. In Kant, the best parallel is the role of 
freedom in moral action. Kant asserts that his transcendental claim - that the will is 
free - is unprovable, since such a will could only be noumenal, and we have access 
only to the phenomenal. Yet we must act under the idea of freedom, for if we do not, 
then we can only think of ourselves as determined, and we can make no sense of how 
it is that we act voluntarily and responsibly in the world. Habermas makes a parallel 
claim: the assumption of the ideal speech situation is what makes possible all real 
dialogues. The mere engagement in argumentation, the attempt to contest and 
determine validity or truth, presupposes that, under ideal conditions, a consensus 
could be reached (see §6.2322 for further discussion). If not, then the rationale of the 
engagement disappears. A skeptic who engages in an argument, while professing to 
deny the presupposition that it can possibly lead to agreement, is caught in a 
performative contradiction (Habermas 1990, 88-92, see also §6.1). We must 
consider dialogues to be aimed at cumulatively achieving an overarching ideal 
speech situation through the continual refinement of previous dialogues. If we do 
not, then the point of a single dialogue, even one far removed from the achievement 
of an ideal speech situation, disappears. This I'll call the "teleological aspect." 
Finally, Kant refers to the role of transcendental ideas as "heuristic principles" for 
the "elaboration of experience." For Habermas, the ideal speech situation provides 
us with a checklist of desirables (rather than an algorithm or set of rules to be 
followed exactly) as a way of keeping tabs on, and making sense of, our attempts to 
engage in discourse (Habermas 1990, 92). Without presupposing the conditions of 
the ideal speech situation, we would have difficulty in evaluating (either 
procedurally, as Habermas argues, or indeed in qualitative research terms) those real 
speech situations in which we do constantly find ourselves. They provide a 
regulating ideal against which to measure our attempts, in something of the same 
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way as the counterfactual "ideal second," unachievable in practice, provides a unit 
against which actual times can be measured, and deviations corrected. This is the 
"practical aspect." 
Each of these ways of looking at the role of the ideal speech situation enters into 
Habermas' characterization in different contexts, and they raise serious problems for 
those who take the ideal speech situation as a set of rules for the conduct of 
classroom dialogue. Firstly, in the Habermasian account, not all classroom dialogue 
is even subject to the conditions of the ideal speech situation since, as Blake (1995, 
356) points out, they are only relevant to critical discourse. Once we realize that 
Habermas is using the word "argumentation" interchangeably with "critical 
discourse," this is obvious from the quotation with which this section commenced. 
But even in the case of critical discourse, caution is needed. Kant comments: "When 
merely regulative principles are treated as constitutive, and are therefore employed as 
objective principles, they may come into conflict with one another" (547, 
A6661B694). He is warning us that transcendental ideal conditions are not rules for 
constructing real objects, and that if treated as such they may be contradictory. Thus, 
for example, if we insist that a classroom dialogue allow any participant to introduce 
any material at any time, this will ensure that the dialogue cannot come to consensus 
within any feasible time allowed. Blake (1995) also makes this point: "Habermas' 
prescription for an ideal speech situation can seem unworthy of even partial 
emulation. For what seems enjoined is an almost anarchisticl conduct of 
discussion... unstructured speech situations can kill rationality." 
So, it is easy to make the case that the ideal speech situation should not be something 
we strive to implement in reality in every respect, for those respects may conflict. 
Some of the respects are impossible (such as allowing all possible speakers into 
every conversation, or always knowing the truth so as always to speak it) and others, 
as we have seen, are unwise or counter-productive even if the conversation is limited 
to the physically present participants. Yet the existential aspect does give us some 
guidance: when we must, for reasons of contingent limitations, move away from 
Kant's "asymptote" by imposing constraints that run counter to the ideal conditions, 
we need to be wary of the ways in which these constraints may contaminate our 
deliberations. Habermas (1981, 25) says that "the structures of an ideal speech 
situation immunize against repression and inequality in a special way." One 
example: if we exclude some from participating in a particular dialogue, or ignore 
certain comments made by some participants, it may make the dialogue more 
focused and easier to run, but it may also undermine the conclusions reached. If we 
1 Perhaps it would have been better if Blake had chosen the word "chaotic" rather than "anarchistic" 
here. Further, while unstructured discussions can damage rationality, they need not. 
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analyse the dialogue under the practical aspect, by noting that universal moral 
respect, or egalitarian reciprocity has been ignored, we can help to make these 
distortions clear. 
Nor can we consider that all the problems with the ideal speech situation in specific 
dialogues can be resolved by looking to the "mega-discourse" implied by the 
teleological aspect. While access to all, including those separated by time and place, 
can be alleviated by "institutionalised discourse" (Blake 1995)2,  it cannot be 
completely overcome: for example, earlier participants have no opportunity to 
challenge latter ones (particularly if they have already died), and even widely spread 
institutions are subject to hegemonic controls. 
In the context of this discussion, where I am trying to make sense of the practice of 
dialogue in classrooms, the most useful aspects are the existential and practical 
aspects. For Habermas, when we sincerely enter into discourse, we must 
existentially act as if it were the case that the conditions of the ideal speech situation 
were being met, even though we know they cannot be. We are expressing the hope 
that our claims and assertions, and our defences of them, are such that they would be 
capable of achieving universal assent, even while recognizing that this may be a 
practical impossibility. It is this that enables us to make sense of the enterprise and 
allows us to accept the outcome of the discourse: 
[In each discourse we] mutually assume an ideal speech situation. The ideal speech 
situation is characterized such that each consensus that can be achieved under its 
conditions is valid as a true consensus per se. The anticipation of the ideal speech 
situation is a guarantee that we may associate the claim to a true consensus with a 
consensus that has actually been attained. (Habermas 1971, 1 36; translated and cited 
by Horster 1992, 34) 
We act in good faith, attempting to the best of our ability to make true and 
normatively valid claims, and make the assumption that all other participants are 
acting likewise. Even when we (or others) enter into discourse insincerely (and thus 
engage in concealed strategic action), it is the underlying presupposition of the ideal 
speech situation (and our adherence to it in many ways, even in the midst of 
dissembling) which allows the deception to work_ For we enter any dialogue, even a 
strategic or communicative one, under a "speech-act immanent obligation"; that is, 
an expectation that we are able, if required, to justify or redeem any validity claims 
that underlie our statements. Since such justification or redemption would have to be 
2 It is worth noting that Blake's main aim in his paper was not to analyse classroom dialogue in 
Habermasian terms. Rather, after pointing out difficulties in implernenting Habermas' ideal speech 
situation in a classroom, he made the claim that it is to institutionalized, rather than specific 
classroom, dialogue that Habermas work is most applicable. However, even institutionalized 
dialogue cannot meet the standards of the ideal speech situation, and we should not expect it to. 
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carried out in critical discourse, there is a sense in which the ideal speech situation is 
anticipated in all dialogical action. 
But although we must always presuppose the ideal speech situation in this way, in 
order to enter into dialogue, we ought also to be aware through the practical aspect of 
the ways in which the actual speech situation falls short of the ideal speech situation 
(since it always must), and to make judgements as to whether the actual speech 
situation is adequate to the purposes of the dialogue. If it is not, then we have the 
possibility of moving it to another level of dialogical interaction. Thus strategic 
action can become communicative, and communicative action can shift to critical 
discourse. 
Habermas claims that it is only through the possibility of such an ascent through the 
modes of dialogue, ultimately underpinned by the presupposition of the ideal speech 
situation, that each mode can be legitimated. That is, strategic and communicative 
dialogue play essential parts in our coordination of social activity, but each on its 
own can, and does, lead to distortions and oppression if unchecked by the possibility 
of critique. Critique itself relies for its justification on the teleological aspect of the 
ideal speech situation; that is, on the underlying presupposition that consensus is the 
(counterfactual) telos or goal of dialogue. Although such a strong presupposition of 
consensus has been questioned (see a number of papers in Meehan 1995; especially 
Warnke 1995), Benhabib (1992) and Braaten (1995), amongst others, have argued 
that Habermas' account can be adequately modified to incorporate an additional telos 
of mutual recognition and understanding. I shall return to this matter in Chapter Six. 
4.13 Types of Dialogue in Classrooms 
Equipped with this understanding of Habennas' theory of communicative action, it is 
time to turn attention to the implications for the classroom. In this section, I will 
explore whether Habermas' theoretical framework can help us to make sense of the 
actual use of dialogue within the classroom, and in the next, whether it needs 
modification. Once we have an adequate theory of dialogue in classroom situations, 
it can play an important role in the analysis and critique of the use of dialogue, 
leading to the development of sound, theoretically based improvements in practice. 
At the base of the problem to be addressed in this exploration lies what is known in 
the German and other continental literature as the "pedagogical paradox." Perhaps 
the earliest formulation of this paradox lies in Kant's question: "How shall I cultivate 
freedom through force?" (Ober Padagogik p. 453, cited in Kivela 1998; see also 
ICivela, Peltonen et al. 1998). In other words, how can teachers justify unilaterally 
imposing many activities and restrictions on children if one of the important aims of 
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education is to produce citizens who can think for themselves: that is, reasonable and 
autonomous citizens? 
The question of whether Habermas' categories will turn out to be useful for this 
purpose must wait until we have seen how well they can be applied to classroom 
dialogue. There are, however, several good reasons for supposing that they might. 
Firstly, they enable us to focus on the degree to which purposes are disclosed and 
negotiated within dialogues. Secondly and relatedly, they explicitly distinguish 
actions which are imposed on other dialogical partners from actions which are agreed 
between them, as well as further identifying actions involving the exploration into 
the validity of the presuppositions that underlie these actions. Thus questions of 
manipulation and freedom can be directly addressed. 
§4.12 should have made it clearer why Habermas' work is of especial interest to me. 
Education is a social institution, within which the teacher has a role to play. 
Communication with the students is one essential part of this role. The teacher, 
however, is not just another partner in communication: part of the social role is to 
structure the educational environment to achieve socially mandated aims, high 
amongst them induction into the communication community. This social 
responsibility of teachers entails that teachers are mandated to wield the power 
necessary to imposing activities on the students. The exercise of this power is 
sanctioned provided it is in certain specific interests of the students: I shall explore 
this issue of power further in §4.14. Thus the teacher may act strategically, seeking 
to achieve curricular aims without jointly negotiating them with the children. 
Yet this is a curious sort of strategic action. The aims of the teacher are not personal 
and selfish. They are only achievable if the students become (amongst other things) 
proficient members of the adult communication community. This aim, though not 
mutually negotiated with students (in fact, being, at least in modem societies, one of 
the non-negotiable foundations of education as an institution), is certainly open to 
question at a number of levels, to be discussed later. If we focus on the teacher's 
role, Habermas' categories provide a means of justifying and legitimating the action 
taken in terms of the purposes of classroom dialogical interaction. His categories of 
dialogical action identify three levels: action where the goals are unilaterally 
implemented; action where the goals are jointly constructed; and finally, action 
where the presuppositions that underlie the goals can be opened to question in 
pursuit of legitimation of those goals. This promises to be useful in providing an 
ethical underpinning to the teacher's actions in the endeavour of education, 
especially education in ethics, in ways which will be explored in §4.14. 
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Furthermore, if we focus on the students, Habermas' categories allow us to 
distinguish between dialogue which instantiates goal-directed actions foisted upon 
them, in which they have no say, dialogue which involves them in (at least a degree 
of) joint consideration of the goals and finally the critical examination of norms and 
facts underpinning goal setting. At the core of the process of education is the 
endeavour, through a supported process of development, to move from a situation in 
which young and unskilled children need considerable outside direction, to a state in 
which they have acquired the ability to participate fully on their own account; that is, 
education attempts to move students towards autonomy. 
It is important to keep in mind the scope of my inquiry. As specified in §4.12, the 
term "dialogue" is being used in a restricted sense, to refer to focused interactive 
talk. Thus, I will not consider unfocused chat, one-way instruction and the like (nor 
will I attempt to draw a clearer distinction between these and focused interactive 
talk). Indeed, for the purposes of exposition, I will narrow the scope (and hence the 
sense of "dialogue") slightly further, to those episodes of classroom dialogue that 
teachers commonly refer to as discussion: episodes where children are both allowed 
and encouraged to talk interactively with the teacher for directly educational 
purposes. I am not claiming that Habermas' categories are inapplicable to all these 
other types of classroom talk: I shall leave this possibility unexplored. Rather, I am 
restricting my inquiry to the sort of talk in which I am most interested, for its 
undervalued educational potential (Dillon 1994). 
We saw in §3.324 that any assertion that dialogue in classrooms ought to meet the 
conditions of the ideal speech situation must be misguided, since no real dialogue 
can ever meet those conditions. Nevertheless, for Habermas, the counterfactual 
presuppositions of the ideal speech situation underlie (even though they don't 
constitute) all dialogue, including classroom dialogue. No classroom (or other) 
dialogue can actually achieve the ideal speech situation, but all such talk can and 
does achieve one of the three levels of dialogical action, or possibly (as I shall 
explore) a mixture of several of them. We can use the two universal pragmatic rules 
(universal moral respect, egalitarian reciprocity) and four conditions (intelligibility, 
sincerity, truth, normative correctness) of the ideal speech situation to guide us in our 
critique of actual classroom dialogue, but we cannot demand that it meet them. 
I will now turn to the task of considering actual dialogues within schools with 
respect to the three levels of dialogical action. It is not difficult to see that much 
classroom dialogue comprises of success-oriented action. The teacher is in a 
position of power within the classroom and controls talk for pedagogic purposes. 
Much empirical research into classroom dialogical interaction reveals that students' 
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responses to teachers are often of the form of "guess what the teacher wants us to 
say." Dillon (1994) calls such questioning recitation. He notes that, although 
teachers commonly call this form of classroom interaction "discussion," it consists of 
cycles of closed, shallow teacher questions, brief student responses and teacher 
evaluations. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) refer to the same pattern as an IRF cycle 
(initiation, response, feedback) and present evidence that most classroom interaction 
fits into this pattern. Lemke (1990) also finds the same pattern dominating the 
science classrooms he studies, although he calls it Triadic Dialogue. Of especial 
interest in this context is the work of Young (1992, Chapter 8), who also finds a 
preponderance of IRF interaction in classrooms, and explicitly discusses it in terms 
of strategic action. I shall return to his analysis in §4.14. 
In such classroom dialogue, the teacher has a clear aim in mind and controls the 
dialogue tightly in order to achieve it. Although less commonly used nowadays, 
straight lecturing and dictation of notes are further pedagogic methods designed to 
meet certain teacher aims, as are such skills reinforcement techniques as the chanting 
of tables. The point to be made is this: although all these teaching techniques can be 
characterized in Habermasian terms as open strategic (success-oriented) action, each 
of them has its own justification in appropriate circumstances. Recitation can be an 
effective way to check students' understanding. Lecturing is a highly efficient way 
to cover content when the students are motivated and properly skilled. There are 
very good reasons for being able to recall "number facts" instantly. It would make 
little sense to call for the avoidance of all success-oriented action in classrooms, just 
as it would make little sense to banish success-oriented action from wider society. 
As we saw in §4.121, Habermas makes this point, although it often gets lost in his 
critique of the inappropriate extension of success-oriented action into the life-world. 
However, a good empirical case can be made for the claim that such success-oriented 
action leads to shallow, poorly integrated learning, and that it takes more than its fair 
share of classroom time. This is effectively the point made by Dillon, Sinclair and 
Coulthard, Lemke, and Young (op. cit.). They, and many others, call for more 
interaction that allows students to express their present understandings, check them 
against those of the other students, the teacher and the world and rebuild them if 
necessary. Such interaction seems to fit well into Habermas' category of 
communicative action: indeed, if the students in the course of such inquiry 
problematize truth or validity claims, they enter critical discourse as well. Often 
referred to as social constructivist learning, such techniques have attracted 
considerable support for their educational value (see, for example, Wells, Chang et 
al. 1990). 
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Such episodes have been identified in classroom dialogue. Lemke (1990), for 
example, found dialogical types he labelled True Dialogue (where the teacher asks 
open questions and the students explore the possible answers) and Cross-Discussion 
(dialogue carried out directly between students, with the teacher either moderating or 
participating as a {quasi}-equal). Nevertheless, he points out that, of all the dialogue 
types he identified, these are the two rarest, and that teachers, who afford them little 
value, commonly bring them to an early close. Both Young (1992) and Dillon 
(1994) provide detailed analyses of how discussions that embody communicative 
action and even critical discourse can be created in the classroom, providing 
transcripts of real classroom discussions that achieve these aims. 
4.14 A Critique of Habermas from the Classroom Perspective 
This outline of an application of Habermas' ideas to classroom dialogue skates over 
a number of difficulties. If the theory is to be used in analysis and critique of 
classroom dialogue, these must be addressed. Some of the difficulties may be 
generalizable to wider applications of his work, but I shall confine myself here to a 
critique of Habermas' theory from the classroom perspective. 
Firstly, it is immediately obvious that any attempt to attach to a complete classroom 
dialogue a label stating that it falls under the category of a single one of the three 
types of action is bound to be too coarse, at this level of analysis. We have seen that 
if children are, for example, engaged in the hermeneutical inquiry into shared 
meaning of communicative action, it is likely that disputed claims about what is 
actually the case, or what is right to do, will arise. Thus communicative action will 
shade into critical discourse, and just as likely return to that level. Similar shifts 
from strategic to communicative action and vice versa can also be expected. 
Secondly, without intervention and cuing from the teacher, much classroom 
discussion is likely to be relatively unfocused and children are unlikely to learn the 
skills and abilities (including the ability to remain focused) necessary to take part in 
each type of dialogical action. These capacities are the ones that I labelled 
reasonableness in §3.1, though, of course, reasonableness can be used in many other 
settings than just dialogue. Remember the stringent requirements for discourse, 
either theoretical or practical. Children are in the process of learning these complex 
dialogical competencies, and it is the task of the teacher to assist them. Of course, 
not all teachers see it this way: if the control they exert on the classroom ensures that 
the dialogue seldom emerges from success-oriented action, the children will be 
impoverished in their abilities to engage in other forms of dialogical action (Lipman 
1991). 
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This second point leads to a wider observation. According to Habermas, success-
oriented action is appropriate when it is utilized in the pursuit of socially mandated 
aims. We might consider that educating children is one such aim, and that the 
profession of teaching is dedicated to achieving that aim. Thus we could claim that 
success-oriented action is perfectly acceptable in the teacher's role. Further, the 
teacher is in a position of responsibility to bring about the consummation of that aim, 
a position that places the teacher in an unequal power relationship with the students 
in the school. The analysis of the previous paragraph shows that this is necessary for 
education to take place (I will further consider the question of power below). Some 
traditional, conservative educational commentators argue that this mandates 
transmission-style education and teacher imposition of curriculum; education as 
success-oriented action. Young (1992, 54-5) cites R. S. Peters, R. F. Dearden, R. 
Spaemann (in explicit reaction to German critical theory of education) and even John 
Stuart Mill as among those who argue for a mastery of the bodies of knowledge 
before engaging children in the joint establishment of goals and understandings with 
others. 
The situation is, of course, more complex in several ways. If education had a single, 
unitary aim, there might be some prospect of transforming society-wide agreement 
that is a Good Thing into a purely success-oriented role for teachers. But 
"education" is itself an essentially contested term, and it is analysable into many 
different sub-units. Two commentators who agree on the vital importance of 
education may be advocating quite different things. Even to understand the point of 
view of the other requires communicative action. Given a wide divergence in views 
on what the facts and the values are that underlie education, entry into critical 
discourse on the matter is inevitable, at least at the level of those whose task it is to 
decide on what to deliver as education. 
Yet, in a democracy, those who decide on educational aims are, at least in theory, the 
public. Since this public is itself produced (in part, at least) through the education 
system, then there is a need to equip all children with the competencies to engage in 
communicative action and critical discourse. Here is where the apparently clear 
distinction between the prima facie success orientation of education and the need to 
engage in communicative action and critical discourse begins to collapse. For there 
is considerable weight to the argument that these latter two modes of dialogical 
action can only be learned (or at the very least, can be learned best) through 
engagement in them (Lipman 1991; Sprod 1994b, §3.23). At the same time, if they 
are being learned, then the children engaged in them are not yet competent, and they 
need guidance and scaffolding from the teacher (Bruner 1986). 
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These considerations suggest that, while the teacher_is joining the children in (say) 
critical discourse, they ought simultaneously to engage in the success-oriented action 
necessary to teaching children how to do it better. This is the view I shall be 
defending in the rest of this section. This is because the teacher is deliberately 
structuring the situation in certain ways with the aim - not exactly hidden but usually 
not made explicit either - of equipping the children to engage more competently in 
critical discourse. The teacher sets up the conversation, decides on the text or broad 
subject matter used to start it (even if not the specific questions to be addressed), 
makes certain interjections into it (such as asking questions, making comments, 
nodding, smiling, looking puzzled) and requires certain behaviours (e.g. listening to 
the speaker, respect for others - even being present in the classroom). Each of these 
is done with a dual purpose: to advance the inquiry; and to improve the ability of 
children to participate in such inquiry. Some of the interventions are clearly 
deceitful, such as the use of Socratic irony (the pretence not to know the answer to, 
or have opinions on, a question), yet this deceit clearly has an educational 
justification (not to stifle or pre-empt student inquiry). Others are just as clearly 
coercive, backed by the ever-present possibility of sanctions and the institutional 
power of the school. 
The account I am developing here bears quite a few resemblances to that advanced 
by Young (1992), in a book that has the advantage that it deals not only with 
theoretical arguments, but also detailed analysis of real classroom dialogue. In one 
instance, he considers a discussion transcript that he characterizes as discourse, and 
comments: 
The agent roles of this form of collaboration are roles of joint rational responsibility, 
although the teacher's role remains one of 'leadership' in the sense of taking a 
special, continuing and methodological responsibility.., for critique of the quality of 
pupil reasoning.... There is still talk asymmetry in this classroom, but it is a different 
asymmetry from that in the dominant [IRF, strategic] classroom type. This 
asymmetry is complementary, since the rights of pupils as rational interlocutors are 
preserved, while the teacher's superior knowledge and rational skills are still able to 
be employed on the pupils' behalf in the fostering of the inquiry of the class. 
Complementary asymmetry of this kind is... what justifies the presence of a teacher. 
(ibid., 117-8, square brackets my clarification) 
Young is at pains to emphasize (and I agree with him) that this is only one of the 
approaches to teaching that teachers are justified in using. He characterizes strategic 
action in education (ibid., 48) as the gaining of students' acceptance of claims 
without their rational assent, solely due to the teacher's authority. This, he says, can 
be justified by, amongst other things, the circumstances of the classroom, the 
particular aims being addressed and the curricular and institutional constrains on the 
teacher (ibid., 108; see also my discussion of indoctrination in §9.4). 
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Yet, if the teacher is going to move beyond pure strategic action at all, this peculiar 
mix of success-oriented action with communicative action and critical discourse 
seems to be inescapable. If teachers abdicate the overall control of the educative 
situation by becoming mere participants in communicative action, then they are no 
longer teachers. Totally unstructured interactions between children can of course be 
educational in a wider sense, but they are not teaching situations. To empower 
children does not mean handing over power to them willy-nilly, allowing them to 
decide everything that goes on in the classroom, for this would lead in many cases to 
its misapplication. Rather, empowering means developing in people the capacities to 
be able to act powerfully on their own account (i.e. autonomously), and this requires 
positive and purposeful interventions. 
Such accounts require an analysis of power, coercion and deceit which legitimates 
their use in pedagogical situations, whilst highlighting the undoubted dangers that 
accrue. Power is often thought to be inherently repressive, imposed in top-down 
fashion by the powerful on the powerless. Yet Foucault (1991) reminds us that: 
the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the 
productive aspect of power.... What makes power hold good, what makes it 
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, 
but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose 
function is repression. (60-61) 
Since the negative guise of power is repression, then its productive use is its positive 
guise (though we need to note that, for Foucault, not all knowledge that power 
produces is good for those involved). There are two important points in this passage: 
power in its positive guise is essential to the production of knowledge; and power is 
distributed throughout social interaction. If schools and classrooms are merely sites 
of the application of repressive power (and some of the worst of them certainly 
approach this), then the educative endeavour breaks down. Secondly, Foucault 
reminds us that even in such situations, power is not merely concentrated in the 
teacher's hands, but is distributed, albeit unevenly, throughout the classroom, to 
appear in every interaction. In repressive schools, for example, the efforts of the 
teacher can be thwarted by the students' power to disrupt or withdraw. 
Wartenberg (1990), in his analysis of the nature of social power, also identifies a 
positive guise for power, with explicit reference to the classroom. He says, "in so far 
as one treats other human beings in a way that encourages them to seek to develop 
their own potential, one can engage in transformative power relationships with them" 
(214). 
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Good education requires that students (as they become increasingly able to do so) 
voluntarily accept the teacher's coercive power, and trust the teacher to use it 
wisely. 3 The teacher's power is exercised legitimately as long as it is used for 
Foucault's productive purposes (creating student knowledge), and it contributes to 
the students' interests; that is, it is Wartenberg's transformative power. The 
students' interests will initially be decided by others on their behalf, but increasingly 
these decisions will take account of the students' own input. Central amongst these 
interests is the induction of the students into the communicative community, without 
which they are unable to engage in this critique of what their interests are, or of how 
these interests can be coordinated with those of others. 
This point - that students are initially incapable to a large degree of either deciding or 
representing their interests - pinpoints one of the dangers in teacher power. As 
Wartenberg observes, "The crucial thing to recognize is that the presence of power 
relationships causes human beings to make choices that determine the sorts of skills 
and abilities they will come to have" (160). In doing this, such power will influence 
the interests students come to have, for having these skills and abilities are important 
in deciding and revising one's interests. We might well add that teachers directly 
influence the things that students become interested in, and how they frame their 
interests. What all this amounts to is the possibility that a teacher's transformative 
power can be misused, a possibility usually marked by the term "indoctrination." I 
shall return to this danger briefly towards the end of §4.141, and treat it in more 
depth in §9.41. 
Hoy (1986, 134) expands on Foucault's account of the point of action of power: "As 
a complex strategy spread throughout the social system in a capillary fashion, power 
is never manifested globally, but only at local points as `micro-powers'." If we 
accept this, as I think we must, an analysis of teacher power (and its relation to 
student power) needs to be carried out at the micro-level, a task for classroom 
dialogue analysis rather than theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, some general 
observations can be made. To choose an example central to the concerns of this 
chapter, when the class is engaged in discussion, I will argue that the teacher's power 
is more likely to be legitimately exercised if it is confined in two ways. 
Firstly, the teacher's power ought to be exerted more in process matters (such as 
encouraging the giving of reasons, the recognition of assumptions, the drawing of 
valid conclusions) than in tightly controlling content (the actual matters that the 
discussion shifts to consider). The requirements of reasonableness in communicative 
3 For a fuller account of educative coercion and trust, albeit in the slightly different context of tertiary 
education, see Garfield(1997). 
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settings are not tied essentially to any particular subject matter (although we have 
seen in §3.124 that they are most certainly context sensitive). They are, however, 
heavily dependent on certain processes, as was seen in §4.123, where the onerous 
criteria for discourse were surveyed. Thus, the teacher's control is pedagogically 
legitimate when it leads the students to internalize these processes, Vygotskian-style 
(§3.23), for reasonableness is not only in the interests of the students; it is central to 
the students' ability to form and critique their interests at all. Of course, not all 
processes contribute to reasonableness, so that teaching students to stereotype, or to 
use ad hominem arguments would not be legitimate. 
Some control over the general content of discussion is necessary for a variety of 
pedagogic reasons: to achieve certain curricular aims; to keep the discussion 
focussed sufficiently that variety and depth of communication can be achieved; to 
take seriously comments previously input into the discussion and thus value that 
contributor; to allow many to address a particular issue before moving on; or (more 
generally) to build social and functional competence in a range of areas essential to 
the ability to act meaningfully in society, amongst many others. In some of these, it 
can be seen that a sharp process/content distinction is not always tenable. 
Nevertheless, excessive content control runs the real risk of collapsing apparently 
communicative action to pure strategic action. Communicative action needs to be 
aimed at mutual understanding. As characterized by the practical aspect of the ideal 
speech situation, it can be mutual only when all present have a chance to introduce 
material into the discussion. Practical considerations (such as those mentioned at the 
start of this paragraph) limit the extent to which these freedoms can be allowed in 
real dialogue, but it can nevertheless be seen that Habermas' theory provides good 
reasons for sanctioning teacher input into process over input into content. 
Secondly, the teacher ought to exercise more power at the level of overall control of 
the educative environment, rather than at the level of determining each individual 
action. Creating an atmosphere in which students feel encouraged towards, and safe 
in, engaging in dialogue contributes more to the development of both reasonableness 
and autonomy than directing and immediately evaluating (in the ERF fashion) each 
person's input into the dialogue. Strategic action brings about behaviour in others 
that suits the actor's purpose. When this purpose is to induct the others into the 
autonomous use of reasonableness (an aim that is indexed to the needs of those 
others), then to maintain tight control over individual actions risks that the inductees, 
having never had to make the judgement about how and when to act, will never be 
able to take them over. Control over the educative environment, in order to be 
legitimate, needs to focus the (strategic) maintenance of dialogue in such a way that, 
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as far as the students are concerned, it approaches the standards of communicative 
action and/or critical discourse. This requires that the teacher play a dual role: 
participating in the dialogue whilst simultaneously monitoring it for opportunities to 
make the sort of intervention that model, encourage and develop good 
communicative moves and keeping the dialogue fruitful. Within such an 
environment, students can practice both reasonableness and autonomy. 
These two observations are not unrelated: the maintenance of an educative 
environment depends critically on the presence of certain processes in the classroom. 
Nor are they clear cut. As I indicated in discussing the first point, process cannot be 
sharply distinguished from content. For example, process aims can be met by asking 
the right question of the right person at the right time, but what determines whether 
the question is the right one can depend as much on the content of the question as the 
process it encourages. With regard to the second point, the educative environment 
cannot be established independent of individual moves, for it is partially created and 
maintained in the encouragement or suppression of particular student actions, 
especially process moves. 
4.141 Pedagogic Action 
The analysis of the place of a teacher with respect to the three types of dialogical 
action advanced so far necessitates a closer look at how Habermas' categories apply 
to classroom talk, so as to address the pedagogic paradox outlined in §4.13. I have 
argued that the peculiar type of action that good teaching requires is a simultaneous 
and considered amalgamation of success-oriented action with the other two. But 
what is the nature of this amalgamation: is it a commingling of separate types of 
action, or are they fused into a single new mode? To accept this latter option is to 
posit a new category of Habermasian dialogical action: we could label it "Pedagogic 
Action." But ought we to posit pedagogic action as another type of dialogical action, 
to be placed alongside success-oriented action, communicative action and discourse, 
or would it be better to use pedagogic action as a label for the way in which 
Habermasian action types can be mixed? It may seem that there are reasons for 
preferring the latter. Habermas (1981) himself states that natural speech occasions 
can mix different types of dialogical action, while discussing the problem of: 
distinguishing and identifying in natural situations action oriented to understanding 
and actions oriented to success. Here we must take into consideration that not only 
do illocutions appear in strategic-action contexts, but perlocutions appear in contexts 
of communicative action as well.... These strategic elements within a use of 
language oriented to reaching understanding can be distinguished from strategic 
actions through the fact that the entire sequence of a stretch of talk stands - on the 
part of all participants - under the presuppositions of communicative action. (331) 
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Relatedly, since Habermasian categories are closely linked to a theory of speech acts 
(see §4.121), a new category would seem to require the identification of a new type 
of speech act, if it were to fit within a Habermasian framework (Bob Young, pers. 
comm.). 
Despite these considerations, however, I will argue that we ought to see pedagogic 
action as a further type of dialogical action. My argument turns on three points. 
Firstly, it is worth noting that Habermas is claiming that, although whole stretches of 
talk can be mixed, each stretch of talk nevertheless stands under the presuppositions 
of one type of dialogical action. He further claims that the "elements" (sentences? 
speech turns? - it is not clear what constitutes an element) of such a stretch can be 
individually allocated to dialogical action types. My analysis is different: in 
pedagogic action at least, single elements of talk can (and often do) simultaneously 
instantiate success-oriented action and (say) communicative action; they stand under, 
and can be analysed in terms of, the presuppositions of both types of action. We do 
not have a mix of strategic elements alternating with communicative elements; 
rather, single elements merge both. A question that asks a student to give reasons for 
their assertion simultaneously advances the inquiry at hand (communicative action) 
and assists in bringing about in the student a realization that reason-giving is a 
valuable move in discussion (success-oriented action). Both the element and the 
whole discussion are thus simultaneously success-oriented and communicative. 
Secondly, although Habermas does align strategic action to perlocutionary speech 
acts and communicative action to illocution, he does not do so on a strict one-to-one 
basis: 
I would like to suggest that we conceive perlocutions as a special class of strategic 
interactions in which illocutions are employed as means in teleological contexts of 
action.... A teleologically acting speaker has to achieve his illocutionary aim... 
without betraying his perlocutionary aim. This proviso lends to perlocutions the 
peculiarly asymmetrical character of concealed strategic actions. These are 
interactions in which at least one of the participants is acting strategically, while he 
deceives other participants regarding the fact that he is not satisfying the 
presuppositions under which illocutionary aims can normally be achieved.... I have 
called the type of interaction in which all participants harmonize their individual 
plans of action with one another and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without 
reservation 'communicative action.' (Habermas 1981, 294, italics in original) 
All speech acts have locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects. In 
pedagogic action, we do not have a situation of concealed strategic action - rather it 
is open strategic and communicative action merged. The teacher's use of (say) 
Socratic irony does have perlocutionary aspects, but they are not essentially hidden. 
It does not matter to the achievement of the teacher's aims that the perlocutionary 
aim is hidden, and often enough it will not be - the students may well understand that 
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the teacher's pretence not to know is a pretence. Not being illocutionary "without 
reservation," it cannot be merely communicative action, but not being perlocutionary 
in the concealed sense of wanting to achieve a result solely in the speaker's interests, 
nor is it mere strategic action. Thus we see the speech act markings of pedagogic 
action. 
To make the final point, I need to sketch in some background. The phrase 
"pedagogic action" (German: padagogischen Handelns) has been widely discussed 
in the continental literature, usually with explicit reference to Habermas and critical 
theory (see, for example, Masschelein 1991). The use of the word "pedagogic" here, 
rather than say "educative," points to the central intentional role of the teacher. A 
situation can be educative without the intention of any participant to make it so. 
Pedagogic action, on the other hand, essentially involves the intentional attempt by 
one participant (maybe a teacher, maybe a parent, maybe another) to educate the 
other(s). For a fuller analysis of the implications of the term "pedagogic" in the 
continental tradition, see van Manen (1991, 27-30, 40-48). 
Kivela (1998) points to some serious shortcomings in attempts (Masschelein 1991; 
Peukert 1993) to equate pedagogic action with communicative action (or 
communicative action plus critical discourse). This is the core of his argument: 
critical theory assumes that an ethical justification of education requires that dialogue 
in the classroom conform to the symmetrical character of communicative action, yet 
the Kohlbergian roots of Habermas' categories require that participants in 
communicative action have reached the post-conventional stage of reasoning. 
Empirical studies, however, show that such a stage is not reached until adolescence. 
Thus, it would seem that education is not possible until adolescence: a position 
which is obviously empirically incorrect. 
I believe that, especially given the attacks on Kohlberg's work (and stage theory in 
general) from other sources (see §5.1 and §3.23 respectively), the Habermasian 
categories can be supported on grounds that do not entail post-conventional 
reasoning as a basis for communicative action. That task is too big for this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the more general point that Kivela makes is sound: that any account of 
pedagogic action cannot assume that children are already competent in 
communicative action, that is, fully reasonable. It is important to be careful here 
with the word "competent." Clearly, in Habermas' ideal speech situation, all 
participants in discourse (and by extension, communicative action) are fully 
competent: i.e. perfect users of language. We need to remember, however, that this 
is a transcendental ideal, and hence counterfactual. Communicative competence in 
actual dialogical situations need not (indeed, cannot) reach these standards. 
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Communicative competence must be contextualized, like all claims of competence. 
For example, I am competent to drive the streets of Hobart, but not the Grand Prix 
track. Similarly, a kindergarten child may be communicatively competent within 
that community, but clearly not in the Oxford Union debates. Judgements of 
competence must be referred to standards, and standards depend on context. 
There is a confusion at work here which I shall be addressing in more detail in 
§6.231. Firstly, "communicative competence" can be used to refer to the present 
ability level of the actor to engage in communication (cf my ability to drive on 
Hobart streets). Secondly, it can serve to mark the complete and normative 
communicative competence that would be counterfactually found in the ideal 
situation (cf my [non-existent] perfect ability to drive anywhere under any 
conditions). Finally, Habermas also uses competence to label the predispositions 
necessary to be able to develop the ability to conununicate. 4 
Underlying this confusion, Biesta (1995) claims, are the presuppositions of the 
"philosophy of the subject," which sees "the human subject as an autonomous, pre-
social, trans-historical source of truth, rationality and identity" (274). Such an 
account makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that the details of the induction into 
communicative competence (in the first sense) will have marked effects on the 
rationality (I would prefer to say "reasonableness") of the subject. It then becomes 
easy to talk, like Kant, of human subjects as "finite rational beings": beings that have 
(amongst other things) achieved communicative rationality and competence (in the 
second sense). The next slide is to considering children as already having 
competence (in something like the third sense): (latent?) rationality and autonomy 
that just need maturity to emerge, with no place for a history of construction through 
social engagement. Thus the second and third senses merge, leaving no place for 
real people with real, variable reasonableness. 
Depending on when we assume this miraculous transformation takes place, this 
picture of children risks either the conservative error of treating children as empty 
vessels that need filling with knowledge until they emerge into maturity, or the 
progressive error of treating them as small adults, who can gain the knowledge they 
need if only we let them exercise their autonomy in learning. Subject-based 
accounts of the pedagogical task of inducting the child into communicative 
competence are then prone to make three mistakes: they assume that the end point 
for the child to reach is ideal competence; that normal adults who take part in 
communicative action have already fully attained such ideal competence; and that 
4 This explicitly follows Chomsky's (1968) term "linguistic competence." 
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any engagement in communicative action indicates (and possibly requires) this ideal 
competence. 
The philosophy of the subject takes the actor as primary, and not the social situation 
in which the act (and hence the subjectivity of the actor) becomes possible. Biesta 
analyses this latter, alternative approach in Deweyan terms, though he points to the 
fact that Habermas and many postmodernist writers have also tackled this task of 
reconstituting subjectivity as intersubjectivity. Mind, according to Biesta's reading 
of Dewey, is not an original datum, but is acquired in the experience of 
communicative transactions (i.e. transactions imbued with meanings) with others. 
The young child is a proto-subject, in that it is biologically equipped to be able to 
take advantage of this social communicative experience and develop subjectivity, in 
a way that lower animals are not (§2.4). Nevertheless, it is only through the right 
sorts of experience that this development becomes possible, and the proto-subject 
develops into a becoming-subject, and finally the sort of situated subject, exhibiting 
a sufficient level of reasonableness and autonomy, that we characterize as an adult. 
In abandoning the philosophy of the subject, we recognize that communication 
becomes, not just another task that the young subject (already rational, autonomous 
and individual) must learn to do, but a primitive interaction that already embroils the 
young child from the start, and is constitutive of the becoming-subject. 
Communication is a structure, a part of the lifeworld in which the child is always 
already entangled, while ideal communicative competence is a normative telos, a 
goal (counterfactual in its entirety) towards which the developing child can be aimed. 
It is the use of the phrase "communicatively competent" to label each of these 
alternatives which causes problems (§6.231). It makes sense to say that a normal 
neonate is communicatively competent in comparison to an autistic neonate at the 
appropriate level, but this is not to imply that the neonate is anything like a fully 
formed subject, autonomous and reasonable. 
So, to claim as Kivela does (correctly, in my opinion) that pedagogic action cannot 
be equivalent to communicative action between (normatively) communicatively 
competent actors is not to say that it cannot involve any element of communicative 
action (or critical discourse) at all. Children are certainly, by the time they get to 
school, competent to engage in communicative action at the appropriate level and 
given appropriate support (see, for example, Tizard and Hughes 1984 for empirical 
support for the pre-school claim). Meadows (1988, 30) comments: 
It seems likely that... the difference between younger and older children will turn 
out to be that the former can do what the latter can; but only sometimes, only under 
favourable conditions, only with help, only without distractions, only up to a point, 
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without so much efficiency, without so much self-control, without so much 
awareness of the implications, without so much certainty. 
As I have argued before on Vygotskian grounds (Sprod 1994b), this is precisely why, 
when given scaffolded support via social interaction to move into their Zone of 
Proximal Development, children are able to improve - to develop their level of 
reasonableness. Support offered through scaffolding is a crucial part of the process: 
without it, communication would remain at the same level. Social interaction in 
general leads to some development of reasonableness, for the sort of scaffolding we 
are talking about here is not unique to teachers. Adults, when interacting with 
children, commonly undertake such scaffolding intuitively, as demonstrated in 
Bruner's (1983) work with mothers and infants. Indeed, it happens informally in 
much social interaction of more with less competent actors. However, the fact that in 
general social dialogue, this support is often incidental to, and not a central focus of, 
such interaction means that the development of reasonableness in the absence of 
education is likely to be partial and piecemeal. These considerations lead us to the 
conclusion that to characterize pedagogic action as scaffolded communicative action 
and/or discourse is to make clear that it is a distinct type of dialogical action, for the 
scaffolding inherently involves open strategic action. 
In summary, as I am characterizing it here, pedagogic action consists in a more 
experienced person interacting with a less experienced person with the specific aim 
of developing the latter's abilities. An important element of such pedagogic action, I 
maintain, is to develop the competencies to engage in communicative action or 
critical discourse, and this requires an inextricable and simultaneous merger of open 
strategic action with communicative action and/or discourse. Pedagogic action is 
clearly not confined to schools, or teachers with students, but is also engaged in by 
parents with their children, adepts with their apprentices and so on (van Manen 
1991). It is marked by the use of power and some degree of coercion (such as 
requiring children to go to school), to achieve the often, but not essentially, hidden 
(from the children) aims of educating them. In a democracy, one of the central aims 
will be inducting the children into the wider speech community. Without this 
pedagogic use of power, the children will be unable to participate effectively in that 
community at a later stage. 
The legitimacy of this success-oriented aspect to pedagogic action itself can, of 
course, be called into question by the students or by others. As Young (1992, 52) 
says: "The issue is whether the asymmetry present in a given situation is functionally 
justified and whether some safeguarding apparatus or process... is present." If such 
questioning, as a safeguarding apparatus, is not (at least sometimes) allowed to 
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become a part of the conversation, then the situation becomes inadmissibly distorted 
from pedagogical action. This is not to say that every challenge needs to be taken up 
at every stage - again, the teacher has power to wield in the interests of the children. 
Rather, such questions should enter the dialogue at appropriate times (as decided by 
the teacher), when consideration of them would serve to advance the children's 
induction. Thus the anarchic situation referred to by Blake (1995) is avoided. 
Moreover, the permitting and encouraging of critical questions is a crucial element in 
the endeavour to ensure that the teacher's pedagogic power does not lead to 
indoctrination (see §9.41). Such questioning can take place at many levels (within 
the classroom, at the school level, at the public policy level and so on); not all of 
which are open to the students. Still, to ensure that the strategic remains open, and 
thus the pedagogic action stays legitimate, there must be the possibility for students 
to question at a level appropriate to their developing competence and understanding. 
Pedagogic action, under such an account, contains room for abuse. The power that 
the teacher has can be used to constrain the discussion and achieve aims (such as 
control and oppression) that are not educational. Yet we have to live with this 
possibility. The opposite situation, where the teacher abdicates power so as not to 
oppress the students, leads to abuse of a different sort - the denial of the child the 
chance to develop the capacities needed to be an empowered participant in the 
conversation of the community; in other words, the opportunity to develop 
reasonableness and autonomy. After a brief aside, I will turn again to autonomy. 
4.15 Pedagogic Action in a Wider Context 
In §4.1, I have suggested a way of reading Habermas on communicative action and 
of modifying his work to appropriately handle classroom dialogue. These 
conclusions could be extended in further work at two levels - the practical and the 
philosophical. In the first, my conception of pedagogic action shows promise for 
specific inquiries into classroom talk. It offers a way to think about the role of the 
teacher and the types of pedagogic techniques to be used, especially with an eye to 
improving the variety and quality of classroom dialogue. It also suggests that 
classroom research, particularly with a qualitative design, might be usefully guided 
through a theoretical framing in terms of different types of dialogical action. 
At the second level, this discussion has merely hinted at several interesting general 
conclusions about Habermas' work. Firstly, it has cast doubt on the claim that 
dialogues, or even elements of dialogues, can be neatly categorized in the way 
Habermas claims, at least in educational contexts. By considering other settings, the 
question as to whether this applies more widely could be addressed. Relatedly, and 
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more importantly, it has questioned whether success-oriented action ought always to 
be characterized as involving merely the achievement of an individual's goals, for 
reaching such an end may be inextricably entwined with the achievement of socially 
desirable, legitimate goals for that individual's interlocutors. The interrelation of 
agents and their interests makes the neat separation of strategic action from 
communicative action suspect: in §7.12, we shall see that Habermas has been 
accused of drawing too-sharp distinctions in other areas. Finally, my work points to 
an important investigation of the role of the ideal and the counterfactual in the 
critique of ordinary everyday practice. While offering much promise, the use of such 
conceptualizations also raises much that is problematic. While I raise these points 
here, they are somewhat tangential to my main interest, so I shall drop them again 
and move on. 
4.2 Autonomy Again 
As we have seen, for Habermas what is rational is what the speech community (in 
the ideal speech situation) would decide is rational. It is a matter for negotiation: 
hence communicative rationality is inherently socially constructed, inherently part of 
being in an epistemic community. However, as in O'Neill's Kantian account of 
§3.221, we can again make a distinction between two levels: the first being the 
public level of historical rationality (the level on which Habermas concentrates), the 
other referring to the developing rationality of an individual. Of course, there are 
two constraints on the rationality of the individual: the finiteness of the reasoner and 
the variation from the ideal of their speech situation. In the historical context, the 
latter of these operates much more strongly than the former, because an epistemic 
community can, across all its resources, construct a model of rationality that exceeds 
the grasp of any individual in it (a point that is certainly true now, though it may 
have been much less so in earlier times). 
While such a distinction can be drawn, the two types of rationality are related, for the 
individual builds rationality through interaction with many members of the epistemic 
community, and so has access to much of this wider version. Historical rationality, 
however, is in many ways a fiction: it supervenes on the actual individual 
rationalities of all the individual members of the community, and all access to it is 
through such individual members. I shall return to this point in discussing the 
problems for Habermas' account. 
So we now have a picture of the child as an apprentice building reasonableness, 
firstly by just listening to others, then by beginning to take part, as more competent 
users scaffold the development, and finally by internalising the competencies 
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sufficiently to be able to "play the game" on their own. The child is becoming more 
autonomous: 
Habermas' communicative theory of epistemic justification provides the content of a 
concept of autonomy as the ability to participate in argumentation (communicative 
competence). (Braaten 1995, 141) 
An analogy, drawing on the phrase "play the game" in the previous paragraph, may 
make this process clearer. A young girl, of say two years, is pretty well incapable of 
playing basketball. Certainly she has a basis on which to build: she can walk and 
catch a soft ball if it is not thrown too hard. Also, she can watch others play and try 
to imitate them. As she grows, and as others include her in their games (but 
carefully, modifying the speed, the physical demands and probably the equipment 
used in the game), she is, with help, able to do more and more. By say the age of 12, 
she is able to play a game that is recognisably real basketball - but she is still not 
very good at it. Her variations from the standard, accepted ways of playing 
basketball are much more likely to be due to lack of skill and understanding than to 
inspired innovation, though there are occasional flashes of the latter. In a game with 
adults (unless she is remarkably exceptional), she would not be able to match their 
speed, strength nor, importantly, their ability to read the game and make important 
strategic decisions well. 
In training, she continues to listen closely to her coach, to drill the fundamentals of 
the game and to watch older and more experienced players. This drilling is essential: 
she must learn to make these skills (in Polanyi's terms, §3.1242) a part of her 
subsidiary awareness of the game, rather than part of her focal awareness. It is in 
this learning to be able to carry out the moves in just the same way as every other 
highly skilled player that she becomes eventually able to be an outstanding player 
herself. Innovation, foresight, originality and independence in play depend on the 
internalization of the common skills of the game, rather than springing out of an 
independence from them. Similarly, to be a great player requires the ability to blend 
those skills seamlessly with the other players in the team: the "brilliant" pass that the 
receiver can't handle is not brilliant at all. In similar style, the autonomous reasoner 
emerges from immersion in the basics of reasoning, held by all reasoners alike. 
Nevertheless, there are problems with the Habermasian account. While Habermas 
does deal with the development of communicative competence, for the most part in 
his work the reasoners that enter into dialogue are adults, who have already 
constructed reason. The account he does give of development rests heavily on the 
work of Piaget and especially Kohlberg (Habermas 1990, 33-41, 119-189; Kivela 
1998, see also §4.141), but this provides a fairly thin account. Piaget neglects the 
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social and interactive dimension of development, drawing overmuch on the 
interaction of the reasoner with the physical environment (§3.231). Kohlberg 
develops an account of moral development that concentrates narrowly on justice 
reasoning based on universal principles, over-emphasizing argumentative rationality 
and neglecting the roles of the affective, the habitual formation of virtues and 
paradigm scenarios (§5.1: see also Gilligan 1982; Matthews 1994). 
The works of Piaget, Kohlberg and Habermas all have explicitly acknowledged 
Kantian roots. In each, formal principles take precedence over content. As we have 
seen (§3.21), for Kant, the Moral Law is an abstract, formal principle, legislated 
solely by a formalistic Reason, that determines morality. Piaget casts all 
development as transformation of the formal logical principles underlying thought, 
which are generally applicable across content domains (Donaldson 1978, 133-140). 
Kohlberg explicitly takes Kant's moral theory as the highest stage of moral 
development (Kohlberg, Levine et al. 1983). Habermas (as we shall see in §6.1) 
claims that two formal principles, empty of normative content, define his discourse 
ethics. These principles (as do Piaget's and Kohlberg' s) draw explicitly on Kant's 
notion of universalizability. 
In §6.24, I shall argue (specifically against Habermas, but drawing on the Hegelian 
critique of Kant), that such formal principles are insufficient to establish substantive 
norms, being devoid of content. My account of reasonableness (§3.1) is much 
thicker than such content-free descriptions, because connection to real people in real 
communities requires the inclusion of contextual and situated factors such as social 
locatedness, emotionality and embodiedness. 
Similarly, Habermas conceptualizes reason as a fairly narrow rationality, as I shall 
further explore in §6.23. This concentration on rationality contributes to his 
acceptance of the possibility of full consensus in the ideal speech situation, an 
acceptance that would be much more problematic if a rich concept of reasonableness, 
as I have previously outlined, was to be accepted. Finally, the reasoners in the 
Habermasian ideal speech situation are often characterised as rational beings, with 
differences between them downplayed. As Benhabib (1992, 58-70) has emphasized, 
the dialogical partners in Habermasian communication are conceptualized as the 
Generalized Other, rather than as specific Concrete Others who differ greatly in 
many respects. Habermas has attempted to escape from the Kantian insistence, seen 
also in Rawls' work, that a monological subject can make moral decisions binding 
on all (I discuss this at length in §6.1). However, as I shall also discuss (§6.232), his 
insistence on the inevitability of a consensus in the ideal speech situation means that 
differences must be set aside. 
118 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 4. Pedagogical action/autonomy 
Thus, while we have the core of a reconceptualized autonomy here, Habermas' 
account needs to be extended: it needs to take more fully into account the formation 
of individual reasoners in diverse situations that have real differences between them. 
This point has been made by a number of feminist and communitarian 
commentators, who appreciate the power of Habermas' recognition of community to 
deal with real, situated and embodied persons. 
4.21 Dependence throughout Development 
It is tempting to simplify any philosophical task involving persons by taking oneself 
as the paradigm person. Perhaps the most famous example of this is Descartes' 
(1984, 17) "Cogito, ergo sum," embedded as it is in the introspective narrative of the 
Meditations. If the endpoint of development is taken as something universal, that 
every person eventually reaches, then this tactic will be fruitful. But it is obvious 
that as adults we all have idiosyncratic features which differentiate us from one 
another, as well as sharing many features in common. There are two philosophically 
important points here: first, whether these differences are sufficiently unimportant, 
and the similarities sufficiently robust and wide ranging, that a simplification of the 
complexity of all persons to a single idealized exemplar will not lose anything of 
philosophical interest; and second, whether the pathway by which such adulthood is 
reached makes any significant difference to the final product. 
Feminist philosophy has led the commentary on the first point. Many writers in this 
tradition have pointed out that the position of advantaged white males in the world is 
importantly different from that of others, especially women (Lloyd 1984). Gilligan's 
work (1982) on the ethics of justice and the ethics of care, tied more closely to males 
and females respectively, is a landmark of this type. More recent feminist 
scholarship (Spelman 1988) has called into question whether we can even use 
categories such as "women" without erasing important differences within the 
category (for a critique of Habermas from this perspective, see Warnke 1995). I 
shall expand on this aspect later. 
The second point has not received as much attention, to my mind. Some feminist 
and communitarian writers have made some contributions, as I will discuss below. 
Nevertheless, a more developed philosophy of childhood will be able to highlight 
important philosophical implications from the development of children for 
mainstream philosophical debates in the same way that feminist philosophy has had 
major impacts in many traditional fields of philosophy. In this section, I will sketch 
out some of the grounds for that claim. 
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Firstly, however, let's see what we can glean from the writers alluded to above. One 
of the chief contributions of feminism is that: 
Feminist epistemology tends to argue that the subject comes to the specialized 
• activity of justifying knowledge claims as an already socially embedded being. 
(Braaten 1995, 150) 
A seminal (or should that read "ovarious"?) text is Baler's (1985) essay Cartesian 
Persons, in which she points out that in developmental terms the first person is not 
chronologically first. The sort of dependence on others for the formation of the self, 
reasonableness and the capacity to operate in the world that I have already discussed 
(§3.23) leads Baler to say that we are all at base "second person": 
Self-consciousness depends upon exercise of the cultural skills, in particular 
linguistic ones, acquired during our drawn-out dependency on other persons. A 
person, perhaps, is best seen as one who was long enough dependent on other 
persons to acquire the essential arts of personhood. Persons essentially are second 
persons, who grow up with other persons. This way of looking at persons makes it 
essential to them that they have successive periods of infancy, childhood, and youth, 
during which they develop as persons. (84) 
This way of looking at persons makes it essential to pay serious attention to what 
goes on during this period of "long drawn-out dependency." In my case, this means 
attention to the development of reasonableness and of the ability to function 
autonomously, two of the "essential arts of personhood." 
Code, with an epistemic focus, has claimed that one important paradigmatic notion 
of "knowing" lies in the knowing of another person, in friendship, as opposed to the 
solitary knowing of an inanimate object sitting in front of us. She criticizes the 
assumption that knowledge as a product is independent of the process, and hence 
independent of persons, claiming that, without knowledge of persons, knowledge of 
objects becomes deeply problematic. If we do pay attention to Baier's "successive 
periods," especially infancy, we find that there is empirical evidence to support 
Code's assertion. 
Many philosophers have noted that objects are relatively simple when compared to 
persons. From this observation they draw the conclusion that epistemological 
investigation should start with examples such as the perception of red boxes. 
However, developmental studies have shown that young children's knowledge of 
persons develops earlier than, and far outweighs, their knowledge of even simple 
objects. Infants attend preferentially to faces, and especially the eyes, over other 
similar shapes from birth (Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 19; Baron-Cohen 1995, 40). A 
child about to enter school will use misconceived mechanical ideas to wrongly 
predict the motion of even simple objects in simple situations (Yates, Bessman et al. 
1988; Millar and Kragh 1994), but will also be able to make accurate predictions of 
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the actions of people (e.g., by ascribing false beliefs to them, Baron-Cohen 1995, 69- 
72). Infants and children do seem to be able to grasp knowledge of persons earlier 
and in more detail than knowledge of objects. The basis for much of this is built-in 
to our cognitive architecture. Cosmides and Tooby (1994, 53-54) say: 
the adaptive problems posed by social life loom large. Most of these are 
characterized by strict evolvability constraints, which could only be satisfied by 
cognitive programs that are specialized for reasoning about the social world. This 
suggests that our evolved mental architecture contains a large and intricate 'faculty' 
of social cognition. 
The development of these social capabilities, however, depends on interaction in the 
sociocultural environment (Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 122). The gaining of 
intersubjective knowledge and capabilities through social interaction underpins, in 
large part, the ability to gain knowledge direct from the world in interaction with it. 
So to take the already adult solitary rational knower as the basis for a philosophical 
investigation into the nature of autonomy is to start well away from the roots. An 
adequate concept of the reasoner upon which to base autonomy must take account of 
the formation of reasoners rather than take reason as given. 
As I have been arguing, the formation of reasoners is an inherently social process, 
involving development that starts with a largely incapable infant, full of potential 
which can only be realized through interaction and dialogue with others. Benhabib 
(1992, 5) captures this well: 
The subjects of reason are finite, embodied and fragile creatures, and not 
disembodied cogitos or abstract unities of transcendental apperception to which may 
belong one or more bodies... the subject of reason is a human infant whose body can 
only be kept alive, whose needs can only be satisfied, and whose self can only 
develop within the human community into which it is born. The human infant 
becomes a 'self,' a being capable of speech and action, only by learning to interact 
in a human community. The self becomes an individual in that it becomes a 'social' 
being capable of language, interaction and cognition. The identity of the self is 
constituted by a narrative unity, which integrates what 'I' can do, have done and will 
accomplish with what you expect of 'me,' interpret my acts and intentions to mean, 
wish for me in the future etc. 
Of course, it is not only in infancy that we define ourselves and gain our powers 
through interaction. Taylor (1989, 36) points out that this dependence lasts a 
lifetime. Although we become progressively more able to act on our own, this is 
only achieved, and is always supported, through that interdependence: 
Even as the most independent adult, there are moments when I cannot clarify what I 
feel until I clarify it with certain special partner(s), who know me, or have wisdom, 
or with whom I have an affinity. This incapacity is a mere shadow of the one the 
child experiences... In this sense, one cannot be a self on one's own. I am a self only 
in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation 
partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to 
those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-
understanding - and, of course, these classes may overlap. A self only exists within 
what I call 'webs of interlocution'. (36) 
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This developmental picture of autonomy portrays persons who become increasingly 
able to function more independently whilst never losing the engagement with others 
that enables such independence. And while engagement can take many different 
forms, Code (1991, 121-2) agrees with Taylor's emphasis on interlocution, giving 
the central place in the construction of thinking and knowing selves to dialogue 
within a community. 
Epistemological positions developed around a 'second person' conception of 
subjectivity represent the production of knowledge as a communal, often 
cooperative though sometimes competitive, activity. Either way, knowledge claims 
are forms of address, speech acts, moments in dialogue that assume and indeed rely 
on the participation of (an)other subject(s), a conversational group... dialogue is 
primary, so that even thinking, that seemingly solitary activity, is constructed on a 
conversational model. 
Drawing on her discussion of the importance of testimony in what we can know, a 
point I have discussed in §3.2413 in relation to thinking for oneself, Code 
approvingly quotes Hardwick as 
claiming that the Peircian conception of the community of inquirers as the primary 
knower, in which individual knowledge is derivative, is the most plausible one, in 
view of the role of circumspect reliance on testimony as a condition of responsible 
knowing. (Code 1991, 132) 
This reliance on the testimony of others is not solely, or even primarily, a reliance on 
others for our stock of facts. As Code recognized in the passage previously quoted, 
thinking itself depends on the testimony of others - on their modelling and 
scaffolding of the very flesh and bones of reasonableness itself. Pettit (1993) argues 
that it is not even merely the higher tools of thinking that are gained through social 
interaction, so that we start with innate rudimentary conceptual thinking and refine it 
socially. Rather, it is the possibility of turning preconceptual, merely 
representational mentation (Pettit's non-thinking intentionality) into conceptual 
thinking that depends on immersion in a linguistic community. Further 
philosophical support for closely related conclusions can be drawn for the works of 
Wittgenstein (1953) in the famous private language argument, Sellars (1963) and 
Mead's (1982) argument that reflective intelligence is possible only because of the 
social component of mind. We saw the empirical and psychological support for 
these philosophical conclusions in §3.23, where the Vygotskian project was 
described. 
So far my argument has been that infants, dependent on others for so much, have to 
rely on others for the development of their reasonableness. This reliance is not 
passive but interactive. As children grow, and as they participate more and more in 
dialogue that jointly constructs reasoned arguments and discussions, they become 
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equipped with the attributes of reasonableness, together with increasing knowledge 
of the world. All this has implications for the sort of autonomy they are building. 
4.22 Communicative Autonomy 
The term "autonomy," as we have seen, has many connotations. Its Kantian lineage 
paints the notion of autonomy as austere, separated and individualistic. Yet I have 
argued that a concept of autonomy must have a place in our consideration of persons 
as moral and ethical agents. This reconceptualized notion cannot be based on a 
strong sense of independence of persons one from another. It has to recognize and 
celebrate the intersubjective interdependence which makes us capable of autonomy. 
Hence, I propose to label it communicative autonomy. 
I will not make the claim that communicative autonomy covers all the areas 
previously covered by the Kantian version of autonomy. In particular, 
communicative autonomy is not taken to cover actions, as distinct from the 
judgements that lead to actions. Nevertheless, such act autonomy is, I claim, 
parasitic upon communicative autonomy. Actions (I am making a distinction here 
between speech acts and physical acts and referring largely to the latter), if they are 
not to be random, issue from judgements. Judgements, in turn, issue from dialogue: 
either the overt dialogue that we have when we discuss our options with others, or 
the internalized dialogue that we call thinking. 
Communicative autonomy is the ability of the self to engage fully in the ongoing 
conversational narrative of humanity. Of course, as life-long learners, we never 
reach that idealized ability to participate perfectly. Our rationality is always limited, 
our imaginations are bounded, our emotional judgements can interfere with as well 
as support our thinking, we are contextually situated in ways that restrict our 
thinking and we are restrained by our embodiment as individual persons. 5 
Nevertheless, as our abilities to expand our horizons grow, through engagement with 
the differing horizons of others, so we become more autonomous. 
Through the internalization of socially mediated practices, including the practice of 
critique, we become more able to engage reflexively with others and with issues. 
Communicatively autonomous persons in this characterization are persons who have 
appropriated the standard, intersubjectively shared rules, prescriptions, techniques 
and capacities of reasonableness well enough to be able to wield them according to 
their own beliefs, desires, aims and goals. They can modify their beliefs, desires, 
5 It should be noted that the constraints placed on our thinking can both hinder and help our thinking. 
Constraints do the latter by restricting the incoming data that will be processed, and by cutting down 
the possibility space in which we have to make decisions. Given time and processing limitations, this 
enables us to make reasonable decisions in real time (Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 11). 
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aims and goals in the light of reasonable grounds for doing so. They can show flair 
and originality, they can adapt them to different purposes at need. They can apply 
their reasonableness uniquely, when a unique application is needed, but they can also 
use it in standard ways when that is adequate to the task. 
Such autonomy does not mark the holder off from others. As the development of 
reasonableness is inherently intersubjective, so is the formation of needs and aims. 
Being immersed in communicative situations, the increasingly autonomous agent 
relies on Taylor's "webs of interlocution" to build and to exercise autonomy. 
Autonomous agents are not identical, for the limits of communicative autonomy are 
different for each, as is the specific personal version of reasonableness upon which it 
rests. Communicatively autonomous persons thus differ in respect of both their 
autonomy and their reasonableness. Indeed, we cannot even put persons on a 
continuum and say that each has developed autonomy to a particular degree. 
Because autonomy rests in large part upon reasonableness, and because 
reasonableness is a multi-aspectual capacity, then comparisons of one person with 
another in regard to their development of autonomy are not straightforward. Indeed, 
the many other factors that contribute to the notion of communicative autonomy 
(such as listening skills, verbal fluency, personality traits like shyness and so on) 
complicate the picture even more. 
A multi-aspect theory of reasonableness implies that different people may develop 
greater abilities in one or more of the aspects of reasonableness than others. The 
claim here is similar to the one made by Gardner (1985) with reference to his 
multiple intelligences theory. Gardner denies that it makes any sense to claim that 
people can be put on a continuum of intelligence, such as that offered by IQ tests. If 
there are seven distinct types of intelligence, each with some interactional effects 
with the others, then efforts to reduce them all to a single figure are meaningless. 
Similarly, we cannot talk as if there is any meaningful way to rank someone with a 
vivid, inventive and focused imagination but poor logical skills against a person with 
a mind like a steel trap, but a lack of imagination. The contextual aspect in thinking 
also means that it is quite possible that the one and the same person will be able to 
join in to some conversations with a high degree of autonomy, yet display 
considerable heteronomy if the situation is changed. Gilligan's (1982) research 
shows that, on average, the females in her samples tend to be more comfortable 
using reasoning with a greater emphasis on the committed aspect of reasoning, while 
the males tended to focus more on the critical. Her case studies also showed that not 
all males and females fitted this pattern, and that changes in the context of the 
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discussion would often lead to a change in emphasis from the committed to the 
critical or vice versa in the same subject. 
4.3 From Foundations to Moral Theory 
In Part I of this thesis, I have philosophically explored two major aims of the 
educational endeavour: reasonableness and autonomy. I have suggested that the key 
to reconceptualizing rationality as reasonableness, and autonomy as communicative 
autonomy, has been to take development seriously. When this is done, we see that 
reasonableness cannot be a singular and identical capacity in all humans, while 
autonomy cannot deny interdependence. 
Through most of this survey, I have not concentrated specifically on the implications 
of these two capabilities for moral education. Before I can do that, I will need to 
outline a moral theory that establishes an aim for moral education. This will be the 
task of Part II. Once again, we shall see that a lack of attention to the developmental 
trajectory of moral development has resulted in some philosophical weaknesses in 
otherwise sound moral theories. 
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Part II: Moral Theory and Moral Development 
Chapter Five: A Target for Moral Education 
It is pointless to talk about a moral education program if it is not made clear what 
counts as morality. Further, an educational program needs to have a clear idea not 
only of its endpoint, but also of the developmental path that leads towards that 
endpoint. In this Chapter, I shall sketch a meta-ethical account that meets these two 
requirements. To construct and defend an entire meta-ethical system would be far 
beyond the scope of this thesis, so I shall take the approach of contrasting two 
accounts of moral development, identifying the meta-ethical theories that underlie 
them, and then developing an account of a plausible goal for moral education that 
draws on elements from these two theories. 
5.1 Moral Development and Meta-ethical Theory 
The most influential theory of moral development this century has been that of 
Lawrence Kohlberg (see, for example, Kohlberg, Levine et al. 1983; Power, Higgins 
et al. 1989, also §4.2). Kohlberg sees moral development as development along a 
single dimension - that of moral judgement. His theory has two roots: the genetic 
epistemology of Jean Piaget (1977) and Kant's meta-ethical theory, via Rawls 
(1973). Piaget explicitly states in his Foreword that "it is the moral judgement that 
we propose to investigate, no [sic] moral behaviour or sentiments," thus leaving 
open the question as to whether his studies encompass all of moral development or 
only a part of it. Kohlberg, on the other hand, rules out any other component of 
moral development. His theory asserts that justice is a universal moral principle, 
that it can be taught, and that all else flows from it (Power, Higgins et al. 1989, in the 
Chapter From Moral Discussion to Democratic Governance, written with Joseph 
Reimer). 
However, the universality and completeness of Kohlberg's theory has been called 
into question by many. Perhaps the most celebrated attack came from within the 
Kohlberg camp. Gilligan (1982), in attempting to replicate Kohlberg's results 
(originally obtained using a cohort of males only) with young females, asserted that 
the Kohlbergian stages left out an important second dimension of moral 
development - that of care. Other attacks have drawn on a number of other points. 
Kohlberg himself (1983) has summarized some common threads: critics assert that 
his account applies a normative theory as universal; misrepresents those with 
different perspectives; and is incomplete in failing to take into account other factors 
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than reasoning about justice (e.g. imagination, affect, sense of responsibility). Let's 
take a closer look at one of these critics. 
Matthews (1994, Chapter 5), following an extended critique of Kohlberg's account, 
identifies five dimensions of moral development, acknowledging that these may not 
exhaust the field. Matthews' elements are: 
Ml. a situated, experiential stock (or knowledge) of moral paradigms , which 
is gradually enriched with further experience, that forms part of the base 
for moral intuitions, against which the other dimensions may be 
measured; 
M2. an increasing ability to be able to offer defining characteristics for moral 
terms that take account of their complexity; 
M3. an increasing ability to judge whether a range of cases fall under a 
particular moral term, especially borderline cases; 
M4. a growing sophistication in the adjudication of apparently conflicting 
claims, when moral intuitions collide; 
M5. a heightening of the moral imagination, based in part on increasing 
understanding of the world and how it works. 
Matthews (ibid., 60) points out that Kohlberg concentrates solely on the fourth of 
these dimensions. Since in his scheme, pre-conventional (Stage 1 and 2) moral 
reasoning is purely prudential, and conventional (Stage 3 and 4) moral reasoning is 
merely conformist, Kohlberg's account seems to deny that anyone can really act for 
moral reasons until they reach Stage 5 or 6. Yet most of the population, according to 
a wide range of Kohlbergian empirical studies, never reach post-conventional 
reasoning, and hence, must be said not to have a grasp of what morality really is. 
This seems to be counter to our experience, in which even quite young children do at 
times act for reasons that we would want to call moral. A multi-dimensional account 
of morality allows us to do so, on the basis of one or more of the other dimensions of 
morality. 
Johnson (1993) also advances a multi-dimensional account of moral development. 
He appeals to the concept of the moral imagination, which itself has multiple 
aspects. A doctrine of Universal Reason, like Kant's (§3.21 and §3.22), "ignores 
the crucial role in our moral understanding that is played by our bodily experience, 
our emotions, our imagination and our interpersonal and cultural relations" (ibid., 
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245). This rich characterization of moral imagination clearly goes beyond merely 
including a creative aspect into critical thinking (as the term "imagination" might 
lead us to think). Johnson's moral imagination explicitly includes embodied, 
committed and contextual elements, as well as the creative and critical (to use my 
terminology). 
Johnson lists five challenges to what he characterizes as Moral Law theories (such as 
Kant's and thus Kohlberg's), which arise from recent empirical findings in cognitive 
science: 
J1. The replacement of a "necessary and sufficient conditions" 
characterization of concepts and categories with a theory of prototypes, so 
that moral concepts now must be seen as having core meanings surrounded 
by fuzzy grey areas; 
J2. Frame semantics, whereby terms get their meanings only within a larger 
context, implying that contextual settings are of vital importance to moral 
matters, and that different people might frame what appears to be the same 
situation in different ways; 
J3. The centrality of metaphor to understanding, so that moral (and other 
abstract) situations are understood in terms of mappings onto more 
concrete, maybe embodied, domains. This also introduces plurality into 
moral understandings, as well as providing a metaphorical extension 
mechanism for extending our moral construal of situations; 
J4. Basic-level experiences (often embodied, and hence universal) have a 
priority in the way we frame moral situations, so that there is a way to 
introduce some degree of universality into the moral domain without 
relying on universal moral laws; 
J5. The centrality of narrative as our form of understanding and experiencing 
moral situations, which provides another mechanism for extending moral 
understanding. 
It can be seen that, despite differences of emphasis, Johnson's points underwrite 
Matthews' account in a number of ways. I shall not try to tease them all out, but we 
can see that the narrative form of understanding (J5), combined with frame 
semantics (J2), underlie Matthews' situated and experiential stock of moral 
paradigms (M1), while the indeterminacy provided by the prototypical structure (J1) 
and metaphorical nature of concepts (J3) makes sense of Matthews' assertions that 
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children need to gradually develop the ability to define moral terms (M2) and judge 
when cases fall under those terms (M3). 
Multi-dimensional accounts of moral development are often (as in the case of 
Matthews') based on a virtue ethics such as that presented by Aristotle. I shall also 
base my account of moral development on a broadly Aristotelian foundation, and the 
next few subsections will explore Aristotle's views and their relevance to this thesis. 
Firstly, however, I shall look a little more closely at the advantages of multi-
dimensional accounts of moral development over a Kohlbergian account. 
The final stage of moral development (Stage 6), according to Kohlberg, is the 
principled stage. When people reach this stage (and it must be borne in mind, as 
previously mentioned, that very few people have been found to reach it in empirical 
studies), they realize that all moral judgements must be based on the universal 
principle of justice. Given that there is a single principle of judgement, all moral 
questions are, at least in theory, decidable, although practical difficulties may make 
it hard to find the universally acceptable answer. Such a moral theory would, if true, 
meet Mill's (1965, 278) criterion that: 
there ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all 
morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence 
among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various 
principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident. 
There are problems with asserting that all moral problems are in principle decidable, 
as I shall discuss in more detail in §6.2322, where I consider Habermas' discourse 
ethics. A multi-dimensional account, such as Matthews suggests, allows the 
consideration a number of ethical dimensions in moral judgement. But, in the 
absence of Mill's "determinate order of precedence among them," then there is no 
algorithm for deciding between these dimensions, if they are in conflict. This might 
seem to be a disadvantage in comparison to a Milli= theory, as it would mean that 
there is no sure way to decide whether an action is morally acceptable or a person is 
good. However, I argue that this is, in fact, an advantage for multi-dimensional 
accounts, as it captures what is surely one of the most striking features of moral 
discourse - the fact that agreement on these matters is difficult to reach. 
In her book Postures of the Mind, Baler (1985, particularly in the essays "Theory 
and Reflective Practices" and "Doing without Moral Theory?") argues the 
advantages of multi-dimensional accounts over Millian theories (without using this 
particular terminology). She claims that: 
A significant fact about moral conscience is that its deliverances need not come in 
verbal form, that it is often a difficult task to articulate what it is that we are certain 
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is wrong in an action, let alone what universal rule it breaks. In moral philosophy 
courses we insist that students make their moral intuitions articulate, that they 
represent them and "defend" them by subsuming them under some universal rule 
that coheres in some system, and we make them feel that they must have been 
muddled if their moral intuitions are inarticulate or resist tidy codification. But it 
may be we the intellectualizers who are muddled... (213) 
Baier reminds us that any account of what it is to be moral must take into account 
the phenomenology of moral thinking; it needs to be sensitive to our everyday 
experience of moral action. While it could be true that such inarticulate moral 
experience merely betrays a lack of sufficiently explicit consideration of the moral 
domain, it could also be the case that moral intuitions are not capturable in explicit 
formulations. A multi-dimensional account is consistent with this moral 
phenomenology, as it allows for various diverse sources of moral input. Due to the 
nature of their source, some of these may not be easily articulable. Similarly, if they 
spring from different sources, there may be real problems in merging them in a way 
that is linguistically reportable. Any meta-ethical theory that fits Mill's criteria, on 
the other hand, seems to imply a high degree of linguistic explicitness, both in the 
statement of the principle(s), and in the deduction of implications. 
A Kantian meta-ethical system is based solely on reason. Since in such accounts 
reason is linguistic and unitary, it is not surprising that the Kantian theory underlying 
Kohlberg's work fits Mill's criteria. A multi-dimensional theory, on the other hand, 
need not eschew reason (provided it is construed more widely as reasonableness) as 
one of the sources for morality, but it does allow that other sources can contribute. 
In what follows, I shall assert at least three sources of morality: the genetic 
inheritance of humanity (Chapter Two), the social situations in which humans are 
raised (§3.23), and the influence of reason (§3.1). Aristotle, as we shall see, also 
makes provision for each of these three sources. It is time to turn to Aristotle in 
order to clarify what a multi-dimensional account of meta-ethics might be like. 
5.2 Aristotle's Virtue Ethics as a Multi-dimensional Meta-ethical Theory 
In this section, I will consider Aristotle's virtue ethics as an example of a multi-
dimensional meta-ethical theory. In doing so, I will illustrate some of the key 
features of multi-dimensional accounts and explore the extent to which Aristotle's 
version is adequate. We will find that while there is much in Aristotle that is useful, 
he says little about one of the features most important to the thrust of this thesis: the 
place of dialogue in moral education. 
According to Aristotle, what is most important to morality is neither following an 
obligation nor bringing about the best consequences, but being a good or virtuous 
person. Being a good or a virtuous person is an important aspect of achieving the 
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inherent aim of human life - eudaimonia (1.7 1 , translated by Ross as happiness, but 
often rendered as "well-being" or "human flourishing"). Aristotle writes (I.13) that 
there are two groups of virtues: intellectual (e.g. theoretical wisdom, understanding, 
practical wisdom) and moral (e.g. temperance, liberality). Thus there are a variety of 
virtues, and the question arises as to how the virtues are coordinated in specific 
moral situations. Before I consider this, however, there is a need for a closer look at 
what the virtues are and how they are acquired. Here, then, is Aristotle's definition: 
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the 
mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that 
principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. (11.6, 1006b36) 
In this definition, there are several key points to note. Firstly, virtue is about 
character, a relatively stable propensity to choose to act in certain ways. Secondly, 
virtue chooses a middle way (Aristotle's Golden Mean), and since the determination 
of that middle way is relative to us, the mean is not something that can be decided by 
reference to principles only. Elsewhere, Aristotle emphasises the situatedness and 
lack of deductive precision of ethical decisions as follows: 
The whole accounts of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not 
precisely... accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject matter; 
matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no 
fixity... the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the 
occasion. (II.2, 1104a1) 
Thirdly, Aristotle's account of virtue involves rational principles as determined by 
practical wisdom - and the latter is clearly embodied in a person. We need an 
account of rationality that will underlie the virtues. I believe that the account of 
reasonableness developed in §3.1 is admirably suited to this role, because its multi-
aspectual character suits a multi-dimensional moral theory. 
As to how the virtues are acquired, there is a certain tension in Aristotle's account. I 
shall explore this tension by means of a commentary on several passages: 
Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we 
are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. (II.1, 1103a25) 
From this, it is clear that the virtues are not fixed in us at birth - they are not merely 
natural reactions. Nevertheless, at birth, we do have an ability to be able to develop 
them (§2.4). Humans are in some way adapted so as to be likely to become virtuous, 
although in the absence of the formation of habits, they will not develop. Note that 
in this passage, Aristotle claims that the virtues are made petfect by habit. This 
1 My exposition here draws on the Ross translation of The Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1980). 
While I shall often cite the book and section number in the form used by Ross (e.g Book Two, section 
6 as 11.6), reference to more specific citations and quotations will be in the standard form, referring to 
the Bekker text (Prussian Academy, Berlin, 1831) by page, column and first line of the quotation. 
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would seem to imply that it is habit alone that develops the virtues. Here he expands 
on what it is to form a habit: 
Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the 
activities that we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of 
character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, 
then, whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a 
very great difference, or rather all the difference. (II.!, 1103b19) 
The formation of habits, then, takes place through repeated activities that are in 
conformity with the virtues. We must again and again act as the virtue would 
require if we are to form the habit. He claims that this is an important process: it 
make all the difference as to whether we can become virtuous or not. So far, the 
account that seems to be building is one that claims virtue depends solely on habit. 
Two things are not yet clear: where the decision to form one habit rather than 
another comes from; and the place of reason in the acquisition of habits. I shall 
leave consideration of the second to one side for a while. 
Given that Aristotle is referring to habit forming "from our very youth," it might 
seem that the sole source of these habits must be their imposition on us from the 
outside, by our parents, perhaps (though Aristotle also argues that the law should be 
involved). I shall refer to this view as mechanical habituation. What it requires - 
and this has been a common interpretation of Aristotle, as I shall document in §5.21 
- is that parents, or society, tell children how to act in certain morally charged 
situations, and children just do as they are told, until eventually the moral action is 
"second nature." Only when a person has been trained to act in a virtuous manner 
unfailingly is it possible to build true virtue through the study of moral philosophy. 
If this is the whole story, then the sorts of habits we form will be beyond our control. 
Yet, there are other passages in the Nicomachean Ethics that cast doubt on this 
interpretation: 
All who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a 
certain kind of study and care. (1.9, 1099b20) 
But perhaps a man is the kind of man not to take care. Still they are themselves by 
their slack lives responsible for becoming men of that kind, and men are themselves 
responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent, in that they cheat or spend their time 
in drinking-bouts and the like; for it is activities exercised on particular objects that 
make the corresponding character.... Now not to know that it is from the exercise of 
activities on particular objects that states of character are produced is the mark of a 
thoroughly senseless person. Again, it is irrational to suppose that a man who acts 
unjustly does not wish to become an unjust man... But if without being ignorant a 
man does the things that will make him unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily. Yet it 
does not follow that if he wishes he will cease to be unjust. (111.5, 1114a3) 
These passages make it clear that the development of habits is under a certain degree 
of voluntary control. Virtue can be attained by "a certain kind of study and care." 
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Just what kind, is identified in the second passage. We make the choice to engage in 
certain activities. If these activities are the sort that are "unjust or self-indulgent," 
then we reinforce our unvirtuous habits. Nevertheless, we can, by taking care, 
provided that we are not ignorant, recognize this and choose to act differently. 
Aristotle is not naive enough to suggest that a single choice of this nature is enough 
to reverse an unvirtuous habit: ceasing to be unjust requires the training of a new 
virtuous habit, and this implies that we must continue to make the explicit choice to 
act virtuously until it becomes a habitual reaction. How are these choices to be 
made? 
Since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is 
deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if 
the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. 
(VI.2, 1139a22) 
Deliberation, using practical reasoning, is the key to such choice. When we are not 
acting habitually, we deliberate about what the right choice would be. It seems that 
this is where Aristotle sees the need for care. If we care about what sorts of persons 
we are (see §3.1235 for an account of "caring about"), then we monitor our habitual 
reactions, as they are formed at the moment. If we suspect that these habits are 
unvirtuous, then we need to invoke practical wisdom so as to deliberate about 
whether to change our habitual reactions. Clearly, the committed aspect of 
reasonableness plays an important role in practical reason here. 
Now, these reactions have been formed by our actions in the past, and many of these 
actions could well have been those that others (our parents, to a large degree) have 
required of us. We are situated in the world in a way that depends on our past. But 
we do not escape responsibility for our reasoning and our desires on this account. 
Our moral character is never a finished product: we are always "becoming men of 
that kind." The kind we are becoming is under our control - not an easy control, but 
a control nevertheless, and one which depends critically on deliberation and 
reflection using practical wisdom. 
But this is not to exhaust the role of practical wisdom. It also plays an important role 
in regulating the application of the virtues, which are general dispositions to act, in 
specific ethical situations. 
But to feel [the virtues] at the right time, with reference to the right objects, towards 
the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both 
intermediate and best, and this is the character of virtue. (11.6, 1106b24) 
The work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as 
with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom 
makes us take the right means. (VI. 12, 1144a6) 
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Judging the right means of achieving the right mark is highly dependent on the 
details of the situation in which we are immersed, and practical reason will call on its 
contextual aspect (§3.124). Aristotle makes it clear that such decision making is not 
a matter of deriving specific instructions for action by deduction from absolutely true 
general principles, for: 
fine and just actions... exhibit much variety and fluctuation... We must be content, 
then, in speaking of such subjects and with such prernisses to indicate the truth 
roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part 
true, and with premisses of the same kind, to reach conclusions that are no better. 
(1.3, 1094b14) 
Ethical judgement is an art, deriving conclusions that are imprecise and contestable 
from maxims which are likewise. This is not to claim that there is no ethical truth, 
that all is relative, because we can address the truth "roughly and in outline." 
Rather, it is to acknowledge the fuzziness and fallibility of ethical judgements, the 
continually open possibility that although we can often distinguish worse from 
better, we might always be able to do better still. 
In short, this survey of Aristotle's virtue ethics shows that it exhibits the following 
features on which I shall draw for my own account. 
1. there are many morally salient factors (virtues, in Aristotle's account). 
These may, in multi-dimensional theories, be in tension with one another, 
thought Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of the virtues denies this latter 
feature in his case. 
2. the morally salient factors have diverse roots. In Aristotle's account, 
genetic factors, social experiences and practical wisdom contribute to 
morality. Thus there are roles for instinctive, habitual and deliberative 
inputs into moral actions, rather than solely rational inputs; 
3. all applications of the morally salient factors are contextualized; 
4. moral judgements cannot be exact, so that they require one and only one 
outcome; 
5. the focus of morality is persons, not acts or principles; 
6. we are responsible for, and should care about, our character and the actions 
that flow from it. 
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5.21 Moral Development of Children: Instinct and Habituation 
Since we are interested in an account of morality that can underpin a program of 
moral education, however, we need to look more carefully at what our meta-ethical 
theory has to say about the process by which we come to be moral persons. So far, 
we have hardly considered Aristotle's views on this question. Above, I identified 
three roots for morality within his theory: instinctive, habitual and deliberative. 
These three roots correspond to the three noted at the end of §5.1: the genetic 
inheritance of humanity, the social situations in which humans are raised, and the 
influence of reasonableness. 
In the first case, humans may have acquired through evolution a genetic disposition 
to react with a feeling of moral rightness or wrongness to certain events (§2.2). 
Recent research supports the contention that empathy with others may well have a 
genetic base, being exhibited from only a few days after birth (Damon 1996). Prior 
to experience and prior to reasoning, a child has an inbuilt propensity to have moral 
reactions to at least some situations. Of course, there are other instinctive reactions, 
not all of which have anything to do with morality. Aristotle concurs with the view 
that children have inbuilt "proto-virtues" available from birth: 
For both children and brutes have the natural disposition to [virtues], but without 
reason these are evidentially hurtful.... Therefore... in the moral part there are two 
types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves 
practical wisdom. (VI.13, 1144b7) 
But why should it be said that these natural virtues are "hurtful" without reason? 
The answer must be that instinctive reactions are programmed, in the sense that they 
occur automatically in response to certain triggers in the environment. The 
environment in which morality applies - that is, the social environment - is much 
more complex than the environment in which many instincts play. Situations similar 
in many non-normative respects may have very different social import to different 
actors, and hence natural virtues might often lead to inappropriate reactions. Damon 
quotes the example of the young child who, reacting to another child's crying, leads 
his own mother over to comfort the other. If the other is crying in the first place due 
to the presence of strangers, this may in fact make the situation worse. Thus, the 
hurt that would follow from allowing children to act solely on the natural virtues 
must be avoided, at first, through controlling children's behaviour and modelling 
appropriate behaviour. Soon, however, the natural virtues must start to come under 
the influence of reason, so that childish virtue may be properly situated and applied, 
even in the absence of an adult. 
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Let's look a little more closely at the process of controlling and modelling 
behaviour, which can be considered as important elements of habituation. 
Interpretations of Aristotle's concept of habituation and views on moral education 
have relied heavily on passages such as the following: 
a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is 
inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these 
and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will 
be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And 
it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the 
defect does not depend on time, but on his living and pursuing each successive 
object, as passion directs. (1.3, 1095a2) 
Anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, 
generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good 
habits. (1.4, 1095b3) 
Before argument and teaching can be effective, Aristotle asserts that: 
the soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits... The 
character... must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue. (X.9, 1179b30) 
These passage leaves open two important questions. What degree of formation of 
character is necessary before teaching can be effective? When is the soul or 
character sufficiently cultivated? The standard answer seems to be that the character 
must be fully formed, and that this does not occur until into adulthood. Sherman 
(1989, 157) comments that "under traditional interpretations.., practice is seen 
primarily as a non-rational training of desires towards appropriate objects." 
Pritchard (1992), quoting the 1.4 passage above (albeit in a different translation), 
attributes a similar view to Aristotle. Baron (1985, 147) also accepts this view, 
adding that virtue ethics implies 
a form of education [which] would set the subject's gears in a certain way, without 
his realizing that anything has been set and, of course, without him being in a 
position to 'reset' the 'gears.' It keeps from the subject both self-understanding and 
self-direction. 
Habituation, on this traditional view, is something that takes place before any 
rational discussion or study of morals can occur. Sherman (op. cit., 194) asserts: 
But to postpone inquiry into the ultimate origins of a discipline is obviously not to 
postpone all inquiry relevant to learning the facts.... Nothing Aristotle says 
precludes the educational path being marked by stages of inquiry and explanation or 
there being an explanatory dimension to the acquiring of adequate habits. 
Certainly we can agree with Aristotle that experience in the actions that occur in life 
is a necessary condition for engagement in practical discourse, but this does not fix 
when such reasoning can be applied. Since even the youngest child capable of 
speech is already "living and pursuing" objects under the direction of passion, it 
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seems that at least one of Aristotle's conditions for benefiting from practical 
reasoning is already met by such a child. 
Sherman argues that Aristotle's conception of habituation cannot be merely "non-
rational training." In support of this view, she offers a illuminating analysis of the 
idea of repetition of a process as a way of habituating it. Taking much more simple 
skills, such as a physical action skill, she notes that even the habituation of such 
actions cannot be merely a matter of repeating them over and over. This is because 
the first attempts at an unlearned action are bound to be clumsy and inaccurate. To 
merely repeat such an action without subjecting it to critique and improving it 
ensures no progress. Consequently, the learner must make trials which are aimed at 
an ideal, and this requires awareness of the goal and continued judgements about the 
closeness of the learner's approach to it. Indeed, Sherman's analysis can be 
extended here. Every sports coach knows that coaching a raw beginner is easier than 
coaching someone who has developed bad skill habits. The tyro can be taught 
properly from the start, whereas the poor skill habits of the experienced player need 
to be broken and remade. Aristotle makes a similar observation with respect to 
moral habits. 
It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since 
been incorporated in the character. (X.9, 1179b16) 
I conclude, with Sherman, that to allow children to believe that certain actions are 
good no matter what the circumstances is to lead them away from ethical behaviour. 
If we are to bring children up to be ethical, we must begin to introduce practical 
reasoning as soon as they have some habitual responses to build upon. It is easier 
for reasoning and argument to be involved in moulding the traits of character while 
they are still in the process of being incorporated, presumably provided that the child 
is capable of comprehending the reasoning. The discussion of the instillation of 
sports skills above led us to a similar conclusion. 
This conclusion is certainly supported by modern research that indicates that the 
moral training of young children is more effective if the demand for moral behaviour 
is accompanied by reasons and discussion (this has been labelled "authoritative 
parenting"), than if it is imposed in an authoritarian manner (see Damon 1988, 
Chapter 4, for an excellent summary). Children raised in authoritarian households, 
through mechanical habituation, lack precisely the initiative and inner responsibility 
to which Aristotle alluded when he discussed the "man who takes care" in moral 
matters (1E5, 1114a3, quoted above). We can note that the same research also 
indicates that reasoning, in the absence of the enforcement of behavioural 
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expectations (i.e. permissiveness), is also ineffective, thus supporting arguments for 
the importance of habituation. 
Our characters are never fully formed: we are always changing, perhaps becoming 
more virtuous, perhaps backsliding. If we care about our moral standing, part of the 
process of becoming more virtuous inherently involves practical reason in the 
evaluation of the present state of this project, and the decision to act in certain ways 
so as to reinforce good, or replace bad, habits already formed. Some habits must be 
in place for this process to work on, and even very young children have already been 
trained and habituated to some degree. The processes of being lectured on, engaging 
in argumentation about, and reflecting on, our habituated responses need not, ought 
not, and cannot wait for a (hypothetical and unachievable) completion of 
habituation. 
The thrust of my argument so far is that, while habituation is clearly an important 
part of growing up to be moral, we cannot support a characterization of habituation 
that, like the traditional interpretation of Aristotle, claims the task of applying 
practical reasoning to the character must wait until virtuous action has been fully 
habituated. Sherman (1989) in a lengthy discussion of the habituation of character 
argues that the notion of habituation, as used by Aristotle, is one that inherently 
involves the use of practical reasoning. Drawing in part on the work of Burnyeat 
(1980) and Sorabji (1980), she says: 
My overall claim is that if full virtue is to meet certain conditions, then this must be 
reflected in the educational process. This will require a developmental conception of 
cognitive and affective capacities, as well as a conception of habituation in varying 
degrees reflective and critical. (159).... We misconstrue Aristotle's notion of action 
producing character if we isolate the exterior moment of action from the interior 
cognitive and affective moments which characterize even the beginner's ethical 
behaviour. (178) 
It is worth quoting some of Sherman's arguments for these conclusions at greater 
length: 
The child is not an empty box in which beliefs are instilled, but an individual who 
has, to a greater or lesser degree, already formed certain construals and judgements, 
which become adjusted and revised through interaction with an adult. Education is 
thus a matter of bringing the child to more critical discrimination.... What is 
required is a shifting of beliefs and perspectives through the guidance of an outside 
instructor. Such guidance cannot merely be a matter of bringing the child to see this 
way now, but of providing some sort of continuous and consistent instruction which 
will allow for the formation of patterns and trends in what the child notices and 
sees.... Though the educator persuades and exhorts, the goal is not to manipulate 
beliefs and emotions - to influence an outcome here and now - but to prepare the 
learner for eventually arriving at competent judgements and reactions on his own. 
Any method which secures rational obedience must at the same time encourage the 
child's own development.., in a way that engages his own critical capacities. What 
is required is some dialogue and verbal exchange about what one sees and (feels) 
and should see (and feel); in other words, actual descriptions which articulate a way 
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of perceiving the situation and which put into play the relevant concepts, 
considerations and emotions. (171-2) 
Throughout this subsection, I have been looking at Aristotle's account of two roots 
for morality: the instinctive and the habituated. Sherman alerts us here to the 
interconnections between these two starting points of the child and the role of 
interaction both with the world and with other persons. Most of all, she highlights 
the absolute indispensability of reason in the development of both the instinctive and 
the habituated responses. It is this enhancement of the judgements involved in 
situated reactions that enables habituation, which might appear on the surface of it to 
be inherently heteronomous, to play its role in the development of autonomy in the 
child. 
Baler (1985) also melds the genetic (natural responses), the habituated (training in 
the interdependent situation) and the reasoned (critical element): 
If we see morality as essentially control of our natural responses to the mixed risk of 
evil and chance of good in our interdependent situation, we can see moral response, 
in the form of training, criticism, and so on, as a response to a natural response... 
(220). What I have tried to make persuasive is the suggestion that morality begins 
in a response to a natural response to a situation in which hope and fear are properly 
inspired by one and the same situation. Morality is a proliferating succession of 
responses, individual and collective, to those primitive responses to the risky 
adventure of interdependence... Morality is throughout responsive to already given 
responses, and its norms are reflective versions of natural responses to the risks and 
opportunities interdependence involves. If we can see morality this way, I think we 
can keep that critical element which most normative theorists want to stress without 
making the critical morality one that cannot make constructive critical responses to 
the real situation. (222-3) 
Indeed, in this passage, Baler stresses one of the key advantages of virtue ethics, due 
to its multi-dimensional character: through its ability to link together emotions and 
drives, habituated actions and critical reflection, it has a greater potential to explain 
how it is that moral judgements can coordinate with real, unique situations to lead to 
moral action. The young child starts moral life through natural reactions to everyday 
situations that are saturated with social mores. These provide the elements of an 
enacted morality. Yet, the social interaction in which the child is immersed does 
more than inculcate moral action. It also inducts the child into the social world of 
discussion and argument, with the result (as we have seen in §3.23), that the child 
becomes progressively able to internalize the mechanisms of public dialogue as 
private thinking. Amongst the topics on which this dialogue and reflection are 
turned are ethical and moral matters. The child becomes increasingly capable of 
entering practical discourse (in the Habermasian sense), both in dialogue and in 
reflection, often assisted by the explicit intervention of more capable reasoners 
(§4.14). The critical element to which Baler refers enters into the child's ethical life. 
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This subsection has shown that habituation needs to include engaging children in 
practical reasoning, through pedagogic action (§4.141), from an early age, if true 
virtue is ever to be achieved. Yet it has left the issue of the development of practical 
reasoning, as used by the child, somewhat obscure. Despite Sherman's reference 
above to the requirement for a developmental conception of cognitive and affective 
capacities, there has been something of an assumption that practical reason will be 
there when it is needed, with little explicit treatment of how this might occur. I shall 
now turn to the question of how practical reasoning develops, and what implications 
this has for a virtue ethics meta-ethical theory. 
5.22 The Development of Practical Reasoning 
In the previous subsection, I explored one of the contentious issues in the 
interpretation of Aristotle: the extent to which he felt that practical reasoning should 
be withheld until after virtuous habits had been established. It is notable that 
Aristotle is not subject to the criticism that he ignored development in his meta-
ethical theory, but his remarks about it are somewhat lacking in detail, and thus 
subject to many interpretational controversies. I don't wish to enter into the issue of 
the proper interpretation of Aristotle on this point, but the controversy does indicate 
a problem for a multi-dimensional account of morality. If moral education involves 
both habituation and reasoning, and some measure of the first must be in place 
before the reasoning can be used, then when ought reasoning to be introduced? 
What level of practical reasoning ought we to expect children to be able to use, and 
to begin to internalize, at what ages? These are clearly pressing problems for the 
teacher of moral education. 
I will mark out several positions on these questions to provide starting points for this 
discussion. At one extreme, we have the view that children ought to be thoroughly 
habituated to follow what the virtues require before entering into any degree of 
practical reasoning. The arguments in the previous subsection show that this 
position is untenable. Some degree of practical reasoning is an integral part of 
habituation. 
At the other end of the spectrum would be the view that children are already capable 
of engaging in practical reasoning at any age. This position is also untenable: 
children clearly undergo development in their ability to reason as they grow older. 
What is not always recognized is the implication: that adults, too, may be at various 
levels of ability in reasoning. Unless there is some threshold value of adequate and 
sufficient reasoning that all adults reach upon attaining maturity, we must expect that 
all judgements of ability to engage in practical reasoning involve placing the level of 
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reasoning on some scale or scales. In view of the multi-aspectual account of 
reasonableness I developed in Chapter Three, my view is that we need at least five 
quasi-independent scales in order to measure reasoning ability. 
So the answers to the questions posed in the opening paragraph of this subsection 
require us to make nuanced and situated judgements in the case of each particular 
child, or group of children. Clearly, such an answer implies that the particular 
judgements are empirical matters, to be decided in action. Nevertheless, some 
philosophical groundwork can assist us by clarifying different levels of practical 
reasoning. 
The most immediate level of practical reasoning will be that which is tied directly to 
the situation. A parent who prevents a child from hitting another may say "Don't hit 
Alan - you can see that he is getting upset." Here, the parent is making the child do 
the moral thing, but is also reasoning with the child - offering an immediate and 
situated reason why the action is not acceptable. Such reasoning commonly (but not 
necessarily - the parent might just have said "Don't!") accompanies coercion in the 
interests of habituating a moral response. We have seen that research evidence 
supports the view that such reasoning (in authoritative parenting) is more effective in 
instilling moral virtues than mere imperatives (authoritarian parenting). 
What of the most abstract level? Perhaps it is Aristotle's "hearer of lectures on 
political science" (1.3, 1095a2). If Aristotle is the lecturer, then we are talking about 
very high level reasoning indeed. Given the subtlety and abstraction of such 
lectures, it is clear that young children will not be capable of handling them. 
Between these two levels lie many others. They differ on a number of dimensions: 
the complexity of the language used; the abstractness of the concepts; the distance 
from the immediate situation; the difficulty of the logic employed; the degree to 
which they are initiated by the adult or the child; the degree to which concepts are 
problematized, and so on. 
At this point I want to make a rough distinction between reasoned moral instruction 
and engagement in philosophical moral discourse. Both of these lie in the multi-
dimensional space between obeying authoritarian commands and listening to 
Aristotle's lectures. The distinction can only be rough, because the one can almost 
imperceptibly shade into the other as a discussion builds, and because the character 
of the discussion can vary along many of the above dimensions quasi-independently. 
However, we can use a number of these dimensions to help clarify it, as shown in the 
following table. 
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Dimension 
1. Abstractness of the 
concepts 
2. Distance from the 
immediate situation 
3. Pattern of initiation of 
discussion episodes 




Concepts are tied to 
concrete exemplars. 
Discussion tied to 
immediate situation, or a 
similar class of situations. 
Instructor wields control 
over topics of discussion. 
Concepts taken for 




Concepts are treated in 
themselves. 
Discussion refers to 
generalized situations. 
Control over topics shared 
amongst group. 
Concepts themselves 
become topic of 
conversation. 
I shall illustrate this distinction by reference to a suite of related examples, clustered 
around the moral concept of fairness. A typical example of reasoned moral 
instruction might be when a teacher sees a child taking most of the coloured pencils 
from the table's supply. The discussion of fairness that follows is likely to revolve 
around the issue of the pencils and related examples ("How would you feel if there 
were five cakes on the table and Greg took four?"). Here, fairness is exemplified by 
concrete distribution problems, and tied to the issues of the pencils present and 
similar cases. The teacher decides how the conversation proceeds and what issues 
are introduced. The teacher has the idea of fair, and wishes the child to acquire it. 
Reasoning is used, but to achieve the aim of instilling good sharing habits among the 
children at the table. 
In a philosophical moral discourse involving the same children, the children might 
explore what the word fair means - does it mean, for example, equal distribution? 
The discussion may not refer to any particular situation that involves the children, 
but range across a number of imaginary examples, often at a quite generalized level 
(e.g. the distribution of goods rather than pencils). Each participant in the discussion 
can introduce new questions or assertions, and many of the words used (e.g. equal, 
deserve) might themselves be problematized. Reasoning here goes beyond merely 
instilling good habits (though it may still serve that purpose), and embarks on the 
journey of finding out what good habits are, and what makes them good. 
It seems clear that habituation into the virtues must, as I have argued, involve 
reasoned moral instruction, at any age, provided the reasoning is appropriate to the 
abilities of the child(ren) involved. It also seems clear that philosophical moral 
discourse requires a greater ability to reason (for the same level of conceptual 
complexity), and hence must in some sense be later than critical habituation. But we 
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still have not addressed the question of the development of the reasoning capacity 
that both require. 
Sherman (1989, 190-7) argues at some length that critical habituation is an integral 
part of becoming morally good and, further, that not just reasoned moral instruction, 
but also a certain amount of what I have called philosophical moral discourse is 
essential to critical habituation. The young must investigate how to construe 
situations, how to proceed, how to distinguish morally salient factors, how to live. 
All this must occur before the young are equipped to attend Aristotle's lectures. She 
concludes: 
Thus if we are to become critical listeners of discourse on ethics, we must first be 
trained to become critical inquirers. Ethical education must, to some extent, include 
this training. 
While I concur with this judgement, I wish to go further. What is left unclear in 
Sherman's account is the process of training the young to become critical inquirers. 
I have been developing an account of moral development which gives a central place 
to the engagement of children in moral philosophizing, at the level appropriate to 
their development. This, I will argue, is an important element in training them "to 
become critical inquirers" in the context of ethical education. Thus, I will be arguing 
that Sherman has oversimplified: becoming critical inquirers in ethical matters can 
be achieved through (amongst other things) becoming critical listeners - and later, 
speakers - in discourses on ethics. In other words, becoming a critical inquirer is 
achieved (best, possibly only) by engaging in critical inquiry (Vygotsky 1962; 1981, 
see §3.23). In the early stages, engaging in critical inquiry just is listening in to 
inquiries carried on around us. With growing experience, the ability to participate in 
the inquiry is gradually internalized and implemented (see the account of the 
acquisition of competency in playing "peek-a-boo" in Bruner 1983 as an exemplar of 
this process). I shall return to this in §5.232 below. 
Although I have framed this as a Vygotskian claim, there is a way of reframing it 
that is clearly Aristotelian. His analysis of the development of moral virtues is 
applicable also to the intellectual virtues - in particular, practical wisdom - in a way 
that undermines any interpretation of Aristotle which claims that the young cannot 
benefit from philosophy. The engagement in moral philosophy is the use of practical 
wisdom. Hutchinson (1995, 207) gives a useful summary of Aristotle's account of 
practical wisdom: 
All in all, practical wisdom is an appreciation of what is good and bad for us at the 
highest level, together with a correct apprehension of the facts of experience, 
together with the skill to make correct inferences about how to apply our general 
moral knowledge to our particular situation, and to do so quickly and reliably. 
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Practical wisdom, we can see, contains three parts: moral appreciation (or an 
appreciation of the moral virtues); apprehension of facts; and practical reasoning. 
Now, practical wisdom is one of the five intellectual virtues (I.13). The moral 
virtues are, as we have seen, based on habituation - a critical habituation. Is the 
same true of the intellectual virtues - in particular, is it true of practical reason? I 
have advanced the claim that it is, using a somewhat different terminology. The way 
that we become able to reason, involves an essential element of habituation, on the 
sort of Vygotskian account I have been urging. We become able to make certain 
intellectual moves because we have been engaged, repeatedly, in conversations 
where those moves have been made. Reid (1872, 641) makes a similar point: 
Our judgment of things is ripened, not by time only, but chiefly by being exercised 
about things of the same, or of a similar kind.... I am very apt to think, that, if a 
man could be reared from infancy, without any society of his fellow-creatures, he 
would hardly ever shew any sign of moral judgment, or of the power of reasoning. 
In other words, moral judgment and reasoning is something that needs to be learned 
from others, and it must be practiced in the company of others, who are already 
better at it than are we, and in contexts sufficiently like those in which we are to 
subsequently use it. To return again to Sherman's quote, to become critical inquirers 
involves firstly being critical listeners (and critical speakers). 
We might paraphrase Aristotle here: being capable of practical reasoning is not 
merely being capable of making intellectual moves. It is a matter of accessing the 
right intellectual moves at the right time, with reference to the right subject matter, in 
interaction with the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way. The 
habits of intellect need to be reflexively turned upon themselves, if we are to reach 
practical wisdom. For the same point applies to habituated reasoning as to 
habituated virtue - if we allow the habituation of poor or sloppy reasoning, then it 
becomes very difficult to set it right later. 
So we cannot treat practical reasoning as a given - something that is merely applied 
to moral appreciation and the apprehension of facts. Practical reason is itself the 
result of much habituation and reflection. Practical reason ought to develop hand-in-
hand with habituated virtuous action, if either is going to be developed to anything 
like the desirable extent, for both are the product of practice and critique. 
5.23 Children and Moral Philosophy 
I do not seek to establish that the young ought to be sent along to high level lectures 
in moral philosophy, akin to Aristotle's, nor that the discourses on moral philosophy 
that they engage in have to be formally convened (although I will argue that it is a 
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good idea to do so). At least some of the ordinary, everyday discussion on moral 
matters in which authoritative parents and carers engage with children meets the 
criteria advanced above for philosophical moral discourse, albeit in a fragmentary 
and loosely structured way. My claim is rather that some involvement in 
philosophical moral discourse of some type is an integral part of effective moral 
development. 
Yet, as we saw in §5.21, a widespread interpretation of Aristotle holds that he claims 
that none but the already experienced, morally habituated person can get anything 
out of any engagement in moral philosophy, at no matter what level. Such an 
interpretation depends on a conflation of Aristotle's lectures with moral philosophy 
in general. For example, even such a sympathetic commentator as Sherman 
conflates "explanation... of the sort that Aristotle's lectures on ethics can yield" with 
"some theoretical and general account of the substantive and formal features of good 
living" (Sherman 1989, 194). The latter can be addressed at a level considerably 
below that at which Aristotle addresses it - a level that lacks his rigour and breadth, 
but which is still recognisably philosophical and well within the reach of the young. 
Nussbaum (1994, 97), another commentator sympathetic to the place of practical 
reasoning in habituation, makes a similar, but longer, slide in worrying about "a 
tension in Aristotle's position" between his partially cognitive account of emotion 
and this requirement to fully form the moral emotions before studying moral 
philosophy. She says: 
On the one hand, he describes the emotions as closely bound up with judgments, and 
therefore capable of being modified by the modification of judgment. This picture 
implies not only that emotions can play a role in rational deliberation, but also that 
they can be changed as beliefs of all sorts can be changed, by deliberation and 
argument. On the other hand.., he makes a sharp distinction between character 
training and the philosophical study of ethics, on the grounds that the emotions need 
to be balanced before the student can get anything much out of his philosophical 
arguments. Why, taking the view of emotions that he does, does he appear to insist 
on a separation between character training and philosophy? Why can't philosophical 
argument shape character? 
"His [Aristotle's] philosophical arguments" 2 turn in the subsequent two questions 
into "philosophy" and "philosophical argument" in general (and note that these latter 
activities can be much less formal than Sherman's "theoretical and general account 
of the substantive and formal features"). What if we were to compare this to a 
modern parallel? If, say, Steven Hawking were quoted as saying that no-one could 
benefit from his lectures without having become thoroughly habituated to tensor 
2 Presumably as delivered in a lecture, not as studied at leisure. 
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calculus, would we conclude from this that children ought not to be exposed to 
mathematical inquiry? I venture to think not. 
Nussbaum's tension dissolves if we take Aristotle to be talking only about terse, 
dense, verbal delivery of a tightly argued system, and not about all philosophical 
inquiry. Indeed, it is difficult to see how he could be talking about the latter, since 
much general discussion has a philosophical aspect; there can be no sharp line drawn 
between philosophy and other types of inquiry. 
But let's leave aside the exegetical question of whether restricting the scope of 
Aristotle's reference to encompass only formal, high-level lectures is legitimate or 
not. His remarks have often been taken to be a claim that children (not to mention 
women and young men) are incapable of either doing moral philosophy or benefiting 
from it. And whether they draw their view from Aristotle or not, there are those who 
still hold this position. 
There can be two sorts of attack on this view. One is empirical, and can be mounted 
by pointing to examples of children doing moral philosophy, or by attempting to 
discuss moral philosophical issues with groups of children and assessing whether 
they do, in fact engage in something that is recognizably moral philosophy. I do not 
intend to take this approach here. Others have, and have compiled an impressive 
amount of data to show that children can and do philosophize, from as young as four 
years old (see, for example, Matthews 1980; Matthews 1994; Pritchard 1996). 
The second approach is to attack philosophically the view that children are unable to 
engage in moral philosophy. Such an attack will have two prongs, both of which 
have been foreshadowed above. Firstly, I will argue that philosophy is not such a 
radically different undertaking from general discourse about ethical matters that a 
sharp wedge can be driven between the two. Secondly, I will draw on the 
understanding gained above concerning the development of reasoning, particularly 
practical reasoning, to argue that the recognition of the philosophical element in 
moral development warrants more explicit study of moral philosophy in order to 
assist children to become ethical agents. 
5.231 Philosophy and Everyday Discourse 
Philosophers who are considering the place of moral philosophy in the world quite 
naturally construe philosophy as that in which they are engaged. Philosophy is 
reading the greats (or, in journals, the not-so-greats); it is attending learned seminars; 
it is writing learned and technically difficult articles and so on. To claim that the 
fact that children, or even ordinary people, are not capable of participating at this 
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level is no argument that they are not capable of philosophizing at any level. My 
fourteen year old son's inability to do integral calculus does not rule out his handling 
quadratic equations. Indeed, to be able to eventually handle integral calculus, it is 
imperative that he study lower level mathematics for a long time, and that this was 
grounded in informal, everyday mathematical awareness long before he started to 
attend school. 
For the ordinary member of the public, however, philosophy is something quite 
different. It is something like an approach to things, an underlying way of looking at 
the world, a listing of important guides to life. It can be talked about in ordinary 
language on ordinary occasions - around a coffee table, or over a beer - whenever we 
slow down a little and think a bit more reflectively. We pass on our philosophy of 
life to others whenever we muse a little and talk about what is important to us in the 
big picture. Often, we do this when we are talking to our children, or to the young in 
general. 
This everyday conception of philosophy is quite different from Aristotle's lectures in 
many ways. It is much more diffuse, less rigorous, more poorly connected and 
systematic. Yet it also shares some important features. It is about "the big 
questions," included amongst which is the question "How ought Ito live my life?" 
Answers to this question are, in the main, philosophical answers, whether they arise 
in the context of a tightly argued lecture series, or in epigrammatic utterances. Of 
course, the quality of the answers, as philosophy, varies in the two cases (though we 
need to be aware that the quality as advice for life might not covary with the 
philosophical quality). 
This characterization of philosophy as attempts to ask and to answer the "big 
questions" (and I don't wish to attempt to spell out just what makes a question "big," 
or to list them) makes it clear that philosophy is something that most - probably all - 
people engage in at various times. In particular, any attempt to bring up children to 
be moral that extends beyond mere mechanical habituation, that attempts to give 
reasons for actions and attitudes, is to that extent philosophical. And it is not merely 
reasoned moral instruction: the child who questions and explores these issues is in 
the realm of philosophical moral discourse. As both Sherman and I have argued, 
such an extension is essential to any effective habituation in the ethical, and so all 
but a small minority of severely ethically disadvantaged children do engage in at 
least a low level of philosophical inquiry in the course of growing up and acquiring 
an ethical outlook. 
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If we accept that there is an inherently philosophical element in ethical education, 
even if it is quite unfocused, then the question arises as to the degree to which it is 
useful to make this element more focused in the ethical upbringing of children. At 
this point, it is useful to recall the spectrum of "moral philosophicality," extending 
from a few wise saws offered with little opportunity to explore them, through to 
Aristotle's lectures. 3 Aristotle, clearly, thought that a course in highly abstract moral 
theory was of no use, and it is hard to disagree with this view. Nor, in the light of 
the arguments presented above about the need for the development of nuanced 
judgement in the building of virtue, can we accept that the odd "philosophical 
advice" without conceptual exploration will suffice. The answer lies somewhere in 
the middle - but exactly where? 
5.232 Children, Moral Philosophy and Practical Reasoning 
My answer to this question brings me to the second strand of the present discussion: 
the development of practical reason (that is, reasonableness as applied to moral 
situations) that must parallel the development of good moral habits. We have 
established that habituation cannot be a blind, repetitive process. It must contain a 
strand of critical evaluation. Now, Aristotle is quite right that a failure to habituate 
the young into good moral habits makes the attainment of practical wisdom much 
more difficult in adulthood (e.g. X.9, 1179b30 and 1180a14, quoted above). Since 
the same applies to the attainment of practical reasoning - it too must be habituated, 
and this habituation involves critical evaluation - then sound ethical education must 
involve both the insistence that children act morally and the insistence that they learn 
how to judge whether their actions are moral or not. Being able to do the former 
requires the latter. 
Let's analyse further what the latter means, and how to attain it. Being able to judge 
whether an action is morally good or not involves having at least the following: 
1. a model of the morally correct action presented to one through speech 
and/or observation. This model may have been presented in the past, or it 
may be being presented at the time of acting; 
2. a concept of the target morally correct action in mind, derived from that 
presentation, and other previous presentations; 
3 Of course, a single dimensional spectrum is too simple. "Philosophicality", as we saw, has many 
dimensions. Further, it could be argued that the 'wise saw' end of the spectrum has lost too many 
philosophical features to be properly called philosophy - it is, rather, reasoned moral instruction. 
Common usage, on the other hand, seems to disagree. However, these are not topics that need deeper 
exploration here. 
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3. an accurate picture of how one is presently performing the action, so as to 
be able to compare it to the model; 
4. a concept of the salient features of one's action, and how they relate to the 
morality of the action; 
5. a grasp of the external features of the situation in which the action arises, 
including an appreciation of the others involved; 
6. an understanding of oneself, so as to be able to relate the action to the 
moral goals and aspirations that one has, for these also help form the 
situation in which one is immersed; 
7. the necessary intellectual tools to be able to draw conclusions from the 
information available. 
Only point 1 is captured by a version of habituation that sees it as externally imposed 
repetitive action; i.e., mechanical habituation. It is the only one that must be 
presented by another, presumably one who has a greater grasp of morally appropriate 
action. Let's call this person the moral trainer. Each of the other six points may be 
present in one of three ways: in the moral trainer; in the moral trainee; or in the 
jointly constructed interpersonal space that includes the moral trainer and the moral 
trainee. 
A mechanical model of habituation assumes that all seven points are the province of 
the moral trainer. Leaving aside considerations of how communication can be 
established at all - considerations which would only strengthen the analysis to be 
presented here - then mechanical habituation asserts that the trainer not only 
provides a model for action, but also carries out the assessment of all the other 
points, and then communicates the conclusions drawn from them to the trainee, 
along with the information on how the action is to be modified. Constant repetition 
results in the inculcation of virtuous habits, until the stage is reached where the 
trainee is ripe for moral wisdom. This account leaves the process of transformation 
from unthinking trainee to moral wisdom candidate entirely unexplained. 
The second way in which the last six points are present - as features of the trainee - 
is clearly the endpoint at which the process of ethical education is aimed. If the 
trainee is fully capable of instantiating all seven points, then there is no longer any 
need for the trainer. 
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It is the third possibility that provides a way of transforming the first situation into 
the second. The first situation, where the moral trainer has responsibility for all 
seven points, may not be an accurate description of the process of habituation 
throughout, but it is certainly close to the truth for the very young child, just starting 
out on the route towards moral wisdom and independence. Parents of very young 
children do closely monitor not just the actions of the child, but also the various 
features of the situation and even take it upon themselves to decide the interests that 
the child ought to have. 
Yet this situation rapidly changes. The parents negotiate with the child, drawing 
attention to salient features, talking about the concepts involved, asking the child 
what they desire and so on. The child reacts. In this intersubjective space, a joint 
understanding of the moral import of the actions is constructed, and the child begins 
to build moral, conceptual and intellectual competencies. These do not appear 
overnight: the parents and other interlocutors of the child continue to provide 
scaffolding, gradually passing over competence. The child internalizes the 
competencies. This is, of course, the Vygotslcian picture outlined in §3.23. Bruner 
(1983) maps the process, albeit in the context of learning the game of peek-a-boo 
rather than learning moral actions. Only such an account of moral learning is 
adequate to explaining how it is that habituation, understood richly, plays an 
important role in moral education. 
There remains one more task, however, to complete this section. That is to 
substantiate the claim that the sort of interpersonal negotiation of meaning and 
competency outlined is philosophical, and that a more explicit recognition of this is 
important in ethical education. I shall approach the first part of this task by 
considering a number of the points in the outline of the judgement of moral action 
presented above, and show that they are, at root, philosophical points. 
Having a concept of the target moral action in mind - the second point - involves the 
conceptual clarification of key moral concepts. Conceptual analysis is clearly a core 
philosophical pursuit. Yet the clarification of key moral concepts need not take 
place through explicit conceptual analysis. Many people become able to use 
concepts adequately through everyday interactions with others. Is this philosophy? 
We can take a number of attitudes to this question. We can deny that it is 
philosophy in any sense of the word, because it is something imbibed, something 
learned through an unconscious induction from examples. Or we can call it a simple 
kind of philosophy - folk philosophy, perhaps - noting that we do at least sometimes 
turn our attention informally to the meaning of such concepts. Either way, it ought 
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to be clear that to make the process of exploring concepts more explicit would be to 
make more likely the improvement of our conceptual grasp of key moral concepts. 
The third point - being aware of the way in which one is performing the action - 
involves a metacognitive awareness of any or all of the embodied, the committed 
and the contextualized aspects of reasonableness. Although these may not be 
specifically philosophical inquiries, we shall see in §10.223 that such narrative and 
psychological inquiry can play an important part in the community of ethical 
inquiry. 
The description of any action can be infinitely expanded, and some features of any 
action one takes will be irrelevant to its moral import. Thus it is necessary to have a 
concept of the salient features of one's action, and how they relate to morality - the 
fourth point. For example, if I am repaying a debt I owe you, then it would generally 
be morally irrelevant whether I give you the money with my left or right hand (at 
least in the West), or what mix of denominations of coins or notes I give you. The 
latter becomes morally relevant, however, if I deliberately choose to give you a large 
number of small denomination coins so as to inconvenience you. Even this simple 
example shows that it is not necessarily straightforward to decide what features of a 
situation have moral relevance. A feel for moral relevance can be attained 
experientially, but an explicit, philosophical exploration of the situated criteria for 
moral relevance will assist in moral judgement of the features of actions so as to 
know how to adapt them to more closely match the target virtue. 
A similar consideration applies to the features of a moral situation that are external 
to the self. It is necessary to have a grasp of the external features of the situation 
within which one acts, and this must include an understanding of others. There are 
similarities between this fifth point and point 4, as external situations are also 
complex, and the relevance of their features to moral matters may also not be clear. 
But we need to notice that a further complication is at work here. An understanding 
of others requires some idea of how it is that they construe the world, and what 
matters to them. Through a philosophical exploration of moral matters, others begin 
to express their views and thus start to reveal themselves further. By means of our 
engagement with these views, we may begin to merge horizons and create an 
intersubjective space in which the morally charged actions of others make more 
sense to us. 
The creation of intersubjectivity referred above is a mutual, interactive process. In 
coming to understand others, we also come to understand ourselves better. In 
mutual dialogue, we can come to know ourselves as we come to know others. 
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Exploration of what eudaimonia means to us, helps us to form ourselves. It is not a 
given, that we merely need to explore to understand, but a self-conception that is 
both revealed and shaped by philosophical reflection with others. 
The final point on my list refers to the construction of reasonableness which, as we 
saw in §3.23, takes place in social interaction. The tools of reasoning, practical and 
theoretical, are one of the central concerns of philosophy (Lipman 1991, 27), and the 
engagement in philosophical inquiry is the high road to the improvement of thinking. 
Lipman's book is a justification of his claim that "the capacity of philosophy, when 
properly reconstructed and properly taught, to bring about higher-order thinking in 
education [is] significantly greater than the capacity of any other approach" (3). 
5.3 Summary 
In this chapter, I firstly mapped out some of the features that an adequate base for 
moral education would need to have. In order to account for the complexity of 
moral development, we saw, we need a multi-dimensional meta-ethical theory. The 
theory presented by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics - that is virtue ethics - 
showed promise of having many of the features required, provided that careful 
attention is paid to developmental matters. The survey of Aristotle's virtue ethics 
forming the second section of this chapter has led us to a number of conclusions: 
1. Aristotle's virtue ethics, being a multi-dimensional moral account, allows 
that morality is an "inexact science," so that there is no strict algorithm for 
calculating the right and proper thing to do in all circumstances. Rather, 
the virtuous person weighs up a number of competing ethical demands 
and, taking full account of the particulars of the circumstances, attempts to 
find the ethical balance. Some of these aspects of morality are those 
mapped by other, Millian meta-ethical theories (such as Kant's Categorical 
Imperative based theory, or Mill's own Utilitarianism) which purport to be 
the single moral principle. Each of these insights, however, can find a 
substantial place in a multi-dimensional virtue ethics, as the virtues of 
justice, benevolence and so on. 
2. Virtue ethics finds a place for the genetic elements of morality, as it allows 
that we are prepared by nature to be capable of virtue, through the natural 
virtues. It is thus compatible with some of the insights of evolutionary 
ethics. 
3. The central role of socialization in the construction of virtuous persons is 
recognized by virtue ethics, especially once we have become clear about 
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the intertwined roles of habituation to virtue and habituation to practical 
reason, which must develop hand-in-glove. So, to bring up a child to be 
moral necessarily includes both the giving of direction as to what actions 
ought to be taken, and reasoning about those actions. Neither is sufficient 
on its own. 
4. Close attention to the development of morality in childhood has led us to 
conclude that we must give a more important role to burgeoning practical 
reason (reasonableness), and its development through (proto) philosophical 
inquiry. 
There are also a number of lacunae in the Aristotelian meta-ethical theory. I have 
commented in a number of places that the virtue ethics account has left out any 
detailed consideration of the place of dialogue in moral education, as emphasized by 
point 4 above. Indeed, the neglect of ethical dialogue goes deeper than that. When I 
outlined the seven capacities necessary to being able to judge the moral worth of an 
action in §5.232 above, the first assumes that the moral trainer already has a clear 
idea of the morally correct action. In a monocultural society, such as Aristotle's, 
when moral correctness is less problematic than in a pluralistic society like our own, 
it is perhaps less surprising that Aristotle's theory pays little attention to public 
debate concerning normative correctness. 
For these reasons, there is a need to supplement virtue ethics with an account of the 
place of dialogical reflection in ethics. There is a meta-ethical theory that does place 
explicitly linguistic reflection at the core of ethics: Habermas' discourse ethics. In 
§6.1, I shall firstly outline the theory of discourse ethics, especially as presented in 
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Habermas 1990) and Justification 
and Application (Habermas 1993). Then in §6.2, I shall critically examine the 
theory, drawing in part on recent feminist, neo-Aristotelian and communitarian 
commentaries, but also on the accounts of reasonableness and autonomy developed 
in Chapters Three and Four. Discourse ethics is an explicitly Kantian meta-ethical 
theory, but in the light of these commentaries, I shall show in §7.1 that it can be cut 
lose from its Kantian roots without loss of the insights it affords. Finally in §7.2, I 
will turn to the development of a positive account of the place of discourse in a 
virtue theory based ethical education. This will take account of the sound core of 
discourse ethics, the weaknesses that have been exposed in it, and the needs of 
children, who are not yet ethical persons in a fully fledged sense, but who are 
working towards it. By the end of Part II, then, I will have advanced a multi-
dimensional meta-ethical theory which is based on virtue ethics and incorporates the 
important insights of discourse ethics. 
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In Part III, I shall draw on the concepts of reasonableness and communicative 
autonomy from Part I, and this meta-ethical account from Part H. These will then be 
applied to the moral education classroom, and I will develop in detail an account of 
the place of moral philosophical discourse and reflection in moral education. 
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Chapter Six: Discourse Ethics 
In this chapter, I will explore Discourse Ethics, which Habermas develops as a 
complete meta-ethical system. I will claim that it fails to provide a full account of 
morality for five reasons. The first is that Habermas' plausible claim that 
communication requires a presupposition that all taking part are aiming at consensus 
(in matters to do with the right) does not establish that such a consensus is inevitable. 
The second, related to the first, is that Habermas needs to be able to distinguish 
cleanly matters of the right from matters of the good, but this distinction cannot be 
drawn sharply. The third problem is that Habermas assumes too easily that the actual 
consensus reached in real discourse tracks fairly closely the consensus that would be 
reached in an ideal discourse. 1 Fourthly, Habermas must assume that every 
participant in the ideal discourse would have access to an identical ideal rationality, and 
I will argue that we have no guarantee that this is so. Finally, Habermas fails to 
establish his claim that discourse ethics is based on a purely formal basis, and does not 
need to rely on some pre-existing substantive norms. 
Nevertheless, in the course of this chapter and the next, I will argue that discourse 
ethics, when properly reworked, has much to offer as a supplement to the virtue ethics 
account outlined in the previous chapter. In a number of ways, it dovetails neatly 
with, and provides a richer account for, virtue ethics. In particular, it clarifies the role 
of socialization in moral development, explains why respect needs to be taken as a 
base value for morality, provides a yardstick for assessing both moral progress and 
justice, augments the Aristotelian account of the place of reasonableness in morality, 
and reinforces, in moving from the monological to the dialogical self, why we must 
take development seriously in any meta-ethical account. 
By the end of Chapter Seven, I will have presented the target that we can aim at in 
developing moral persons through moral education: a target based in virtue ethics, but 
clarified through insights from discourse ethics. 
1 Any meta-ethics which does not posit directly perceivable, or revealed, moral truths faces some sort 
of analogous charge, so this is not in itself a fatal weakness. I shall return to this in §6.22. 
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6.1 Habermas and Discourse Ethics 
Discourse Ethics, as developed by Jurgen Habermas from work by Apel (e.g. 1980) 
and Peters (1966), is a decidedly Kantian enterprise. Habermas (1990, 65-6 - 
subsequent citations are to this work unless otherwise indicated) bases discourse 
ethics on two principles. Firstly, every valid norm has to fulfil the principle of 
universalization that: 
(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests (and 
these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for 
regulation). 
Secondly, there is the principle of discourse ethics that asserts: 
(D): Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practice discourse. 
(U) gives us the condition for accepting any particular posited norm as valid: it must 
be universalizable in a specific and technical sense. The term "universalization" refers 
to a situation in which everyone who could possibly be touched in any way by the 
application of the norm, has agreed to accept the outcomes that would follow from the 
adoption of the norm. They must have forecast what the effects of the norm would 
be, if everyone followed it, and they must all be happy with the forecast outcomes, in 
the light of what each of them wants out of life. The parenthetic comment, which does 
not appear in alternative statements of (U) (e.g. p 93), implies that all the alternatives 
to the posited norm have been similarly investigated. (U) clearly has an ideal, 
counterfactual character, for such investigations could never take place in actuality. 
(D) provides the procedure (p 103) for deciding which particular norms do, in fact, 
constitute morality. Morally right action consists in following this set of norms, and 
we have seen from (U) that the set must be decided by seeking the approval of 
everyone on whom they might have effects. (D) says that this approval can only be 
given in a particular way - when the approval has been negotiated by the members of a 
practical discourse (and anyone who might be affected has to be one of the members). 
In other words, all the negotiators must withdraw from action for the moment, and 
concentrate on redeeming the validity of contested norms (proposed and questioned 
within the lifeworld), solely through observing the force of the better argument (103- 
4). Again, as particularly emphasized by the parenthetic comment in the definition, 
this must be seen as an ideal, counterfactual situation. I discussed the conditions of 
such ideal discourse in § 4.123 and §4.124. There is an assumption here that one 
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particular argument will be the better argument, and that all will be able to recognize 
this. I shall explore this notion of consensus at further length in §6.21. 
One point should be noted here. Habermas is quite clear that this procedure does not 
allow us to create norms, but merely to redeem them: 
Basic norms of law and morality fall outside the jurisdiction of moral theory; they 
must be viewed as substantive principles to be justified in practical discourses. (86) 
Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but a procedure 
for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically 
considered for adoption.... In its openness, practical discourse is dependent upon 
contingent content being fed into it from outside. (103) 
Norms themselves arise within the lifeworld; they form part of the taken-for-granted 
background to strategic and communicative action. When any participant calls a norm 
into question, then practical discourse is the procedure to use to try to redeem the 
norm. If the better argument goes against that norm, then it can be replaced with the 
One supported by that argument. 
In that it is based on these two principles, discourse ethics is a Millian theory (in the 
sense developed in §5.1 above). It purports to tell us, in general terms, how we can 
find moral rightness. It seeks to ground morality, though we must note that the type 
of grounding being talked about here is not a foundationalist enterprise - at least 
according to Habermas. Some of his critics do not agree, and I shall address this in 
§6.24. 
Habermas emphasizes one vital respect in which discourse ethics is very different 
from Kantian ethics. Discourse ethics is a dialogical and not a monological theory, a 
position that he explicitly contrasts with that of Kant and such neo-Kantians as John 
Rawls. Monological theories hold that any one person acting alone, provided he or 
she is a sufficiently good thinker, is able to derive substantive ethical norms by the use 
of an appropriate solitary and reflective method. A dialogical theory denies this. It 
will hold that the process of arriving at any substantive ethical correctness must, at 
least in the ideal, involve discussion between all those affected. 
Habermas explains this as follows: 
I have formulated (U) in a way which precludes a monological application of the 
principle. First, (U) regulates only argumentation among a plurality of participants; 
second, it suggests the perspective of real-life argumentation, in which all affected 
are admitted as participants. In this respect my universalization principle differs from 
the one John Rawls proposes. 
Rawls wants to ensure impartial consideration of all affected interests by putting 
the moral judge into a fictitious "original position," where differences of power are 
eliminated, equal freedoms for all are guaranteed, and the individual is left in a 
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position of ignorance with regard to the position he might occupy in a future social 
order. Like Kant, Rawls operationalizes the standpoint of impartiality in such a way 
that every individual can undertake to justify basic norms on his own. The same 
holds for the moral philosopher himself. It is only logical, therefore, that Rawls 
views the substantive parts of his study (e.g. the principle of average utility), not as 
the contribution of a participant in argumentation to a process of discursive will 
formation regarding the basic institutions of late capitalist society, but as the 
outcome of a "theory of justice," which he as an expert is qualified to construct. 
If we keep in mind the action-coordinating function that normative validity claims 
play in the communicative practice of everyday life, we see why the problems to be 
resolved in moral argumentation cannot be handled monologically but require a 
cooperative effort.... Only an intersubjective process of reaching understanding can 
produce an agreement that is reflexive in nature; only it can give the participants the 
knowledge that they have collectively become convinced of something. 
From this viewpoint, the categorical imperative needs to be reformulated as 
follows: "Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be 
a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively 
testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will 
without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a 
universal norm [quoting McCarthy]." This version of the universality principle does 
in fact entail the idea of a cooperative process of argumentation. For one thing, 
nothing better prevents others from perspectivally distorting one's own interests 
than actual participation. It is in this pragmatic sense that the individual is the last 
court of appeal for judging what is in his best interest. On the other hand, the 
descriptive terms in which each individual perceives his interests must be open to 
criticism by others. Needs and wants are interpreted in the light of cultural values. 
Since cultural values are always components of intersubjectively shared traditions, 
the revision of the values used to interpret needs and wants cannot be a matter for 
individuals to handle monologically. (66-8) 
Here, Habermas highlights his view that universalization on a Kantian monological 
model is in fact a process of impoverishment. The Kantian or Rawlsian moral 
legislator strips away all inclination, all knowledge of self as different from others. 
This is a least common denominator picture of the subject of moral norms. 
In discourse ethics, however, each person represents him or herself. Each brings their 
own concerns, likes, dislikes, prejudices, convictions and so on to the conversation. 
If in the end many of these are set aside as irrelevant to the normative judgement in 
hand, then this is because each has been convinced of the need to do so. So practical 
judgement starts, not with a process of impoverishment, but with a process of 
enrichment. What is set aside in universalizing is not what is decided, by one person 
in advance of even entering into the making of the practical judgement, to be 
irrelevant, but what is mutually decided, after wide consultation in which all have their 
say, to be irrelevant. There is no chance that morally relevant features will be 
accidentally left out because of the systematic blindness of the moral legislator. 
Habermas advances another reason (at the end of the quotation) as to why we cannot 
allow one person, even an idealized one, to make our moral judgements. The 
understanding of morally charged situations, he asserts, involves interpretation of the 
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culture within which they are found, which in turn interacts with the values expressed 
by, and the needs and wants of, the individuals involved. Each of these - culture, 
individual interests, intersubjective values - is recursively connected to the others, in 
ways that cannot be established by solitary contemplation, but need to be clarified 
collaboratively. 
Kant and his successors have commonly faced the charge that moral legislators in the 
"original position" make exclusions of this sort. Feminist commentators in particular 
have alleged that Kant wrongly left gender out of consideration, with distorting effects 
on many of the substantive moral principles he derived, and that by further leaving out 
considerations of interpersonal attachment, Kant's ethical system is flawed at a deeper, 
more fundamental level, in that it overemphasizes justice, and neglects care. For these 
reasons, Habermas' account of meta-ethics has received a welcome from feminist 
writers (Benhabib 1992; Meehan 1995), though not without reservations. In §6.2, I 
shall consider some of these reservations. 
We can see, from the second paragraph of the passage quoted above, that Habermas 
holds that no substantive moral conclusions can be asserted by an individual as the 
valid moral conclusions. At best, all that an individual can do is to submit a proposed 
norm to the discourse. He criticises Rawls for purporting to tell us of the correct 
conclusions of substantive moral argument from a monological position, when all that 
he can validly aspire to is to join the discourse. We cannot, Habermas avers, cast 
ourselves as moral experts who can monologically answer any moral questions. 
On first glance, this seems to catch Habermas in a contradiction. Surely in advancing 
the principles (U) and (D), he is doing precisely what he has just accused Rawls of 
doing? Why is it that these principles are not themselves moral claims that need to be 
submitted to practical discourse? To understand why Habermas thinks that his 
principles escape such a charge, we need to turn to the ideas of transcendental 
pragmatic justifications and performative contradiction. 
Thus the necessary justification for the proposed moral principle could take the 
following form: every argumentation, regardless of the context in which it occurs, 
rests on pragmatic presuppositions from whose propositional content the principle 
of universalism (U) can be derived. (82) 
Habermas claims that (U) is a formal, and not substantive, moral principle. As the 
previous quotation asserts, (U) rests on those necessary assumptions that we cannot 
escape if we engage with each other in the attempt to redeem moral principles at all. I 
investigated what Haberrnas means by argumentation, or discourse, in §4.123. There 
we saw that Habermas claims that argumentation is an attempt to decide a question by 
recourse to reasons alone. If this is to be able to happen, then the following rules 
159 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 6. Discourse ethics 
(Habermas quotes their formulation by R. Alexy) must be always already assumed by 
those entering argumentation: 
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in 
the discourse. 
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. 
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising 
his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).... 
If these considerations are to amount to more than a definition favoring an ideal form 
of communication and thus prejudging everything else, we must show that these 
rules of discourse are not mere conventions; rather they are inescapable 
presuppositions. (89) 
In the last sentence, Habermas clearly recognizes that the status of these rules is 
crucial. For his account to succeed, it must be shown that the three rules are not just a 
series of recommendations for improving discourse, but our best representations of 
ideal requirements that every participant must tacitly understand and accept in order 
that argumentation could even be possible. The actual form of words used to express 
these representations, he says, is a rational reconstruction of these presuppositions, 
and could be inaccurate. In order to establish the inescapable nature of these 
presuppositions, Habermas turns to the notion of a performative contradiction. 
Assertions are acts. So it is possible to perform an act by making a statement in which 
the assertion and the act performed are mutually contradictory. Consider the statement 
"Don't listen to me!" The act of uttering this statement is a claim to be listened to, yet 
the content contradicts this. Habermas claims that in entering argumentation - making 
any argumentative moves at all - we are always already acting in a way which 
contradicts any assertion that coercion, exclusion or limitation is acceptable. The rules 
3.1-3 must be tacitly accepted in order to enter argument or practical discourse at all 
(including asserting the rejection of those rules), for in: 
practical discourse we always already make use of substantive normative rules of 
argumentation. It is these rules alone that transcendental pragmatics is in a position 
to derive. (86) 
To understand the force of this, we need to remind ourselves of the special sense in 
which Habermas uses "argumentation": as the attempt to redeem claims by the force of 
the better argument only. It might seem that the anti-Habermasian skeptic merely has 
to point out that real arguments and discourses do not rely solely on the force of the 
better argument - that inevitably they involve coercive aspects as well. That such 
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dialogues take place, Habermas does not deny (though he does withhold the labels 
"argumentation" and "discourse" from such dialogues). In a long discussion (pp 98- 
102), he considers what the implications of this retreat from argumentation to different 
modes of dialogue are. He firstly claims that skeptics must refuse to enter into any 
form of argumentation at all (pure or not), if they wish to escape the binding force of 
the presuppositions. That is, the skeptic cannot appeal to better reasons at all, in the 
attempt to establish any norm, without accepting the presuppositions that underlie such 
an attempt. Further, because argumentation is merely the reflective continuation in a 
hypothetical stance of action oriented to reaching an understanding (i.e. of 
communicative action), and argumentation is essential to the maintenance of 
communicative action (100), then the presuppositions of communicative action "are at 
least partly identical with the presuppositions of argumentation as such" (101). Hence 
the skeptic must retreat further, to pure strategic action. 
However, Habermas claims, this is impossible. Such a retreat is just conceivable in 
the abstract, once a person has been formed, but the central role of communicative 
action in forming persons within society means that to shun communicative action 
from birth is to never become a person in the first place, and to withdraw once formed 
is to risk "schizophrenia or suicide" (102). Thus, although it is abstractly possible to 
avoid the presuppositions of argumentation (in the way that rocks do), it is impossible 
for us. There is no alternative. 
In Habermas' own summary: 
My programmatic justification of discourse ethics requires all the following: 
1. A definition of a universalization principle that functions as a rule of argument 
2. The identification of pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation that are 
inescapable and have a normative content 
3. The explicit statement of that normative content (e.g. in the form of discourse 
rules) 
4. Proof that a relation of material implication holds between steps (3) and (1) in 
connection with the idea of the justification of norms. 
Step (2) in the analysis, for which the search for performative contradictions 
provides a guide, relies upon a maieutic method that serves 
2a. to make the sceptic who presents an objection aware of the presuppositions 
he knows intuitively. 
2b. to cast this pretheoretical knowledge in an explicit form that will enable the 
sceptic to recognise his intuitions in this description, 
2c. to corroborate, through counterexamples, the proponent's assertion that there 
are no alternatives to the presuppositions he has made explicit. 
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Substeps (2b) and (2c) contain unmistakable hypothetical elements. The description 
we employ to pass from knowing how to knowing that is a hypothetical 
reconstruction that can provide only a more or less correct rendering of intuitions. 
(96-7) 
We have seen that (U) fills the requirement of the first step. Mexy has provided the 
statement of the normative content in the form of discourse rules (required by step 3 
and quoted above). These are an attempt to make the inexplicit explicit, following the 
process outlined in the expansion of step 2. As Habermas points out, this 
reconstruction may be in error, and empirical evidence can be brought to bear in order 
to test whether the reconstruction is adequate. Once an adequate statement of the rules 
is available, then (U) must be shown to be directly derivable from them. It is 
Habermas' claim that he has been able to show this. Whether these claims of 
Habermas are justified will be addressed in §6.24. 
In this subsection, I have outlined the core of Habermas' discourse ethics. It is a 
fully-fledged meta-ethical theory, and it seeks to ground morality, not in a 
transcendental foundation (like Kant and Mill did), but in a transcendental-pragmatic 
argument that arises out of the practice in which we must engage in ethical matters. 
This argument has an essential core of empirical claims, through the "reconstructive 
science" of making explicit that which lies beneath unavoidable everyday human 
interaction. Ethical concerns (embedded in the lifeworld) are clearly distinguished 
from moral concerns (which have universalizable solutions). At a number of places in 
this outline, I have flagged points of concern. I will now turn to these, and look at 
some criticisms of discourse ethics. 
6.2 A Critical Appraisal of Discourse Ethics 
In this section, I will undertake two tasks. The first is a critique of the status of 
Discourse Ethics as a complete meta-ethical theory. Is discourse ethics able to carry 
the weight that Habermas places on it, as an explanation of the moral domain? There 
are a number of interrelated reasons for thinking that it cannot. Below, I shall 
investigate four of the weaknesses of discourse ethics: the assumption that discourse 
will inevitably reach consensus (including consideration of sharp cut that Habermas 
makes between issues of the right and the good; the problem of identifying normative 
correctness; the account of rationality that underlies discourse ethics; and the claim that 
discourse ethics is a purely formal and procedural meta-ethics, which does not rely on 
a substantive moral principle. Given that I can show that discourse ethics is flawed in 
these ways, then the second task, which I shall interweave with the first, is to explore 
what the insights of Discourse Ethics are that ought to be incorporated in an adequate 
meta-ethical account. While I shall identify a number of these, the synthesis of these 
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insights from discourse ethics with virtue ethics, under the modifying influence of my 
account of reasonableness, shall be deferred until Chapter Seven. This will provide 
the theory of moral development on which to base my discussion of moral education 
in Part III. 
6.21 What is a Consensus? 
As we have seen above, the idea of consensus plays a central role in Habermas' 
theory. In the ideal practical discourse, all will eventually give their approval to the 
norm supported by the better argument. In Habermas' characterization of consensus, 
all those affected come, through an exhaustive process of argumentation, to see that a 
certain line of argument is better than all the other lines advanced, and so all freely 
accept that its normative conclusion is the single best answer for each of them, 
considered individually. Consensus is a positive agreement by everyone that each 
norm is precisely what they would choose over all other possible norms. As he says, 
"it follows directly from (U) that anyone who takes part in argumentation of any sort 
is in principle able to reach the same judgments on the acceptability of norms of 
action" (121). 
It is not clear why this must be true. All that follows directly from (U) is that we can 
conceive of a situation in which all agree to accept a particular norm. Underlying (U) 
is Habermas' assertion that, when we enter argumentation, we must be aiming to 
convince the others, using good reasons: "argumentative speech is a process of 
communication... [which has the] goal of reaching a rationally motivated agreement." 
This itself is not obviously true to everyone: it can be asserted that the goal of 
argumentation may merely be to reach mutual understanding, with consensus as a 
possible outcome. I shall not try to adjudicate on this claim, for even if it is granted, it 
is hard to see how the fact that all involved are aiming at a consensus guarantees that 
they will reach a consensus. 
It seems to me that there are three possible outcomes to rational argumentation, even in 
the ideal: consensus, compromise 2 and a failure to reach agreement. Here is how 
Habermas (1996, 165-166, italics added) distinguishes the first two: 
Compromises provide for an arrangement that (a) is more advantageous to all than 
no arrangement whatever, (b) excludes free riders who withdraw from cooperation, 
and (c) excludes exploited parties who contribute more to the cooperative effort than 
they gain from it.... Whereas a rationally motivated consensus rests on reasons that 
convince all parties in the same way, a compromise can be accepted by the parties 
each for its own different reasons. 
2 Habermas later (p 281) makes it clear that he thinks compromise "may well allow for strategic 
interactions." However, there seem to be no reasons for thinking such a compromise cannot be 
reached even in the ideal situation, with no coercion. 
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Consensus requires more than an unforced agreement: the reasons that lead to 
agreement must also convince all participants "in the same way." Compromise occurs 
when some (maybe all) are willing to settle for less than they would ideally want on 
the grounds that, otherwise, no agreement could be reached. The exhaustive process 
of argumentation may lead all affected to a position where they come to see that there 
is not going to be a single version of the norm that each can accept in a strong 
consensus. Nevertheless, they may each see that, in the light of this stalemate, there is 
a norm which all are happy to accept as the best achievable outcome. It does not 
represent the ideal conclusion that each individually would prefer. However, it does 
represent a conclusion that each is happy to accept, given that irreconcilable difference 
has prevented each from convincing all others of their own preferred norm. Each 
accepts the norm as the best achievable, given that they must all live in community. Of 
course, it seems perfectly possible that, even with the best will in the world, an ideal 
discourse might come to no agreement on the contested norm at all, if different parties 
dig their heels in on "unnegotiable claims." If I am right, and the outcome of an ideal 
practical discourse could be any of these three, then to aim at consensus does not entail 
reaching it, even in the ideal. 
There are a couple of things to note about Habermas' assertion of the inevitability of 
consensus (in the ideal). Firstly, it depends very much on the acceptance of a 
universalist model of reason, and I shall explore this connection in §6.23. Secondly, 
Habermas uses the word "norm" only to apply to statements regulating matters of 
justice (or the right). He says: 
The universalization principle acts like a knife that makes razor-sharp cuts between 
evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, between the good and the just. 
(104) 
This, he says, is because only statements concerning justice can be fully universalized. 
Evaluative statements about the good life are so embedded in the culture and the forms 
of live of individuals that there is no possibility of reaching consensus on them. This 
is easy to see in endless and undecidable arguments about the good. Habermas 
requires this sharp cut because it is only thus that he can establish, through his 
transcendental-pragmatic argument, that a neo-Kantian account of morality is broadly 
accurate, in advance of entering into practical discourse. 
Compromise is not capable of cutting the right from the good because it is not "razor-
sharp" (see also Habermas' discussion on pp 86-91). 3 A compromise can be reached 
3 It is worth noting that Habermas has attracted criticism for making over-sharp cuts in other areas as 
well. For example, Cohen (1995) claims that his distinction between the public and private spheres 
fails to appreciate the fluidity between them, while Meehan (1995) attacks his sharp distinction of 
ego-identity from moral identity. 
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in Habermasian ethical dialogues, where we recognize that we have conflicting ideas 
of the good life, and that it is acceptable for each of us to pursue our own. 
If it is the case that, in some matters of the just and the right, a compromise is the best 
that can be achieved, then this amounts to an admission that practical discourse will 
tolerate a norm that allows some leeway to those with different conceptions of just 
action to pursue different ends. Such a case would arise if two proposed moral norms 
were incompatible, and some members of the discourse claimed A should override B, 
while others claimed B ought to override A. Such a pair might be competing 
normative accounts of fairness: "treat everybody equally" and "give everybody what 
they deserve." An argument-driven agreement (that is, an outcome of a critical 
discourse) that the two could be reconciled through weakening each in relation to the 
other, in a way that leaves the supporters of neither side completely happy, but both 
sides content that this is the best achievable outcome, would be a compromise. If such 
a scenario is possible, then the sharp cut of right from the good cannot be made. 
The distinction that Habermas draws between discourses of justification and 
discourses of application is designed to deal with this sort of difficulty. Habermas 
claims that strong consensus can be reached in discourses of justification, which deal 
with the attempt to redeem a contested norm. Such norms are highly abstract, 
generalized principles which, because of the abstraction from any concern about their 
application, can gain general acceptance (i.e. consensus). Thus we could agree in 
practical discourse to both of the principles: equality and desert. It is only when we 
try to apply them, to bring them back into the lifeworld, that clashes become apparent. 
But these discourses of application no longer seek the consensus of universal 
agreement: 
The application of norms calls for argumentative clarification in its own right. In 
this case, the impartiality of judgement cannot again be secured through a principle 
of universalization; rather, in addressing questions of context-sensitive application, 
practical reason must be informed by a principle of appropriateness. (Habermas 
1993, 13) 
The problem with this, of course, is that the severe abstraction from situatedness in the 
lifeworld needed to achieve the abstraction of justificatory discourses strips meaning 
from the words that make up the proposed principle. In such a rarefied atmosphere, 
how do we decide what we mean by "everybody?" Who counts? What is the 
meaning of "equally?" In what respects need one be equal? These questions, and 
others like them, can only be decided by a consensus which is reached in close 
proximity to the lifeworld, and this requires consideration of the potential applications 
of the principles (see Warnke 1995, for a similar argument). Without such 
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situatedness, these purported moral principles become little more than "motherhood" 
statements. 
Taylor (1991) is another who has asserted that, in order to formulate principles of 
justice, we need to have a conception of the good life. Habermas clearly recognizes 
this, as questions of justice in his scheme can only be decided by a community, each 
member of which is situated in the lifeworld, each with their own individual 
conception of the good life. He asserts, however, that a mutual agreement will be 
reached to drop questions of the good from the discourse, as they cannot be decided 
by consensus. Participants will agree, without coercion, to leave them to one side. 
Yet, as Taylor points out, it is far from clear why just these considerations will be 
dropped: 
We have to do here with a central area of moral problems which focuses on 
weighing up the often mutually competing claims of the different virtues against 
one another and bringing about a uniform, consistent form of life. Questions of such 
a kind are at the centre of a moral life; it would therefore be completely arbitrary and 
unfounded simply to exclude this whole area by adhering to the false thesis that only 
virtues oriented towards charity have a moral character. (32) 
There seems to be a circularity in Habermas' argument. On the one hand, we have to 
assume that it is possible to divide all matters of moral concern into matters concerning 
justice or matters concerning the good life, if we are to be able to assert that only 
argumentation concerning justice will (inevitably) lead to a consensus in a practical 
discourse. On the other hand, the assertion that argumentation is solely about the 
inevitable force of the better argument, which guarantees coining to a consensus,4 is 
used to show that (U) can make the required cut of the right from the good. 
Discourse ethics rests on a rational reconstruction of a number of presuppositions 
(§6.1). Habermas says "all rational reconstructions, like other types of knowledge, 
have only hypothetical status... rational reconstructions of presumably basic 
competencies [should be put] to the test, subjecting them to indirect verification by 
using them as inputs in empirical theories" (1990, 32). Thus, we could break the 
circularity in one of two ways: we could find evidence that we can presuppose the 
right/good cut; or we could find support for the presupposition that argumentation 
concerning justice must reach consensus. 
Attention to how the distinction between the right and the good operates within our 
society does not provide empirical confirmation that they are cleanly separable. 
Benhabib (1992, 184-185) points out (with examples) that a sharp cut of this sort is 
incompatible with our intuitions about the domain of morality, and claims that 
4 That is, rather than also entertaining the possibility of mutual understanding amongst difference 
(coming either to compromise, or to an understanding of difference based in a failure to agree). 
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Habermas has confused matters of the identification of the moral domain with 
considerations of the kinds of justificatory constraints that apply to moral judgements. 
So, in the case of the distinction of the right from the good, the empirical test seems to 
fail. Some analytic distinctions between right and good can be made (I develop this 
view in §7.24), but the cut cannot be made "razor-sharp." 
The cut between the right and the good is meant to be able to tell us which types of 
questions will, in fact, lead to consensus before we conduct the discourse. Yet 
Habermas has claimed, as we saw in §6.1, that moral theorists ought not to anticipate 
the consensus, but merely make contributions to it. How can we anticipate what will 
lead to consensus? Ideal practical discourse is counterfactual, so we cannot test a 
claim that a certain class of question (e.g. about truth, normative correctness or 
evaluative correctness) would necessarily lead to a strong consensus by entering such 
a discourse. Claims such as these need to be either established through principled a 
priori argument, or to be made as conditional claims, supported by empirical studies of 
actual discourses. The transcendental-pragmatic argument of Habermas takes the first 
route, and I have already argued that it fails. Certainly the history of social and 
political dialogue provides anecdotal evidence that questions of the right are more 
likely to lead to some sort of consensus than questions of the good, but continued 
dissension about key questions of justice hints that we have no empirical guarantee of 
strong (or even weak) consensus. 5 Thus the second way to break the circularity also 
fails the empirical test. 
The relationship between the actual norms that have been accepted (tentatively) by the 
cumulative practical discourse of humanity to this point in history, and the 
counterfactual consensual outcome of the ideal practical discourse (i.e. the valid 
norms) is a tricky one. It seems to be possible that we have been, and still are, on the 
wrong track, as perhaps societies that accepted (say) the subjugation of women have 
been throughout most of history. Next, I shall explore the extent to which discourse 
ethics gives us grounds for confidence that our norms are valid, or at least 
approximating validity. 
5 It is interesting to note that several empirical studies (e.g. Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992; Chan 
1998) have been made to test the support for Rawls' (1973) claims about which principle of justice 
would be chosen by people in the original position - and that they have not borne out Rawls' 
predictions. Rawls makes substantive claims, of course, and Habermas would no doubt argue that 
these results reinforce the need for submitting claims to widespread discourse. Yet if his 
transcendental-pragmatic argument for the right/good cut fails, then his claim needs to be submitted to 
the discourse as well. 
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6.22 How Can We Anticipate Normative Correctness? 
Habermas, we recall from §4.123, clearly distinguishes between practical discourses 
(concerning normative rightness) and theoretical discourses (concerning states of 
affairs). Nevertheless, he also refers to parallels between the two, and a little closer 
attention to some of the similarities and contrasts might help to clarify the idea that a 
practical discourse gives us grounds for confidence that our conclusions approach 
moral correctness. There are problems with this assertion. 
For Habermas, that which underlies normative correctness is not objective: it is a 
product of the intersubjective world. Consider the way Habermas contrasts truth with 
rightness (normative correctness), on p 137: the function of truth is "the representation 
of states of affairs," which are "in accordance with the world of existing states of 
affairs," while the function of rightness is "the maintenance of an interpersonal 
relationship... in accordance with... our world of legitimately ordered interpersonal 
relationships." These are different "relations to the world" (all italics in the original). 
On p 61, he says that "while there is an unequivocal relation between existing states of 
affairs and true propositions about them, the 'existence' or social currency of norms 
says nothing about whether the norms are valid."6 
Until agreed upon, it would seem, normative correctness does not exist, and since that 
agreement must be the same as that which would be the product of a (counterfactual) 
ideal practical discourse, we cannot be sure that it has yet been (or ever will be) created 
- especially if, as I argued in §6.21, we cannot be assured that the discourse would 
issue in consensus. Not only, in other words, is there no standpoint between 
language and reality, but social reality does not even exist until it is intersubjectively, 
and counterfactually, constituted. This leads to some problems that I shall address 
next. 
Any actual discourse - institutionalized, overarching or whatever - must be finite. 
However, the consensus that constitutes normative correctness must be reached in an 
infinite discourse. The question thus arises: why ought we to put any weight on any 
outcome of any particular practical discourse? What norms are we to act on? 
Habermas' answer is that the real discourses that have taken place over time and space 
give us an approximation of the valid norms on which we would, in the ideal practice 
discourse, come to a consensus. In Habermas' words (previously quoted in §4.124): 
6 This all strongly suggests that Habermas has a realist ontology for the physical world, and that 
what underwrites his consensus theory of truth for theoretical matters is the (unprovable) 
presupposition that theoretical consensus in some sense tracks the real world. I shall not explore this 
further here. 
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[In each discourse we] mutually assume an ideal speech situation. The ideal speech 
situation is characterized such that each consensus that can be achieved under its 
conditions is valid as a true consensus per se. The anticipation of the ideal speech 
situation is a guarantee that we may associate the claim to a true consensus with a 
consensus that has actually been attained. (Habermas 1971, 136; translated and cited 
by Horster 1992, 34) 
We must just assume that our infmitesimally small fragment of discourse has tracked 
validity sufficiently so as to be reliable, because we anticipate an ideal practical 
discourse. Elsewhere, Habermas (1996, 14) says that "because no-one has direct 
access to uninterpreted conditions of validity, 'validity' must be understood in 
epistemic terms as 'validity proven for us'." We have to remember that when we act, 
for Habermas we act on the norms embedded in the lifeworld. These norms are "valid 
for us" because they have either never been problematized or, more likely, because 
they have been problematized in the past, subjected to practical discourse, and returned 
to the lifeworld. Are these norms at all close to being correct? 7 
In the end, according to Habermas, we must act on lifeworld norms, which have 
attracted wide agreement, as an act of faith: faith that the meta-practical discourse has 
been going on long enough, has been inclusive enough, and is free enough of 
distortions that we can tentatively accept its fallible outcome and act with confidence 
on it. Of course, if we have doubts, this tentative acceptance does not mean that we 
fail to continue to test these norms in practical discourse for their adequacy. It is this 
that makes for critical theory and practice. Habermas claims: 
It is within the world that such learning realizes the conditions that must be 
presupposed as sufficiently satisfied for the unconditionality of the context-
transcending validity claims. Here a certain degree of satisfaction counts as 
"sufficient" when it qualifies our current practice of argumentation as an exemplary 
local embodiment of the (unavoidably assumed) universal discourse of an unbounded 
community of interpretation. (15-6)... The universalistic meaning of the claimed 
validity exceeds all contexts, but only the local, binding act of acceptance enables 
validity claims to bear the burden of social integration for a context-bound everyday 
practice. (21) 
We can judge what practices count as sufficient - i.e. which of the many unavoidable 
variations from the ideal can be ignored - by reference to the existential, teleological 
7  There are some reasons for thinking so: claims that a good number of basic norms are widely 
accepted in all cultures: prohibitions on murder, stealing and dishonesty, for example (see Lewis 
1946, 56-64, for a wideranging attempt); the advent of such agreements as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the spread of democratic institutions, and the increasing condemnation of slavery 
and many forms of discrimination. Yet there are also reasons for caution: we make these judgements 
from within a society that widely agrees with them, and our horizons (geographical, temporal and 
societal) might inappropriately bias our judgement; for every alleged advance, there are those who 
would claim the norms are flawed - the consensus is far from universal; other norms which are 
becoming more widely accepted are problematic (free abortion, bombing of civilians), and possibly 
not advances but backslidings; if we appeal to empirical evidence, the claim that the world is 
becoming a morally better place is highly contentious; the claim of an increasing moral consensus is 
based on a narrow, Western sample across a short time span, ignoring the lessons of history, present-
day cross cultural comparisons, and subcultures within our own society. 
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and practical aspects of the ideal, as I discussed in §3.324. By presupposing the 
ideal, we can judge the actual, and take a stance on the reliance we are prepared to 
place on our existing discourses. 
It is important to realize that any meta-ethical theory which does not entail some sort of 
direct and certain access to moral truth (through revelation or moral intuition, say) 
faces similar problems. If no such theory is tenable (and I argued in §5.1 that the 
multi-dimensional nature of morality gives us plenty of reasons for drawing this 
conclusion), then we need to be able to tolerate the consequent lack of guarantee to 
normative correctness. Virtue ethics, being multi-dimensional, has its own problems 
in specifying precisely what is morally correct. Yet this is not to say that moral 
inquiry is pointless; that we cannot ever make moral progress. All it says is that 
morality is not straightforward, not just a matter of following self-evident truths. Both 
discourse ethics and virtue ethics claim that through immersion in a culture, and 
through reflection concerning both ourselves and the moral views of that culture, we 
can gain moral improvement. Certainly, this is one of the key aims of moral 
education. In §7.23, I shall demonstrate that discourse ethics, through its dialogical 
emphasis, provides important resources to virtue ethics in this respect. 
In Part III, I shall be considering the implications of this account for classroom 
discourses in moral education. In §9.1, I will consider how discourses about moral 
correctness assist the ethical development of children. In §9.413, we shall see that the 
interaction of lifeworld norms and moral discourses underpins an account of the 
avoidance of indoctrination. In §10.23, I will return to the question of moral 
correctness again, this time within the practical context of the community of ethical 
inquiry within the classroom. In each of these, Habermas provides the theoretical 
basis on which to build a robust account of the place of discourse in enabling and 
facilitating moral reflection: reflection which is especially essential in a pluralistic 
society within a rapidly globalizing culture. 
6.23 Rationality 
On the first page of the introduction to The Theory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas (1981) says: "The rationality of beliefs and actions is a theme usually dealt 
with in philosophy..., reason remains [philosophy's] basic theme." He readdresses 
the concept in an essay in Postmetaphysical Thinking (Habermas 1992) entitled "The 
unity of reason in the diversity of its voices." As this title hints, the idea of 
reason/rationality is inextricably linked in Habermas' thought with those of language 
and communication. Brand (1990, 138) says of Habermas' work that "a lot hinges... 
170 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 6. Discourse ethics 
on the very concept of rationality." In this section, I will claim that Habermas uses 
reason/rationality in three different senses, not always clearly distinguished. 
My intent is not to give a full account of rationality, language and communication in 
Habermas, for such an undertaking would constitute a research project on its own. 
Rather, I wish to explore the place of rationality in discourse ethics, comparing and 
contrasting Habermas' three concepts of rationality with my conception of 
reasonableness, as developed in §3.1. There are two main reasons for this. I have 
already questioned Habermas' claim that ideal practical discourse will lead to a 
consensus in matters of the right. My analysis of the place of reason in this claim will 
support my rejection of discourse ethics as a sound meta-ethical theory. Secondly, if 
we have a clearer picture of the role of rationality in practical discourse, this will 
provide guidance to teachers in actual classroom dialogues for moral education in a 
way that enhances their students' rationality (or reasonableness). In pursuit of these 
aims, I shall initially highlight a few distinctions that can help to clarify the senses in 
which Habermas claims that rationality is unitary and universal. This will lead to a 
survey of the place Habermas claims for the use of rationality in discourse. 
6.231 Three Conceptions of Rationality 
One of the difficulties in reconstructing exactly what Habermas takes rationality to be 
lies in his frequent use of alternative words and phrases for what seems to be the same 
concept. It is not always easy to work out whether he is using these as synonyms, or 
as means to make subtle distinctions. I have already noted the interchange of 
"rationality" and "reason," but other words that seem to play the same role include 
"competence" and "competences," "ability," "reasoning," and a variety of phrases in 
which the foregoing terms are combined with the adjective "communicative": e.g. 
"communicative rationality," "communicative competence" and so on (examples of 
each of these appear in the following discussion). Sometimes these latter phrases 
seem to be treated as subsets of a broader rationality, and other times they seem to be 
used interchangeably with rationality itself. 
In order to assist in this discussion, I propose that we can distinguish between three 
separate but connected notions of rationality, as outlined below. I propose a 
terminology (not used by Habermas) to distinguish them. Each notion is used in 
Habermas' writing in different places, and this is sometimes the source of confusion. 
I will substantiate these claims with detailed references below. Subsequently, I will 
explore whether Habennas may sometimes slip between these senses, leading to 
problems with his analysis. 
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Before investigating them, however, I need to point out another distinction that can be 
drawn. There is an ambiguity between rationality as some capacity (or cluster of 
capacities) that an individual has, and rationality as intersubjectively shared within a 
large group such as a culture (where it is likely that no single individual has a complete 
grasp of the whole). Habermas, with his sociological interests, is often concerned 
with the latter, which I shall label collective rationality; I, with my educational 
interests, with the former (individual rationality). While it is not always necessary to 
pay attention to this distinction, I shall at times have reason to raise it. 
Presuppositional rationality: the anthropologically given fact that (virtually all, 
excluding perhaps those with specific neurological disorders) humans have a potential 
to engage in communication and argumentation, together with the presuppositions that 
this fact implies. Brand (1990, 18-20), referring to Habermas' use of the phrase 
"communicative competence" to mean what I have identified as presuppositional 
rationality, say that it involves: 
the rules which are at the basis of linguistic communication and which competent 
speakers (that is, speakers with communicative competence) can apply although they 
would not be able to spell them out. The term communicative competence has been 
coined in analogy with the term 'linguistic competence' which was first used in a 
specific sense by..,. Noam Chomslcy.... Thus communicative competence is the 
competence to achieve rationality with the means available to us in language, 
which, if used, are steering us in the way of reason. Those linguistic means do not 
only presuppose the possibility of discourse but also indicate what type of discourse 
we should engage in if communication is switched to that level. 
Presuppositional rationality is thus a built-in ability to become rational through a 
reasonably normal upbringing. 
Communicative competence is the ability to operate within these rules. This is an 
ability of the species as such. There is a unity in the plurality of language games, 
the unity pointed to in an answer to the question 'how a use of language oriented to 
reaching an understanding is possible'. Communicative competence is the capacity 
to handle language adequately as a certain tool in the necessary attempt to reach 
shared understanding. It is because this tool has certain characteristics that the 
attempt to reach shared understanding is not always doomed to failure. (ibid., 124) 
Thus, all human beings (barring, presumably, those with certain neurophysiological 
malformations) are claimed to be communicatively competent in the same sense that 
Chomsky claims they are linguistically competent. That is, they are able, given the 
right environment, both to learn a language and to enter into communicative action, 
including discourse. In both cases, there is an underlying tacit knowledge (of 
universal grammar; of Alexy's rules of discourse) that everyone has, but which few 
can articulate, and even then only after considerable empirical study. I assert that it is 
presuppositional rationality that Habermas is referring to in passages such as the 
following: 
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I have gone into this controversy with the intention of rendering plausible a weak 
but not defeatistic concept of linguistically embodied reason.... Communicative 
reason is... [the] more or less trivial suppositions of commonality that make 
possible the cognitive, the regulative, and the expressive uses of language 
(Habermas 1992, 142). 
For, although they may be interpreted in various ways and applied according to 
different criteria, concepts like truth, rationality, or justification play the same 
grammatical role in every linguistic community (Habermas 1996, 138). 
Situated rationality: the actual capacity that any particular human has, at a given 
point in time, to engage in communication, and to think, rationally. This version of 
rationality has developed from the complex interplay of presuppositional rationality (as 
a potential and an in-built competence) with the social interactions of the child with 
others and the environment, influenced by maturational factors. As we shall see, 
Habermas' notion of situated rationality draws on the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, 
both of whom make universalist assumptions about cognitive development. I assert 
that it is situated rationality that Habermas is referring to in passages such as the 
following: 
[Competences are] capacities to solve particular types of empirical-analytical or 
moral-practical problems (Haberm.as 1990, 33) 
Ideal rationality: the ideal (and counterfactual) capacity that every person would 
have in the ideal practical discourse, or the ideal speech situation. This rationality 
plays the same role in each and every individual; i.e. it is that which leads from pooled 
opinions, desires, interests etc to knowledge of truth and normative correctness. Yet 
being an ideal, it is unachievable and "must not be... projected into the future as a 
utopia" (Habermas 1992, 145). Rather, it plays the same type of role as other ideals 
in Habermas' thought. I assert that it is the ideal rationality that alone leads to strong 
consensus in the ideal practical discourse, to which Habermas is referring in the 
repeated use of such phrases as "the unforced force of the better argument" and 
"rationally motivated assent." 
Habermas has quite a lot to say about presuppositional rationality, and addresses ideal 
rationality at some length in a couple of places (as subsequent citations will 
demonstrate). In his scheme, both of these are universal and unitary. He argues at 
length for the universality and unity of presuppositional rationality, as we shall see 
below. On the other hand, he seems to assume rather than establish that all humans 
would counterfactually have a universal ideal rationality in the ideal discourse. I will 
argue that this is because he does not distinguish the two sharply enough, and because 
he inadequately analyses situated rationality, which must be the link between the two. 
Before expanding on this argument, I will further substantiate my claim that these 
three notions of rationality are to be found in Habermas' account. 
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Presuppositional rationality refers to the "general and encompassing structures of 
rationality" which "would have to be shown to be universally valid in a specific sense" 
(Habermas 1981, 137). Presuppositional rationality must be quite careful in its 
claims, for Habermas recognizes the weight of previous attacks on a substantive 
metaphysical concept of rationality. Hence, he seeks to defend a "concept of reason 
that is skeptical and postmetaphysical, yet not defeatist" (Habermas 1992, 116), later 
again described as "a weak but not defeatistic concept of linguistically embodied 
reason" (Habermas 1992, 142). In what sense, then, is Habermas' presuppositional 
rationality skeptical and weak? 
One of the results of these previous attacks that Habermas accepts is that we can no 
longer unproblematically assume that reason comes with substantive content. Thus he 
seeks to "explicitly state what we mean by procedural rationality after all substantial 
concepts of reason have been critically dissolved," drawing a distinction between the 
contents of cultural traditions of reasoning and universal standards of rationality 
(Habermas 1981, 249). If we are to draw such a distinction, then what specifically 
remains under the heading of the universal standards of rationality? They are: 
"the pre-theoretical knowledge and the intuitive command of rule systems that 
underlie the production and the evaluation of such symbolic expressions and 
achievements as correct inferences; good arguments; accurate descriptions, 
explanations, and predictions; grammatically correct sentences; successful speech 
acts; effective instrumental action; appropriate evaluations; authentic self-
presentations; etc." (Habermas 1990, 31) 
It is important to note that presuppositional rationality underlies these productions and 
evaluations, rather than constituting them. I explored Habermas' arguments for this 
claim in §6.1. To be actually capable of correct inference, good argument and so on 
requires a considerable degree of learning, and this learning must take place within a 
cultural tradition. Inference, argumentation and the others are the contents of 
reasoning, but it is important to note that they are also procedures. A sharp content-
procedure distinction is impossible to maintain in reference to rationality, for as we 
acquire the tools of rationality, exploring the ways in which they can be used (i.e. treat 
them as content), we must also be simultaneously using some rational procedures to 
do so. The universal standards of rationality, then, cannot be the procedures of 
rationality, but that which universally underlies them. It is in this sense that 
Habermas' presuppositional rationality is weak: it does not directly provide us with the 
tools of reasoning, but rather merely with that which underlies our capacity to acquire 
them. I suggest that this "pre-theoretical knowledge and intuitive command of rule 
systems" must be part of our biological heritage, as identified in Chapter Two. 
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As this acquisition proceeds, we become the bearers of a situated rationality. Indeed, 
the strength of Habermas' account of presuppositional rationality is that it provides 
good grounds for believing in an underlying commonality of all humans, preserving 
the possibility of communication between them, without necessarily privileging any 
particular historically situated version of rationality. 
Situated rationality attracts relatively little attention in Habermas' work. It cannot be 
universal: each person will have developed their individual rationality to a different 
degree (on the unlikely assumption, which Habermas often seems to assume 
unproblematically, that it is a single dimensional capacity) or will have different 
aspects developed to different degrees (assuming that something like my account of 
multi-aspectual reasonableness is correct). That is, the detailed instantiations of 
individual rationality in different members of a single society will differ. Likewise, 
each society will develop a collective rationality that will differ from that of other 
cultures. 8  Habermas clearly recognizes that individuals and societies do not exhibit 
anything like a perfect rationality: 
It is, of course, obvious that the type of action oriented to reaching understanding, 
whose rational internal structure we have sketched above in very rough outline, is by 
no means everywhere and always encountered as the normal case in everyday 
practice. (Habermas 1981, 138) 
As we have seen in §4.2, Habermas firmly bases his account of the development of 
rationality on that of Piaget and Kohlberg (Habermas 1990, 33ff). Built in to a 
Piagetian account are several universal and unitary assumptions: that development is a 
matter of moving from one stage of operations to another; that the order of stages is 
invariant; that all people everywhere go through the same stages; that the operations 
mastered in each stage are domain-general and context-independent (Donaldson 1978, 
133-140). Each of these assumptions has been questioned, and many workers in 
child development would consider them to be, at best, oversimplifications, and 
probably false (see §3.23, also Sprod 1994c). 
Yet, if these Piagetian assumptions are weakened or abandoned, we lose that thread of 
universality which constitutes the path for the situated development of rationality in 
individuals. As the title of the essay "The unity of reason in the diversity of its voices" 
indicates, Habermas is well aware that diversity is inevitable. The question is: "How 
8 There is sufficient parallel between variations in rationality between individuals, and that between 
societies, not to be too concerned with this distinction. One reason why it might need to be taken 
more seriously would be if it were accepted that different cultures have incommensurable rationalities, 
for individuals in a single culture, given the constructivist account of rationality that I have argued 
elsewhere in this thesis, could not hold incommensurable rationalities. I believe, for similar reasons 
to those advanced by Habermas, that intercultural incommensurability in any strong sense is false, so 
I shall not explore the matter further. 
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much diversity?" A Piagetian account of cognitive development constrains the 
diversity to the results of differential development along a single path 9 . 
There are, however, passages in this essay that support a more open interpretation of 
situated rationality, such as: 
The procedural concept of communicative reason... discharges everything that has to 
do with content into the realm of the contingent and even allows one to think of 
reason itself as having contingently arisen. (Habermas 1992, 116) 
Contingent factors will include differing cultural traditions of reasoning, different 
individual histories of learning, possibly even different preferred styles of reasoning 
or levels of native intelligence, which lead to a multitude of voices. On this account, 
presuppositional rationality, being purely formal, does not specify the content of 
situated rationality (and we need to recall that the content and specific procedures of 
reason are not easily distinguished). Indeed, the shape of the intersubjectively shared 
cultural version of reason, which has great impact on the situated rationality of its 
members, depends on its construction in communicative communities (as I argued in 
§4.22). 
This is not to argue for radical incommensurability between different versions of 
rationality. Habermas argues, and I agree, that the presuppositions of communication 
are strong enough to keep all the variations of rationality within the bounds of mutual 
translatability (Habermas 1992, 116). Yet it is enough to establish that the 
development of rationality will not follow the same path in each individual's case. 
This would be true even if we restricted our concept of rationality quite narrowly to 
encompass only what I called the critical aspect of thinking in Chapter Three. It will 
hold even more strongly if we accept that rationality (or reasonableness, which I have 
argued is a better term) is construed as having many other aspects. 10 
With this analysis of situated rationality in hand, I will turn my attention to ideal 
rationality. If the progress through situated rationality could be seen as being along a 
single path, then there would be a single end towards which the path is heading. Even 
9 I have simplified Piaget's claims somewhat here. In fact, he talks of sub-stages, makes allowances 
for some variation within developmental pathways and recognizes decalage, or the slipping between 
stages under some circumstances, amongst other complications. However, I do not believe that these 
simplifications affect the argument in any major way, and would only warrant reference to a tight 
network of near parallel paths. 
10 I note that Habermas' account of rationality in The Theory of Communicative Action (1981, 8- 
22), and especially the explication of different types of discourses, has potential for development into 
a multi-aspectual account of reasonableness. However, as far as practical (and theoretical) reason goes, 
Habermas' account does seem to assume that rationality is constrained to what I have called the critical 
aspect of thinking. The other aspects, to some extent at least, seem to be consigned to other types of 
argument (e.g. the committed aspect of thinking is assigned to therapeutic critique; the creative to 
aesthetic criticism). I shall not explore this case any further in this thesis. 
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if the path were too long to traverse in a lifetime, there would still be an ideal 
rationality at the other end. 
When he is drawing on Piaget and Kohlberg, there is a hint that Habermas believes the 
path is not too long. The following comment may be interpreted to mean that he sees 
formal-operational thought and postconventional moral judgment as the embodiments 
of ideal rationality in the theoretical and practical spheres respectively, and that such 
ideal rationality is within the reach of every young adult: 
Piaget and Kohlberg describe the terminal competence of the young adult in the 
framework of rational reconstructions of formal-operational thought and 
postconventional moral judgment (Habermas 1990, 33). 
However, it seems better to interpret these remarks as describing a well developed 
rationality, rather than a terminal one. It is not clear that Piaget would claim that 
formal-operational thought (or in Kohlberg's case, postconventional moral judgement) 
is "terminal" rationality, rather than a stage or style of thought that requires 
considerable specific learning of content (including procedural content) in order to 
operate better. For example, a formal-operational thinker for Piaget is capable of 
understanding formal logic, but does not, merely for that reason, know all of logic; 
that is, does not have the capabilities of a professional logician. 
In The Theory of Communicative Action (1981, 24ff - see also my discussion in 
§3.323), Habermas gives a general account of the detailed abilities required by ideal 
rationality. The abilities required here are clearly far from the empty, formal 
potentialities of presuppositional rationality. There is a need to have firm situated 
abilities to adduce data, frame warrants, understand and motivate needs and values, 
anticipate consequences and so on. Again, these abilities are not beyond the reach of 
many individuals, but it is overwhelmingly probable that no actual individual is 
capable of using them all ideally. In any case, each of them is a high level capacity, 
dependent in turn on a multitude of lower level capacities and not constructed out of 
these in a unique way. These lower level capacities themselves can be more or less 
well mastered. 
I have been building a case that rationality, for Habermas, is usually best interpreted as 
presuppositional rationality. This is the way the concept has been used in most of the 
references to rationality that I have considered. This is not to say that he does not 
address either situated or ideal rationality: at times, he certainly does. But at these 
times, it is noticeable that he is much less likely to refer to the universality or unity of 
rationality: these characteristics are by-and-large reserved for his "weak and minimal" 
presuppositional rationality. The question arises, however, as to whether, having 
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established the claim to universality and unity of presuppositional rationality, he also 
applies these characteristics to situated and/or ideal rationality. For example, he 
implies that an institutionalized public discourse (building a collective situated 
rationality) can approach or even achieve unified, universal ideal rationality. 
The unity of practical reason can be realized in an unequivocal manner only within a 
network of public forms of communication and practices in which the conditions of 
rational collective will formation have taken on concrete institutional form 
(Habermas 1993, 17). 
Implicit in this remark is a recognition that individual situated rationality is always 
somewhat fragmented and idiosyncratic. Practical reason cannot be unified at the level 
of the actual individual. Habermas argues that what is needed for the reunification of 
rationality in the real world of actual human beings is a public merging of individual 
rationalities. The unification of reason, he avers, can be achieved in a process of 
institutionalized collective rational action. It is important to note that there is some 
tension between this claim and the notion of counterfactual ideals. In the light of this, 
I will now turn my attention to the connections and pathways between 
presuppositional, situated and ideal rationalities. 
How do these three categories fit with my analysis? Reasonableness, I claim, is 
equivalent to Habermas' individual situated rationality, though we have to recast the 
latter in terms of the five aspects. My analysis of how reasonableness forms supports 
the Habermasian alternative that "discharges everything that has to do with content [of 
reason] into the realm of the contingent," and that thus we all differ in the details of 
our reasonableness (though there is, given the constructivist account of the 
development of reasonableness, considerable overlap). Presuppositional rationality 
underlies our capacity to acquire reasonableness, and as such must be part of our 
biological heritage (Chapter Two). Ideal rationality is more problematic, and the next 
section will clarify this. 
6.232 The Development and Endpoint of Rationality 
One of my central concerns in this thesis is to give an account of the way teachers can, 
through the community of inquiry, help their students to improve their reasonableness. 
With this in mind, I will now consider the developmental pathway(s) between 
presuppositional, situated and ideal rationality. Some understanding of the 
development of reasonableness is essential to a teacher's pedagogical action in the 
classroom (§4.141). Can teachers assume that there is a single endpoint at which the 
development of reasonableness is aimed? If not, what can guide them? In the course 
of this investigation, I shall also consider the role such a convergence of reason plays 
in Habermas' thought. This will strengthen my judgement in §6.21 that consensus 
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cannot be taken as an inevitable outcome of ideal practical discourse, and hence that 
discourse ethics does not stand up as a complete meta-ethical theory. 
In what follows, I will accept Habermas' account of presuppositional rationality. The 
use of language does imply that we must presuppose that communication is possible, 
that we are oriented towards reaching an understanding with others, and that this 
means that there is a necessary reciprocity to the process. It does seem to me that 
Habermas' argument that such a conception of rationality can secure the middle 
ground between a metaphysical myth and incommensurable radical relativism 
(Habermas 1992, 133-139) is sound. Presuppositional rationality also underwrites 
the teacher's assumption that all (normal) children are capable of developing 
reasonableness. 
Now, there seem to be no problems in principle standing in the way of the 
development of an account of how individuals move from a universal, unitary 
presuppositional rationality to (a particular) situated rationality. After all, an identical 
potential can be developed in different ways depending on the environment in which it 
is developed. Consider again the parallel with Chomskian linguistic competence: all 
humans have it, but the differing circumstances in which it is developed lead to 
individuals being able to use different languages, being able to produce unique 
utterances and having differential abilities to communicate and understand. Further, 
Habermas' presuppositional rationality is only one part of the potential that a human 
has - a fairly minimal one. Other potentials will be present as well (not all of which 
need be universal - e.g. "native ability" or general intelligence), and the interaction 
between these potentials will differ amongst individuals. Yet it is this development 
which is of great interest to educationalists, and I shall return to it in §9.1. 
Nor is there, on first glance, an obvious logical problem with the possibility of a move 
from differentiated situated rationality to a universal ideal rationality (though we must 
note that this is seen as a counterfactual move by Habermas). It is quite conceivable 
that different entities may start at the same place, move along different paths, and 
(potentially, dependent on contingent factors) end up at a common destination. This is 
effectively the position for which Habermas argues in asserting that a strong 
consensus is achievable in ideal discourse, and an ideal rationality would have to be 
created in this way. Indeed, given the intersubjective formation of reasonableness 
(§3.23 and §3.241), there will be some conformist pressures pushing in this direction: 
I shall look at these in §8.23. 
Yet, although there is no logical difficulty with such convergence, there needs to be a 
solid argument as to why convergence will take place. After all, if different entities 
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head off in different directions, the safer assumption in the absence of such an 
argument would be that they are going to diverge to different destinations. 
Furthermore, there are a number of arguments that all lend credence to the conclusion 
that convergence is unlikely or impossible. I shall advance these below. Before that, 
however, I will explain why it is that Habermas needs to be able to establish that the 
various situated rationalities of concrete individual persons would converge on a single 
ideal rationality in a counterfactual ideal practical discourse. 
6.2321 Why Situated Rationality Needs to Converge, in Principle 
Although, as we have seen, it is presuppositional rationality on which Habermas lays 
most emphasis, the acceptance of a universal and unitary ideal rationality is vital to his 
argument that consensus is both possible and inevitable in ideal discourse in theoretical 
and practical matters. In order to see why this is so, let's have a closer look at the sort 
of consensus that is reached in the counterfactual ideal practical discourse. Here is 
Habermas on the idealizations of an ideal discourse: 
the premise we posit for strict discourses, [is] that in principle a rationally motivated 
agreement must always be reachable, where the phrase "in principle" signifies the 
counterfactual reservation "if argumentation were conducted openly and continued 
long enough." (Habermas 1990, 105) 
What argument leads us to the conclusion that agreement must always be reachable in 
principle? Habermas does not offer an explicit argument to this effect. A 
reconstructed outline of the implicit argument that underlies Habermas' conclusion 
seems to go like this: 
Premise 1: Each participant in the ideal practical discourse has the same 
information at their disposal, because all possible participants (it was open 
enough) have contributed all that they want to it (it was long enough); 
Premise 2: Each participant, at the time of decision, has at their disposal an 
identical (i.e. ideal) rationality; 
Conclusion: Therefore, all will come to the same conclusion, because if identical 
data is processed by identical rational means, then there is one and only one 
conclusion that can be reached: the consensus. 
Note that, although rationality has a clear role to play in this argument, just how this 
ideal rationality arises is left unclear. We saw above that Habermas asserts that we 
must "think of reason itself as having contingently arisen," and that this implies that 
real individuals each have their own different situated rationality. Yet if agreement 
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must be rationally motivated, by the end of the discourse this rationality must be the 
same in each. 
Let's look a little further at the question of the nature of the participants in discourse. 
What do they bring to the discourse? In what ways are they the same, and in what 
ways do they differ? As we have seen, Habermas is critical of the position taken by 
Rawls, that each person, if placed in the "original position," is capable of making the 
correct decision. Being in the original position, Habermas argues, impoverishes the 
thinker. Though Habermas does not provide a single list of the ways in which the 
participants in a discourse differ from each other, we can try to reconstruct one from 
the comments he makes. In saying "for one thing, nothing better prevents others from 
perspectivally distorting one's own interests that actual participation" (Habermas 
1990, 67), he identifies that participants differ in their interests. A few lines later, he 
adds needs, wants and cultural values to the list. Presumably, they may also differ in 
emotional makeup, life histories, access to information and so on. In the ideal 
discourse, explications of each of these differences can be shared, and hence all have 
access to such information, as stated in Premise 1. 
But on the question of rationality, he remains largely silent. Habermas, as we have 
seen, holds that all bring an identical presuppositional rationality to the discourse, for 
this is universal. It is, however, also weak, formal and empty. It is certainly not 
substantive enough to bear the weight of actually weighing evidence, engaging in 
arguments and reaching conclusions, because the abilities to do each of these, while 
they are underpinned by the presuppositions of rationality, are actually learned in 
social situations and dialogue. Consequently, the rationality that the participants bring 
to the ideal discourse must be either a situated or an ideal rationality. 11 
At first glance, the former seems to be the more likely candidate. If this is so, and if 
the rationality that participants use to make the final decision is the variegated situated 
rationality that they brought into the practical discourse, then Premise 2 fails, and the 
argument does not hold. Differing rational processing of identical information will not 
necessarily come to identical conclusions. A modified version might hold, for it is not 
impossible that participants with differing, but overlapping 12 situated rationalities 
could nevertheless come to a consensus. There is no logical reason, as we have seen, 
to rule out differing paths to the same conclusion - but note that for Habermas 
consensus requires that the reasons convince "in the same way" (Habermas 1996, 
11 For a real discourse, of course, the rationality would have to be situated rationality. But then, real 
discourses do not have to issue in consensus. 
12 That the situated rationalities must overlap follows from two arguments: because rationality itself 
is formed in dialogue (the Vygotslcian argument: see §3.23); and because it develops from a universal 
presuppositional rationality. 
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166, discussed in §6.1). I have argued that whether this is so is an empirical, and not 
an analytic, question, and needs to be decided separately in each case. Although we 
might find some cases where convergence occurred, this would still not be enough to 
establish the general case in the absence of a general argument. One does not seem to 
be available. And in any case, there are good reasons for believing that situated 
rationalities will not converge. Let's explore them. 
6.2322 Will Situated Rationality Converge? 
As hinted, an alternative argument is available to Habermas. This is that, just as (he 
claims) theoretical truth and normative rightness are the inevitable constructs of ideal 
discourse, then ideal rationality will also be the inevitable outcome of a discourse in 
which rationality itself is the subject matter. Thus, although all humans develop (and 
continue through life to develop, or at least alter) their situated rational capacity in 
idiosyncratic ways, in the ideal situation, all these different paths converge on a single 
Universal Reason. 
On first blush, it might seem that, if we take a narrow conception of critical thinking as 
our model of rationality, then there is some plausibility to this position. This version 
of critical thinking sees rationality as little more than the application of formal logic to 
information, and logic might be seen as a self-evident axiomatic system. There are 
two reasons to doubt even this account of convergence on ideal rationality. Firstly, 
even if critical reasoning is implausibly collapsed to formal logic, there is no single 
agreed system of logic that can handle all logical problems; witness the development of 
deviant logics. Secondly, as I discuss in §3.121, Chemiak's (1986) work on minimal 
rationality concludes that "beyond generalizations about human psychology, there 
seems to be no transcendentally 'right' kind of logician" (48), and that the idea of a 
perfect epistemic agent is "a profoundly inapplicable idealization, not just a harmless 
approximation of actual human rationality" (134). 
This assumption of convergence becomes even more problematic if our model of 
rationality is multi-aspectual, as I argued that it is in §3.1, and based on "a rag-bag of 
'quick and dirty' on-line stratagems" (Clark 1998, 179). Here are a number of 
reasons for thinking that different people's multi-aspectual situated rationality - that is, 
their reasonableness - is such that, even in an ideal discourse on rationality, 
convergence on ideal rationality is unlikely. 
1. Talk of the unity of reason implies that rationality is a seamless, coherent whole. 
Yet the different aspects or heuristics of thinking do not essentially mesh with each 
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other. They may, taking the same information into account, push towards different 
conclusions. 13 
2. Two of the aspects of thinking are essentially located: the first in the individual 
history of the thinker (the contextual aspect); the second, in the person of the thinker 
(the embodied aspect). 14 While it is true, in general terms, that these locations are the 
same for all persons, in detail, they are different. Thus the detailed instantiation of at 
least these aspects of reason in each person will be idiosyncratic, and will not "wash 
out" when we attempt to reconcile our different rationalities. 
3. Our concepts, and even many reasoning processes, are themselves mostly 
metaphorical and thus not universal, as Johnson (1993, 32ff) has persuasively argued 
in relation to moral thinking. Because our key moral concepts and reasoning are too 
ambiguous and multivalent, the upshot is that the "view that there must be one and 
only one right thing to do in a given situation is, for the most part, mistaken" (187) - 
which is not to say that we cannot obtain "general guidance about how to live" (189). 
4. Reasonableness is constructed through engagement in dialogue (§3.23). Drawing 
on Taylor's (1995) notion of the dialogical self, Glaser (1998, 229) argues that, since 
the outer speech in which the emergent thinker engages is dialogical, then the inner 
speech of thought is also dialogical: "a pluralistic model of the individual thinker... 
gives full recognition to the fact that selves are not wholly consistent or unitary." 
Since one of the major capabilities constructed through dialogue is reasonableness, 
then even within a single participant in a practical discourse, rationality is not unitary. 
5. Warnke (1995) claims that reasons and justifications in discourses do not only aim 
at agreement: they are also involved in interpretation, which aims at insight and 
understanding. This applies to matters of the right as much as to matters of the good: 
"we might still have as many interpretations of the meaning of our norms of action and 
principles of justice as we have of our art and literature" (257). But while there are 
ways of establishing that some interpretations are better than others, often no one 
interpretation can be established as superior to all others. If this is the case, reasoning 
cannot be unitary. 
13 Two examples. In the justice/care debate, cold, impartial logic (often associated with the critical 
aspect of thinking) will push us towards the former approach, while attention to our emotional 
attachments (under the committed aspect of thinking) will incline us to the latter (see Johnson 1993, 
114-118, for a related discussion of Gilligan's work in this regard). Secondly, within the critical 
aspect of thinking, we may strive to be both clear and concise, yet achieving the one may interfere 
with the achievement of the other. 
14 Note that the emotions, from the committed aspect of reasonableness, depend on both the bodily 
reactions of those feeling them, and the contexts in which they have been learned. 
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For all these reasons, we must doubt the claim that individual situated rationalities will 
converge in what we might call rational discourse (i.e. discourse in which rationality is 
the content) towards an ideal Universal Reason. This has grave implications for the 
claim that discourse must converge on consensus. 
6.233 Implications of the Plurality of Reasonableness 
What is the conclusion we are to draw from this survey of rationality in Habermas' 
work? Firstly, let's return to the reconstruction of Habermas' argument for the 
inevitability of consensus in discourse (§6.2321). Through the assumption of 
convergence on universal ideal rationality, Premise 2 has reintroduced the monological 
subject into the ideal practical discourse. Habermas' monological subjects differ from 
Rawls' (§6.1), in that each represents their individual interests and retains their 
individuality in ways not available to the person in the original position. Habermas 
maintains that the pooling of information must be done interactively: "the revision of 
the values used to interpret needs and wants cannot be a matter for individuals to 
handle monologically" (1990, 68). Rawls reaches the information pool needed for 
decision by excluding these needs and wants from consideration. Once the pooling of 
information has taken place, however, they are the same as Rawls' subjects, in that 
they have become identical in their reasoning capacity. Now, any one of them could 
in principle come to the correct consensus decision. 
Habermas needs situated rationality to converge on an ideal rationality so that 
consensus can be guaranteed in the ideal discourse. For all the reasons surveyed in 
§6.2322, especially those drawing on Chemiak, Clark, and Johnson's work, we have 
seen that it will not converge. Therefore, consensus cannot be guaranteed in any 
particular matter (though it is still possible, as are compromise and failure to agree). 
Since the strong distinction between the right and the good is underwritten by the 
guarantee of consensus for discourses concerned with the former (but not the latter), 
and since the guarantee of consensus requires a unitary reason (§6.2321), this is one 
more line of argument to show that the cut cannot be made "razor-sharp." Further, the 
insistence that all reasoners must, in the ideal rational discourse, become monological 
subjects with identical ideal rationality weakens Habermas' claim that discourse ethics 
is able to handle diversity without exclusion. Since the cut of the right from the good 
is central to Habermas' attempt to establish normative correctness through 
universalizability, and his dialogical proceduralism is designed to be inclusive of 
difference, these conclusions suggest that discourse ethics fails to achieve adequacy in 
its own terms. It is not satisfactory as a full meta-ethical theory. 
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Nevertheless, Habermas is right to identify reason as a central theme of philosophy, 
and a vital player in moral dialogue. Both from the Habermasian account of rationality 
itself, and from my reasonableness-inspired critique of it, arise a number of points that 
have great implications for classroom practice. Here, I will indicate what they are, and 
where they will be picked up in Part Bl. 
In identifying presuppositional rationality, Habermas gives teachers a basis on which 
to build. The identification of the egalitarian, symmetrical and communicative nature 
of this underpinning mandates the use of communal approaches in the classroom, 
which value all, encourage participation and recognize difference (§8.21). This 
potential to engage in communicative action and discourse, present in every child, 
needs to become actualized into a burgeoning reasonableness. The Habermasian idea 
of a discourse that takes rationality itself as its content makes clear the central 
importance of inquiry (§8.22 and §10.22), and the merging of inquiry into a 
community (§8.23). Consensus, so central to Habermas, may not be the only goal of 
discourse, but it remains an important goal nevertheless. The concept provides 
important guidance to the classroom community of inquiry, and the teacher within it, 
as they seek to find out whether consensus is possible, when it is an appropriate aim 
and, if so, what the consensual position will be (§9.4 and §10.23). 
The recognition that, contrary to Habermas, reasonableness does not converge on an 
ideal rationality highlights even more the need to allow and encourage students to 
represent their own interests in the community (§10.21 and §10.223). Nevertheless, 
reasonableness is a publicly tested and honed product (see also §3.241), and students 
need to expand their repertoire, and strengthen each of the aspects of reasonableness, 
through exposure to alternative approaches (§9.1). 
Presuppositional rationality provides the basis from which Habermas' principle of 
universalization (U) is derived (§6.1) and it is time to address this last feature of 
Habermas' system. 
6.24 Is (U) a Purely Formal Moral Principle? 
Habermas claims that the basis of discourse ethics, (U), is a purely formal moral 
principle. 
The justification of discourse ethics outlined here avoids confusion in the use of the 
term "moral principle." The only moral principle here is the universalization 
principle (U), which is conceived as a rule of argumentation and is part of the logic 
of practical discourses. (U) must be carefully distinguished from.., substantive 
principles or basic norms, which can only be the subject matter of moral 
argumentation. (Habermas 1990, 93) 
185 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 6. Discourse ethics 
As we have seen in §6.1, (U) is derived from our rational reconstruction of the 
pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation. These presuppositions are made 
whenever we seek to convince another by using reasons, whether we realize it or not. 
They themselves have a normative content (Habermas 1990, 96) which must be made 
explicit in the form of the discourse rules, from which (U) must then be derivable. 
So, (U) is merely a rule of argument, a principle of inference. It does not pre-decide 
what moral principles we will adopt, because they have to be proposed to, and 
accepted in, a practical discourse. Yet (U) itself has been derived from pragmatic 
presuppositions that do have normative content, and Habermas claims that these 
presuppositions arise solely in the attempt to convince another. Let's look again at the 
presuppositions: 
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in 
the discourse. 
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. 
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising 
his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2). (Haberrnas 1990, 89) 
It is not hard to see that these presuppositions do have a substantive value written into 
them, that then transfers to (U). That substantive moral principle is respect for others. 
For Habermas, this normative content of the presuppositions is built into language 
itself - a medium the purpose of which is to establish communication with others. But 
which others? Habermas has a circumlocution for the group of communicants but, as 
we shall see, it begs the question somewhat. The group includes "every subject with 
the competence to speak and act" (a few lines later: "all subjects without exception 
who have the capacity to take part in argumentation"). In other words, the others are 
those that are judged to have competence. 
In §6.231, we saw that the best interpretation of Habermas' use of "competence" is to 
refer to presuppositional rationality. But it also brings us up against a second 
question: who decides who has presuppositional rationality? It is not uncommon to 
hear "those people are just not worth talking to" or "they never seem to understand a 
word I say." It is inescapable: the decision has to be made by us. Another way to put 
this is to say that the set of potential participants is those that we respect as potential 
communicants. 
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Benhabib (1992,29-32) argues that we cannot derive a meta-ethical theory from a 
purely formal principle derived from the notion of performative contradiction. 
Instead, she claims, we must make two substantive ethical assumptions: universal 
moral respect (the assumption that all ought to participate) and egalitarian reciprocity 
(the assumption that all ought to have an equal right to speak, ask, be listened to and 
so on). Both imply respect. She recognizes that these assumptions do not tell us who 
is included in the "all," and asserts that for some societies, the scope may be very 
restricted (e.g. my kin group), while for "modernity," it extends to all humans. 15 
Taylor (1991) raises a related point: 
The fact that I should argue with the aim of achieving domination-free understanding 
may admittedly be structurally implied by the logic of discourse. If, in other words, I 
attempt to assert my own interests irrespective of the objections other participants to 
the conversation raise, then I certainly violate the logic of the discourse. But why 
should I not do this? Why should I not attempt to reach my desired goal at the cost 
of being slightly inconsistent? (31) 
For Habermas, to make the attempt to which Taylor refers in the last sentence is to 
catch oneself in a performative contradiction. For Taylor, it is merely a type of 
inconsistency. The participant in discourse needs a reason not to be inconsistent in 
this way, and what underlies the desire to not be inconsistent is that we see ourselves 
as "beings who should respect reason in themselves and others" (Taylor 1991, 30). 
Once more, respect emerges as a presupposed substantive moral principle. 
Still the question remains as to who deserves this respect. The answer seems 
inevitably to be (as Benhabib saw) that we extend such respect only to those who are 
sufficiently like us; those with whom we feel we can genuinely communicate. Over 
history, this has left such varied groups as barbarians, children, women, underlings, 
servants and slaves out of the circle of respect - the Greeks left most of these groups 
out. Respect has been extended, not to all, but to the wise, the aged, the powerful, the 
clever, the word of a deity and so on. Universal respect has been a powerful idea in 
history, but it has not been the only account of who deserves respect. 
Although such accounts seem somewhat foreign to the modern mind, it is important to 
see that there is no open-and-shut case for universal respect. Habermas says that all 
traditional ethical philosophies "have to protect a dogmatic core of fundamental 
convictions from all criticism" (Habermas 1990,   88), but the same might be said of 
universal respect in discourse ethics. Even then, there does not seem to be a sharp 
principled way of making the cut between those worthy of respect (as possessors of 
presuppositional rationality) and those not. Instead, the case for each group of those 
15 In a lengthy and interesting footnote, she explores the extent of "all humanity," and reminds us 
that communication extends beyond the use of language to gestures, cries and so on. 
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near the margins needs to be thrashed out in practical discourse, in which the subjects 
of the discussion may or may not be able to participate. 
Since we need some substantive moral principle(s) to underpin discourse ethics, then 
it loses its purely formal character. According to its own requirement that all 
substantive principles need to be submitted to practical discourse and achieve a 
consensus before they are justified, then discourse ethics as a formal structure cannot 
be correct. But all this conclusion establishes is that discourse ethics cannot hold as a 
meta-ethical theory. It does not mean that we cannot reconstitute discourse ethics as a 
part of a wider theory. 
Our ethics must start with the modernist lifeworld assumption of respect, and it must 
open this assumption to examination. This establishes a circularity, but it need not be 
a vicious circularity. As Benhabib (1992, 30) claims, we need to anchor ourselves in 
the lifeworld, but we open up the possibility of an historically self-conscious 
universality, checked against reflective equilibrium, and situated within our modernist 
historical horizons. Recall §6.22: we can never have a strong sense of certainty that 
any widely accepted consensus does actually track the norm which would reach 
consensus in an ideal practical discourse. Thus, I maintain, we are in fact in no 
weaker a position due to the collapse of a formalistic pragmatic-transcendental 
foundation. In both cases, we have to act on faith that our deliberations are giving us 
adequate, even strong, reasons for acting as we do. In both cases, we may be wildly 
mistaken. But in both cases, our very openness to argument and counter-argument, to 
dissent and agreement, to multiple points of view gives some confidence that there is 
every opportunity that sound conclusions will prevail and that unsound ones will be 
unmasked. This confidence, of course, cannot be shown to be (absolutely) justified, 
but we can argue that it is better than any of the alternatives. It seems to me that in 
both cases, real practical discourses rely on Peirce's cable, rather than a tight chain of 
argument: 
Philosophy ought... to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments 
than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which 
is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, 
provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected. (Peirce 1955, 229) 
The arguments of this section have established that we must take respect to be a basic 
substantive norm if we are to have access to the insights of discourse ethics. We 
cannot start from a formal, morally neutral position. But equally, we cannot treat this 
foundational norm as an unproblematic foundation. Even while observing respect, we 
can investigate and possibly reconstitute it. 
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This theoretical account of the place of respect plays an important role in deciding the 
practical implementations of pedagogical action by teachers, both in the wider school 
(§8.1) and in classroom discussions (§9.2). It provides a justification for teachers to 
impose the values that arise out of respect even if the students have not had any 
opportunity to examine and adopt them. Equally, this account will be useful in my 
discussion of how teachers can avoid the charge of indoctrination (§9.41). These 
discussions, however, will appear in Part ifi. Before moving on to that task, it is time 
to look at the way in which the advantageous features of discourse ethics, as outlined 
in this chapter, can be incorporated into virtue ethics, discussed in Chapter Five, to 
form an appropriate target for moral education in the schools of the modern West. 
6.3 Discourse Ethics: Benefits and Drawbacks 
Chapter Six has undertaken three tasks: to outline discourse ethics, to examine it as to 
its adequacy as a complete meta-ethical system, and to prepare the ground for an 
analysis of the insights it can provide to a more satisfactory meta-ethics. We have 
seen that Habermas, working from an explicitly Kantian base, has claimed that 
discourse ethics provides a complete description of the nature of morality. However, 
in §6.2, I demonstrated that there are a number of problems with this account (the 
claimed inevitability of consensus, the split of the right from the good, the assumption 
that consensus tracks moral correctness, the account of rationality, and the claimed 
formalism). These, taken together, undermine Habermas' claim, and I shall expand 
on them further in §7.12. 
Nevertheless, discourse ethics, when suitably modified, articulates well with virtue 
ethics: I shall defend this claim in greater detail in Chapter Seven. Discourse ethics 
requires the simultaneous and mutually supporting development of the intellectual 
virtues (in the form of reasonableness) and the foundational virtues of respect. 
Further, as I shall discuss in §7.25, in an ethics-oriented discourse, the virtues will be 
both the subject matter, and the products, of the conversation. 
Discourse ethics' principle advantages lie in its dialogical and developmental 
emphases. In insisting that the development of human capacities and knowledge (both 
practical and theoretical) are dependent on interaction with others, discourse ethics 
leads us away from a faulty assumption that humans are somehow pre-existing 
subjects (see also the discussion of the philosophy of the subject in §4.141). 
Engagement with others becomes central to the development - even the possibility - of 
reasonableness, autonomy and moral virtue - three of the central themes of this work. 
Particularly when modified by the Vygotskian account of learning (§3.23), the 
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dialogical emphasis of Habermas' work takes development seriously. His account of 
immersion in the lifeworld also fits well with Aristotelian habituation. 
Despite the critique of discourse ethics presented in §6.2, some of the Habermasian 
ideas investigated there do, with suitable modification, provide the resources for 
important conclusions. Although Habermas is (I maintain) wrong to claim that ideal 
discussions concerning matters of the right would reach consensus, nevertheless, the 
attempt to reach consensus, compromise or understanding is central to the construction 
of intersubjectivity and hence of reasonableness and autonomy. This will, as I explore 
in §7.23 and §7.24, contribute to my analysis of moral progress and justice. Further, 
and despite Habermas' failure to advance an adequate account of rationality, discourse 
ethics is of considerable use in clarifying the role that Aristotle allocates to practical 
wisdom and, even more importantly, it fills the gap in Aristotle's account concerning 
the origins of practical wisdom itself. Finally, a more careful analysis of the basis for 
dialogical action reveals that, despite Habermas' claims of formality, inculcated respect 
is one of the basic virtues upon which communication must be based. 
I now turn, in Chapter Seven, to a more detailed look at the relationship between 
discourse ethics and virtue ethics. 
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Chapter Seven: A Meta-ethics for an Ethical Education Program 
Chapters Five and Six have explored the requirements of a meta-ethical theory on 
which moral education can be based. In §5.1,1 explored the connection between 
theories of moral development and meta-ethics. We saw that moral development is not 
the development of a single capacity (contra Kohlberg, who identified this capacity as 
that involved in making moral judgements on moral dilemmas). Rather, it involves the 
simultaneous development of at least five capacities. 
Next, I engaged in detailed critiques of two meta-ethical theories: virtue ethics, 
through a survey of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (§5.2), and discourse ethics, via a 
critique of the writings of Habermas (Chapter Six). In both cases, I identified the 
considerable strengths of the theories, but also some of their shortcomings. In this 
chapter, I will firstly recall, in summary form, the weaknesses and strengths of each 
theory (§7.1), and then suggest that, while we can use virtue ethics as our primary 
meta-ethical theory, discourse ethics is more useful in developing an account of the 
place of discussion in classroom moral education (§7.2). 
7.1 Strengths and Weaknesses 
In §5.24, I came to the conclusion that virtue ethics, because of its ability to handle 
multiple, potentially cross-cutting perspectives on morality, and because of its 
acceptance of the contextually situated nature of all moral matters, captures the varied 
phenomenological experience of our engagement in morality. As such, it can 
incorporate the insights of many other meta-ethical theories that reduce morality to a 
single principle. Like many meta-ethical accounts, virtue ethics recognizes the 
important facts that we are born into the world with a biological inheritance (§5.2), 
and that socialization plays a central role in building moral character (§5.21). I 
explored the intertwining roles of habituation to virtue and of practical reason in an 
adequate account of socialization, coming to the conclusion that, although Aristotle's 
account of virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of the development of moral 
persons, it does not provide an adequate account of such development (§5.22). In 
particular, there is a need for a fuller account of the place of dialogue in both 
habituation and the building of practical reasoning (§5.23). 
Discourse ethics shows promise for completing this task. Yet as a competing meta-
ethical theory, discourse ethics claims to tell the whole story of the moral domain, and 
its basic approach - a Kantian deontology - it at odds with the basic thrust of virtue 
ethics. Discourse ethics does assert a single core moral principle, derived from 
reasoning about the nature of language and communication, on which to base 
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morality, rather than appealing to a cluster of virtues. According to discourse ethics, 
morality is a matter of universalization rather than contextualized choice of the right 
option. Discourse ethics also narrowly defines morality so as to exclude questions 
that are situated in the lifeworld, whereas virtue ethics is essentially about living a 
good life (§6.1). Given these fundamental differences between the two, there can be 
no question of merely cobbling the two together. Instead, some of the basic 
assumptions of one or the other (maybe both) need to be questioned and reconstructed 
so that the elements of each that are to be combined can merge hannoniously. 
I have argued in §5.24 that the basic premises of virtue ethics are sound, and in §6.2, 
I have indicated that the Kantian roots of discourse ethics are misguided. 
Consequently, it will be discourse ethics that will need to be modified most. As a 
preparation for this, I shall firstly (§7.1) gather together the strengths of discourse 
ethics - those features that we will want to preserve - and then (§7.12) survey the 
weaknesses that I have identified, which lead me to reject its strongly universalist and 
pragmatic-transcendentalist underpinnings. In §7.2, I shall show how this 
reconstructed discourse ethics can fill the holes in the Aristotelian theory. 
7.11 What We Can Learn from Discourse Ethics 
Although I have pointed above to the distinct differences between discourse ethics and 
virtue ethics, when we survey the strengths of the former, we find that there are some 
important intersections as well. Probably the foremost of these is the fact that both are 
social. They both recognize that the first steps in morality are taken in interaction 
with, and by means of becoming familiar with the practices of, other people. While 
Aristotle talks of habituation, Habermas refer to immersion in the lifeworld. 
Discourse ethics places communicative interaction more centrally than virtue ethics, 
however, because it asserts that any advance in moral thinking must take place as a 
result of communication. Benhabib (1992, 53) suggests that "if there are certain moral 
and cognitive skills involved in reaching perspicacious, appropriate, sensitive and 
illuminating judgments... they bear a 'family resemblance' to the conversational skills 
and virtues involved in the ongoing practice of moral dialogue and discourse." My 
analysis shows that this is no accident: it is precisely because Aristotle's phronesis 
(i.e. the contextualized moral judgement referred to by Benhabib in the first half of her 
comment) is constructed in Vygotskian manner through engagement in moral dialogue 
(§3.23 and §6.232). 
Discourse ethics' emphasis on universalizability may not be strictly derivable from the 
presuppositions of communication in such a way as to provide a pragmatic-
transcendental foundation (§6.24). Nevertheless, it does imply strongly that, behind 
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any attempt to communicate reasonably with another lies the presupposition that we 
must extend egalitarian respect to our conversational partners. Certainly, the idea of 
respect for others itself hinges on a concept of reasonable communication, but I have 
argued that this circularity is not vicious. In the absence of a foundation, our beliefs 
must be mutually supportive. Within the historical horizon of modernity in which we 
find ourselves, this presupposition of egalitarian respect extends to all humans, and if 
we were to ignore it, we would need to advance compelling reasons. 
Discourse ethics thus provides a checklist for illegitimate practice - practice that denies 
respect to others. As virtues arise from within a culture, a virtue ethics account 
contains a danger of insularity and exclusion (§5.3). Reflection can provide a counter 
balance, but only if it extends beyond reflecting on whether one is properly 
instantiating the virtues oneself, to the matter of whether the versions of the virtues 
held within one's society are indeed virtuous. Such reflection is better accounted for 
by discourse ethics, and §7.23 will explore this issue further. 
Habermas' clarification of the place of reason in ethics may suffer from a narrow 
construal of rationality (§6.23), but it does remind us that morality is connected with 
the giving of reasons, and the attempt to persuade others that our moral positions are 
correct. As Benhabib (1992, 50) points out, there is a danger of confusing moral 
cognitivism (that we try to justify with reasons our moral positions) with moral 
rationalism (that morality involves nothing more than a narrow rationality), yet to deny 
the latter does not refute the former. Moral development, as I pointed out in §5.1, is 
in part a burgeoning ability to handle moral matters cognitively. 
Habermas also provides an important critique of the philosophy of the subject, 
throwing into question a number of assumptions that have shackled inquiry into the 
philosophical implications of the development of persons through their childhood 
(§6.1). Although his own discussion has been restricted to a Piagetian/Kohlbergian 
treatment of moral development (§6.232), and does not treat the growth of reason 
fully, thus being (in my view) inadequate, it opens the door to an inquiry which can be 
of the utmost philosophical importance. This critique demonstrates that we cannot 
take the individual as a starting point for philosophical investigation, ignoring the 
social constitution of that individual. Individuals cannot know their own interests in 
isolation, and what might initially be taken to be their own interests must be 
constructed, negotiated and clarified in conjunction with others, in community. 
Discourse ethics provides a way of understanding how such concepts as interests, 
needs, wants, principles, autonomy and solidarity are intertwined through their social 
interactive construction (Habermas 1990, 68). In Part ifi, I shall explore this in the 
context of the classroom. 
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Universalist theories have been commonly attacked for ignoring the fact that we are 
always already immersed in a situation. Habermas is well aware of this, and 
discusses the (as he characterizes it) Hegelian attack on Kant in great detail, notably in 
Morality and ethical life: does Hegel's critique of Kant apply to discourse ethics? 
(1990, 195-215). Consequently, he takes pains to emphasize that discourse ethics 
must be anchored in the lifeworld, that the moral questions submitted to practical 
discourse arise out of everyday practice through the problematization of the taken-for-
granted. Practical discourse arises out of, and continues reflectively, ordinary 
communication (Habermas 1981, 25: see §4.124 and §6.1). Norms are not found in 
discourse, but in the lifeworld: discourse aims at their justification. Although the 
distinction between questions of the right and of the good is too strongly drawn in 
Habermas' work (§6.21), discourse ethics does provide a mechanism - practical 
discourse - for change and growth in moral understanding, and thus a way of escaping 
the potentially stifling conformity of immersion in the lifeworld (§7.23). Benhabib 
(1992) argues that discourse ethics can only approach universality through 
engagement with concrete others, by means of an interactive, and not a legislating, 
reason. She draws on Arendt's notion of "enlarged mentality" to show how extending 
our circle of respect results in a universalist perspective (§7.24). When practical 
discourse and enlarged mentality are combined with a more careful analysis of the 
emergence of reasonableness itself in communicative interaction (as I have developed 
in §6.23), this position has many implications for moral education (§10.23). 
7.12 The Weaknesses of Discourse Ethics 
In the discussion of discourse ethics in Chapter Six, I identified a number of its 
weaknesses. Here I shall summarize them. 
Even if we accept the place of consensus as a necessary presupposition of 
argumentation, this does not establish that such a consensus is achievable in any 
particular subject matter, or substantive content. For confirmation that it is achievable, 
we need to turn to the empirical evidence. The empirical evidence of the long and 
multi-strand discourse conducted throughout history is that there are some questions 
(notably abstract questions of justice) where the hope of consensus seems to be a more 
viable target, and others (notably questions of the detailed individual instantiation of 
the good life) where it seems not to be. Nevertheless, we cannot assume that 
consensus is achievable on even the most abstract questions of justice, for such a 
universal consensus has never been achieved. Further, it is not clear that, even if we 
granted the hope of an ideal agreement in matters of justice, why that agreement needs 
to be a consensus rather than a compromise (§6.21). 
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Certainly, as such questions get less abstract and decontextualized, even the rough 
degree of consensus that adheres to some very general principles of justice gradually 
erodes. The possibility that agreements in matters of the right will be compromises 
rather than consensus supports the contention that the right cannot be sharply cut from 
the good, as Habermas maintains (§6.21). Indeed, I surveyed a number of other 
reasons for questioning the sharp cut of the right from the good, amongst them 
Habermas' narrow account of rationality (§6.23). 
Even if we were to grant that ideal practical discourse would lead to consensus, the 
finitude of the discourses to which we have access implies that there are grounds for 
caution as to whether the norms which we presently accept track that consensus 
(§6.22). We need to note, however, that this is a version of a problem that will occur 
for any meta-ethical theory which does not propose some sort of direct access to 
objective moral truth. Nevertheless, it is not merely enough for us to be able to 
participate in discourse - it is also important to be able to engage in a meta-discourse 
which can evaluate the reliance that can be placed on our conclusions. Recognition of 
the fallibility of our currently accepted norms ought also to mean that we remain open 
to opposing views and (sufficiently) tolerant of difference. This, of course, raises the 
question of the limits of tolerance. I shall argue in §7.23 that discourse ethics 
provides us with the resources to address this issue, and return to the question in the 
context of the classroom in §9.2 and §10.23 . 
My clarification of the three senses in which "rationality" (§6.23) is used by Habermas 
shows that the argument for consensus is based on a universality and unity of reason 
that cannot hold at the level of the actual situated individual. I am inclined to accept, 
with minor caveats, the case for the universality and unity of presuppositional 
rationality. Any attempt at communication does entail an attempt to convince, or at 
least to reach understanding, but it does not entail that consensus must follow. In the 
third sense of rationality, the argument that consensus would necessarily be reached in 
ideal discourse relies on a convergence of reason on a universal and unitary rationality. 
I believe, for reasons that I outlined in §6.2322, that reason will not converge, and 
that the assumption that it could smuggles a monological individual back into the 
argument. 
Finally, I have argued (in agreement with others, such as Taylor and Benhabib) that 
we need to accept that one or more substantive moral principles underlie discourse 
ethics (§6.24). Minimally, discourse ethics rests upon a principle of respect, and there 
is an unanswered question as to the scope of this respect. Since we need to take for 
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granted, at least initially, a substantive moral principle, discourse ethics cannot be a 
purely formal system. This is not to argue that the principle of respect is an 
unquestioned given: on the contrary, both it and its scope must themselves be 
submitted to practical discourse at any time they are questioned. Habermas claims that 
the key to the pragmatic-transcendental "foundation" for discourse ethics is "the fact 
that there are no alternatives to these rules of argumentation...; the rules themselves are 
not being justified." (1990, 95, original italics). Yet these considerations show that an 
alternative, in which respect is circumscribed, is available. 
From the considerations presented above, we must draw this conclusion: discourse 
ethics is not an adequate complete meta-ethical system. It relies on an equivocation 
between the presupposition of consensus as an aim, and the certainty of the 
achievement of consensus as an ideal outcome. It makes an untenable cut between the 
right and the good. It assumes a closer correspondence between current discourse and 
ideal discourse than is justified. It relies on an assumption that the multifarious 
situated rationalities of individuals would converge on a single ideal rationality. It 
does not establish a pragmatic-transcendental foundation, but rather needs to be 
anchored in the lifeworld by some substantive commitments. Consequently, if we are 
to maintain the many strengths of discourse ethics, we need to either supplement it, or 
incorporate it into another meta-ethical approach. I shall take the latter path. 
7.2 A Meta-ethics for the Classroom 
Now, I will sketch in a meta-ethical theory that draws upon the strengths of both 
discourse ethics and virtue ethics. Given the constraints on this thesis, I shall attempt 
neither to either fill in all the detail, nor to fully defend the theory. Nevertheless, my 
account will provide the basis for an extended exploration in Part DI of the justification 
for, and the role of, discussion in classroom-based moral education. 
As indicated, my meta-ethical approach will be based in virtue ethics, as providing a 
general account of what it is to be a moral person. A modified discourse ethics 
provides an account of the role of reflection and interaction within virtue ethics. 
Having investigated both theories in some detail earlier in this chapter, I do not 
propose to argue again for either the adequacy of virtue ethics as a base theory, or for 
the distinctive attractions of discourse ethics. Rather, I shall make four claims as to 
the advantages of incorporating discourse ethics insights into virtue ethics. These 
claims are that a virtue ethics theory that incorporates discourse ethics: 
1. entails a need to inculcate certain basic virtues, especially the virtue of 
respect, without which the discursive part of a discourse ethics account 
cannot get going; 
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2. provides a much richer and more detailed account of the place of 
development, and especially of dialogue (communicative action and 
discourse), in ethics; 
3. gives us an account of how virtue ethics can evolve, without being arbitrary; 
4. enables us to incorporate justice as a virtue in a way that respects the 
universalizing claims of justice. 
I shall now explore each of these claims in turn, before revisiting the role of virtue, 
both as the subject matter and as the product of discourse, in §7.25. The implications 
for classroom practice, particularly in terms of classroom discussions, shall be taken 
up in Part III. 
7.21 Inculcation of Respect 
We have seen (§6.24) that, although discourse ethics draws on the notion of a 
performative contradiction, in order to get a contradiction rather than just an 
inconsistency, communicative actors need to have a basic level of respect for those 
with whom they interact. As we saw, Benhabib identifies a number of substantive 
values that underlie discourse ethics, the major two of which are universal respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity. In what follows, I will use the term "respect" in an inclusive 
sense, to cover both of these, for we do respect others both in including them in the 
conversation and in ensuring equal opportunities to speak and be listened to. Indeed, 
in this more inclusive sense, respect covers other values, such as the positive attempt 
to encourage the more inarticulate to contribute (see also Benhabib 1992, 74). 
However, I do not wish to try to map out the full extent of this notion of respect. 
Rather, I am pointing out that, however we unpack "respect," it must include at least 
Benhabib's two values. Some substantive moral principle of respect is necessary to 
underpin the ethical implications of discourse claimed by Habermas. Whether the 
particular instantiation of respect that we operate under is adequate can itself be made 
the subject of discourse. 
In Habermas' account, this respect is an inescapable feature of the use of 
argumentative language at all. I have argued, in effect, that this only holds for 
respectful argumentation, when the interlocutor is conceived of as being worthy of 
respect. In a society where some members are considered so inferior that 
argumentation is merely a means of imposing normative correctness, then respectful 
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argumentation is restricted to only certain members of that society. It is far from 
universa1. 16 
The upshot of these considerations is that the possibility of seeing discourse as 
ethically important rests on an acceptance of universal respect, where "universal" 
minimally includes all humans who are capable of representing their own interests and 
giving and hearing reasons to some extent. That is, in the terms developed in Chapter 
Six, we need a sense of respect that extends to all humans who have developed at least 
some situated rationality. 
Such an extension of respect is, I argue, a defining feature of modern Western culture. 
It forms part of the lifeworld within our culture. This is not to say that all members of 
our culture accept it: clearly, some do not. Nor is it to say that it can be 
unproblematically assumed to develop in members of our culture. Rather, it is an ideal 
of this particular culture, expressed, for example, in many of our basic political and 
legal documents. There is a presupposition of equality within the culture, and 
institutions or customs which seem to violate it must argue the case as to either why 
they do not, or advance compelling counter reasons that justify the violation. 
I do not wish to enter the more contentious argument regarding whether some concept 
of universal respect either can be shown to, or ought to, hold in other societies. My 
intuition is that such a case can be mounted, though it will be a difficult one, seeing 
that it can be argued that imposing an ideal of universal respect on a society which 
does not fully recognize it, is to violate respect for the members of that culture (or at 
least, the members who already have respect within the culture). My interest in this 
thesis is not in the arguments for or against universal human rights, or for or against 
universal moral values. Rather, my interest is in moral education within our society - 
a society that has a general, even if somewhat vague and sometimes contradictory, 
lifeworld commitment to universal respect. We would expect that within such a moral 
education, questions such as the one about universality would be raised and contested. 
In view of my concern with moral education within a Western modernist horizon, the 
practical question here is, at what stage and in what ways can we develop the virtue of 
respect for all others? Discourse ethics proper would give two answers to this 
question. Firstly, such respect is a taken-for-granted norm in the lifeworld of a 
modern society, although this is not to say that it always receives top billing, or that 
other taken-for-granted but contrary notions may not interfere with it. Secondly, its 
16 Note that this is not a sneer from a perfect, modern society at more primitive societies. The same 
division exists in our society, and the boundary is contested. Does it include or exclude the brain-
dead, foetuses, the senile, higher mammals? Some in our society claim that it excludes those with 
whom we strongly disagree. 
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force can be established in practical discourse, if and when its taken-for-granted nature 
is problematized. As respect itself is a complex notion, and there might be cases when 
either respect is not due (because someone's behaviour has forfeited a right to respect) 
or showing respect might entail treating someone in a way that may seem on the 
surface disrespectful (such as in Kant's argument that treating wrongdoers with 
respect entails punishing them: Rachels 1993, 135-136), such discourse will involve a 
clarification of the meaning and ramifications of respect. A virtue ethics account is 
quite similar: the virtue of respect must be habituated, though (as we have seen in 
§5.22) habituation itself requires reflection as it progresses. 
The differences between the two accounts are small, as both mandate parents, teachers 
and other social actors to inculcate respect for others - by insisting on it, modelling it 
and other non-discursive means - and both mandate reflection on it. Thus there is no 
problem in incorporating a discourse ethics account into the virtue ethics theory. 
However, the differences, though small, are also vital. Virtue ethics provides a richer 
account of habituation to values (in Aristotelian language) through immersion in the 
lifeworld (to use Habermasian language) than discourse ethics does. On the other 
hand, Aristotle's account of reflection has little to say about how the moral subject 
becomes capable of such reflection, nor about how such reflection must be embedded 
within an intersubjective discourse. This is where discourse ethics' strength lies. 
Nevertheless, discourse ethics itself needs to be supplemented with a richer account of 
the development of reasonableness in becoming-persons, and this is provided by the 
Vygotskian account presented in §3.23. Let's consider this further. 
7.22 Dialogue and Development 
Virtue ethics, as I have outlined in §5.2 and hinted above, has an insufficiently 
articulated account of the role of reflection in the development of virtue. We have seen 
that Aristotle places a great deal of emphasis on habituation, and that his account of 
habituation includes reflection and the possibility that reflection is central to the 
changing of one's habits. However, Aristotle's account leaves mysterious how it is 
that reason itself develops: it is largely absent in childhood but present in adulthood. 
Habermas' discourse ethics, as we have seen, avoids the worst of this characterization 
of reason through its denial of the philosophy of the subject. In failing to maintain a 
clear distinction between presuppositional, situated and ideal rationality, however, 
Habermas does place an over-reliance on the universality and unity of reason (§6.23). 
My account, which I have largely outlined in §3.23, pays close attention to the way in 
which reasonableness itself is intersubjectively constructed through dialogue. Thus it 
equips discourse ethics with a richer account of a simultaneous, interweaving and 
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mutually supporting development of moral insight and reasonableness. Both the 
moral insight and the reasonableness, being intersubjectively constructed, will have 
considerable overlap between children: in order to think well, children have to be able 
to think like others (§3.241). But both, however, being idiosyncratically constructed 
by each individual who will vary from the others in terms of history, family 
background, social situation, temperament, embodiment and other ways, will be in 
detail unique to the individual. 
With the rectification of this weakness in place, discourse ethics provides us with a 
basis for explaining how children can bring forward for clarification, elaboration and 
possible modification both the moral virtues and the reasoning that they are 
assimilating within the lifeworld. Although in a homogeneous group, this may lead to 
the reinforcement of narrow views, the possibility of heterogeneity (and as we shall 
see in §10.23, this is partly the teacher's role) will often lead to the merging of wider 
horizons and the possibility of enlarged mentality - the subjects of the next two points. 
7.23 Progress in Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics was developed by Aristotle in a relatively closed and homogeneous 
society. In such a society, it is possible to believe that the virtues to be inculcated are 
uncontroversial and timeless. We, on the other hand, live in a society which can be 
described as multicultural, global, pluralistic and even (in postmodern terms) 
fragmented. Certainty about moral values is much less easy to assert 
unproblematically. 
In such a society, one of the criticisms levelled at a virtue ethics account is that it 
mandates a return to narrow moral communities and traditional "certainties." In 
Benhabib's words, such communities can be "small, homogeneous, undifferentiated 
social units, particularly prone to intolerance, exclusivisin, and maybe even forms of 
racism, sexism and xenophobia" (1992, 76). Of course, there is no reason why a 
community should not inculcate more inclusive and expansive virtues. The criticism is 
that, without a universal objective moral principle (or principles) to provide an ideal 
aim, a community will either merely reproduce itself (good virtues or bad), or drift 
into a different morality for no good reason. 
Virtue ethics does, as we have seen, have some resources for refuting such a charge. 
Practical wisdom is responsive to context and needs to take circumstances into 
account. If the wider (societal) circumstances change, then practical wisdom "makes 
us take the right means" (Aristotle 1980, 1144a6) to pursue the good. The need for 
reflection so as to become the right sort of person, the sort of person who cares about 
their character, also contains within it the seeds of change (see §5.22 and §5.23). 
200 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 7. A meta-ethics for education 
Contextual sensitivity and personal responsibility for one's moral character make 
change possible. However, this virtue ethics account of change deals more 
comfortably with individual progress towards a moral character mandated by a 
particular society, rather than with societal progress towards a better morality 
(assuming this concept makes sense). 
Two features of Aristotle's virtue ethics mitigate against an adequate basis for societal 
moral change and improvement. Firstly, the nature of the virtues themselves is taken 
somewhat for granted, so that reflection is more about how to hit the mark, rather than 
about what the mark ought to be. Secondly, reflection is seen to be a somewhat 
solitary pursuit, undertaken monologically by a solitary member of society, and 
concerned with that person's own moral improvement. Neo-Aristotelian work has 
grappled with these features (e.g., Baier 1994; Nussbaum 1994), but I shall turn to 
some of the insights of discourse ethics. 
Aristotle's account of moral improvement can be usefully enriched by reference to the 
place of discourse in change, both individual and social. The previous two 
subsections have been concerned with the former, while this and the next subsection 
target social moral change. Of course, individual and social change are inextricably 
linked: an individual's new moral views may affect others and hence society as a 
whole, while being in a changing society changes many individuals. In §7.24, I will 
explore the place of justice and the right in virtue ethics, while here I consider the 
mechanisms of change in the accepted characterizations of the virtues. 
In a pluralistic society, our taken-for-granted norms, inculcated in early upbringing 
and social interaction, will come into conflict with alternative formulations advanced 
by other members of the society. In this event, one of six things may happen: we may 
accept the other's norm; they may accept ours; we may both modify our norms to 
attain a consensus or compromise norm neither of us held before; we may both agree 
to tolerate the original plurality of norms; we may understand each other's norm but 
remain in non-tolerating conflict about the norm to adopt; or we may simply fail to 
understand each other and thus remain in conflict. 
Given that the point of morality is to live in society with others without conflict (or at 
least to contain the harm arising from conflict), then each of the first four outcomes 
can be seen prima facie as local progress in morality provided that neither side's 
position was coerced. In discourse ethics terms, we have achieved an agreement in 
practical discourse (even if it is just the agreement to differ). I shall return to the 
notion of local progress soon, after considering further the implications of each of the 
six outcomes. 
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The difference between the fourth and fifth positions lies in the notion of tolerance. In 
the fourth outcome, we tolerate difference; in the fifth, at least one of us does not. 
Tolerance is a difficult concept in itself: it can be either a virtue or a vice, and the line 
between the two is not always clear. For example, few would disagree that to tolerate 
another's killing of a carrot growing in their own vegetable patch is a virtue, while 
equally few would dispute that to tolerate murder in the privacy of one's home would 
be a vice. Yet fierce arguments rage about whether to tolerate abortion is to tolerate the 
mere removal of a foetus or the murder of an unborn child, and hence whether such 
toleration is a virtue or a vice. As this example shows, even the language used to 
describe the act tends to prejudge the issue. 
In claiming that each of the first four outcomes constitutes an agreement in discourse 
ethics terms, my account does not square with Habermas' characterization of the 
outcome of practical discourse. This is because the fourth outcome countenances the 
idea of an agreement on an irreducible plurality of norms, whereas Habermas would 
insist on the ultimate achievability of consensus on a single norm in the idea1. 17 For 
him, the fourth position must, in the ideal, shift to one of the first three. This arises 
from his characterization of understanding: 
We understand a speech act when we are acquainted with the kind of reasons that a 
speaker could cite in order to convince a hearer that he (the speaker) is entitled under 
the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance.... Understanding an 
expression means knowing how one can make use of it in order to reach an 
understanding with somebody about something. Therefore... from the conditions for 
comprehending linguistic expressions [we see how] speech acts... are directed 
towards mutual understanding and thus towards a rationally motivated agreement 
about what is said. One would hardly know what it is to understand the meaning of 
an utterance if one did not know that an utterance can and should serve to bring 
about an agreement" (Habermas 1992, 78, italics added). 
Again, we can see that Habermas has moved from the fact that in seeking to 
understand each other we have the presupposition that we might be able to convince, 
to the illicit conclusion that therefore we "can and should" (in the sense of will) come 
to agreement in the ideal. Thus, for Habermas, tolerance of difference is merely a way 
station on the route to (counterfactual, ideal) consensus. 
When, in the absence of understanding, a speaker cites reasons for an utterance, the 
point is to motivate the other to change their view: to convince the other that the 
speaker is entitled to claim validity for the view, to paraphrase Habermas. So the 
initial view of the other has two aspects: the other does not already agree with the 
validity of the claim (otherwise there would be no need to convince them); and 
secondly, the other does not know the reasons why the speaker, "under the given 
17 I'll leave aside here the distinction between a consensus and a compromise addressed in §6.21. 
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circumstances," would want to assert that claim. Changing their view through the 
assertion of a reason, then, is somewhat ambiguous. If the other is to understand the 
speaker, then what changes is the other's view that what seemed to be insupportable 
does in fact have some support, even if the other is unable to be motivated by that 
support to agree. If, on the other hand, the other is to come to consensus with the 
speaker, the other must change their view that the reason does not motivate them to 
accept the validity of the claim. These are two different views and, for the other, there 
is no reason why changing a view about whether a reason might motivate the speaker 
must lead to changing a view about whether the same reason would motivate oneself. 
While the attempt to gain understanding may entail that the speaker tries to convince 
the other, it does not entail that the attempted conviction needs to be about the validity 
of the claim itself, not that the ideal achievability of consensus must be assumed. 
However we regard the status of the fourth outcome, it is clear that neither of the last 
two outcomes can in themselves constitute moral progress. The fifth, as it includes 
understanding each other's position, may be a precursor to progress but cannot be 
moral progress in itself, if it does not decrease conflict. This is not to say that the 
position of one of the antagonists may not be morally praiseworthy, or even that each 
position may not have morally praiseworthy elements, but rather to say that no joint 
progress has been made. 
Even local progress, of course, may not be seen more widely as moral progress if it 
involves agreement that others outside the local agreement would not accept. The fact 
that two hit men come to a local agreement that the right thing to do is to "rub out" an 
informer does not make this local progress into moral progress. We can make 
stronger claims that local progress is meaningful progress the larger and more 
representative the group in the local agreement is. This, I take it, is the key insight of 
discourse ethics. As we achieve wider agreement (either to adopt common norms, or 
to understand and tolerate divergent norms) with a wider circle of interlocutors, we 
can place more credence in the possibility that we are making moral progress. If we 
come across norms that we can understand but not tolerate, or even worse, that we 
cannot understand, then we must, if we wish to pursue moral progress, still attempt to 
reach agreement across this difference. 
This process does not assume that there are universal objective moral norms. As we 
have seen in §6.22, even under the Habermasian account that postulates such norms 
"exist" as the counterfactual agreements of ideal practical discourse, we would not 
have access to them in any case. So moral progress can only be prima facie progress, 
through the achievement of wider local agreements, always subject to the proviso that 
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if we are exposed to a new, radically different point of view, we may need to rethink 
our norms and accept that our previous local agreement was probably mistaken. 
Of course, just to become aware of difference is not enough to provoke change. On 
the contrary, it can evoke a siege mentality, where the awareness of difference leads to 
digging in at the present position. Discourse ethics requires a different response: a 
discursive attempt to redeem one or more of the normative claims expressed. This is 
to be done through the advancing and weighing of reasons. Even if no agreement is 
reached in the process of dialogue, and even if such a consensus is entirely beyond 
possibility, then it is still true that the discourse will almost certainly lead to better 
understanding. And although such understanding is not guaranteed to shift the initial 
positions closer together, nor to make the participants more tolerant of each other, it is 
more likely to do so than to do the opposite. The attempt shows respect for the other 
(§6.24). 
Discourse ethics adds to virtue ethics a methodology for dealing with difference and 
disagreement; one which concentrates more on the joint attempt to construct moral 
values, and to create virtuous individuals, through striving for a virtuous community. 
Difference and disagreement can be resolved through the reaching of a consensus, 
under the influence of the better argument (if one exists), but they can also be resolved 
by reaching understanding and an agreement to tolerate the difference. In 
Habermasian discourse ethics, for matters of the right, the first is not only desirable 
but also ideally achievable, and its achievability marks out these matters as the subject 
matter of justice, the core principle of morality. Those matters in which such 
consensus is not ideally achievable are relegated to the realm of the ethical. If, as I 
have argued (§6.2l), this sharp cut of the moral from the good is not sustainable, then 
we need a modified account of justice. 
7.24 Justice as a Virtue 
As I have argued in §6.24, given an underlying virtue of respect for others, to engage 
in practical discourse is to seek increased intersubjective agreement. If I respect you, 
and I offer you reasons in support of a contention, then I am hoping that the reasons 
will be compelling enough to convince you. As we saw in the previous subsection, 
this is somewhat ambiguous. I could be hoping to convince you either that my view is 
fully justified so that you ought to embrace it, or that my view is justified for me, 
given who I am. That is, I could hope that you and I reach consensus, or that we 
reach understanding. 
Let's consider the first possibility: suppose for a moment that in offering reasons one 
must, at some deep level, desire full consensus. We have seen that even this cannot 
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demonstrate, as Habermas claims, that such an agreement is ideally inevitable (even if 
we restrict the domains of discourse to matters of the right), but this realization would 
not negate the desire for consensus. Of course, in giving my reasons I can realize that 
you might merely reply, "Well, I see what you mean, and why you might think so, 
but / don't agree with you." If I respond "Why?" you must offer your reasons, and in 
doing so, you hope to convince me. You may succeed, or I may respond to you as 
you responded to me. Here, we would have reached understanding but not agreement 
on the substantive contention. While we could agree that this is good, it would not 
have gone as far as either of us had (ex hypothesis) hoped when we entered discourse. 
The question remains: Is the supposition with which the previous paragraph began 
justified? The supposition could have one of two natures: the claim could be 
conceptual, or it could be empirical. In other words, it could be that we must, as a 
consequence of the nature of reason-giving as an activity, have some (perhaps deeply 
buried) idea that consensus is the ideal outcome of that activity; or it could be that we 
are claiming that as a matter of fact, when people do offer reasons they do also (again, 
perhaps at a deeply buried level) hope to convert the other to their point of view. 
The empirical claim would be difficult to prove. While it is couched in such a way that 
there is always a way out (we haven't looked deeply enough), it just does seem to be 
the case that people do offer reasons for their views to others without seeking to 
convert them. This is commonplace in discussions of art, music and which football 
team to support, for example. These examples are all, it should be noted, from the 
ethical sphere, in Habermas' sense. The first claim is also difficult to establish, for it 
itself seems to rest on further presuppositions (perhaps: that we must privilege our 
own well-thought-out views over those of others; or that unity is better than diversity) 
which can be coherently denied. 
Consequently, I shall not try to defend either version of this claim here, although I feel 
that a weak version of the conceptual claim may be defensible. Instead, I shall 
examine the conditions under which people do, or do not, look for consensus rather 
than understanding. This will suffice for my later purposes. In doing so, I will 
consider the formulation I gave above for understanding: you understand me when 
you come to see that "my view is justified for me, given who I am." Who I am, in 
this context, means how I am situated in the world as an embodied self, encumbered 
with likes, dislikes, interests, desires, a certain history and so on. Now clearly, you 
cannot know who I am in any full sense of the term. Such a knowledge is not even 
available to me, given that we are not transparent to ourselves. Yet, you must have 
sufficient access to who I am to be able to make the judgement that you understand (I 
note, without further analysis, that understanding cannot be full either). 
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Consequently, you need only to know about me in terms of those respects that are 
relevant to the validity claim in question. This gives a revised formulation for 
understanding: you understand me when you come to see that my view is justified for 
me, given who I am in those respects relevant to the view. 
Let's apply this example to a claim about music. I claim that the Sex Pistols make the 
best music ever made. You dispute this claim. I offer reasons for the claims: I refer to 
a love of loud noise; to the elegance of rapid strumming and simple chord changes; to 
social conditions in the UK in the late 1970's and so on. In that you can imagine what 
I am like, and that you know (or come to learn) something of my history and so on, 
you can agree that you understand why I like the Sex Pistols, even though you are no 
closer to sharing that judgement. However, if you were more like me in the relevant 
respects (you also like loud noises, think rapid strumming and simple chord changes 
elegant and were anti-Thatcher), then you would be more likely to come to consensus 
with me, although you might opt for The Damned instead. If you were, in the relevant 
respects, just like me, we would come to agreement. 
The upshot is that we have a greater hope of consensus when the participants in a 
discussion are more alike in the respects relevant to the claims under discussion. The 
point of Rawl's original position (§6.1) is that he claims a priori that matters of justice 
are such that the only relevant respects are those that any person would retain if they 
were placed in the original position (i.e. shorn of virtually all their personal attributes). 
Habermas contests this, and claims that any normative matter must be submitted to a 
practical discourse. In terms of this analysis, this is so that the participants themselves 
can decide what the relevant respects are, and then leave all the others out of the 
considerations. He does, however, seem to assume that in matters of normative 
correctness the upshot of such a discourse would be this: the only respects the 
participants in the discourse would count as relevant would be the action of rationality 
(identical in each) on shared information, thus ensuring a consensus outcome (see 
§6.232). In matters of the good, of course, other respects would be found relevant, 
and understanding, not consensus, would be the outcome. 
If we do not follow Habermas' assumption, then the outcome of practical discourse 
must be found solely through real engagement in practical discourse. Yet we can 
predict that, on questions where the decision made in discourse is that many of the 
respects in which people differ are not relevant, and many of the relevant respects are 
shared by most or all of the discursive partners, then the hope of consensus can be 
stronger. Of course, we have seen that one of the respects that Habermas assumes is 
shared (i.e., rationality), is not, since situated rationality differs from person to 
person. Hence, consensus cannot be guaranteed. Nevertheless, the strength of hope 
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for a closer approach to consensus rests on a conception of persons, and how much 
commonality they have. 
What I am seeking to establish is that there does exist a spectrum between, at the one 
end (the "goodish"), claims on which we can agree that understanding is the only 
appropriate hope, and at the other end (the "rightish"), claims on which there are 
reasonable grounds for seeking, and hoping to approach, consensus. In order to 
establish this, I need to achieve three tasks. Firstly, I need to show that there does 
exist sufficient common ground between persons (even persons who are inherently 
embodied and encumbered) so that, when we decide the relevant respects, we can 
have a reasonable hope that they retain sufficient similarity so that a meaningful 
consensus is a reasonable, even if not fully achievable, target. Secondly, I need to 
provide reasons for thinking that, while there are some claims for which we would be 
wrong to think that any sort of consensus is possible, there are others for which there 
are good grounds for thinking that an approach towards consensus is more likely. 
Thirdly, I need to show that there are good reasons for wanting to pursue wider 
agreement on claims of this sort. 
Before embarking on the arguments for these three claims, I will reiterate that these 
arguments can be made with two target populations in mind. The more important one, 
clearly, is the totality of human beings, while the population to which I have restricted 
this discussion is the denizens of the modern West. My stronger claim is that these 
arguments may well work for the more inclusive population, but I shall be content if 
they hold for the more restricted population - the sort of society in which the schools I 
will discuss in Part In have to operate. 
The first task I set myself will prepare the ground for the second. If I am to argue (as 
I will) that morality requires respect, that respect licences a separation along a 
continuum between rightish and goodish claims, in that the former can be discussed in 
a way that abstracts more (not wholly) from the particularity of people, and that this 
means that we can come to some discursive agreements that are not vacuous, then I 
need to show that even when many of the particularities of persons are laid aside, there 
still remain sufficient "relevant respects" in which the participants are alike for a 
substantive agreement to be possible. If the agreed stripping away of the varying 
particularities of participants left no common core, then it is hard to see how agreement 
could be reached on anything of importance. 
In other words, the issue here is one of the content of human nature, or, more 
accurately, human universals. If a postmodern account of humanity, in which any 
individual is nothing more than a chance intersection of historical/cultural accidents 
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(Lyotard 1984), is correct, then no leverage can be gained for generalized agreement 
(or approach towards agreement) once all or most of these are bracketed. If, on the 
other hand, there is a sufficiently large and substantive core of traits common to all 
humans, such leverage is potentially available (although the actual achievement of 
consensus cannot be anticipated in advance of the discourse). An important root of the 
postmodern view lies in anthropological studies which assert the necessity to: 
focus instead on the super-individual structures of language, ritual and kinship which 
make the individual what he or she is. Simply put, it is not the self that creates 
culture, but the culture that creates the self.... it also implies that nothing is 
"authentic," that there is no fundamental, originary nature of the human self against 
which we could judge a culture. (Cahoone 1996, 5) 
Now, I do not wish to enter into a philosophical exploration of the self. Nevertheless, 
I would like to look more closely at just what anthropology does have to tell us about 
human nature and human universals. The distinction between these two I take to be 
this: human nature tells us what humans, being the biological beings they are, could 
not help but be like. Human universals tell us ways in which humans, as a matter of 
fact, are all alike. The former includes both genetically encoded traits and those that 
must inevitably arise through the interaction of a human person with the sort of 
environment a human must be in. The latter covers these, but also all those traits 
which, although contingent, are in fact shared through some process like diffusion 
into all cultures followed by cultural transmission. For my purposes, the latter 
concept is the relevant one, because it will inform us about the similarities that can 
survive the discursive stripping of particularities. 
I shall draw on the work of anthropologist Brown (1991), who surveyed a great deal 
of anthropological literature in compiling his work Human Universals. There are three 
observations that I must make before looking at his findings. The first is that the 
focus of anthropology is on cultural groups, so Brown's lists of universals refer to 
those traits found in all cultural groups. Presumably this implies that most of them are 
found in all normal members of those groups, but it is quite possible that it excludes 
some individuals, such as the dysfunctional, maybe the very young or old, and so on. 
By and large, I shall ignore this complication here, for real discourses also have 
similar boundary problems in deciding who to include. The second is to note that 
because all humans exhibit some trait does not imply that all humans have the trait to 
the same degree, or developed in the same manner. As we have seen, to say that all 
humans reason does not imply that all humans have the same situated rationality. 
Thirdly, it needs to be noted that many of these commonalities are described at a high 
level of generality, and cover considerable diversity in the specific ways in which the 
commonalities are instantiated culturally in different groups. This last point will 
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complicate the analysis, and I shall consider its implications more fully after presenting 
the list. 
In his Chapter 6, Brown devotes pages 130 to 140 to a fairly concentrated listing of 
human universals for which he has found considerable anthropological evidence, 
warning that the list is somewhat tentative. I have culled from this list a subset of 
universals (in roughly the order he gives them) that seem to me to have moral 
implications. According to Brown, the Universal People: 
• interpret the external behaviour of others in terms of internal intentions; 
• have the same facial expressions for happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise, disgust 
and contempt [thus presumably also having these emotions]; 
• use a smile to imply friendly intentions, and cry when they are unhappy or in 
pain; 
• can mask or feign expressions; 
• distinguish the self from others; 
• can see themselves as both an object or a subject; 
• see all persons as both subject to external actions and as partly responsible for 
their own actions, being able to distinguish between being in control of 
one's actions and not being in control; 
• have the concept of intention; 
• know that others feel emotions; 
• can project themselves into other's states; 
• live in groups, in which senior kin contribute to the socialization of the young; 
• learn by copying and practice; 
• cooperate in labor; 
• undertake reciprocal exchanges; 
• plan to maintain or manipulate social relations; 
209 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 7. A meta-ethics for education 
• have a form of government (in the sense that decisions which are binding on 
all are made); 
• admire generosity; 
• have laws (especially laws against rape, violence, murder); 
• have a sense of rights and obligations; 
• use punishment (including removal of the wrongdoer in some way) especially 
of acts that threaten the group; 
• have more conflict in their society than they would like to have; 
• understand seeking redress for wrongs, and consultation and mediation as 
means of trying to right wrongs; 
• expect more cooperation from members of their in-groups; 
• are not objective when comparing members of their in-groups to members of 
out-groups; 
• distinguish right from wrong; 
• have promises; 
• empathize; 
• have envy and ways to deal with it; 
• have forms of etiquette and hospitality; 
• have some standards of sexual modesty; 
• have some food and word taboos; 
• distinguish personal and group ownership of objects. 
Bearing in mind the observations I made above, this is an impressive and far from 
empty list. As my third observation noted, it is also a list expressed in fairly general 
terms. Even if we know that all humans have a sense of rights and obligations, for 
example, this does not tell us what those rights and obligations are. Different groups 
can assert quite different clusters of rights and obligations. So a sceptic can claim that 
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even such universality as is picked out by this impressive list is too indeterminate to 
generate much in the way of hope for agreement in rightish discussions. 
There seem to be two sorts of replies to this point. The first is to note that there must 
be sufficient commonality in what different cultures take to be (say) rights so that we 
can recognize that these are in some sense the same things as what we call rights. But 
this is unlikely to get us too far. Given a family resemblance account of concepts, the 
commonality may not have any universal core, and hence it may not be enough to 
generate optimism that some questions may tend more strongly towards agreement. 
Hence I will turn to the second sort of reply. 
Among the other universals that Brown lists are poetic and rhetorical speech forms, 
metaphor, narrative and storytelling. Johnson (1987; 1993) has discussed the role that 
such imaginative structures play in human affairs, especially in morality. He, too, 
draws on the family resemblance account of concepts to assert that all our key moral 
(and other) concepts are prototypical: they have a core, relatively uncontentious in a 
given culture, and shade off radially into more and more contentious exemplars of the 
concept. These radial meanings are linked to the central meaning metaphorically. 
So far, given the reference to the "given culture," this account seems unhelpful to 
claims for some sort of universality. But Johnson's The body in the mind is an 
extended defence of the claim that the most basic and central of these prototypes and 
metaphors are derived from the experience of the human body as it is situated in the 
human environment. These experiences are universal, and they underlie far more 
complex and abstract concepts. For example, the highly abstract moral notion of 
justice is underpinned by the ubiquitous bodily experience of balance (Johnson 1993, 
194). Although our moral concepts are elaborated in a variety of culturally influenced 
ways (so that balance does not define justice in any straightforward way), we have 
now found good grounds for asserting that there is some commonality upon which to 
pin a reasonable hope of progress towards agreement in matters which tend towards 
the rightish end of the continuum. This agreement may (certainly not "will") approach 
consensus, and is indeed more likely to than in matters towards the goodish end. 
As Johnson (1993, 194) comments, "What is universal is likely to be so abstract that, 
taken by itself, it places only the most general constraints on action." Yet it does 
provide, as he puts it later (p 237) "the common basis for a possible dialogue" across 
all humans. Because we must talk in general terms before we can plug into the 
commonality of humanity, we can understand why it is that more abstract and general 
claims hold out more hope for agreement. These claims are not vacuous, because they 
tap into a vast, even if general, reservoir of commonality. Nevertheless, deciding the 
211 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 7. A meta-ethics for education 
detailed application of generally held moral maxims will still be fraught with 
difficulties, because of the level of abstraction needed to approach agreement. I will 
defer this problem for the time being and turn to the problem of how we can 
distinguish claims for which consensus is a reasonable aim from those for which it is 
less reasonable. 
In approaching my second task, I will draw on Brown's list to consider how morality 
is related to items on the list. Humans live in groups, and this implies that there needs 
to be some mechanism for mediating their interactions. Indeed, all humans plan to 
maintain social relations, distinguishing right from wrong, have laws to require right 
action and use punishment to enforce them. Indeed, Brown is more specific: all 
humans consider rape, violence and murder to be wrong. Although much more could 
be done in terms of relating morality to Brown's list, I feel that this is enough to 
establish that the institution of morality is ubiquitous in humans, and that it has a 
broadly determinate character. 
At the start of this subsection, I referred to respect as an underlying virtue of discourse 
ethics. Does Brown's list give us any grounds for asserting that respect for others is a 
universal human virtue? We have seen that respect (in a broad sense) is a core moral 
principle of the modern West, even if it is not always observed. Certainly, schools as 
an institution have been based, since the introduction of the ideal of universal 
education, on respect for all citizens, and this will suffice for my purposes in Part III. 
Nevertheless, I will briefly consider whether Brown's list indicates that respect is a 
human universal. 
To respect others is to allow that they are persons in their own right, with the sorts of 
attributes that we value in ourselves, taking account (insofar as we are able) of the 
ways in which they differ from us. All human cultures ascribe intentions to others and 
interpret their behaviour in those terms. They feel, and recognize, key emotions, 
including hurt and anger, and empathize, projecting themselves into the other's state. 
They ascribe responsibility to themselves and others in appropriate circumstances. 
They understand reciprocity and admire generosity. These characteristics begin to 
map out a broad concept of respect for others - but which others? The fact that all 
humans expect more cooperation for members of their in-group, and that they evaluate 
in-group members more highly than out-group members implies that, although respect 
for others is a human universal, the scope of that respect can vary quite markedly. 
Let's turn to the question of whether accepting an underlying virtue of respect for 
others gives us any grounds for distancing rightish claims from goodish ones. To 
explore this, I shall narrow my focus from respect as a whole to a single aspect of 
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respect. Respect implies that we recognise that others, like us, do not like being 
harmed and do like pleasure (however their detailed understanding of harm and 
pleasure differs from ours). Now, to knowingly cause certain types of harm depends 
on knowing the detailed attributes of the person harmed. If I wish to harm you by 
playing Barry Manilow tapes at full volume, then it had better be the case that you 
have some musical taste, for if you actually get pleasure from Barry Manilow, the ploy 
will not work. On the other hand, if I wish to harm you by chopping your hand off, 
your detailed attributes seem to have little (but not nothing) to do with it. Almost 
everyone will be harmed by this act. 
Some harms seem to be more basic than others, and the reason is that they are so 
general that they deprive the person harmed of the opportunities to seek other, more 
particular pleasures and avoid other, more particular, harms. Without a hand, you are 
deprived opportunities to do many things; with Barry Manilow playing, there are still 
many other pleasures open to you - and, mercifully, the tape will soon end. Because 
they are more general in this way, such harms are more likely to be agreed to be 
harmful by many differently situated people. Therefore, we may start to seek 
agreement on matters such as these with a greater hope of approaching consensus. 
These matters sit at the rightish end of the spectrum. Note, I am not asserting that this 
exhausts the criteria for distinguishing rightish claims from goodish claims; merely 
that at least one criterion for doing so exists. This is all my second task requires. 
Note also that I have based it on a notion of broad respect for all humans, so that the 
claim is limited to societies where such a principle holds. 
So far my analysis has been restricted to an example where one human interacts with 
another. There is another dimension to interhuman interaction: how we are to treat 
others in general. This is where my third task arises. If it is established that I can 
cause you harm both by playing Barry Manilow tapes to you and by cutting off your 
hand, then respect for you (and morality) require that I do neither. The difference is, 
as we have seen, that I need to know some fairly particular facts about you in order to 
establish the former, whereas pretty common facts about humans in general will 
suffice to establish the latter. Having moral rules-of-thumb that tell us how to treat 
others can save us some work. Compare the following two possible rules: 
1. All humans who dislike Barry Manilow ought not to have Barry Manilow 
tapes played in their vicinity. 
2. All humans who dislike having their hand cut off ought not to have their 
hand cut off. 
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If I am to apply the first rule to you, I need to do some investigation about you, but it 
seems unlikely that anyone would ever bother to do such an investigation before 
deciding to apply the second. It could plausibly be replaced with: 
2. AU humans ought not to have their hand cut off. 
Given that we must engage in many actions with moral import, having rules-of-thumb 
that cut down on the number of investigations we have to do before acting makes a lot 
of sense. These rules-of-thumb are more useful if they can be applied with less 
particular investigation. We have seen that claims which require less particular 
knowledge of the individual(s) to which they might apply are those that lie towards the 
rightish end of the continuum. They can, all things being equal, be applied to large 
numbers of people in the absence of particular knowledge. 
Nothing I have said implies that rightish rules-of-thumb need always to be applied 
universally. Compared to goodish rules, they tend towards that, but they may clash 
with other rightish rules, or there may be unusual circumstances that mitigate against 
the rule in this particular case, or it might be unclear as to whether the situation is one 
that calls for this particular rule, and any of these will require further deliberation 
before the rule is followed. So situated decision is always needed in all moral contexts 
(even if it is routinized and largely tacit), and widely agreed, contextually 
impoverished rightish rules can ease the burden and assist in the routinization of the 
action. We can act from a sense of justice: that is, exhibit the virtue of being just. 
To recap: Habermas claims, as we saw in §6.232, that there is a class of contentions 
that would, in principle, lead to consensus in practical discourse. This class maps out 
the domain of justice. I have argued that we cannot decide the members of this class, 
if it exists, in advance of actual practical discourse. It is an empirical and not an a 
priori matter. But this does not establish that there are no contentions that could 
achieve consensus, and I have argued that it is not the case that all contentions are 
equally unlikely to reach consensus. I have advanced grounds for asserting - rather 
than Habermas' sharp cut between contentions that can or cannot reach consensus, or 
the pessimistic conclusion that all statements of value are equally undecidable - that 
contentions range across a continuum of varying degrees of likeliness to attract 
widespread agreement. 
In what follows, I will extend this argument. Firstly, I will illustrate this continuum 
by looking at some candidate pairs of contentions that differ in their position - one 
closer to the "wide agreement" or rightish end and another closer to the "personal 
value" or goodish end. Then I will look more closely at two difficulties (alluded to 
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above) with the assertion that the position of a contention on the spectrum carries any 
special status: the problem of acting on rightish agreements when agreement, though 
wide, is contested; and the problem of applying very abstract contentions in particular 
circumstances. I shall call on Johnson's work again to show how my modified 
discourse ethics can give a convincing account of justice based on widely agreed 
norms. Justice in this sense will be an important virtue, but not one that trumps all 
other considerations. 
I have argued that some contentions that are submitted to practical discourse show 
greater promise of achieving wide agreement than others. For example, we seem 
more likely to reach an agreement that "Innocent people ought not to be harmed 
unnecessarily" than we are than that "Children ought to play Aussie Rules rather than 
rugby." We also seem more likely to reach agreement on abstract, highly 
decontextualized statements such as "All children ought to have an education" than we 
are to similar, but more concrete and contextualized statements such as "All 15 year 
old children ought to study The Merchant of Venice." In my terms, the former sit 
towards the rightish, and the latter towards the goodish end of the spectrum. A 
Habermasian would consider the former to be a matter of justice and the latter a matter 
of a person's preference for a good life. 
I want to reiterate that there does seem to be a genuine spectrum here. If we compare 
the two statements at the personal value end, we can see that the football code 
contention would most likely gather even less agreement than the Shakespeare one. 
The evidence for this statement is that schools will countenance a syllabus that 
includes compulsory study of The Merchant of Venice where they generally do not 
impose footy and exclude rugby. Further, the degree of agreement is contextually 
sensitive. A community on the NSW-Victorian border would presumably reach less 
agreement on the football code contention than one in Melbourne, while one in 
Llanelli, Wales would most likely reach a high degree of agreement that it was wrong. 
Similarly, while the innocent persons contention has been likely.to  garner widespread 
agreement across time and societies, the education for all one will only have 
approached this in quite recent times. 
From our historical vantage point we can see that some contentions have gathered 
wide (not universal) agreement both within the present global society and the sum of 
human societies over time. These more inclusive viewpoints have often been built in 
the attempt to incorporate the views of all, where possible. There are however, as I 
have argued (§6.21), a number of problems with extrapolating such agreement to an 
ideal consensus. I will now consider certain difficulties with the assertion that the fact 
that a contention has achieved a higher degree of agreement carries any special status. 
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The first of these is that, despite widespread agreement that certain contentions (let's 
use "all children ought to have an education" as an example) are just conclusions and 
so basic human rights, there remain those who are outside this agreement. While 
some of these dissenters are outside the West, others are members of our pluralistic 
society. This can be seen as a problem for discourse ethics, for if universal rights are 
only known to be established when universal consensus is reached, we would have 
difficulty claiming certainty about any human rights at all. Given the basic assumption 
of universal respect that underlies discourse ethics (§6.24), it might seem that its basic 
moral stance entails that we cannot impose our own conclusions about what does 
constitute a human right on others: that we must first seek their agreement. Yet such a 
conclusion would often lead to moral paralysis. 
Of course, opposition to a claim of right in a real practical discourse does not 
necessarily denote a genuine belief that the claim is wrong: people can be duplicitous 
and self-serving. A dictatorship, or even a complacent majority, may suppress 
education in order to quell dissent. In an ideal discourse, of course, all must speak 
sincerely (see §4.123), but we have no such guarantee in any real discourse. And it is 
precisely those who duplicitously deny human rights to others for their own (immoral) 
ends who ought to be resisted and opposed in the name of morality. Yet, even though 
such cases exist, it is problematic to assert that all those who disagree with us must be 
duplicitous. At least three other possibilities exist. The others may be sincere but 
mistaken. It may be that neither side in this dispute is wrong, because we have a 
genuine case of competing values, neither of which has any hope of reaching 
consensus, so that the best we can hope for is mutual understanding and toleration. 
And of course it might be we that are wrong. 
This discussion is leading into difficult areas of political and cross-cultural moral 
theory, and, given the constraints of my project, I do not wish to follow it too far. So 
I will round it off by stating, without detailed argument, a few tentative conclusions. 
It seems to me that moral paralysis is not a good thing. We must act on moral 
convictions, for not to do so risks allowing immorality to thrive. Nevertheless, the 
lack of actual consensus on all but the most abstract (and hence potentially empty) 
moral principles must also give us pause for thought. There also exists the danger of 
moral zealotry - seeking to impose on others a moral conviction which is not justified. 
This danger is also complicated by power inequalities. Discourse ethics tells us that 
the most important guide that we have between these twin dangers is the position of 
our convictions on the spectrum of agreement. Those moral contentions that achieve 
most agreement, particularly agreement across other differences, stand most chance of 
being justified. I cannot advance this as a sole criterion, for such a position faces 
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other objections. I will mention one: it is difficult to account for the lone voices that 
oppose what they see as widespread immorality (such as slavery) and eventually 
succeed. But here again discourse ethics offers assistance. It tells us that we must be 
tolerant, willing to keep an open mind and to treat our conclusions as potentially 
fallible; recognize that they bear a "time and knowledge index," as Habermas puts it 
(1993, 37). It encourages listening and reasoned engagement across difference. 
I'll turn now to a second problem: one to which I alluded above in referring to 
abstract, possibly empty, moral principles. Allegedly universal moral principles are 
highly abstract and general. For Habermas, following Kant, this is because the 
ultimate moral principle is purely formal. This difficulty is addressed by Habermas' 
distinction between justification and application (1990, 181-182; 1993, 35-39). 
Justification, he claims, is the process of assessing the proposed norm independently 
of its application in any particular situation, whereas a discourse of application 
assesses, not the norm, but the appropriateness of the norm to the detailed situation. 
This clear distinction between justification and application seems to be another of 
Habermas' unsustainable sharp cuts, closely related to that cut between the right and 
the good. To even make sense of the proposition "All children ought to have an 
education" requires interpretation of the key terms, including "children" and 
"education." Such clarification cannot take place in isolation from the particulars of 
the lifeworld and its understandings. As Benhabib (1992, 23-26) makes clear, 
discourse ethics needs to recognize Hegel's insight: that all formalism presupposes 
some context from which to abstract, together with material presuppositions about the 
self, the social institutions in which deliberation takes place, and so on. Justification 
must entail a degree of abstraction from context, but this abstraction cannot ever be cut 
sharply from the context, otherwise the completely decontextualized terms lose all 
meaning and the conclusions lose all possibility of application. 
According to Benhabib (op. cit., 42), the answer lies in the "comprehensive 
reflexivity" that discourse ethics entails. Nothing is beyond the scope of discourse, 
not even the presuppositions of discourse themselves. In everyday communicative 
action, we "practice the reversibility of perspectives implicit in adult human 
relationships," and in discourse we "extend... this to the viewpoint of humanity" (52). 
The expression by others of their own viewpoints develops, Vygotskian-style, our 
wherewithal to take up multiple stances, provided we are open enough to attempt to 
empathize. This attempt, jointly and symbiotically, to enlarge our mentality enables us 
to address questions of the justification of norms, but without becoming 
unencumbered selves (73). We come into the conversation as ourselves and 
continually check any emerging positions against our lifeworld expectations (and vice 
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versa) in a process of reflective equilibrium. In such a way, we are able to achieve 
"reflexive role-distance" from our unreflective selves (73), without cutting ourselves 
free from them. 
While Benhabib's account shows how we can seek agreement without abstracting 
away from our own lifeworld, it does not fully address the problem of the alleged 
vacuity of abstract norms. To use one of my previous examples, this problem would 
arise if, although all the participants in a discourse have come to consensus that 
"innocent people ought not to be harmed unnecessarily," the contents that different 
participants have for key concepts such as "innocent people," "harm," and 
"unnecessary" are so different that the assertion as a whole lacks any common content. 
My claim is that, even though all proposed norms, including highly abstract ones, are 
uninterpretable in the absence of links to the lifeworld, yet human commonality will 
anchor a core shared content for these norms. This shared content may not be large, 
but it is sufficient to save abstract norms from vacuity. I will return to Johnson's 
work, specifically his discussion (1993, 90-99) of the meaning of moral concepts, to 
explicate why all such concepts are linked to the lifeworld. He claims that much of the 
confusion about moral concepts arises because concepts are conceived of as being 
defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. If concepts were of such a 
character, then it would be at least possible that continued discourse would be able to 
define them tightly in a way that leads to consensus on their meaning. Equipped with 
such tight concepts, discourse could then disconnect the concepts from the lifeworld 
and consider them in the abstract. Drawing on the pioneering work of Rosch (e.g. 
Rosch and Lloyd 1978), Johnson claims that concepts have an entirely different 
structure: they are prototypical. 
Each person learns a concept by means of generalizing particular instances. Johnson 
uses the concept "lie" as his example. In a speech community, core instances of lies 
are so widely agreed that they appear to be structured by necessary and sufficient 
conditions - the speaker believes the statement to be false; the speaker intends to 
deceive; the statement is false - which are weighted in importance in that order. 
Depending on many factors, such as the usage of the word "lie" by those about one, 
one's detailed history of incidences of lying (together with the outcomes) and so on, 
different non-central speech acts become more-or-less lies. This radial structure to the 
concept not only means that the concept has fuzzy edges, but also that the details of the 
fuzziness vary from speaker to speaker. 
The consequent indeterminacy of meaning implies that, in discourse, it cannot be 
assumed that concepts carry the same meaning for all speakers, and that any 
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negotiation about the meaning to be assigned to the key terms of any disputed norms 
must always be tied to consideration of the lifeworld. However, it is equally 
important to note that the shared core meaning of moral concepts entails that the 
indeterminacy of concepts is not a radical incommensurability. This "highly stable and 
determinate character of the prototypical cases" (op. cit., 101) is sufficient to 
underwrite a good deal of agreement in many cases where moral norms are submitted 
to discourse. In abstract statements of possible norms, agreement can be reached 
when all participants have in mind this stable core for the concepts involved. When it 
comes to thinking about detailed application of the norm, however, the radial 
indeterminacy of the concepts means (to return to the earlier example) that just exactly 
what counts as an innocent person in specific difficult cases will remain contested. 
Within a particular culture, the stable and determinate core of a prototypical concept is 
shared amongst members of that culture. If we are engaged in a discourse across 
cultures, however, we cannot be so sure of the commonality of the prototypical core to 
a given concept. This is why the level of abstraction of normative claims submitted to 
cross-cultural discourses needs to be sufficient to tap into the human universals 
identified by Brown (1991), and listed above. Statements of universal rights (such as 
the innocent people statement) generally make reference to human universals. To be 
an innocent person means that one was not responsible for a wrong. Since all peoples 
_ have a concept of right and wrong, and one of responsibility, there is a non-empty 
core meaning to the phrase "innocent person," even though its extension to specific 
concrete cases may be contentious. Instead of applying to the intersubjective lifeworld 
of a particular culture (a very thick lifeworld), it applies to the rather thinner 
intersubjective lifeworld of humanity that Brown has described. This is sufficient to 
anchor practical discourse. When Habermas (1992, 138) argues that "although they 
may be interpreted in various ways and applied according to different criteria, concepts 
like truth, rationality, or justification play the same grammatical role in every linguistic 
community," we may take it that he is pointing to this stable core of meaning that 
enables us to understand and use such concepts, no matter what language or 
community they are used in. 
In conclusion, in this subsection I have argued that the scope-widening effect of 
discourse ethics enables us to distinguish between goodish claims and rightish claims 
along a continuum of potentiality for agreement. Claims that lie towards the rightish 
end are those that are capable of garnering greater agreement, striving towards and 
approximating universalization, without ever reaching it. It is this that marks out 
justice, even though its boundary with realms containing other, less agreement 
susceptible claims is not sharp. Our approach towards universalizability (as in the 
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attempt to reach a wider consensus across cultures and time) must be tentative. Some 
moral contentions gather wide agreement (notably within the modem West, but also to 
some extent across cultures), and these tend to coincide with the norms picked out by 
Kantian theories as universalizable norms of the right and the just. 
Justice is a virtue - a very important one. Yet, because agreement is neither 
unanimous nor certain, justice does not hold a unique, trumping position. It is one 
virtue amongst many, and since the virtues are not unitary, it may urge us to action 
different from that urged by other virtues. Discovering the best thing to do must 
always take place in contextualized deliberation. In the face of our knowledge of the 
potential fallibility of our concepts of each of the virtues, including justice, we need to 
reflectively balance the requirements of the different virtues whenever they seem to 
point us in different directions. Justice is an important touchstone, but not the only 
one. 
7.25 Virtue in Discourse 
Justice is not the only virtue, I have just claimed. What, then, of the other virtues, and 
how are they involved in a virtue ethics that draws on the insights of discourse ethics? 
I have already outlined the role of two broad categories of the virtues. 
Reasonableness, we have seen, can be characterized in terms of the intellectual virtues. 
In this, I agree with Aristotle's view that "philosophical wisdom and understanding 
and practical wisdom [are the] intellectual [virtues]" (1980, 1.13, 1103a5). Indeed, 
the multi-aspectual nature of reasonableness allows us to explain the dispositional 
character of the intellectual virtues more easily than a more rationalistic account does. 
This is due to the committed aspect to reasonableness, which is to some degree always 
present in any reasonable thinking. In order for us to be able to display (for example) 
the disposition to be intellectually honest, or to manifest intellectual courage, we have 
to be committed to our thinking (3.1236). 
The second role for virtue that has already been outlined is the ethical virtue (or bundle 
of virtues) called "respect." In §6.24 and elsewhere, I have argued against the 
Habermasian view that discourse ethics rests on a purely formal principle. Instead, I 
have asserted that it requires a basal value: respect. In Aristotle's listing of the virtues 
(ibid., II.7), respect does not have a high profile. Of the ten virtues he discusses, 
three are to do with the "intercourse of words and actions" (ibid., 1108a10); that is, 
with the relationships between persons in discourse and interaction. The names he 
gives the means of these three virtues are "truthfulness," being "ready-witted" and 
"friendliness." Certainly, we can see that each of the three is implicated to some extent 
in respect for our interlocutors, but it is not hard to see that a full account of respect 
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(which, of course, I have not offered) would include a number of other more central 
virtues of respect, such as care for their feelings, taking what others say at face value 
in the absence of contrary evidence, hearing them out and so on. Here it is obvious 
that the dialogical (rather than monological) core of discourse ethics alerts us to just 
how important the virtues of respect are in human lives. 
To refer to the intellectual virtues and the basal virtue of respect, however, is not to 
exhaust the relationships between discourse ethics and virtue. Discourse ethics, we 
recall, is based on Habermas' account of the place of values and norms in our lives. 
Ordinarily, he claims, we operate within the normative horizon of our society, but 
when one of the norms that make up that horizon becomes problematized, we suspend 
action, enter practical discourse and try to redeem the norm. To recast this in virtue 
ethics terms, we usually act habitually and virtuously until the virtuousness of a 
particular action is brought into question. At that time, we bring practical wisdom to 
bear to determine the right way to act. Here we see the difference between discourse 
ethics and virtue ethics. Within discourse ethics, the primary mode of inquiry into 
normative questions is dialogical (and individual reflection is parasitic on that), 
whereas for a virtue ethics, the order is reversed. 
Given my developmental interest, the difference is vital. In moral education, in the 
light of the Vygotskian account of learning, it is clear that discourse ethics provides an 
essential modification to virtue ethics. As I shall explore more thoroughly in §9.2 and 
§10.23, moral education needs a mechanism whereby the virtues become the subject 
matter of a practical discourse. I shall suggest that the community of ethical inquiry 
provides that mechanism. 
Virtues do not form merely the subject matter of discourse. If we are to achieve the 
aims of moral education, then it is not enough that students consider the virtues: they 
must also become virtuous. A detached and "rationalistic" discourse on virtue which 
did not lead the participants to become more virtuous would not be contributing to 
moral development. Aristotle warns us that mere philosophizing on its own is 
insufficient for becoming virtuous: "But most people... take refuge in theory and think 
they are being philosophers and will become good in this way" (ibid., H.4, 1105b13) 
Hence, the specific characteristics of the practical discourses that students enter must 
contribute to a linking of the conclusions of the discussion to the formation of virtuous 
habits. Because the details of the dialogue are so important, I will not address this 
issue just yet: I am presently talking at too high a level of abstraction. I will return to 
the issue in §9.2, where my focus will be on classroom organization. 
221 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 7. A meta-ethics for education 
7.3 From Meta-ethics to the Classroom 
Chapter Seven has gathered together some of the major strengths and weaknesses of 
virtue ethics and discourse ethics as meta-ethical systems. This survey has, I believe, 
shown why virtue ethics provides a suitable account of morality to use as a basis for a 
moral education program. Virtue ethics has the advantages that it emphasizes the 
development of character as a multifaceted and idiosyncratic achievement by 
encumbered individuals within a society. However, classical virtue ethics, developed 
as it was in a relatively closed society, needs supplementing with some sort of 
recursive and fallible, yet still useful, guidance as to what constitutes moral progress 
in a multicultural and pluralistic society. Further, virtue ethics neither provides more 
than a sketchy outline of the place of education in moral development, nor does it 
consider sufficiently the role of discussion in such development. 
Discourse ethics offers resources for escaping the conformist and traditionalist dangers 
of virtue ethics. Moral improvement for society as a whole is not to be found in the 
unreflective following of the precepts of other, wiser folk. Nor it is to be found in 
individual soul searching, unless this is parasitic on the quest for intersubjectivity. As 
an account that takes cross-cultural discourse seriously, and provides considerable 
insight into its educational importance, I turned to a version of discourse ethics shorn 
of its Kantian transcendentalism. While I have argued that Habermasian discourse 
ethics fails as a complete meta-ethical system, there is much to be gained from its 
insights in educational terms. 
In terms of the primary aim of this thesis, discourse ethics can play a vitally important 
role: providing a richer and more practically useful account of the development of 
moral character. There are, as I have pointed out above, distinct parallels between the 
virtue ethics mix of habituation with reflection, and the discourse ethics mix of 
socialization in the lifeworld with discursive exploration of norms. Discourse ethics, 
however, supplemented by both a broadening of rationality into reasonableness, and a 
reconstruction of its developmental model to take in Vygotskian as well as Piagetian 
insights, can give us a much clearer insight into the role of discussion in school-based 
moral education. 
To give an account of the place of the community of ethical inquiry in a moral 
education program is to be the task of Part III of the thesis. Before I proceed to that, I 
will take stock of what I have done so far. Parts I and II of this thesis have laid the 
major philosophical basis for a justification of the place of a Community of Inquiry in 
moral education. Part HI will thaw on these conclusions in the context of the 
classroom. 
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Any account of moral development must take notice of the fact that we are talking 
about the moral development of human beings, who come into the world with the 
features characteristic of that species. In Chapter Two, I looked at the biological roots 
of moral development, showing that, while human biology cannot be said to fix the 
outcome, it needs to be taken into account, and provides some commonality. 
In Chapter Three, I investigated one of the core capabilities essential to moral agency, 
often referred to as rationality or reason. I argued (§3.1) that a full account of this 
capability requires attention to five aspects - the critical, creative, committed, 
contextual and embodied aspects - and that we ought to use the name "reasonableness" 
so as to emphasise that it is a much broader capacity than has been commonly picked 
out by "rationality" or "reason." Reasonableness so construed is capable of describing 
the intellectual capabilities of real persons whose thinking takes place while they are 
immersed in the physical and social world. I also argued (§3.23) that an 
understanding of the mechanisms by means of which reasonableness develops is also 
vital to a proper understanding of reasonableness itself, and examined the Vygotskian 
explanation. Reasonableness must be learned through interactions in the social world, 
scaffolded by more experienced thinkers. Such a recognition leads to a 
reconceptualization of thinking for oneself (§3.241) and the realization that autonomy 
requires interdependence, not separation (§3.3). 
A focus on Habermas' account of communicative action in Chapter Four provided a 
theoretical framework within which to explore more closely the development of 
reasonableness and normative judgement within the classroom. Initially, I explored 
the role of strategic action, communicative action, critical discourse and the ideal 
speech situation in Habermas' thought (§4.12), before turning to an exploration of 
how these ideas can assist in the analysis of classroom dialogical action (§4.13 and 
§4.14). I argued that, in order to understand how teachers can assist students in 
developing reasonableness and autonomy, we need to modify Habermas' categories of 
action to incorporate pedagogical action: an inextricable mix of strategic with 
communicative action undertaken by a more experienced person with the less 
experienced, so as to lead to such development. Reconsidering autonomy in §4.2, I 
advanced the case that autonomy must be reconsidered as communicative autonomy, 
whereby children are equipped to participate effectively in critical discourse. 
I turned my attention to moral theory in Part It In §5.1, I argued that any meta-ethical 
theory that takes development seriously needs to be multi-dimensional, rather than 
basing morality on a single principle. Aristotle's virtue ethics is such an account, and 
I explored it in §5.2, arguing that the traditional interpretation that Aristotle requires 
that children be mechanically habituated into morally good habits before they can 
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engage in philosophical and ethical discourse is mistaken. On the contrary, I argue 
that habituation requires judgement, and that judgement can be built through the 
engagement in philosophical inquiry. 
For a better account of the place of dialogue in ethics, I turned in Chapter Six to 
Habermas' discourse ethics. Firstly, I outlined Habermas' project in §6.1, before 
appraising the program in §6.2. I argued that the weaknesses in discourse ethics - its 
assumption that ideal discourse will (in matters to do with the right) inevitably reach 
consensus; its inadequate account of rationality; its claim to be based on a purely 
formal principle - mean that it is not satisfactory as a complete meta-ethical system. 
Nevertheless, when reconceptualized to cover these weaknesses, it has much to offer. 
In Chapter Seven, I looked (§7.1) at the ways in which virtue ethics can be 
strengthened by incorporating many of the insights of discourse ethics, particularly in 
terms of the necessity of taking respect as a foundational virtue (§7.21), the place of 
dialogue in development (§7.22), a way of allowing for progress within virtue ethics 
(§7.23) and an account of justice as a virtue (§7.21). 
In this summary, I have gathered together the major ideas that will inform the three 
chapters of Part III. It is time to focus much more directly on the classroom, the 
students in it and the teacher. 
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Chapter Eight: Ethics, the School and the Community of Inquiry 
In Parts I and H, I have been concerned to look philosophically at a number of 
concepts which are centrally important to moral education, especially when conducted 
through discussion of ethics in the classroom, as summarized in the final section of 
Part H. Chief amongst these are reasonableness, autonomy, pedagogical action and 
two meta-ethical systems: virtue ethics and discourse ethics. In Part Ill, I will draw 
together these key concepts specifically with an eye to what teachers can do in their 
own classrooms in order to assist children in the task of growing up to be ethical 
persons. 
In this first chapter of Part III, I will acknowledge that teachers can play many roles in 
such assistance, before concentrating on a positive move that they can make: the 
engagement of children in a community of ethical inquiry. The second section of this 
chapter will investigate the notions of community, inquiry and why their intersection 
in a community of inquiry can be expected to be educationally powerful. 
In Chapter Nine, I turn my attention to a number of the bigger issues identified so far, 
and outline just how they can be addressed within the community of ethical inquiry. 
Firstly, I will show that claims that the community of inquiry is an efficacious medium 
for the development of reasonableness are supported by empirical studies, both of 
other critical thinking programs, and of Philosophy for Children itself. The second 
section will explore the place of the community of ethical inquiry in ethical 
development, addressing two claims of weakness that are sometimes levelled at 
classroom-based moral education programs: that they cannot lead from judgement to 
morally good action; and that they produce "bush lawyers" who can better rationalize 
their wrong actions. In the third section, the place of the teacher as a wielder of 
pedagogic power and action is taken up again, with specific attention to the community 
of inquiry. Finally, I will look at the charge that a teacher who wields pedagogic 
power must be indoctrinatory, and also consider the possible consequences of a retreat 
from pedagogical action: ethical relativism and moral indifference. 
The focus of my attention in Chapter Ten will become even more practical. There, I 
will look at the specific stages of the community of ethical inquiry and discuss specific 
steps that teachers can take in best conducting these communities. I will look in turn at 
the questions of the ways of setting up discussion, the control of the content of the 
discussion, and the inculcation of reasonableness, moral correctness and 
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communicative autonomy. In each case, I will show what the philosophical 
underpinnings are for my advice, drawing on Parts I and H. 
The key claims to be established in Part III are that the task of moral education is to 
assist children to develop their reasonableness (i.e. their intellectual virtues), their 
ethical and moral virtues, and hence their autonomy. One powerful method of 
achieving these aims (which are interrelated in ways to be explored) is to engage 
children in ongoing ethics-oriented communities of inquiry which are run by teachers 
wielding pedagogic action. 
8.1 Moral Education and Schools 
I use the word "assist" in the last paragraph because it ought to be obvious that 
teachers neither should nor could be the sole source of moral education, let alone 
morality, for children. Firstly, many other people and institutions, in particular 
members of the close family, have roles that impinge on moral development. In the 
case of the family and probably some others, this influence is far beyond that which a 
single teacher can have. Secondly, the account that I have been developing implies 
that the children themselves ought to be taking an increasing responsibility for their 
own moral development. It is not something that can be imposed on a child from the 
outside. 
Nevertheless, given the focus of this thesis, I shall have little to say about these 
matters, apart from pointing out that these other influences are not always benign, and 
the teacher's role may include what we might call remedial work on damage done by 
families, the media or other agents. This, of course, raises disturbing questions about 
the rights or duties of teachers to engage in educational activities that might work 
against the views of families or broader society. The questions of indoctrination 
(§9.4) and the place of the teacher's personal moral views (§10.23) will be addressed 
subsequently. 
Some make a sharp distinction between moral education and moral training (Beck, 
Crittenden et al. 1971, Introduction, 8-9). In that collection, for example, Baier 
(1971, 95) claims that moral education must be both deliberate and carried out by 
professionals with the aim of fostering moral excellence: Kohlberg (1971) takes a 
similar view. Like others in the same collection (Gauthier 1971; Loubser 1971; 
Melden 1971), I will not make a sharp distinction. My discussion of the Aristotelian 
notion of reflective habituation (§5.23), when bolstered by a Habermasian account of 
the necessarily communicative element in such reflection (§6.22), undercuts any such 
analysis. Parents or others who offer even the most simple of reasons for their moral 
directions to children are engaged in moral education just as much as moral training. 
226 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 8. The school and the community of inquiry 
In this chapter, I will follow a path that has been hinted at in §6.24. While there are, 
of course, many interesting questions to address about cross-cultural issues in moral 
education, I shall restrict my focus here to moral education in modern Western 
societies. This is not to say that such a restriction will make the issue of cultural 
diversity disappear. On the contrary, given that modern Western societies are 
culturally diverse, I will need to pay considerable attention to this issue. Rather, it is 
to say that I will take the basic underlying moral principle of respect as given. I 
argued in §6.24 that respect must be assumed in order to underpin discourse ethics, 
and I take it to be one of the defining moral notions of modern Western moral thought. 
Consequently, when considering moral diversity and the response of schools, I will 
assume that schools, being institutions of a modern Western society, ought to take a 
conception of respect as given. However, just what this concept of respect 
constitutes, in detail, and what practical implications it has will remain contested (see 
10.23). Thus it will be one of a number of key concepts that ought to form the subject 
matter of classroom discourses. 
For the moment I will concentrate on the school itself. A school is an institution set up 
with the broad aim of educating children. Just how we are to understand this broad 
aim itself is, of course, the subject of much philosophical work, ranging back to 
Plato's Republic and beyond. Whether education ought even to include moral 
education has been questioned by some, particularly those who have what Dewey 
(1966, 359) calls "a narrow and moralistic view of morals." On the one hand, some 
of these assert that schools ought not to have anything to do with moral education 
because any attempt to inculcate a moral view amounts to indoctrination or the 
enforcement of religion (§9.4). Others assert that moral education is the domain of the 
parents, not the state, and schools should keep out of it. I shall argue that schools 
cannot withdraw from moral education even if they attempt to, for the stance of 
avoiding addressing morals inevitably involves a transmission of certain precepts with 
moral import. 
8.11 The Range of School Procedures with Ethical Import 
Teachers and schools are important. Whether teachers like it or not, even accept it or 
not, they are inevitably influential in the moral development of the child. Much of this 
influence is incidental (which is not to say it is beyond the control of the teacher). It 
occurs through the model of moral concern and action that the teacher presents, 
through the expectations the teacher has of children in the class, through the rules of 
the classroom, through the habits of behaviour that the teacher inculcates. 
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Nor does the teacher exist in a vacuum. The school as an institution has its own 
impact on the moral development of the children through many avenues, as diverse as 
the school rules; the model it presents through its discipline policies; the informal 
interactions that the school encourages, accepts, ignores and discourages; the formal 
messages conveyed at assemblies and other occasions of public messages; the 
interactions it has with the wider community and so on. 
I am not making a claim that any of these types of practice are, at least in general 
terms, bad or unnecessary. Most of them are inevitable, and each can be implemented 
well or badly - that is, to assist or to hinder the development of ethical persons. 
It is not my intention to develop a typology of all the ways in which a school 
influences the moral development of the children entrusted to its care. Nor do I intend 
to analyse each influence in any detail. Many of these influences are not at all, or only 
partly, explicit. Others are fully explicit, but are in the form of advice or orders from 
on high. Each of them can be, and not uncommonly is, made the subject of explicit 
evaluation within a school, as the school attempts to do its job well. 
By and large, however, these influences of the school on its students can be put into 
one of two categories (though there may well be considerable fuzziness at the 
boundary between these categories): the influences of the school fall either into the 
category of relatively unreflective moral shaping, or the category of moral instruction. 
In the category of unreflective moral shaping, I place all those practices which require 
students to act in certain ways, or model such action to students, with little or no 
explicit reference to the moral import of the actions involved. Moral instruction does 
make such explicit reference, and it includes what might be called sermons or lectures: 
moral influence purely through one-way talk. 
A few comments on this categorization are needed. Firstly, the use of the word 
"moral" here is neutral as to whether the influence is morally praiseworthy or 
blameworthy. Both unreflective moral shaping and moral instruction can have bad as 
well as good moral effects - and sometimes it will be contentious as to which it is. 
Secondly, it is not hard to see why these categories overlap, for the explicitness of 
moral referencing can vary smoothly from none at all to quite up-front. Thirdly, it is 
quite conceivable that a single incident may have mixed moral messages, such as when 
a teacher shouts angrily at a child, "You shouldn't try to scare others into doing what 
you want them to do!" 
Those who advocate that schools ought not to be involved in moral education 
generally have in mind only the category of moral instruction. They ignore the fact 
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that much of the moral influence of a school lies in the unreflective moral shaping - 
part of what has been dubbed the "hidden curriculum." A school which treats children 
respectfully teaches the value of respect and produces children who are more 
respectful of others, whether it explicitly preaches respect or not. In a school where 
teachers are explicitly banned from expressing any moral view, students would be 
likely to learn the moral lesson that to have a moral stance is not important, or that any 
moral stance whatsoever is acceptable. Of course, it is doubtful that such a school 
could exist - it is usually contentious moral views concerning matters in broader 
society that are being discouraged. 1 Those moral views that are taken-for-granted 
within the lifeworld are not only largely invisible to unreflective participants (as we all 
are most of the time), but are also continually reinforced. Any time teachers insist that 
their class is quiet when they are speaking, they are tacitly expressing the view that 
respect is due to them. If they similarly insist on quiet when another child is talking to 
the class, the message is extended to respect for peers. Indeed, any action teachers 
take with regard to students' behaviour will have some moral import, even if very 
minor. 
As Habermas makes clear, any of the taken-for-granted norms of the lifeworld can be 
problematized by reflective participants at any time (§6.1). Hence, any of the moral 
influences on students mentioned above may potentially be made the subject of a 
practical discourse. Schools and teachers that are concerned about their impact on 
their students engage in investigations into these matters, and educational researchers 
(especially of an ethnographic bent) mount studies to discover them. It is of course 
also possible, though it usually happens much less frequently, to include the students 
or their representatives in such practical discourses, either through such 
institutionalized bodies as student representative councils, or in other more informal 
ways. 
Of course, when schools, teachers and/or students enter into discourse about moral 
matters, there are many different forms that the discourse can take. As I have 
commented in respect to student involvement, some are highly regulated and 
institutionalized, others are quite informal. We have seen in §4.124 that Habermas' 
ideal speech situation can play a regulative role in assessing the adequacy of discursive 
set-ups. The rules of institutionalized discourses can serve to maintain the power of 
some and to exclude others, or they can serve to neutralize power differentials and to 
be inclusive. Similar comments apply to informal interactions, even though the rules 
will be both more tacit and more fluid in such circumstances, and will depend on the 
11 will note in passing here that the opposite view - that teachers ought to express their views on 
contentious moral issues - also has its dangers. I shall return to this issue in §9.4. 
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persons involved and the details of how they interact with each other. Further, the 
informal nature of this sort of discourse may serve to make it harder to ensure that 
distortions and exclusions are either discoverable or preventable. 
Thus if we are to recommend that practical discourse is a vital part of moral education, 
then it will be necessary to have an account of how such discourses are to be set up, 
and what sorts of rules and understandings are to structure it. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will argue that the community of inquiry is a suitable structure for real 
practical discourses. Since the phrase "community of inquiry" has been used in a 
number of related but differing senses, I will explore these usages, before 
concentrating on developing a version suitable for classroom practical discourse, and 
explicating the reasons why a classroom community of ethical inquiry ought to be seen 
as an essential element of moral education. 
8.2 The Community of Inquiry • 
The origin of the phrase "community of inquiry" has been (tentatively) traced back by 
Lipman to Peirce's article The Fixation of Belief (1955, 5-22). This is what Lipman 
has to say: 
This phrase, presumably coined by Charles Sanders Peirce, was originally restricted 
to the practitioners of scientific inquiry, all of whom could be considered to form a 
community in that they were similarly dedicated to the use of like procedures in 
pursuit of identical goals. Since Peirce, however, the phrase has been broadened to 
include any kind of inquiry, whether scientific or nonscientific. (1991, 15) 
Peirce certainly had such an extension in mind, for he also talks of inquiry amongst 
the community of philosophers (1955, 229). However, Peirce does not say a lot 
about exactly what a community of inquiry is. Lipman, and (following him) others in 
the Philosophy for Children movement, have written extensively on the notion, but 
usually in the context of education. There exists a tension in this writing between 
expansive and particular notions of the community of inquiry, which I shall explore in 
Chapter Nine. Before I turn to that, though, I shall explicate the notion of a 
community of inquiry in the broader sense of a community existing throughout 
society, as indicated by Peirce. 
Clearly, an obvious way of analysing the notion of a community of inquiry would 
involve some sort of characterization of "community," followed by an examination of 
"inquiry," and finally an explication of the way in which inquiry applies to 
community. This is the path that I shall follow. In this analysis, I will restrict my 
focus to human communities. 
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8.21 Community 
The first thing that is obvious about a community is that it must consist of a collection 
of individuals. But a community is more than just any group of people. As the 
etymology of the word itself indicates, a community must have something in common. 
Now, there are many ways in which a group of people can have something in 
common, but not all of them turn the group into a community. Originally, the 
commonality was a quasi-political one, so that a community lived in close proximity 
and was subject to the same laws and regulations. The term is still used widely in this 
sense. By extension, we now also talk of communities as groups of people who have 
similar aims, purposes, intentions and/or beliefs. 
In discussing the concept of a community, it is useful to keep Johnson's point (§7.24) 
that concepts are not generally defined by necessary and sufficient conditions in mind. 
There are two ways we can apply it here. The first applies to the totality of different 
communities. They neither all necessarily have the same type of thing in common, 
nor is it sufficient for a group of people to have some common factor to form a 
community. Equally, it is not the case that we can say that a group of people either are 
a community or they are not. Some groups, with similarities and links that place the 
group close to the prototypical core of the concept, are clearly communities. An 
example might be an isolated village in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Other 
groups form only, at best, loose communities, such as the community of players of a 
particular computer game. Many of them do not know many other members of the 
group, and would not be too bothered about communicating with them. Yet they do 
have an interest in common, and if they do meet, are likely to be interested in 
discussing this common interest, perhaps by swapping tips for playing it. Some 
groups of people that share something in common - say, a mole behind their left ear - 
cannot be said to form a community in any but the most vague and metaphorical sense. 
Secondly, the boundaries of a given community are also often far from clear. Some 
communities have membership lists, explicit rules, common commitment to a cause 
and other trappings of institutionalization. These tight communities are those that help 
define the prototype for the concept community. It is relatively easy to identify 
members of the community, as well as criteria for joining and leaving it. Yet even in 
these tight communities, there can be demarcation disputes. Is a member who has 
forgotten to pay the membership subscription part of the community or not? What 
about the interested newcomer who is attending meetings but has yet to officially join, 
or the long time member who still pays, but has not attended meetings in years and 
hardly ever thinks about the organization? Considerations like these show that a 
community is not coextensive with an organization that formalizes the community. 
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And if there are boundary problems with communities based around organizational 
structures, these become much more acute when dealing with less formal 
communities, such as Peirce's communities of scientists and of philosophers. 
As the examples of the potential and the inactive members of a community show, a 
community is not a static entity. Individuals can become more involved in a 
community over time, or less involved. As they do so, the community changes. The 
community can become stronger, and thus closer to the core of the prototype, or it can 
become weaker and possibly disintegrate. 
In modern societies, as Dewey (1966, 20-22) reminds us, communities are internally 
diverse, and individuals are members of many overlapping communities. "Each such 
group exercises a formative influence on the active dispositions of its members," so 
our membership of communities is partly constitutive of us, just as the nature of the 
community itself is influenced by the characteristics of the people who join it. In part, 
it is the diversity of these formative influences present in any large community (such 
as a modern Western state) that acts against the production of a stiffing conformity. 
This brief survey of the concept of a community leaves us with a number of important 
points to consider when we turn our attention to the particular nature of a community 
of inquiry in Chapter Ten. We shall need to identify the commonalities that 
distinguish the community of inquiry from a mere group of disparate individuals, all 
the time being aware that these commonalities may not be shared by every member. 
Secondly, we shall need to pay attention to the ways in which individuals become 
members of the community, or maybe drop out of it, and how these processes help the 
community to grow and evolve, or possibly decay. Thirdly, we will have to be aware 
of the diversity within the community, including both the possible existence of sub-
communities and the overlapping of the community with many other communities. 
Finally, we will need to consider how the community interfaces with other, larger 
communities of which it is a sub-community. 
8.22 Inquiry 
Peirce (1955, 10) defines inquiry in this way: 
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this 
struggle Inquiry . . . With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the 
cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of 
opinion. 
More recently, Splitter (1997, 30) has this to say about inquiry: 
Inquiry.., what we have to do when we want to understand the why and wherefore of 
things. An inquiry is, fundamentally, a search: a search for answers to questions and 
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puzzles that confront us - or better, a search for understanding (which may lead to 
answers, but does not even assume that we know what questions to ask).... Inquiry 
is, necessarily, self-correcting. This reflective - or reflexive - dimension of inquiry 
reminds us that inquiry is a mode (or perhaps, many modes) of thinking. 
It is certainly worth noticing the similarities: in both, inquiry begins in doubt, 
questions, puzzles; it continues in a struggle or search and it ends in the settlement of 
opinions, or answers. But then Splitter goes on to make an interesting modification to 
this apparent unanimity. He suggests that inquiry aims beyond merely coming to 
answers (the settlement of opinion), towards a more encompassing outcome: 
understanding. As he points out, this is more encompassing because the search for 
understanding may or may not issue in answers. One can see the roots of Habermas' 
ideal consensus (§6.21) in Peirce's conception of inquiry. 
Splitter's characterization may be wider than Peirce's in another way. Can we so 
easily identify "the irritation of doubt" with "questions and puzzles" as I did above? 
Again, Peirce is anticipating Habermas, who claims the trigger for discourse is the 
calling into question of the taken-for-granted of the lifeworld. When irritated by 
doubt, or when our taken-for-granted knowledge is problematized, we need to come 
to a resolution. Yet, although questions and puzzles can arise in this way, they may 
also arise from curiosity rather than need. 2 My juxtaposition of curiosity and need 
may seem to call for further analysis, for there does seem to be a sense in which 
curiosity creates a need - to find out - of its own. Nevertheless, given Peirce's 
reference to the irritation of doubt, I do think that we can contrast the drivenness of 
this type of need with the playfulness of curiosity. Further, the explanation of 
Peirce's favourite model for inquiry - science - would be sadly lacking if inquiry arose 
solely from the irritation of doubt, and left no room for that well-spring of pure 
research: the imaginative asking of "What if..." questions. Curiosity fits better if we 
have a more expansive conception of reasonableness, with full recognition of the 
creative aspect of thinking, rather than a narrow, critical thinking based idea of 
rationality. 
Splitter's final claim is that inquiry must be self-correcting. Here I think that we 
would fmd that Peirce and Habermas would agree, and the reason why they would is 
instructive in our analysis of inquiry. As we have seen, both Peirce and Habermas lay 
a great deal of emphasis on the place, in inquiry, of community. They both rule out 
the possibility of substantive gains from purely monological thinking. Even if an idea 
can be introduced into discourse from a monological position, it must be tested in 
community before it can have any claim to legitimacy (Peirce 1955, 13; Habermas 
2 I must thank Cyn Townley (pers. comm.) for drawing to my attention to the roots of inquiry in 
curiosity as well as need. 
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1990, 66). It is this public testing of ideas that ensures reflexivity. In the discourse in 
which reasons are offered for an assertion, counter reasons may be advanced, and any 
flaws in the reasoning may be exposed. Indeed, because we learn the processes of 
reasoning and inquiry within such public discourses (§3.23), then even that part of 
inquiry that can be carried on individually will be subjected to the internalized voices 
of critique and reflection (Lipman 1991, 52). Here we begin to see the reason why 
"community" and "inquiry" merge so well into the community of inquiry. 
8.23 The Community of Inquiry as a Setting for Vygotskian Learning 
Underlying the notion of a community of inquiry is a concept which I refer to as 
Vygotskian learning and outlined in detail in §3.23. In this section, I shall recall what 
I mean by Vygotskian learning, and draw together the strands of it that have been 
variously developed in different places throughout this thesis. Then I shall study more 
closely why it is that the community of inquiry offers an exemplary setting for 
Vygotskian learning. 
According to Vygotsky, we recall from §3.23, "What the child can do in cooperation 
today, he can do alone tomorrow" (1962, 104). This is the key Vygotskian insight: 
that children can engage verbally in a social group in forms of reasoning that are not 
yet available to them individually, and that it is precisely this engagement that enables 
children eventually to use those forms of thought. We must remember that the phrase 
"forms of thought" must be construed quite widely, as befits both the broad version of 
reasonableness developed in §3.1, and Vygotsky's own broad conception of thought 
(§3.234). I have argued, for example, that the less reflective versions of the virtues 
can be learned Vygotskian-style (§5.232), as well as practical reasoning itself. 
Vygotslcy uses the term "zone of proximal development" to label this conceptual and 
reasoning space in which children can operate with help from a group, but are not 
capable of operating in on their own. The community of inquiry offers an excellent 
environment for a group of students to construct such reasoning, especially with the 
scaffolding provided by a teacher engaged in pedagogical action (4.141). 
Lipman (1991, 52), the foremost theorist of the community of inquiry in school 
education, provides extended examples of the sorts of capacities that can be 
internalized in this way. 
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Characteristic behaviours of the 
community 
Members question one another 
Members request of each other reasons for 
beliefs 
Members build on one another's ideas 
Members deliberate among themselves 
Members offer counterexamples to the 
hypotheses of others 
Members point out possible consequences 
of one another's ideas 
Members utilize specific criteria when 
making judgements 
Members cooperate in the development of 
rational problem-solving techniques 
Internalised individual behaviours 
Individuals question themselves 
Individuals reflect on their reasons for 
thinking as they do 
Individuals build on their own ideas 
Individuals deliberate in their own thinking 
Individuals anticipate counterexamples to 
their own hypotheses 
Individuals anticipate possible 
consequences of their own ideas 
Individuals use specific criteria when 
making judgements 
Individuals follow rational procedures in 
dealing with their own problems 
Internalization of social thinking (after Lipman, 1991) 
It is worth noting that this Vygotskian internalization of social thinking can be both 
relatively unreflective and explicitly reflexive (or somewhere on the continuum 
between them). Those less experienced persons who engage in the social group may 
well pick up competency without ever bringing the matter to focal attention - an 
unreflective habituation to an intellectual virtue. On the other hand, especially if the 
more experienced members of the group (in the classroom case, particularly the 
teacher) flag the possibility, the competencies being learned may become the explicit 
content of discussion. A turn to Habermasian analysis (§4.1) will make the 
connections between Vygotsky and my broader argument clearer. Unreflective 
appropriation of situated rationality (§6.23; i.e. my "reasonableness") is the norm in 
the lifeworld. Communicative and, especially, strategic action will commonly result in 
unreflective learning, while a shift to critical discourse (4.123) marks the suspension 
of lifeworld action, and the reflexive attempt to understand (amongst other possible 
topics) the competencies of the lifeworld. 
In the community of inquiry, both processes can take place. While the students are 
driving the inquiry, many of the competencies in the right hand column of the list 
above will be internalized relatively unthinkingly. Yet the teacher, will not be standing 
idly by. By engaging in pedagogical action (§4.141), the teacher can both encourage 
this process through the strategic element of pedagogic action, and help the students 
(when appropriate) to turn their attention to the competencies of reasonableness 
through the communicative and, especially, discursive elements. The latter role of the 
teacher in scaffolding explicit rather than just implicit learning of reasonableness is one 
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of the features that marks off the community of inquiry from normal lifeworld 
dialogue. It is also the way that students become progressively more able to think for 
themselves (§3.241) and hence intersubjectively work towards autonomy (§3.3). 
In an excellent comparison of the Piagetian and Vygotskian programs, Howe (1996) 
considers their implications for science teaching. While the focus of my dissertation is 
moral rather than science education, Howe's discussion raises a number of relevant 
issues. The implications of Piaget's program are that the teacher needs to create a 
classroom climate in which children construct and test their own hypotheses, in 
interaction with the world. In doing so, the teacher creates the setting for children 
individually to advance a further stage through their own efforts. This is, in Piaget's 
terminology, a form of constructivism: children construct their cognitive capacities 
through individual interaction with the world, and hence must be placed in situations 
of cognitive conflict. 
Howe asserts that the implications of the Vygotskian program are different: teachers 
need to treat children "as participants in a joint enterprise in which meaning is derived 
through interaction with other people, mediated through language" (ibid). Language 
must be treated as a tool to support and promote thinking, with the teacher taking a 
central role of stimulating children to reflect and explain. A Vygotskian perspective 
emphasizes the importance of context and questions the automatic transfer of broad 
skills. Howe claims that the constructivist insights of Piaget need to be merged with 
sociocultural views, encouraging the integration of personal experience and 
knowledge into the scientific systems, models and ways of thinking that are being 
learned. In particular, he calls for a shift of focus from the solitary thinker to the 
thinker/talker in a social context. 
What is true of science teaching, which has an explicit focus on the physical world, is 
even more true of moral education. Ethics deals with contents which are social 
constructs (even though they may be underpinned by biological facts, as I argued in 
Chapter Two). This Vygotskian picture is supported strongly by a Habermasian 
account of progress towards moral correctness through engagement in a practical 
discourse (§6.22 and §7.23). 
Empirical research provides support for the Vygotslcian contention that the major 
vehicles of thought are constructed socially in dialogue. Based on Perkins' (Perkins 
1994) analysis of open-ended dialogue, I investigated the structure of classroom talk 
in a community of inquiry (Sprod 1994c; 1997c, d; 1998: more details of this research 
can be found in §10.222). The analysis was able to identify episodes, made up of 
utterances by different participants in the dialogue, that followed a single strategy (or 
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epistemic game) for investigation of the ideas being discussed. These episodes, which 
I dubbed "epistemic episodes," are the jointly constructed thinking strategies to which 
Vygotsky refers. Analysis of the lesson transcripts provided clear evidence that 
students became more likely to use, and better able to sustain, epistemic games that 
had been previously introduced and sustained by the teacher (Sprod 1998, Table 6). 
Similar episodes have been independently identified in other discourse analysis 
projects. Bruner (1983) studied 8-13 month old children and their interactions with 
their mothers through the game of "peekaboo." He found that, over this time, the 
children appropriated the deep structures that lay beneath the mother-child interactions, 
so that the child could eventually control the interaction in the same way that the 
mother initially had. He labelled these thinking structures "formats", and comments 
It is at the heart of any support system involving games - "play" games and 
language games alike. If the teacher in such a system were to have a motto, it would 
surely be "where before there was a spectator, let there now be a participant". One 
sets the game, provides a scaffold to ensure that the child's ineptitudes can be rescued 
or rectified by appropriate intervention, then removes the scaffold part by part as the 
reciprocal structure can stand on its own. (60) 
Tizard and Hughes (1984) studies the interaction of somewhat older children - 
preschoolers - and identified "passages of intellectual search," in which parents and 
children (but not nearly so often preschool teachers and children) engaged in episodes 
displaying similar characteristics to my epistemic episodes. These, they asserted, 
were influential in teaching higher order thinking to the children. Similar claims have 
been made by Barnes and Todd (1977), who labelled similar sequences of talk 
"episodes of cognitive strategies" in their study of small group work, and Pontecorvo 
and Girardet (1993), who in their account of research on small group work in history 
classrooms, used the rather unwieldy label "reasoning sequence which uses a single 
epistemic action." 
Thus, there is substantial empirical evidence that the very ability to think well, and the 
concepts with which to think, are both dependent on dialogical social interaction which 
seeks conclusions. While such interactions are a common part of the lifeworld, they 
are often informal and unfocused. This is not surprising when we consider that such 
interaction ostensibly serves many other purposes as well. Since cognitive, 
conceptual and ethical development are all key aims of schools, they need to create 
these conditions in a more explicit and controlled way. In the next two chapters, I will 
argue that the obvious classroom setting for maximising these opportunities is a 
classroom community of inquiry. 
In the course of this chapter, I have outlined the features of communities and of 
inquiry. My claim, following Peirce and Lipman amongst others, is that the 
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constitution of a community of inquiry (i.e. a group whose commonality is the 
commitment to engage in inquiry) is a powerful learning methodology. To 
substantiate this claim, I have called on Vygotskian theory. The Vygotskian account is 
highly compatible with several of the aims I have argued for in Parts I and II of this 
thesis. 
Vygotskian learning is the key way to develop reasonableness, and its reliance on a 
rich interpersonal setting clearly enhances the development of thinking that displays 
the multi-aspectual character I have identified for reasonableness. Virtue as I have 
characterized it also gels well with Vygotskian learning, especially in the light of the 
Habermasian gloss I outlined above. Not only can the virtues be learned relatively 
unreflectively through immersion in the lifeworld, but the wherewithal for reflection 
on that habituation (a central part of habituation in the virtues - §5.21) is also learned 
both through the Vygotskian implicit habituation and through explicit reflexivity. This 
practical reason (in Aristotle's terms) can be then applied to reflection on the 
acquisition of the moral virtues. Thus it can be seen that we need to draw on 
Aristotle's virtue ethics, Habermas' theory of communicative action and Vygotslcian 
learning theory to show the power of the community of ethical inquiry in moral 
development. 
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Chapter Nine: The Community of Inquiry in the Classroom 
In the previous chapter, I gave a broad brush outline of the notion of a community of 
inquiry. Yet it is still a rather nebulous notion. As we shall see, the idea has been 
applied in a number of social settings. Coming from the Philosophy for Children 
approach, I am primarily interested in the classroom setting. I have, in the final 
section to the last chapter, linked the notion to a number of philosophical approaches 
(reasonableness, Habermasian theory, virtue ethics, communicative autonomy) which 
do not figure in its historical development. In this introductory section, I will look 
more closely at those historical roots, and at its usage in Philosophy for Children. 
Subsequently, each of these major philosophical themes will re-enter the discussion, 
as I consider the place of the classroom community of inquiry in moral education. 
Drawing explicitly on the work of Peirce and Vygotsky, the Philosophy for Children 
movement has adopted the phrase "community of inquiry" and applied it to the 
classroom. Lipman (1991, 16), founder of Philosophy for Children, says: 
Thus we can now speak of "converting the classroom into a community of inquiry" 
in which students listen to one another with respect, build on one another's ideas, 
challenge one another to supply reasons for otherwise unsupported opinions, assist 
each other in drawing inferences from what has been said, and seek to identify one 
another's assumptions. A community of inquiry attempts to follow the inquiry 
where it leads rather than being penned in by the boundary lines of existing 
disciplines. A dialogue that tries to conform to logic, it moves forward like a boat 
tacking into the wind, but in the process its progress comes to resemble that of 
thinking itself. Consequently, when this process is internalised or introjected by the 
participants, they come to think in moves that resemble its procedures. They come 
to think as the process thinks. (16) 
This passage clarifies the concept of a classroom community of inquiry somewhat, but 
it also raises a number of questions. Firstly the clarification: the Vygotskian ideas that 
underlie the community of inquiry (§8.23) are very evident in the final two sentences. 
Moreover, the active participation of the students in co-constructing the arguments is 
also clear. But there are a number of problematic or obscure aspects to the notion. 
Nowhere in this passage is the teacher mentioned. Yet, as anyone who spends any 
time in a classroom knows, the teacher has a vital role to play in any classroom. I 
have discussed this in some detail in §4.14. The notion of "following the inquiry 
where it leads" also needs further unpacking, and may seem problematic in two 
respects: How can an inquiry, as opposed to some or all of the participants in the 
inquiry, lead? How are the agreed curriculum materials to be taught under such a 
system? I shall address these questions in §10.21. 
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Clearly, before proceeding, I will need to have a more precise account of what I will 
mean by the phrase "a classroom community of inquiry" in this thesis. There is, 
however, an ambiguity in the Philosophy for Children literature. The phrase 
"community of inquiry" is used in two quite different ways. It is most often used to 
refer to a specific classroom pedagogy, with detailed organizational and procedural 
guidelines, as I will outline below. In parts of the Philosophy for Children literature, 
on the other hand, as in Lipman's first sentence above, the claim is made that the entire 
classroom can be converted into a community of inquiry. Exactly what this means is 
seldom spelt out in much detail. In the remainder of this section, I shall spell out and 
contrast the two senses, which I shall (for the moment) label the "narrow-sense" and 
"wide-sense" communities of inquiry, respectively. This discussion should make 
clear the reasons why the phrase "community of inquiry" ought to be used in the 
narrow sense only, and explain why it would be better to use another name for the 
wider sense. 
Lipman (1991, 241-243) gives the definitive description of the narrow-sense 
community of inquiry. It has five stages: (I) the offering of the text; (II) the 
construction of the agenda; (11I) solidifying of the community; (IV) using exercises 
and discussion plans; and (V) encouraging further responses. This is a very specific 
model of the community of inquiry, and it is the one that teachers being trained in 
- Philosophy for Children learn. It commences with a text, written in story form, which 
is read around the class. This is followed by the collection of questions regarding the 
text from the students. The third and fourth stages both involve discussion by the 
class, though there is a tension between Lipman's descriptions of each. In the notes to 
stage IEL Lipman emphasizes the students' responsibility for the conduct of the 
discussion, through the use of such phrases as "group solidarity," "articulation of 
disagreements," "joining together," "collectively" and so on. Stage IV focuses much 
more on teacher control of the discussion, using phrases such as "employing 
questions from the academic tradition," "opening students to other philosophical 
alternatives," "focusing on specific problems" and "compelling the inquiry to 
examine." Only in stage V is there any hint that the community of inquiry can take 
place without the students,sitting in a circle talking. Here, Lipman mentions eliciting 
further responses which, although they include telling, also encompass writing, 
painting and drawing. 
Lipman's description here captures the core meaning of "community of inquiry" in the 
Philosophy for Children literature. If a classroom teacher in the Philosophy for 
Children tradition talks of forming a community of inquiry, then the expectation would 
be that the children would get into a circle, read a story, gather questions and discuss 
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them. Of course, the narrow-sense community of inquiry can be augmented, by 
incorporating such techniques as pair discussion, small group work or individual 
writing within this general structure. Some of the exercises of stage IV encourage 
this, and I will allow that the term "narrow-sense community of inquiry" incorporates 
such enrichment, provided it fits within a methodology largely described by Lipman's 
five stages. Despite this enrichment, the phrase "community of inquiry" functions 
very well to mark out this particular pedagogical activity from other activities that go 
on in a classroom, such as lecturing, writing, doing worksheets, collaborative group 
work, recitation discussions and so on. Together with the philosophical focus, it is 
what is most distinctive and, many would maintain, most powerful about the 
Philosophy for Children approach. 
Yet we have seen that Lipman calls for us to convert the classroom into a wide-sense 
community of inquiry. Splitter and Sharp (1995), in their introduction, take their task 
to be to "explain how the classroom can be transformed into a community of inquiry 
based on dialogue, trust and respect." Are we to take this to mean that students should 
sit in a circle all day long, reading, questioning and discussing? Is communal 
discussion to be the only learning technique used in the classroom? Such a 
recommendation would seem to be disastrous, for it would impoverish the variety of 
the classroom and neglect many important pedagogical techniques, as I discuss further 
below. 
Let's turn again to the origins of the phrase. For Peirce, the community of inquiry 
was archetypically an international community of scientists. This community would 
seldom fulfil anything like the conditions specified by Lipman for a narrow-sense 
community of inquiry. If scientists have texts to read, they are not stories. Rather, 
the texts are the world itself and the academic writings of other scientists. Nor do they 
commonly sit around in circles and discuss, though this does happen occasionally. 
Rather, the scientific community of inquiry is carried out over widely separated sites, 
through a combination of many, many activities, only some of which directly involve 
communication between scientists. Scientist who form part of the community can, 
amongst many other things, engage in solitary experimentation or musings, work in 
small research teams, give or listen to lectures, or consult experts. Yet underlying this 
is a crucial element of the scientific method. As Popper (1962, 220) puts it: 
What we call 'scientific objectivity' is not a product of the individual scientist's 
impartiality, but a product of the social or public character of scientific method; and 
the individual scientist's impartiality is, so far as it exists, not the source but rather 
the result of this socially or institutionally organized objectivity of science. 
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It is not merely objectivity-as-intersubjectivity that is built by the international scientific 
community of inquiry: other products include methodologies (e.g. gene splicing), 
conventional standards (e.g. the cutoff points for statistical significance), conceptual 
schema (e.g. sea floor spreading), interpretations of mathematical formalisms (e.g. the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics) and so on. Each of these requires 
open communication, in which any other scientist can potentially participate, raising 
questions, suggesting alternatives, pointing out flaws in data, methods or analysis, 
supplying reasons, identifying assumptions etc., which takes place informally, at 
conferences or meetings, or in journals. It is in this part of the scientific community of 
inquiry that the parallels to the discussion stages of the classroom narrow-sense 
community of inquiry are the strongest. Nevertheless, while the parallels are stronger, 
the two communities are by no means identical. The scientific community of inquiry 
is methodologically much more diverse than the classroom narrow-sense community 
of inquiry, even if we do not go quite as far as to agree with Feyerabend's slogan 
"anything goes" (1975, 14). 
Splitter and Sharp (1995, 24-25) discuss how "every classroom, in every discipline 
and subject area, can be transformed into a community of inquiry." In their 
discussion, they do not make specific reference to the narrow-sense community of 
inquiry. Rather, they talk of "redefining teaching and learning as inquiry based 
activities." Teachers "must tap into the conceptual bases of their respective disciplines 
and allow their students full scope to explore contestable issues as they arise." The 
lack of reference to teaching methodologies in this description leaves the methods 
open. Nevertheless, the narrow-sense method is undoubtedly uppermost in their 
minds, as is born out in the later section Transforming the classroom into a community 
of inquiry (140-147), which makes only passing reference to other methods: "small 
group work and other forms of co-operative learning" can be introduced into a mature 
community, and "virtually all forms of learning... will be enhanced" (ibid., 145) once 
students have internalized the procedures of inquiry. 
This does not really grapple with the real problem with the concept of turning a 
classroom into a community of inquiry. The slogan surely cannot imply that narrow-
sense communities of inquiry ought to be conducted in every session throughout the 
week, for this would have several bad consequences. First and foremost, students 
would soon become restless. Good classroom planning takes note of the students' 
needs for variety in classroom organization, learning styles and activities. While it is 
often true that children can engage in philosophical discussion for much longer periods 
than their teachers would anticipate, to ask them to do it all day, every day is asking 
for trouble. Secondly, though schools undoubtedly undervalue talk and the 
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construction of meaning, there are many other valuable learning methods that do not 
rely so heavily on pure dialogue, and cannot be efficiently achieved through the 
narrow-sense community of inquiry type of dialogue. Many practical skills must be 
learned by doing. Valuable abilities such as the instant recall of number facts are best 
instilled by drilling, perhaps even chanting. Large amounts of relatively 
uncomplicated information can often be best learned through listening to a lecture or 
reading a reference book. As Osborne (1996) notes, there is a role for didacticism, 
telling, showing and presenting. 
Yet this is not to say that all these methods would not be enhanced by being 
judiciously interleaved with narrow-sense communities of inquiry, which could 
introduce or reflect upon other activities. Indeed, I have argued (§8.23) that the 
community of inquiry is an excellent place to build the tools of inquiry that are 
foundational for other learning styles. As well, the planning of such other activities, 
in a class which has already internalized many of the tools of inquiry, could probably 
be usefully carried out within a class-wide dialogue. This picture is probably closer to 
what Lipman, and Splitter and Sharp have in mind in calling for the classroom to be 
converted into a wide-sense community of inquiry, and it mirrors more closely the 
scientific community of inquiry. 
However, even within such a classroom, as I discussed in §4.14, the teacher has a 
professional duty to organize the classroom, through the use of pedagogical action so 
that learning takes place. Here the teacher, drawing on the ideal speech situation for 
its regulative power (P.124), encourages the students to enter explicit critical 
discourse (4.123) in the form of philosophical inquiry (§7.3). This asymmetry in 
the positions of the teacher and students does not disappear (even though it might be 
lessened) when the class is capable of conducting a mature narrow-sense community 
of inquiry. At this stage, the students will have developed their communicative 
autonomy to a high level (§4.22) There does not seem to be any parallel to this 
pedagogic role in the scientific community of inquiry. 
A major problem with talk about transforming the classroom into a wide-sense 
community of inquiry in this way is that many teachers will claim already to have done 
so, even if they do not utilize a narrow-sense community of inquiry at all. And it is 
not prima facie evident that they are wrong in so claiming. There are, as the Peircean 
scientific community of inquiry shows us, many ways of engaging in inquiry. The 
Philosophy for Children movement claims to have developed an exceptionally 
powerful and effective way to do so, but we can hardly claim to have a monopoly on 
inquiry. While I claim that the use of the narrow-sense community of inquiry leads to 
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further important and essential enhancements, teachers have created classrooms in 
which the spirit of inquiry is strong using many different specific teaching methods. 
The conflation of the idea of the (narrow-sense) community of inquiry as a specific 
method for fostering philosophical discussion and critical discourse, with a (wide-
sense) classroom-wide ideal for the transformation of education, is a confusing and 
unnecessary one. What is distinctive and important about the narrow-sense 
community of inquiry risks being lost. As I have said, a narrow-sense community of 
inquiry can be usefully enriched by incorporating other methodologies, such as using 
materials other than stories as the trigger, breaking into small groups or pairs for 
specific tasks, or adjourning so that individual research can be carried out, before 
reconvening to discuss the outcomes. Indeed, the use of exercises and activities in 
Philosophy for Children support materials (see stage IV in Lipman's characterization 
of the community of inquiry above) already encourages such enrichment. But I 
propose henceforth to restrict my usage of "community of inquiry" to those classroom 
activities that largely fit with such enriched versions of Lipman's narrow-sense 
description. The concept of a classroom converted into a wide-sense community of 
inquiry ought to be marked by a different phrase, and I propose "the inquiring 
classroom community." 
In the remainder of this section, I want to expand and defend the contention that the 
community of inquiry, in the sense just delineated, ought to be used in classrooms as a 
core element of a program of moral education. In this, I shall draw further on the 
philosophical positions developed in Parts I and H. 
9.1 The Development of Reasonableness 
In §3.12, I identified five aspects of reasonableness: the critical, creative, committed, 
contextual and embodied aspects. To be reasonable, I argued, is to be able to 
incorporate all five aspects into one's thinking in a way which balances the imperatives 
of each, and does not give too great an emphasis to any one aspect. Due to this multi-
aspectual nature of reasonableness, we are unable to assert that there is one unique and 
decisive way to think about many complex problems (§3.126). Thus the idea of a 
Unitary, Universal Reason is not merely practically unattainable, but also ideally 
incoherent (see also §6.232). 
Reasonableness, however, must be one of our educational targets. It encompasses the 
intellectual virtues (§7.25) and is a corequisite for the possibilities both of becoming 
reflectively morally virtuous (§5.2) and becoming more autonomous (§4.2). As we 
have seen, reasonableness is multi-aspectual (§3.12) and does not fall prey to the 
problems that beset Unitary Reason (§6.2322). 
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Our pedagogical methods need to recognize this. Any method for developing 
reasonableness ought to invoke all five aspects as appropriate. Yet many thinking 
skills courses focus largely on critical reasoning, often breaking it down into many 
isolated skills which, it is thought, can be assembled into complex thinking. Hence, 
these sorts of programs teach formal logic, informal fallacies, identification of 
assumptions, argument structures, and so on through demonstration, worked 
examples and repetitive practice. Such teaching is commonly done on toy examples, 
specifically constructed to fit the skill being taught. These examples are usually quite 
divorced from the lived lives of the students, and almost never chosen by them. 3 
In a review of 27 studies on the influences on college students' critical thinking 
development, McMillan (1987) found that very few showed any significant changes 
due to specific courses or instructional methods, although they did conclude that weak 
research design in most cases meant that the conclusion that critical thinking courses 
were ineffective might not be warranted. There was, however, good evidence that 
college attendance as such did improve critical thinking, though the factors responsible 
had not been identified in these studies. He quotes Brabeck's (1983) opinion that 
critical thinking skills are necessary, but not sufficient, for the attainment of high 
levels of reflective judgement. In his discussion, McMillan claims that the evidence 
suggests that good critical thinking courses would have an everyday emphasis, a meta-
cognitive focus and be set in specific content domains. 
Pascarella and Terenzini (1991, Chapter 4) report similar conclusions about the 
effectiveness of critical thinking programs, and about general college attendance to 
McMillan' s. Factors they identified as associated with gains in critical thinking fell 
into two categories: general factors to do with activities at the college; and factors 
associated with classroom organization in specific courses. In the former category, 
they include following a general education curriculum, being socially and intellectually 
involved in college life, and having informal, non-classroom contact with lecturers. 
Within classrooms, the degree to which teachers encourage, praise or use student 
ideas; the degree to which students participate in the class; the extent of peer-to-peer 
interaction; an emphasis on high cognitive level student discussion, problem-solving 
or learning-cycle/inquiry techniques; and small class size were all associated with 
improved thinking. 
From studies such as these, we can gain some clues as to which factors to look for 
when trying to find effective methods of improving the thinking of students. 
McMillan's advice that thinking needs to be situated both in everyday settings, and 
3 This characterization of thinking skills courses owes much to van Gelder (1998). 
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within specific content domains, is supported by my analysis of reasonableness, for 
these factors connect to the committed, embodied and contextual aspects of thinking. 
If thinking is richly contextualized in a way that connects to the everyday lifeworld of 
the students, then this will entail that the committed and embodied aspects of thinking 
will be enlisted. If the context creates real piuzles, and the students are motivated to 
try to solve them, then both the critical and creative aspects will also be involved. If 
the means of dealing with these is relatively open-ended and student-driven, then the 
aspects will be invoked when the discursive context requires them, and they will be 
incorporated in an integrated way. The classroom list of Pascarella and Terenzini 
(with the possible exception of the small class size) reads like a list of tips to a teacher 
in a community of inquiry. 
The community of inquiry approach used in the Philosophy for Children program 
matches many of the features identified above. Starting by reading a story taps in to 
the strengths of narrative, as a way of grounding the discussion in a context 
recognizable to the participants. Since the students set the agenda for the discussion 
by asking their own questions, the link to their own interests and lifeworld is 
strengthened. Thus they will engage not just critically, but also emotionally and 
viscerally, making connections through the offering and analysis of anecdotes (this 
will be further developed in §10.223). Student ideas and speculations form the grist 
of the discourse, and are analysed, modified, accepted or rejected, on the basis of a 
rich investigation of the reasons for and against them. Conceptual analysis encourages 
students to explore imaginatively the concepts involved, so learning how they can be 
metaphorically extended in concrete situations (§7.23). Student participation, 
particularly peer-to-peer, is paramount, though, as we saw in §4.141, the teacher's 
pedagogic action entails strategic action that ensures the discourse attains sufficient 
rigour. This scaffolding is an essential element of Vygotskian learning. 
The case presented here supports the thesis that a classroom community of inquiry 
provides an effective means for developing reasonableness in all its aspects. The 
claim that Philosophy for Children has positive impacts on children's thinking has 
been supported in a series of empirical studies, although the focus of these studies has 
been almost entirely on the critical aspect of thinking, with some minor attention to the 
creative and committed aspects. Fourteen are summarized in Lipman (1986), and 
another four in Gazzard (1988). Between them, these studies found that classes using 
Philosophy for Children materials showed gains statistically significantly greater that 
control classes in reasoning ability (including formal inferences, finding alternatives 
and possibilities, providing reasons and ideational productivity), reading 
comprehension, reading and maths achievement, moral justifications, self-concept and 
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teacher perceptions of their ability to function rationally. In my own work (Sprod 
1994c; 1997c, d; 1998), I was able to demonstrate that a Year 7 science class that 
incorporated a Philosophy for Children approach showed significantly greater gains in 
scientific reasoning when compared to a control class, and that the Vygotskian theory 
outlined above best accounted for the gains (see §8.21). I will return to this study in 
§10.222, where I present some empirical evidence that all the aspects of 
reasonableness were used by students in those discussions. 
This is true independent of the specifics of its content matter, provided it is rich 
enough for inquiry. As Splitter (1997) argues, the investigative nature of the 
community of inquiry ensures that, "irrespective of whether the inquiry engaged in by 
a community is philosophical, the community itself is philosophical." He makes this 
claim on the basis that any community of inquiry at any depth will soon have to deal 
with common, central contestable concepts: common in that they are found in 
everyday talk (fair, good, beauty etc.); central in that they are vital to the way we make 
sense of our experience; and contestable in that they "resist our best efforts to define 
them with clarity and finality." Such concepts "help to establish philosophy as a 
discipline with its own content or subject matter," so that a philosophical investigation 
is not just a process, but a process that includes engagement with this sort of concept. 
The procedure, of course, is as important as the concepts, for to deal with the concepts 
in a manner that is not reasonable (in my sense) would be not to engage 
philosophically with them. Reasoning is at once the tool-kit and part of the content of 
philosophy, for a reasonable inquiry into concepts will not erect barriers that prevent 
investigation of the method of the inquiry. Inquiry will turn reflexively onto its own 
methods, and thus introduce the meta-cognitive element that McMillan (1987) 
identified as being so important. Yet this reflexive investigation of the tools of 
reasonableness sits firmly within a context, and since the tools are being honed to 
serve a present need in an inquiry chosen by the participants, it is their contextualized 
usefulness that is established. Thus is the critical aspect of thinking dependent on the 
contextual aspect. A community of inquiry will use and reflect on the same tools 
many times in different contexts, thus encouraging the sort of generalization from 
context that leads to more domain-general reasoning. 
Thus, both philosophical and empirical evidence supports the contention that a 
community of inquiry is a powerful pedagogical method for fostering reasonableness, 
though future empirical work ought to pay more attention to all the aspects. Indeed, 
since the community of inquiry is in a sense merely a formalization and intensification 
of Habermasian communicative action and critical discourse (§4.123 and §4.124) that 
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form reasonableness in the lifeworld, deliberately scaffolded by the teacher through 
pedagogical action (§4.141), there is every reason to believe that this would be so. 
9.2 Ethical Development in the Community of Inquiry 
In the preceding subsection, I made the case for the community of inquiry as a 
pedagogy for the development of reasonableness, and I asserted that the specific 
content of the inquiry is not critical, provided that it engages with Splitter' s common, 
central and contestable concepts. In this subsection, I will focus more closely on 
communities of ethical inquiry. I will investigate the contribution that the engagement 
of students in such inquiries can make to their development as ethical persons. 
It is important to be clear from the start that I am not making the hegemonic claim that 
all that is needed to produce ethical persons is to engage them in a community of 
ethical inquiry (in the pedagogical sense that I am using here). There are three things 
to say about this. Firstly, as I discussed at the commencement of Chapter Eight, 
neither classroom teachers nor schools as a whole have a monopoly on moral 
education. Secondly, even within a classroom, the teacher uses many other means of 
moral education, such as listing, explaining and enforcing a set of classroom rules, 
enforcing and reasoning about informal or implicit expectations of behaviour and so 
on (§8.1). 
Thirdly, there is a broader sense in which we are all engaged in an informal, society 
wide community of ethical inquiry. This is seen every time a child asks "Why?" when 
required to act ethically, or when a parent offers a reason for requiring behaviour even 
without being challenged. It is a Habermasian engagement in communicative action, 
possibly transformed at times into practical discourse, that is an essential part of the 
lifeworld. As we have seen, this blurs any sharp distinction between moral education 
and moral training. This brings us closer to some of the central concerns of this 
thesis, for as we saw at the conclusion of §8.23, this type of moral development of the 
young can be equally well described in Habermasian language, or using the 
Aristotelian language of habituation into the virtues mediated by practical wisdom 
(§5.21). 
This last point, however, does highlight one of the most important features of the 
community of inquiry as a pedagogic method. It is not a totally new and strange 
method of learning to the children who take part in it for the first time, because it 
formalizes and makes more explicit the communicative action and discourse that 
children will have engaged in frequently. Here, Habermas' account has the advantage 
over Aristotle's account which (as we saw in §5.21 and §5.23) has been interpreted to 
mean that children cannot take part in philosophical inquiry. For Habermas, the 
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young are not excluded from engagement in practical discourse. Indeed, they may 
enter into practical discourse (albeit at a low level of competence) whenever they, or 
others in their dialogical group, call a validity claim into question. 
It is this familiarity that provides much of the power of the method, and it also leads to 
students claiming that they are not doing any work while they are participating in a 
community of inquiry. Nevertheless, there are important differences as well. The 
formalization, the larger group than is normal in lifeworld conversations (which can 
lead to problems with the dynamics of turn taking), the more explicit focus on inquiry 
and the fuller coverage of ideas expected are all features that can make a community of 
inquiry strange to students. As the discussion in §4.141 made clear, the major 
difference lies in the pedagogic action of the teacher. Communicative actions and 
discourses within the lifeworld do not generally contain participants who are moulding 
the conversation for concealed ends, for if they did, Habermas would claim they were 
examples of strategic action instead. Yet when a more experienced person - teacher, 
parent, coach etc. - is involved with less experienced persons in an instructional role, 
they must through pedagogic action include some strategic actions (even if the ends 
need not remain concealed once they are made a subject of the inquiry). It is part of 
their pedagogic role, and this is especially important in a community of inquiry. 
A community of ethical inquiry takes ethical concerns as its content. This means that 
the set of concepts to be raised by the initial story will include a large number of the 
common, central and contestable concepts of ethical life. We can expect stories in 
which the characters find themselves in situations with ethical implications, wondering 
what is the fair, right, good or acceptable thing to do. We can expect them to be 
considering their own actions and reactions, reflecting on what sort of person they 
wish to be. For this, they will simultaneously need to develop their reasonableness, 
for this is essential to the ability to engage in such considerations. The situations in 
which these concerns arise will not be extraordinary ones, but rather they will be set in 
the sorts of narratives that might engage ordinary children in their everyday lives. Yet 
the outcomes of the story will not be clear cut and unproblematic: these are not fables 
with neat morals at the end, like Aesop's fables. Nor will the philosophical puzzles 
that arise be restricted to ethical ones, for life is not so neatly compartmentalized either. 
The Philosophy for Children canon contains quite a number of stories of this sort. 
First (chronologically) and foremost (in terms of length and depth) among them is 
Matthew Lipman's novel Lisa (1983), with its accompanying manual Ethical Inquiry 
(Lipman and Sharp 1985). It is worth looking in some detail at what Lipman has to 
say about ethical inquiry in his Introduction. 
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Lipman characterizes ethical inquiry as an "objective and dispassionate inquiry into 
moral problems and moral situations. Its aim is never to indoctrinate, but rather to 
help people more clearly understand what their moral options are and how those 
options can be critically assessed." He contrasts ethical inquiry with values 
clarification, decision-making and moral-dilemma stage theory, averring that each has 
something to offer moral education, but none covers the whole of it. To identify 
moral education with decision-making or moral-dilemma stage theory is, he avers, like 
identifying farming with harvesting. Although harvesting is essential in farming, it is 
by no means the whole of it. For good moral decisions to be made, the ground must 
be prepared first, and so Lipman claims that 
a sound moral education minimally involves helping children understand: what 
criteria are and how they function; the significance of assumptions; the process of 
reasoning; the giving of good reasons; the moral character of situations; the relative 
importance of and proportion between parts and wholes; the opinions of other 
people; the interests of the community in which one finds oneself; the need to take 
all relevant factors into account; the need to weigh consequences; the importance of 
neither overestimating or underestimating the role of the self in the context of a 
moral situation; the importance of sizing up other people's and one's own 
intentions; the anticipation of possible harm as a result of one's actions, both to 
others and to oneself andk] the fundamental importance of preventing moral crises 
before they occur. 
Such a project is, according to Lipman, long term and open-ended, preparing students 
both to adapt to change, and to hold on to the valuable in a changing and pluralistic 
world. He asserts that: 
The aim of ethical inquiry is not to teach children certain particular values; it is 
rather an open-ended, sustained consideration of the values, standards and practices by 
which we live, discussed openly and publicly so as to take all points of view and all 
facts into account. It is the assumption of ethical inquiry that such discussion and 
reflection, taking place in an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidence, and 
impartiality, can do more to foster moral responsibility and moral intelligence in 
children than any system which merely acquaints them with "the rules" and then 
insists that they "do their duty." 
This account fits well with the case developed in this thesis, though I shall comment 
on one discrepancy shortly. Lipman, like me, sees ethical education as a wide ranging 
and long term endeavour. While his list of necessary conceptual capacities shows that 
an account of rationality essentially underlies ethical inquiry, this list is expansive, and 
includes important creative and contextual elements. The rationale for such an 
emphasis is particularly acute given the diversity of modem society. With his farming 
metaphor, Lipman follows Aristotle in claiming that ethical action springs from a 
reflectively modified character immersed in context. Like Aristotle and Habermas, 
Lipman recognizes that we all live in a value-laden lifeworld, habituated to certain 
values, standards and practices, and that the purpose of ethical education is to 
strengthen the ability to reflexively assess them. His emphasis on open and public 
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discussion echoes Habermas' insistence that this reflection must be dialogical, not 
monological and, though he doesn't explicitly say so here, in Thinking in Education 
(1991, Chapter 15) he makes it clear that this will also prepare the child to enter the 
larger discourses of democratic society. The reference to an atmosphere of mutual 
trust, confidence and impartiality shows that ethical inquiry must be grounded in 
respect. 
The one detail with which I would disagree is in the description of the inquiry as 
"objective and dispassionate." Lipman is concerned that the inquiry ought to be aimed 
at reaching beyond the idiosyncratic views of any one individual, and that the moral 
positions advanced ought to be supported reasonably, and not through displays of 
partisan emotion. However, in the light of my discussions of agreement (§6.21) and 
reasonableness (especially in §3.123), a better description of the inquiry would be that 
it ought to be tolerant and appropriately passionate. The committed aspect of thinking 
is essential if judgement is to be linked to action and this requires passion, but 
inappropriate displays of intolerant passion will not assist the inquiry. Objectivity can 
only be understood in the sense of the search for intersubjective agreement, either in 
consensus, or in agreement to disagree. 
As we have seen, following Aristotle, to be ethically good is to act in accordance with 
virtue, and this requires doing the right thing in the right way at the right time (§5.2). 
Deciding the right thing is something that arises from character. So, if we are to be 
responsible for our actions, we must be responsible for our characters. If our 
character were to be merely the product of our upbringing, then we could not be 
responsible. Yet in the absence of obvious ethical disability, our society will hold us 
responsible. Now, my account of habituation (§5.23) shows that there is no such 
thing as a mindless habituation, for even habitual actions need judgement concerning 
context and suitability. Yet, even if we have been habituated well, it is possible to be 
relatively unreflective in our ethical actions and hence to be prone to make poor 
judgements. 
One essential element of moral character, then, is the ability to read ethical contexts 
well and to act reflectively according to virtue. In frequently occurring ethical 
contexts, these responses can be automatized, but to be a morally mature person 
requires the ability to withdraw from action in order to reflect when circumstances are 
such as to call these automatic responses into question. This reflective ability itself, as 
I have argued, is parasitic on engagement in communicative action and (especially) 
critical discourse. Although we all do so engage in our ordinary lives, schools can 
provide opportunities both for building the capacities of reasonableness on which 
reflection is based, and for deliberating collectively about the ethical import of many 
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different factors in different contexts. The community of ethical inquiry is an ideal 
setting for both. 
Collaborative reflection is important for morality not only because our reasoning is 
improved through Vygotskian learning, but also because ethical decisions almost 
always concern our relationship with others. Our ability to frame a situation morally 
depends crucially, as Lipman notes, on our ability to read others in various ways and 
incorporate consideration of their interests. This too cannot be learned monologically. 
Exhortations to "do as you would be done by" are worthless (or even harmful) unless 
we are able to imaginatively situate ourselves as we would be situated if we were the 
other, rather than if we were ourselves in the other's place. Developing Arendt's 
"visiting imagination" (Glaser 1998) is something that can only be done dialogically, 
and the community of inquiry, with its dynamic aimed at understanding the other, 
enables Vygotskian learning of this capacity too. 
Schools are places where disembedded (or decontextualized) thought is both valued 
and taught (Donaldson 1978,76-78). For this reason, perennial complaints arise that 
school knowledge is not transferable to the "real world" (see also Claxton 1991; 
Solomon 1992, for discussion in the context of science education; Splitter and Sharp 
1995, 70-79). Similar difficulties arise in moral education, where general principles 
of morality can be taught, but remain somewhat disconnected from real world 
situations. This is, of course, exactly the problem identified by Habermas when he 
makes the distinction between discourses of justification and discourses of application, 
as discussed in §7.24. 
While we might all agree that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that we ought always to be 
honest, just how to apply this in specific situations is underdetermined by this 
agreement. Johnson (1993, 91-98) discusses at length the reasons why this should be 
so, given the prototypical structure of the concept "lie." Central examples (the 
deliberate attempt to mislead the hearer using a statement the speaker knows to be 
false, in such a way as to disadvantage the hearer and advantage the speaker) are 
relatively unproblematic, but examples that are somewhat like this is some respects, 
but unlike in others (a white lie to protect the hearer's interests, for example) are more 
difficult to deal with. Pritchard (1996) also discusses the case of lying and honesty at 
length, comparing the simplistic and moralistic cautionary tale told of George 
Washington, who allegedly claimed as a child "I cannot tell a lie, father," with the 
picture book Honest Andrew (Skurzynski 1980), in which young Andrew Otter 
comes face-to-face with the difficulties of trying to live up to his father's advice that 
"an otter ought to be honest." 
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As Pritchard claims, it is by the dialogical exploration of stories like Honest Andrew in 
a community of inquiry, rather than by blindly following George Washington's simple 
rule, that children can come to grips with the tension between abstract, 
decontextualized moral principles and situated moral action. Pritchard invokes the 
notion of casuistry, or case-by-case reasoning. If we turn to the exploration of 
morally puzzling cases with children, he claims, then moral development is enhanced 
by the search for agreement, the development of shared principles, which are 
nevertheless open to revision from new cases, the sorting out of relevant similarities 
and differences, and by attention to nuances. Such development needs good character 
as well as good reasoning, and open discussion to build familiarity with context. In 
Habermasian terms, a community of inquiry must by turns enter discourses of 
justification, to generate moral principles (i.e. rules of thumb for moral judgement) 
and discourses of application, both to hone the ability to invoke them in the context of 
lifeworld applications, and to test these principles against problematic cases. A 
student who can do this is communicatively autonomous. In Aristotelian terms, virtue 
cannot be identified with the following of mechanically habituated virtues. To be 
virtuous requires situated practical wisdom together with caring about the sort of 
person one is (§5.2). If one does not approve of one's habits, one has a responsibility 
to habituate new virtues. Thus, under a virtue ethics account, do children become 
morally autonomous. The Habermasian story, however, makes it clear that such 
autonomy is parasitic on the intersubjective development of the requisite situated 
rationality (i.e. reasonableness). 
In the pursuit of well-being under virtue ethics, rightish questions of how to treat 
others justly and goodish ones of how to serve my own best interests intertwine (see 
§6.24 on the rightish/goodish distinction). Children, and particularly adolescents, are 
very interested in the intersection of the two. As Lipman and Sharp (1985) point out, 
they are not only concerned with what is right in total, but also with what is right for 
me. Many adolescents are torn between a strong moral sense and a burgeoning 
individuality, trying to discover or invent who they are. In the light of this, questions 
of whether a society has a right to impose standards on its members, and whether 
individuals have a right to flout them, are live and contentious. No easy line can be 
drawn between the right and the good, and the community of inquiry is a safe haven in 
which to negotiate these burning issues in their lifeworld. Moral maturity and 
autonomy requires the ability to integrate the two (see Gilligan 1982, Chapter 6, for an 
interesting parallel account of maturity as the ability to integrate separation and 
connection). 
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I have made a case that the community of ethical inquiry ought to be an essential part 
of a program of school-based moral education, on the broad grounds that it improves 
children's abilities to be reasonable about ethical matters. Yet there are two possible 
objections to a reasoning based approach to moral education. Firstly, if one decides in 
discourse that certain things ought, or ought not, to be done, this does not entail that 
one will actually do, or avoid doing, those things. Secondly, practice in rationally 
deciding that certain actions are right or wrong may merely lead to the ability to 
rationalize one's actions as right, whether they are or not. I characterize these 
problems as the problem of turning judgements into actions, and of bush lawyerism, 
respectively, and will discuss them below. 
9.21 Judgement to Action 
Socrates famously held that if you know the right, you will do the right, to which 
Aristotle replied that this is "manifestly at odds with the observed facts" (see Rowe's 
discussion, 1993, 125-126). Certainly, we all have experience, even if only minor, of 
knowing what we think we ought to do, and of nevertheless doing what we think we 
ought not. There are two possible reasons for this outcome: weakness of the will; and 
knowing the good but choosing to do evil. I do not wish to explore this problem here, 
but merely to point out that it is a perennial problem for all moral agents, and that it is 
unlikely to be solved by a particular form of moral education. 
Nevertheless, it is a reasonable question to ask of any proposed moral education 
program whether it contains the resources to strengthen the link between judgement 
and action. A program which turned out persons who could unerringly identify the 
right thing to do, but who seldom actually did it would not be producing morally good 
persons. In relation to the community of ethical inquiry, I shall offer two sorts of 
answer to this question. Firstly, I have repeatedly pointed out that the community of 
ethical inquiry cannot stand on its own as the whole of a moral education program: it 
must form part of a wider package. Secondly, it does have features that give it an 
important role to play in linking judgement to action. 
The wider package to which the first point above refers includes elements that 
recognize that the carrying through of judgement into action requires practice. 
Consequently, a total school-based moral education package ought to have elements 
that are directly related to actions with moral import. This will include a social setting 
in which students are expected to take responsibility for their actions, and which 
imposes rewards and sanctions for actions which are respectively morally 
commendable or morally blameworthy. It will also include opportunities and 
encouragements to perform morally desirable actions. Additionally, teachers and 
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others in positions of authority within the school will provide good role models for 
ethically good action. This admittedly broad brush sketch of the other components of 
a full moral education program is not meant to be exhaustive or detailed, as my focus 
here is on the community of ethical inquiry. I merely mean to indicate that other 
elements are also essential. 
I cannot be so sketchy with respect to the other answer. The resources the community 
of inquiry has for strengthening the link between judgement and action are important 
to my argument that it ought to be used in a moral education program. Before doing 
so, it is worth noting that much moral judgement is not explicit. In relatively 
unproblematic situations (or situations we perceive as unproblematic), moral actions 
are largely habituated or automatized. This is the case in many everyday moral 
situations, and if we have built a good character, we make tacit judgements about the 
right thing to do, and then do it. The question of linking judgement to action thus has 
two prongs: What do we do when we are faced with a morally charged situation that is 
sufficiently unusual that we are forced to make an explicit rather than tacit judgement? 
How do we react when we find that our tacit judgements (i.e., our habituated 
reactions) are not leading us to take actions about which we are sure we approve? 
The first, and possibly narrowest, way in which participation in a community of 
ethical inquiry helps to link judgement to action becomes evident when we note that 
students in such a community are acting every time they contribute to the community. 
Speech is an act in itself, as are such forms of non-verbal communication as nodding 
in agreement, looking disdainful and so on. In a community based on respect, actions 
and utterances which are respectful of others are encouraged and reinforced. In the 
initial stages of building a community, these respectful actions may be continually 
encouraged by the teacher, or made the subject of negotiation within the community. 
Once the community is well established, they will be largely habituated. Nevertheless, 
students will be able to make respectful or disrespectful actions within the community 
once more the subject of the discussion, and hence be able to evaluate the reasoning 
that leads to the actions. 
It is important to realize that this account is restricted to action and judgement within 
the community itself. Since we know that competency is contextualized, we cannot 
expect that students who can link moral judgement to moral action excellently in the 
classroom community of ethical inquiry will unproblematically transfer this 
competency to their everyday lives. It is for this reason that the community ought to 
form part of a wider moral education package, as discussed above. Nevertheless, 
there are still other resources within the community of ethical inquiry that can assist 
this task. 
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Damon (1996), pointing out that empirical studies find that it is rarely the case that 
moral views are completely melded with an image of one's self, says that this fact 
implies that moral judgement not in itself a good indicator of morality. Morally 
praiseworthy persons, he claims, need both moral beliefs and also a strong personal 
identification with them, so that they have a place of great importance in one's sense of 
self. The community of inquiry often focuses on exploration of what it is to be a 
person (Splitter and Sharp 1995, 167-171), and thus, through reflexive consideration, 
each participant will reflect about the sort of person they are becoming: a view that 
parallels Aristotle's (§5.2), but gives it (as does Habermas) a dialogical twist. The 
habituation for linking thought and action practiced within the community can be 
carried over into the wider community through seeing one's self as a character in an 
ongoing story. 
Philosophy for Children emphasizes narratives, and narratives, as continuing stories, 
frequently link the judgements that characters make to their subsequent actions. There 
are two levels on which this can happen: firstly, for the characters in the stories used 
as trigger materials for discussion and, secondly, for the students of the community 
itself, in that they include anecdotes about their own lives into the discussion.4 
Indeed, when participants inject into the discussion a story from their own life, they 
are not only able to reflect more explicitly about their own actions, but they also 
provide to the other participants the opportunity to see into others' lives. In 
Vygotskian fashion, this strengthens their moral imagination. Jointly, the community 
can explore an issue through taking into account not just disembodied reasons for 
abstract cases, but multiple perspectives on situations drawn from the lifeworld of 
their peers. This continuing symbiosis between conceptual exploration and lived 
experience aids transfer from discussion to action. 
The linking of the fictional narratives to lived narratives is more likely to happen the 
richer the fictional narratives are. We can consider Kohlberg's moral dilemmas as 
narratives, but they are thin, devoid of interesting contextualization about the 
characters and situations. For this reason, some of those confronted with them 
(women more often than men), find it very difficult to come to judgement in the 
absence of such information (Gilligan 1982, 100-101). The longer stories and novels 
used in the Philosophy for Children program allow for the building of context and 
deeper understanding of the characters of the fictional characters in the story (indeed, it 
is hardly coincidental that the word "character" is used in both these senses). 
4 The place of anecdotes in a community of inquiry is further explored in §10.223. 
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The richness of the narratives used in the community of ethical inquiry is reinforced by 
the rich account of reasonableness that underlies the community. Instead of a narrow 
concentration on the formal correctness of arguments that lead to judgement, having a 
multi-aspectual understanding of reasonableness leads to a stress on integrating 
critical, creative and committed thinking in the light of specific contexts and visceral 
reactions. Certainly, there is a need to be able to monitor arguments for validity, but 
without the capacity to imaginative extend our prototypical understanding, or to put 
ourselves in others' shoes, we will not be able to fmd ways of morally considering the 
most interesting and puzzling morally charged situations (see Johnson 1993, Chapter 
8, for a full account of the place of moral imagination in moral thought). If we rigidly 
exclude emotions from our moral thought, then, as Hume so rightly pointed out (see 
§3.123), there is no way to motivate even the most logically impeccable moral 
judgements (or even the desire to come to judgement itself). 
Nor should we seek to separate out the considerations of a community of inquiry into 
episodes that consider each of these aspects independently, although there might be 
times when one or other is given greater emphasis. Certainly, we will sometimes 
want to abstract to a degree away from particular contexts, as we enter discourse 
concerned more with justification, but we will need to take much more notice of 
contextual matters as the discourse veers towards application. Sometimes, we will 
need to concentrate fully for a while on the structure of an argument, or the reasons 
why we feel strongly about a certain matter, but the conversation as a whole will need 
to cover these and other matters as the discussion requires. 
Without the capacity to reflect on their own actions, especially in a way that 
incorporates a well grounded ability to envision the ways in which the particular others 
who are involved might see them, children will not be able to evaluate their actions 
well. Communal reflection is the method by which such individual reflection can be 
best built (§3.23). This ability to reflect is certainly not a sufficient condition for 
moral action, and neither, at least in simple, prototypical cases, is it necessary. But it 
is necessary for taking the sort of care about our character that Aristotle identifies as 
being so important (see §5.2). In other words, it is important if we are, as moral 
agents, to approach autonomy (§4.22). 
9.22 Bush Lawyers 
A "bush lawyer," in Australian usage as defined by the Macquarie Online Dictionary, 
is "one who attempts complicated and often specious arguments to prove a point." 
The worry here is that if we improve students' abilities to reason about morality, they 
will use this ability to excuse their actions even when those actions are not morally 
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good, and they know they are not. This is often expressed by saying that they are 
offering, not reasons, but rationalizations for their actions. 
Let's try to be clearer about the distinction between reasons and rationalizations. The 
key question is whether the person offering the reasons really believes them. If they 
are offering reasons duplicitously, then these are not reasons, but mere 
rationalizations. It can also be the case, however, that reasons are employed to bolster 
a certain degree of self-deception. If the self-deception is, at a more basic level, being 
knowingly practiced, these reasons are rationalizations. 
An example will make these points clearer. Fred is found shoplifting a small item 
from a bin on the pavement outside a shop (I shall assume for the sake of this example 
that this is in fact an immoral act, and that Fred knows this). When asked why, Fred 
offers a number of reasons: the shop is part of a big chain who can afford it; the shop 
rips people off anyway, so we ought to rip it off in return; if they place temptation in 
people's way, they are asking for things to be taken; capitalism is evil, so stealing 
from capitalists is morally acceptable. If Fred knows that shoplifting is clearly a case 
of stealing and thus morally wrong, then his "reasons" are really rationalizations. 
Fred is just be trying to talk his way out of trouble. Alternatively, Fred might really 
want the item, and be looking for some way to convince himself that it is really all 
right to take it. If he heard someone advance the above reasons and pretty well 
convinced himself that he believed them, then he would be self-deceptively 
rationali7ing his act. Finally, Fred may be a member of a group who genuinely 
believes these arguments. For him, these are good reasons and hence not 
rationalizations, even though, for us, they are bad reasons. 
If, through the community of ethical inquiry, we improve a child's ability to reason in 
moral matters, this reasoning can be used genuinely, duplicitously or self-deceptively. 
Used genuinely, it will improve that child's ability to identify the right and wrong acts. 
But we cannot rule out the possibility that it will be used duplicitously or self-
deceptively, nor do I think that there is anything we can do to guarantee that this will 
not happen. The question is: is there anything in the nature of the community of 
ethical inquiry that will tend to decrease the likelihood of either of these things 
happening? I believe that there is. 
The key to this assertion is the community part of the community of inquiry. 
Participants within the community have responsibilities to the community. These 
include the responsibility to try to establish their position if it is challenged, the 
responsibility to challenge another's position if it seems problematic, and the 
responsibility of respect for each other. In an established community, these 
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responsibilities will be taken seriously, and in a new one, the teacher will insist that 
they are. 
The upshot of this responsibility is that it ought not to be easy to get away with 
duplicitous reasoning (provided, of course, that the whole community is not similarly 
duplicitous on this point). Any student who believes that the position put forward by 
another is wrong can, and has a responsibility to, challenge that position (or, failing a 
student challenge, the teacher must wield pedagogic action: see §10.23 for further 
discussion). In the ensuing discussion, rationalizations will have to compete with 
reasons. While there is no guarantee that the reasons will expose the rationalizations, 
the challenge will at least ensure that the duplicitous reasoner will either have to 
construct a strong and coherent case through rationalizations, or admit that the case 
will not stand. In this need for public justification, the bona fides of the participants 
can be tested, and the duplicitous player will have pressure brought to bear to return to 
genuinely held views. 
Self-deceptive views can be genuinely held, of course. The participant who offers 
reasons in defence of a view that is based on self-deception will not be deliberately 
trying to "pull the wool over the eyes" of the other participants. Nevertheless, the 
challenge that their views are likely to provoke will lead to a closer look at some of the 
assumptions that underlie the view advanced. In this deeper examination of views, 
and of the person that propounds it, greater self-transparency will be gradually 
constructed. The self-deception will be replaced with a clearer self-understanding. Of 
course, the actor might now turn to other-deception and hold onto the view in this 
way, but in most cases, the disappearance of self-deception will lead in the other 
direction. 
My discussion so far has applied to the classroom community only. The broader 
society into which the students go is not a community of inquiry, and none of the 
responsibilities I have outlined might hold. It seems that it might be possible for a 
student to learn reasoning within the community, and be constrained there to avoid 
duplicity, but to use specious reasoning quite deliberately when others do not 
question. Clearly, if the education system as a whole equips students with Postman 
and Weingartner's (1969) "crap detector," then the conditions for practicing duplicity 
in the wider community would be lessened. 
There is an additional safeguard in the method of the community of inquiry, for the 
charge that teaching moral reasoning only produces bush lawyers assumes that good 
reasoning in this argumentative sense (i.e. largely the critical aspect) will be learned 
independently of any moral flavour. In a community that works on the rich model of 
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reasonableness I have outlined, discussions will be shot through with the imaginative 
empathizing with others that lies at the core of moral sentiment, and investigations of 
one's own, and others', emotional commitment that drives good thinking. If such 
thinking is built publicly by the community, then the Vygotskian internalization of this 
thinking will ensure that these aspects are well integrated in the individual thinking of 
the students. By contrast, thinking that is taught in a disembodied, decontextualized 
way will make this sort of separation of good (as in efficient) thinking from good (as 
in morally acceptable) thinking much more likely. 
My account is a little too simplistic. Not all (or even most) disagreement within the 
community implies that somebody is being duplicitous or deluded. The respect which 
must be taken as a foundational ideal within the community (§6.24) means that neither 
side ought to level one of these charges at the other without good reason. Caring for 
another does not always mean shielding them from attack, even though it might often 
do so, but it does influence the manner in which such an attack might be made. 
In summary, any time we teach children to reason better, we run the risk that they may 
misuse that reasoning. The best safeguard against this outcome is to teach reasoning 
in a way that avoids divorcing it from its moral uses. The community of ethical 
inquiry meets this condition. For if we want to educate children so as to become 
moral persons, we must teach them to reason. A person with poor reasoning may be 
crudely habituated to "do the right thing" in some centrally common situations, but 
they will lack the capacity to be a fully functioning moral agent with a large degree of 
moral autonomy in situations with any degree of moral puzzlement or import about 
them (§5.21). 
9.3 The Place of the Teacher 
So far my account of the community of ethical inquiry in the classroom has 
concentrated largely on the students. Yet, as we have seen especially in §4.141, the 
teacher has a central and important role in the community. The teacher must wield 
power via pedagogic action if the classroom is to be transformed into a community of 
ethical inquiry in the first place, since children left to their own devices would be most 
unlikely to spontaneously form such a community. 
The teacher inevitably occupies a unique place in the classroom. Students do not, and 
probably cannot, consider the teacher as like just another student. Teachers are 
expected to try to organize the classroom, and to take responsibility for the overall 
conduct of the room. This is not to say that the teacher always has the de facto power 
in a classroom, for the students may usurp that. But the teacher is the de jure power, 
and this position means that, however teachers act, whether they have effective power 
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or not, their behaviour will have a special (quite possibly greater) impact on the 
students than the behaviour of another student. 
I will not discuss the case of the teacher who has greatly diminished authority within 
the classroom, for it would seem to be impossible to create a community of inquiry 
under such conditions. Rather, I intend to analyse the place of the teacher in a 
properly constituted community of ethical inquiry. In such a classroom, we can 
assume that the teacher has the respect of the students in the class, and that respect 
extends also to fellow students. We cannot, however, assume that the same type of 
respect is extended to the other students as to the teacher. Indeed, it will differ, for the 
students will respect, among other things, the authority of the teacher, whereas they 
will not attribute the same sort of authority to each other. 
In what does this authority consist? Clearly, one of the prime areas of authority 
recognized by the students in the teacher is organizational authority. While students 
have a clear right to request another student to do something, the teacher has the 
authority to demand it. Students can suggest classroom activities, topics of 
discussion, work to be done and so on, while teachers can, indeed have a duty to, take 
overall control of these matters. It is teachers who in the end decide on the delivery of 
the curriculum, even if they derive their authority from the educational system and may 
at times (whilst retaining a veto) devolve some of this authority to the students. 
To leave the picture at this would be to imply that the teacher's authority is purely 
coercive (as indeed it is in part). Organizational authority that depends on such factors 
as age and external power structures can be seen as somewhat arbitrary. But in 
reality, the power of a teacher rests also on epistemic authority: that is, the teacher is 
not only in authority, but also is an authority. Students respect teachers and willingly 
cede power to them largely insofar as they respect both the knowledge that teachers 
have and the ability to impart that knowledge. Teachers largely have their 
organizational power delegated to them on the same basis. 
The epistemic authority of a teacher ensures that any view that teacher expresses will 
(in the absence of good reasons to the contrary) be given a far greater weight than 
would be given to the same view if expressed by a student. That there is a real 
asymmetry between the epistemic authority of the teacher and the student can be seen 
in the fact that a teacher may almost always flatly contradict a student's assertion 
without anyone thinking it impertinent, whereas the opposite is certainly not so. In 
many cases, particularly when the teacher's view concerns matters of relatively 
uncontested facts, this greater epistemic weight for teacher utterances is perfectly 
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reasonable. However, when the view is more contestable, as is often the case in 
matters of value - and with many facts - the matter is more complex. 
I do not wish to enter into the argument concerning the fact/value distinction, other 
than to note that some alleged "facts" can be very contentious, while some values can 
be widely accepted and uncontentious. Indeed, teachers and schools assert and 
reinforce certain values, such as the importance of listening to the teacher, or the 
unacceptability of hitting other students in class, on a regular and largely uncontested 
basis. These values can be quite explicit (appearing on lists of classroom rules and so 
on), or they can be implicit, perhaps being promoted by the teacher without explicit 
awareness that this is what is being done. These "attitudes and values [implicitly] 
conveyed by the content or the process of learning" have been "referred to as the 
'hidden curriculum'." (Henry, Knight et al. 1988, 60). These hidden curriculum 
values are promoted by the school with relatively little overt discussion of their 
suitability. 
Many of the values of the hidden curriculum are not at all contentious, even when they 
are made explicit. For example, the cluster of values associated with respect largely 
fall into this category, although there may be many contentions about how exactly 
respect ought to be manifested. Some values of the hidden curriculum, when 
unmasked, may become highly contentious. For example, teachers who believe that 
they run open, thinking classrooms ("I ask lots of questions") can be shown to be 
keeping a tight reign on the class through the questions, and promoting a "guess what 
the teacher thinks" mentality (Hull 1985; Edwards and Mercer 1987; Lemke 1990). 
The values taught in such classrooms (valuable knowledge is bitty and already known) 
can run directly contrary to the espoused values of the teacher. 
The values of the teacher as expressed in the hidden curriculum need not go 
unchallenged, even if the students themselves are not explicitly aware of the values. 
They can be challenged in an equally hidden way, through the misbehaviour of the 
students. But again, this problem of the breakdown of the educative relationship 
between teachers and students is not my concern here, important though it is. The 
point is that much of the value-laden interaction of the classroom is submerged in the 
lifeworld, and is not made explicit to any of the actors involved. 
This places a special responsibility on the teacher. The realization that many of the 
values being taught in a classroom, even in a community of inquiry, are somewhat 
hidden from view does not provide a reason to withdraw. We have to act within the 
horizons of our lifeworld. Nor does it mean that we have to watch every step, to 
question every action. To try to make every implicit value of the lifeworld explicit at 
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every moment could only lead to paralysis. Yet teachers must be aware that their own 
practice is not transparent to them, and that they may not be able to see what others, 
including their students, can see. 
Teachers must take up the responsibility of being in a privileged position in the class 
both with regard to organizational and epistemic authority. How they wield this 
power is the question. Is it wielded in the interests of the education of the students, or 
is it wielded in such a way as to suppress the development of the students both 
epistemically and morally? Is the teacher also willing to learn and develop? As I 
argued in §4.141, the teacher must engage in pedagogic action, imposing much on the 
students through strategic action, without making all the educational goals explicit at 
all times, but always with the aim of preparing the students for full participation in 
communicative action and practical discourse. The teacher's actions will be guided by 
their own virtuous practice, which ought to be well habituated, though this practice 
must also be the subject of reflection (§5.21). This requires both an inquisitive 
approach to one's own practice and an openness to critique and questioning from 
students, but it does not require a withdrawal from the position of classroom 
authority. The teacher's conduct of the community of inquiry ought also to be 
regulated by the conditions of the ideal speech situation: not, as we saw in §4.124, by 
trying to emulate the ideal speech situation in the classroom (which is impossible), but 
by using the existential and practical aspects to make judgements about the progress of 
the discussion, and to guard against repression and inequality. 
This general survey of the place of the teacher in the community of inquiry has raised a 
couple of issues with which I shall need to engage. I claimed in the previous 
subsection that there are conditions under which the teacher ought to challenge the 
views of students. Given the authority of the teacher identified in this section, it might 
seem that there are dangers to open inquiry in this recommendation. In §10.23, I will 
look more closely at this issue. The second issue is related: the teacher's authority 
(epistemic and organizational) gives the views of the teacher an added weight above 
those of other students, especially when those views are not explicitly taught, but form 
part of the hidden curriculum. This opens the teacher up to the charge of 
indoctrination. I shall now turn my attention to this issue. 
9.4 Indoctrination, Ethical Relativism, Moral Indifference and the 
Path Between Them 
Splitter and Sharp (1995, 180) point out the dilemma of ethical education: the twin 
dangers of indoctrination and ethical relativism. Put simply, they claim that the former 
is a danger if teachers assert their own moral views strongly, while the latter is a 
danger if they don't. I think that the situation is considerably more complex in several 
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ways. Firstly, I shall later develop the position that not all moral views have the same 
status with regard to indoctrination. In particular, the broad value of respect, as I 
argued in §6.24, is more basic than many other moral views. Secondly, we have a 
trilemma rather than a dilemma. If teachers do not assert their own moral views, there 
can be two outcomes: ethical relativism and moral indifference. By "ethical relativism" 
here I mean the view that there is no way to differentiate the adequacy of competing 
moral views, and that hence any view you hold is as good as anybody else's. Such a 
moral view can be quite strongly held, well developed and provide moral guidance to a 
life. Moral indifference, on the other hand, I am using to mark the view that it is not 
important to hold moral views, and that hence it is a waste of time even to think much 
about moral matters. 
9.41 Indoctrination 
On the surface, the danger of indoctrination seems easy to avoid. In the community of 
inquiry, the questions to be addressed are decided by the students. Once the 
discussion commences, the teacher remains purely neutral, and thus cannot 
indoctrinate the students. There are, however, problems with this stance. Firstly, 
such a stance will be likely to indoctrinate, tacitly and unreflectively, the value of 
neutrality (I will address this further in the next subsection). But of more immediate 
interest is the observation that, if the teacher remains completely neutral in all matters 
of value, then this will include those matters that have to do with the fair and equitable 
conduct of the discussion itself. Yet, as we have seen, the teacher must take 
pedagogical action to ensure that the discussion can work, and this requires the 
enforcement of the values of the community of inquiry itself. These largely spring 
from that broad value cluster that I have already identified as basic: respect. 
9.411 Avoidance of Indoctrination in the Philosophy for Children 
Literature 
Lipman et a/.(1980, 186) have attempted to address this problem of indoctrination, by 
drawing attention to 
the particular usefulness of the distinction between substantive and procedural 
considerations with respect to classroom instruction. The teacher.., should normally 
be neutral when moderating discussions among students about specific substantive 
issues in which value questions predominate. But the teacher in such discussions 
should definitely be partial to and insistent upon the rules of procedure by which the 
discussion is carried on. Should these rules happen to become themselves the 
substance of the discussion, then the teacher should endeavor once again to assume a 
neutral attitude towards them. 
In this analysis, they separate matters of procedure from matters of substance, and 
advise neutrality towards the latter only. Nevertheless, they recognize two problems 
here. Firstly, procedural respect cannot be said to be a non-substantive value. 
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Children might ask why it is that they ought to take turns, or why one with a louder 
voice should not win out over one with a softer voice, or why the teacher should make 
the choice as to who will speak next. In this case, the procedure of discussion itself 
becomes the subject of the discussion. Whenever a procedural rule is questioned, 
Lipman et al. claim, the teacher ought to switch to treating the rule as a substantive 
matter, become neutral on the matter, and thus avoid indoctrination of the rule. 
However, if the distinction between procedural and substantive values cannot hold, 
then neither can the argument that they can be treated differently. If all procedural 
matters are in fact at base substantive, and the teacher ought to remain neutral in all 
substantive matters, then it is contradictory to claim that the teacher has a justification 
for ignoring this duty of neutrality and pushing a certain value. It is particularly 
strange to claim this justification holds only on the condition that the value remains 
unquestioned. I shall return to this problem below. 
The second problem is recognized only obliquely by the use of the word "normally" in 
the second sentence. It hints that there are times when neutrality is not appropriate, 
but it does not tell us how to identify the circumstances that warrant the dropping of 
neutrality by the teacher. This question needs more analysis. On page 159, Lipman et 
al. recognise that "the teacher always has the right to intervene and state his or her 
opinion if the circumstances warrant it." Only two circumstances are identified for 
such teacher expressions of opinion: after the other students have already had a chance 
to respond to the view to which the teacher wishes to respond, or if the community 
has become strong enough that individual students are able to oppose the teacher's 
epistemic authority if they disagree. In my view, these are certainly two circumstances 
in which the teacher ought to express a view on matters of substance, but there are 
also others. While teachers must remain aware of their epistemic authority and the 
potential that their expression of a view might discourage students from exploring the 
matter further, there are dangers in the other direction, too. 
The distinction between procedural and substantive matters calls to mind Habermas' 
attempt to ground ethics in a purely procedural moral principle (see §6.24), leaving 
substantive matters to be decided in practical discourse. In §7.21, I argued the 
inadequacy of this position, giving reasons why we need to take respect as a basic, 
presuppositional, substantive moral position. Lipman et al., despite recognizing that 
there is no sharp cut to be made between procedural and substantive values, advise the 
teacher to treat discussions of procedural rules as if they were substantive, by taking a 
neutral stance towards them. If this is merely a tactical neutrality, allowing the other 
students to mount a defence of the rule, then it is good advice. Certainly, a teacher 
would be right to allow students to do the work of critique if they are capable of doing 
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so. However, we may ask whether the teacher ought to maintain this neutrality if the 
other students prove not to be capable of mounting the critique, or if the class agree to 
reject the rule, or if the questioner mounts a strong and ingenious case for rejection. 
The community of inquiry, if it is still in the early stages of construction, may be 
widely flouting the rules of respect, or incapable of properly defending them. In these 
and similar cases, I would argue that the teacher must spring to the defence of respect. 
The procedural rules of respect are central to the possibility of a community of inquiry. 
As Reed says, "democratic and egalitarian conditions are non-negotiable prerequisites 
for philosophy in the classroom. That is, children have the right to have and express 
their opinions..., we ought to respect other people as persons..." (quoted by 
Cresswell and Hobson 1994, 29-30). Reed clearly wants and expects these values to 
be held not only by teachers but also by students. Splitter and Sharp (1995, 36) say 
"principles of fairness, reciprocity and respect for persons... are fundamental to a 
community of inquiry" and claim that "the procedures of ethical inquiry are among 
those which are enacted and valued by the community itself' (175, italics added). 
Philosophy for Children theorists are most certainly not neutral towards a certain core 
set of values that they expect the program to foster in children. It is one of the most 
ubiquitous features of the Philosophy for Children literature. 
This raises the difficult issue of autonomy. The problem becomes acute if children are 
assumed to be autonomous for, in the light of this assumption, the imposing of values 
on them is taken to be a violation of that autonomy. However, the account of 
autonomy that I developed in §3.3 and §4.2 makes it clear that we cannot assume 
children are autonomous: rather, they are becoming autonomous through their 
interactions with others. They need assistance to achieve a sufficient level of 
autonomy, and the teacher is charged with bringing this state of affairs about through 
pedagogical action (§4.141). 
If the broad values of respect were to be rejected, Habermas would claim that such a 
rejection amounts to a performative contradiction. This would be true if the students 
tried to maintain a discussion while rejecting the values of respect, but they may make 
the rejection behaviourally, and be content with non-discussion-based educational 
activities. In situations where the class is incapable of criticizing the rejection, or 
agrees with it, I maintain that the teacher is well justified in arguing the case for the 
rule as vigorously as possible and, if this fails and the alternative is to abandon the 
community, in imposing the rule anyway. As I have argued, teachers are teachers 
because they have been assigned a role by society - that of education through 
pedagogical action - and they must use the means, sometimes strategically, that 
organize the classroom as an educative environment. One of their aims is to induct 
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students into the capabilities needed to engage in practical discourse, which will lead to 
the development of their autonomy. The teacher cannot assume that autonomy, 
reasonableness and other capacities are already in place, and must establish the 
educational environment in the classroom in which they will be learned. 
The standard defence of the community of inquiry from the charge of indoctrination is 
that it can turn reflexively on any of its assumptions and values (Cam 1994, 19-23; 
Splitter and Sharp 1995, 180). Certainly, this is its best defence. However, to 
question reflexively in this way requires a community that is capable of inquiring well 
into the matter in hand, and it will only be such a community if it already follows 
certain procedural rules of respect. A young or a dysfunctional community may well 
not be able to inquire well, and the onus is on the teacher to assist the community (and 
its members) to grow to the stage where it can inquire well. By the time this stage is 
reached, the values of respect may be so well in place that students will be much more 
likely to agree that respect is an essential moral position. Does entrenching respect in 
this way amount to indoctrination? If it does, then pedagogical action will be 
indoctrinatory. 
If we are to decide whether a teacher's actions in building a community of inquiry 
through inculcating the values of respect is an instance of indoctrination or not, we 
clearly require an account of indoctrination. Here is a not untypical example from the 
Philosophy for Children literature, based on the discussion of indoctrination in Woods 
and Barrow (1975, Chapter 4). 
If students in a community of inquiry were intentionally brought by some non-
rational means to the unshakeable belief that freedom of speech, say, is a moral 
right, then they would have been indoctrinated. (Cam 1994, 36) 
In Cam's definition, we have a clear account of the nature of indoctrination. It entails 
that we can only avoid indoctrination through the rational consideration of values. 
Rational means, according to Cam, involve the explicit endorsement of a value for 
well, and freely, considered reasons, while "it would become indoctrination were we 
to use the practice of free speech to directly inculcate belief in freedom of speech" 
(Cam 1995, 36). Hence, immersion in practice which does not include the explicit 
verbal consideration of reasons for and against a value would be an example of non-
rational means. 
However, it is clear that my account of pedagogic action means that the teacher will 
quite often take intentional action to bring about a belief in certain procedural values by 
means that do not involve explicit consideration of the values in question but, rather, 
by means of immersion in practice. It appears, then, that according to Cam's account 
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of indoctrination, I am advocating the indoctrination of the basic values of respect. In 
the next subsection, I will demonstrate that Cam's account of indoctrination is 
inadequate, being based on a misconstrual of how it is that we are situated in the 
world, and in §9.413 show that the insistence on respect within the community of 
inquiry is not indoctrinatory. 
9.412 Assumptions Underlying Cam's Account of Indoctrination 
Let's acknowledge straight away that many of the procedural values of the community 
of inquiry do become substantive subjects of the discussion, and that students do 
become rationally (in Cam's sense) convinced to adopt or retain these values. Clearly, 
these values have not been indoctrinated. But there are many other values that are 
never explicitly considered. 
I shall take as an example a particular, fairly narrow, procedural value: respecting 
another's right to finish what they are saying before commencing one's own 
comment. It may well be that this value has never been explicitly considered by the 
students, but is nevertheless internalized so that they come to think, unshakeably, of 
"butting in" as rude; something that ought not to be done (even though they might 
sometimes slip). For the sake of argument, I will assume that, for the students in 
question, a number of the crucial ways in which this value has been inculcated have 
been due to the intentional actions of the teacher, who has shushed people who tried to 
butt in, or waved them down, or sometimes even said "Wait your turn" and so on. 
Through a Vygotskian process, the students have internalized an aspect of 
communicative action that they have engaged in within the community. Explicit verbal 
reasons for this rule have neither been advanced nor considered. Rather, this (non-
explicit) value that the students have internalized (through immersion in practice) 
forms part of their lifeworld, taken-for-granted, held unshakeably, and not present to 
them consciously. Is this a case of indoctrination? 
Now, we must concede that, since the process by which this value was inculcated is 
non-rational in Cam's sense, it is, by his definition, a case of indoctrination. 
However, underlying Cam's definition are two assumptions, which I have shown in 
previous chapters to be untenable. The first assumption concerns the way in which 
persons are situated in the world (§3.124), and the second, which arises from the 
first, concerns the nature of belief acquisition processes, and how they justify the 
beliefs acquired(§3.23). Under Cam's assumptions, it is impossible to explain how it 
is that we become able to operate within the world, and most of out beliefs and values 
would be unjustified. 
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In Cam's account, persons are already rational, autonomous beings who are presented 
with a smorgasbord of values. Ideally, from their value-neutral position, they 
rationally assess the values that surround them and choose which to adopt. 
Sometimes, however, manipulative others trick or coerce them through non-rational 
means to adopt other values. This picture is derived from the philosophy of the 
subject, as discussed in §4.141. 
The contrary view, which I discussed in §3.124, is that we are always already 
immersed in the context of the lifeworld, and that coming to be able to operate within 
the lifeworld cannot be a matter of explicitly and rationally (in Cam's sense) evaluating 
the context. In that section, I drew on the arguments of Heidegger (1962), Polanyi 
(1958), Haugeland (1985), Dreyfus (1992), Cosmides and Tooby (1994), Clark 
(1998), and Winograd and Flores (1986). Many of our values reside, in Heidegger's 
phrase, in our pre-reflective background and form, in Gadamer's (1975) phrase, part 
of our prejudices. As he says, "All understanding inevitably involves some 
prejudice... 'Prejudice' means a judgement that is given before all the elements that 
determine a situation have been finally examined" (239-240). Much of our thinking is 
not reflective and we cannot be conscious of all the thinking that we do. When we are 
immersed in a practice, we do not explicitly consider even a good deal of the 
potentially conscious thinking that we are doing, especially when some other topic is 
engaging our attention. One consequence is that some of the values we exhibit in our 
actions are inconsistent with our espoused values, while others are quite consistent. 
But without the presupposition of this horizon, including the presupposed values, it 
would be impossible to make any sense of the world or to operate within it. 
Within the lifeworld, our learning is Vygotskian (§3.23 and §8.23), so that we come 
to think and value through engagement in socially constructed thinking and valuing. 
Some of this is explicitly evaluated, some is not, but the ability to evaluate both the 
thinking and the valuing is gradually constructed. Since our ability to evaluate 
explicitly is weakest when we are youngest, and only gradually strengthens, many of 
our values are acquired well before they could possibly be fully evaluated. However, 
as I argued in §4.22, in order to become an ethically sensitive person, we need to 
develop not just values, but also reasonableness about values. In Aristotelian terms, 
we can say that reasonableness is needed not only so that we can apply the values we 
have in the right way, but it is also needed to be able to exercise care about the sort of 
person we are. Consequently, to be able to become a virtuous person (both morally 
and intellectually) requires that certain values, and capacities of reasonableness, are 
inculcated within us through non-reflective means. These may, or may not, be 
subsequently endorsed (as we shall see), but they cannot be initally acquired through 
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explicit choice. This fact about how these values and capacities have been acquired 
carries, in itself, no implication as to whether they have, or have not, been 
indoctrinated. 
This leads to Cam's second assumption concerning the nature of the fixation of belief. 
Cam's idea of rationality is heavily dependent on what I have labelled the critical 
aspect of reasonableness in §3.121. He says 
we need to be not only aware of the values that we promote in the classroom.., but 
also careful to see that these values are subjected to scrutiny by the community. 
This is not just a matter of coming up with a list of reasons to support these values, 
but of subjecting them to genuine assessment. (ibid, 35) 
Such rationality requires recourse to argumentation backed by reasons and conducted 
in language (see Habermas' account of argumentation outlined in §4.123). This, in 
Cam's view, is the only legitimate way to acquire values. Values can be acquired in 
other ways, but until they have been rationally endorsed, they have merely been 
indoctrinated into us. Cam admits that "the stand against indoctrination is... difficult 
to achieve in practice," partly because of this requirement to subject all beliefs to 
scrutiny. Further, he claims that we are "all of us working against a background of 
indoctrination, including the influence of the school, the home, peer group, televisions 
and so on" (ibid., 35). The problem raised by this account of indoctrination is that it 
labels much of the ordinary activity of the lifeworld indoctrination. If this is so, then 
indoctrination will be difficult to avoid indeed, even in the community of inquiry. 
I will show that, while the process of gaining a value through immersion in practice is 
(in Cam's sense) non-rational, it is nevertheless not, solely for that reason, a case of 
indoctrination. I will outline the conditions under which the charge of indoctrination 
is not justified. 
9.413 An Alternative Account of Indoctrination 
I have argued that to say that a value has been acquired in the lifeworld (non-
rationally, in Cam's sense) is not to say that it has been indoctrinated. But, of course, 
it is not to say that it was not indoctrinated either. Suppose I acquire in this manner a 
belief in the supremacy of my race over others. Subsequently, I recognize this to be 
an immoral value, inconsistent with other values I have acquired reflectively and hold 
to be more basic, so I change it. Then I would say that my old belief in racial 
superiority had been indoctrinated into me. This example points to a counterfactual 
account of the nature of indoctrination. Whether a belief has or has not been 
indoctrinated depends on what my explicit judgement about my acquisition of it would 
be, were Ito make such a judgement. I shall expand upon this view. 
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My claim is that we are always already situated in the lifeworld, before we can 
reflectively evaluate any of the beliefs and values that we have. Many of the beliefs 
and values we hold are inculcated through this immersion. Nevertheless, through our 
immersion, we learn in Vygotskian fashion not just beliefs and values, but also 
reasonableness. If we were not immersed in the lifeworld, then we would not be able 
to learn, and teaching would itself become impossible. Through our engagement in 
social reflection on matters of belief and value, we become gradually more able to 
reflect ourselves. As we become more able to reflect, we are then (in Aristotelian 
terms) gradually able to take on the responsibility for our own characters, and begin to 
look reflectively at the values we always already have. We are becoming not only 
habituated to the virtues, but also to reasonableness, without which we cannot be 
virtuous. 
In this account, indoctrination cannot be identified with this lifeworld process by 
which we come to hold a value, since we cannot escape acquiring values through non-
rational (Cam's sense) means. Rather, a value is indoctrinated if it meets one or both 
of the following counterfactual conditions. 
• A value has been indoctrinated if, were the value to be subjected to reflective 
evaluation by the person in whom it has been inculcated, it would not be 
adopted; 
• A value has been indoctrinated if, were the means by which the value was 
acquired subjected to reflective evaluation by the person in whom it has been 
inculcated, those means would not be endorsed. 
The corollary of these conditions is that a value may well have been acquired by non-
rational means (in Cam's sense) but not have been indoctrinated provided that, were 
the holder of that value to reflect on both the value itself and the means of acquisition, 
then both the value and the means would be approved. 
I shall expand and illustrate my account by reference to the value of respect, in terms 
based on the Aristotelian/Habermasian account of moral development (see §7.2). 
Recall that both Aristotle and Habermas assert that children come to moral discussions 
already holding some values. This I have described above using Habermasian 
terminology. The child is always already situated in the lifeworld: a world which is 
intersubjectively created within the physical environment by embodied and already 
socialized creatures. The lifeworld provides facts and values that are taken-for-granted 
and acted upon quite unreflectively. As the child becomes more able to reason and to 
question (and we have to bear in mind that these capacities are built dialogically), some 
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of these facts or values emerge from the lifeworld and become thematized. They can 
then become the substance of discourse. 
Communication is seen as a comprehensive goal or value: by attempting to 
communicate, actors in the social world demonstrate that they value the ability to 
communicate with others. The community of inquiry arises out of the lifeworld in 
which such communication can take place, and continually draws upon it. Without 
this overlapping and shared background, it could not get started. Habermas, as we 
have seen, asserts that amongst the presuppositions that must be in place in the 
lifeworld are those that underlie the possibility of communicative action at all: the 
presuppositions of respect. This is not to say that the rules of respect (such as Alexy's 
list presented in §6.1) are known and agreed to explicitly by all participants: far from 
it. Yet when communicative action takes place, they are acted upon locally, and any 
local violation is seen as disruptive to communication: it is not valued. This 
inculcation of the local variants of the rules takes place with all speakers as they 
develop the ability to enter, however haltingly, into communicative interaction with 
others. 
In saying this, I recognize that the presuppositional rules of communication (closely 
related to what I have also called the broad value-cluster of respect) are not purely 
procedural values. They are substantive values that are very often treated merely as 
procedural values. Only when they are problematized does their substantive nature 
become apparent: this is probably true of all the values of the lifeworld. But some 
inkling of them is present in every communicative exchange, and the infant that is 
learning to communicate is learning these values, unconsciously for the most part. 
This is not to say that they cannot be made explicit or questioned, for they often are. 
Admonitions for the young child to listen, or not to speak over the top of someone 
else, are common, and children are not backward in asking why. Thus lifeworld 
values can be part-thematized and part-redeemed in discourse at a level accessible to 
the developing communicative subject. 
The community of inquiry self-consciously places a good deal of emphasis on 
explicitness: much more than the lifeworld does. It is a structured situation, in which 
one person - the teacher - has explicit organizational responsibility, and part of this 
responsibility is precisely to build the possibility of, and to encourage, explicitness. 
The lifeworld does not have such formative guidance, but is jointly constructed by all, 
some of whom have greater or lesser organizational authority in various fragments of 
the lifeworld. 
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When students become part of the community of inquiry, they bring all their lifeworld 
values with them. Some have never been brought to conscious attention, but many 
will have been, at least to some extent. Some of those to do with respect are very 
likely to have been made explicit on many occasions, both before entering school and 
certainly within school. Just how much conscious attention has been paid, how much 
these core values influence behaviour and just what detailed content they have will 
vary from student to student. We might capture this by saying that each of them will 
have a different respect-horizon. To the extent that these overlap, and overlap with the 
respect-horizon of the teacher, the students will unproblematically practice respect in 
the community of inquiry. When they do not overlap, especially when one student's 
actions jar with the teacher's respect-horizon, the teacher can, verbally or by non-
verbal means, require that the student comply with the teacher's value. One of two 
things can happen at this juncture. Either the student will acquiesce, possibly 
modifying somewhat their corresponding value, or the student can question (verbally 
or behaviourally) the value that jars. 
The first of these possibilities is one of the major processes by which the lifeworld 
values are built in the first place (possibly, as I intimated in Chapter Two, on an 
empathetic genetic base). We must bear in mind that the students are becoming-
persons, not finished persons (as, to a lesser extent, are adults). They are continually 
learning, Vygotslcy-style, the facts, values, concepts and capacities that are collectively 
constructed in the human interactions in which they are embroiled. Yet, insofar as 
they have already internalized the capacity to reason and to question, they can also 
follow the second possibility. They can problematize the value. Then, insofar as the 
community of the students can jointly explore the value, the teacher ought to confine 
input to procedural matters. But equally, insofar as the students are not yet capable of 
exploring it well, the teacher must intervene, both procedurally and substantively, so 
as to bring about the conditions under which the community of students will be able to 
enter as full a practical discourse as possible. Since this practical discourse will be in 
the joint zone of proximal development of the students, they will benefit by being able 
to internalize the capacities, concepts and (most importantly in this context) values that 
they jointly construct with the teacher's scaffolded assistance. Here is another of the 
processes for lifeworld learning, only it has been sharpened and deliberately wielded 
by the teacher. 
In this account, I have hinted at, but not yet made explicit, an account in which some 
values, or value-clusters, stand in a higher or more overarching position with respect 
to other values. To expand on this, I shall draw on Raz's (1986, 289 ff.) discussion 
of the nature of our valuable goals, and their relation to our well-being and our 
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morality. He claims that our well-being requires that we have goals or values, some 
of which (like the value attributed to eating) are mainly biological, others of which we 
have adopted deliberately, and still others of which we have drifted into. This last 
category covers those that we acquire through immersion in a practice, for he says that 
our values are not always come to by explicit reasoning. Importantly, he points out 
that our values and goals are nested hierarchically. The highest level values - those he 
calls comprehensive goals - pervade our life, while the lower level values have little 
weight, and are subsumed under our comprehensive goals. These, he says, are often 
not means to the end of the larger goal, but constitutive elements of it. 
Our highest values and comprehensive goals, Raz claims, 
are too dense to allow explicit description or learning, they can be learnt only by 
experience, direct or derived (e.g. from fiction). It is if course not only the learning 
which is not explicit. Even once the patterns of behaviour have been learnt much, 
indeed most, of our behaviour remains based on learnt semi-automatic responses (i.e. 
ones which we can, usually with some effort, suppress, but which we normally do 
not deliberate on and which we are not explicitly aware of). (312) 
Raz is claiming that individuals can only acquire and maintain their goals through 
familiarity with social forms; that is, through immersion in practice in the lifeworld, or 
a surrogate for it like literature. The high-level values that are learned in such a way, 
he says, are expressed through a dense series of behavioural responses, each 
representing a lower level value that is constitutive of an overarching comprehensive 
value. These lower level values are enacted and implicit rather than expressed and 
explicit, but they are subject to a degree of control and can be made the subject of 
consideration if necessary. In this account, Raz agrees with the one I have developed 
above, but he adds to it a distinction between levels of values. 
The pervasive, comprehensive values to which Raz refers are more likely to come to 
awareness simply because of their pervasiveness. We are more likely to be conscious 
of the fact that we value communication, and the broad value of respect for our 
partners in communication, than we are of, for example, the "thousand tiny clues of 
what is known as body language [which] contribute.., to the success of the 
developing relationship" (ibid, 312). Yet each pause in conversation, or encouraging 
eye movement, or whatever, instantiates a value of respect for the other. 
To say that we ought to bring to awareness and evaluate all the lower level values that 
we hold, and act out, would be to call for paralysis. It would make the world we are 
immersed in strange to us and alienate us from it. This is not to say that they cannot 
be considered, because circumstances (such as unexpected consequences) may make 
one of them strange to us, and cause us to deliberate. 
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Yet, as I have noted, the more pervasive values are more likely to be opened up for 
deliberation, as they are involved in our most important choices and actions. In many 
situations, the choices we make and actions we take are unreflective, even when they 
involve comprehensive values, but there will be situations where several values clash, 
or where the situation is sufficiently novel to cause us to wonder how best to 
instantiate our values. On such occasions, the comprehensive values emerge from 
Polanyi's subsidiary awareness and into focal awareness (Polanyi 1958, 57, see 
§3.1242). Since it is these comprehensive values that guide our lives, then these are 
the values that most need to be open to reflective evaluation. 
However, to endorse the engagement in reflective evaluation when appropriate is in 
itself a comprehensive value, instantiating a large number of lower level values. Yet it 
stands in a peculiar relation to the other comprehensive values that a person may hold, 
because it is a necessary value for the very possibility of testing for indoctrination. It 
is thus a value that underwrites any anti-indoctrination value. 
This discussion of the hierarchical structure of value systems points to a modification 
of the account I gave earlier of indoctrination. In that account, I claimed that the 
decision on a charge of indoctrination was a counterfactual one. An actual decision as 
to whether such and such a method of inculcating such and such a value is, in fact, 
indoctrination, turns on actually subjecting the method and the value to scrutiny. This 
in turn depends on the allegedly indoctrinated person being capable of carrying out the 
scrutiny. It would thus seem that a society could avoid the charge of being 
indoctinatory by inculcating comprehensive values that discourage puzzlement and 
questioning, and by not inculcating the capabilities of inquiry, thus avoiding the test of 
indoctrination as much as possible. 
So, we need to add another condition: not at the value level this time, but at the social. 
• 	A society (or subsection of society) is indoctrinatory if it does not provide 
its members with the wherewithal and the opportunity to reflectively 
evaluate values that become problematized. 
Here, then is an account of indoctrination and its avoidance. Societies, through the 
social actors that make up those societies, will inevitably create the conditions under 
which children will absorb the many values of the lifeworld - values which are not 
necessarily coherent. The processes by which this happens can be either explicit or 
implicit. This is not just inevitable but also necessary, for action must arise in and 
from a rich lifeworld. Teachers are not exempt from this, and the community of 
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inquiry, like any social action, also inculcates values. To apply the word 
"indoctrination" to this makes no sense at all. 
However, if the society (or subsection of society such as a family, school, classroom 
etc.) does not provide both the wherewithal and the opportunities to problematize the 
values that form part of the lifeworld(s) of its members, then it can be accused of 
being indoctrinatory. It is not so much the inculcation of values or the insistence upon 
their observance which makes for indoctrination, but the denial of the chance to make 
those values the subject of a practical discourse. The community of ethical inquiry is 
not indoctrinatory because it does provide both the wherewithal (in that it promotes the 
development of reasonableness) and the opportunity (in that it allows and encourages 
the problematization of values when those values seem to need to be problematized). 
Thus, we cannot say that a child has been indoctrinated with a particular value solely 
on the grounds that the child has never explicitly rationally endorsed it. Indeed such a 
total stocktake of all our values may be extraordinarily difficult or even impossible to 
achieve. Nor can we say a value is indoctrinated if, on one occasion, it is inculcated 
without explicit rational endorsement. Indoctrination is a charge which must be 
brought on the grounds of a total approach to a group of people over time, where these 
people are denied the wherewithal and/or the opportunity to submit their values, when 
questioned, to practical discourse. 
On this account, then, we do not need to call for teachers to remain neutral about 
matters of value so as to avoid the charge of indoctrination. Nevertheless, we can say 
that there are good pragmatic reasons why teachers ought to be wary of asserting their 
values, and that there are important distinctions between types of values which ought 
not to be asserted strongly, and those for which (with appropriate caveats) strong 
assertion is acceptable or even desirable. I mentioned these at the start of this 
subsection. There is a distinction, rough though it may be, between those procedural 
values necessary for the enterprise of communication, and those substantive values 
about which communication can take place. The former may be converted into the 
latter, when it seems appropriate, and their exact nature can be clarified, but they are 
still needed in some form to create the conditions under which discourse about values 
is even possible. This possibility is the insurance against indoctrination. The 
epistemic authority of the teacher is strong, and hence the teacher ought to be wary, at 
least until the students in the class have attained the ability and inclination to test the 
teacher's views in the same way they can each other's, of asserting substantive values 
which are not connected to the development of discursive capabilities. 
In summary, the charge of indoctrination has often been understood in terms that rest 
on an (often implicit) mistaken assumption that children already have reasonableness 
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and autonomy. If this were so, then the demand that all values must be rationally 
chosen and endorsed might make some sense. But when we consider that children 
come into the world with certain predispositions (§2), which are then supplemented by 
much knowledge and values that are implicitly acquired as background through 
immersion in practice (§3.124 and §3.125), we begin to recognize that rational 
endorsement can only be expected once many other capacities have been developed to 
a sufficient degree. Becoming virtuous requires an Aristotelian habituation to the 
virtues (§5.2), or (equivalently) a Habermasian immersion in the lifeworld (§6.1). 
Yet this is not a claim that reasonableness (or rationality) has no part to play in moral 
development. Aristotelian practical wisdom (Habermasian practical discourse) must 
be exercised in the process of habituation, and reasonableness itself must be habituated 
(§5.22). Only through this cycle of recursive habituation and reflection can the 
capabilities to make reasonable, autonomous decisions about values be built (§4.22). 
Building them is (to an important degree) the role of the teacher, who must exercise 
pedagogical action to bring their development about (§4.141). The consequent 
inculcation of values in the classroom, like that in the lifeworld, is not indoctrinatory 
provided the three conditions I have advanced in this section are met: students would 
endorse the values once they are reasonable and autonomous to do so; students would 
endorse the means of their inculcation; and the classroom provides the opportunity and 
wherewithal to consider such endorsement, if the students so choose. 
9.42 Ethical Relativism and Moral Indifference 
It is the fact that we live in a pluralist liberal democracy, rather than in a closed, 
monocultural one, that has made the dangers of indoctrination loom large. In a diverse 
society, to try to force one set of views on another, particularly when those views run 
counter to the beliefs of a minority or disadvantaged group to which the other belongs, 
has been seen as violating important rights of the other. In response to such worries, 
great efforts have been made in schools to avoid indoctrination. It is my belief that too 
great an effort in this direction has dangers of its own. Above, I identified two: ethical 
relativism and moral indifference. 
Since there are many varieties of relativism, I need to be clear about the sense in which 
I am using "ethical relativism" here. If I come to believe that moral values are purely 
personal, not the sort of things that are subject to outside criticism, and that hence any 
view I hold must be as good as any view anyone else holds, then I am, in this sense, 
an ethical relativist. This is a deeply individualistic view about the criticizability of 
moral views. I explicitly distinguish this type of ethical relativism from the suite of 
philosophical theories that go under that name. A relativist meta-ethical theory may be 
tenable, but only after philosophical consideration which must take place in a 
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community of philosophers. Most well-thought-out relativist meta-ethics do allow for 
criticizability. And any theory that relativizes morality to a society is incompatible with 
the sort of ethical relativism I am picking out here. 
Moral indifference is the other danger. I am morally indifferent if I believe that it is 
not important whether I am for or against abortion, war, violence in the media, sex 
before marriage, or whether I am personally honest, or take account of the effects of 
my actions on others and so on. Moral indifference means giving such commitments a 
very low weighting in the scheme of things. If moral views are thought to be 
unimportant, then the disposition to take morally good action when in a position of 
temptation will also be low. Nor will consistency of action matter much. Such 
persons may be good calculators of their own personal advantage, like Hume's (1955, 
236) sensible knave who "observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the 
exceptions." Or they may, lacking strong values, be prey to the urgings of those that 
surround them. 
If it is recognized that values are important, and that students ought to have values, but 
there is a strong commitment that these values ought not to be indoctrinated, then we 
might conclude that any offering of views, or evaluation of students' views (especially 
by teachers) is unacceptable. There are two well known values education programs 
that take this approach: Values Clarification from the US (Read and Simon 1975; 
Raths, Hannin et al. 1978); and the Schools Council Nuffield Humanities Project 
(1970) in the UK. Both programs are based around the consideration of values under 
the neutral eye of the teacher, though there are important differences between them. 
In the Humanities Project, the teacher is expected to act as a "neutral chairman" who 
"regards it as part of his responsibility not to promote his own view" in class 
discussions concerning controversial moral social issues, but "the teacher as chairman 
of the discussion should have responsibility for quality and standards in learning" 
(1970, 1). This description of the teacher's role relies on a strong content/process 
distinction, which we have seen is not tenable. However, we have also seen that 
some sort of distinction can be made between promoting values that have to do with 
the conduct of the discussion, and promoting values that have to do with clearly 
controversial content. 
In discussing this Project, Straughan (1988) quotes Warnock's criticism that "children 
must not be deprived of the spectacle of a teacher who holds, and clearly expresses, 
moral views." I agree, for the danger is that to model neutrality is to convey the 
message that neutrality on moral issues is a good thing - the danger of moral 
indifference. But we need to fmd a balance that also recognizes the epistemic authority 
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of the teacher and the coercive weight this can carry. Teachers can and ought to hold 
and clearly express views, provided that they both make it clear that they have a 
responsibility to open these views to critique, and that they provide the students with 
the wherewithal and opportunity to engage in that critique. Despite these comments, 
the approach suggested by the Project, in which the children are encouraged to criticize 
and defend moral positions in class discussion, does resemble the community of 
inquiry approach much more closely than Values Clarification, in that it recognizes the 
need for public assertion and defence of moral views. 
The attitude of Values Clarification to values education is much more individualistic. 
Thus, Raths etal. (1978) say that "values are personal things" (34), and that 
"something will not qualify as a value if... it has not been freely chosen (there is no 
room in this theory for values that are imposed by outside pressures)" (47). It is easy 
to see the Kantian roots of this view. Children are autonomous, rational individual 
agents who are capable of making a free choice. Choices are personal, and ought not 
to be subjected to outside pressures. There are, however, non-Kantian elements as 
well: our inclinations and desires are allowed to influence our choice. 
Unlike either Philosophy for Children or the Humanities Project, little role is seen for 
the social negotiation of values. Raths, Hannin and Simon (in Read and Simon 1975) 
say: 
Choices cannot be considered sufficiently free if each one is to be weighed, approved, 
disapproved or graded by someone in charge. (78) 
This means that we are dealing with an area that isn't a matter of proof or 
consensus. It is a matter of experience.... It is important to note that our definition 
of values and valuing leads to a conception of these words that is highly personal. It 
follows that if we are to respect a person's life, we must respect his experience and 
his right to help in examining it for values. (80) 
We are interested in the processes that are going on. We are not much interested in 
identifying the values which children hold. (81) 
While the first sentence precludes the teacher from making any evaluation of the 
student's choice, it is clear from the disapproval of proof and consensus in the second 
that it is not just authority figures, but everyone, who are excluded from evaluation. 
The source of values is extremely unclear. On the one hand, they are freely chosen 
from alternatives, whereas on the other, they are the result of experiences we have. 
There is certainly no room for the development of the capacity to choose in this 
picture: it is present all along. Finally, there is again a very sharp process/content 
distinction. The actual values held are not seen to be of any great importance. Ethical 
relativism, indexed to the individual, is seen as a positive outcome. 
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One of the major problems with the Values Clarification approach is that it makes no 
effective distinction between moral and other values. Whether one values blue clothes 
over red clothes is seen as being much the same as whether one values cruelty to 
animals over kindness. To aim simply for clarification in matters of taste is 
unobjectionable, though it must be pointed out that this still avoids the question as to 
whether taste can be educated. However, when it comes to matters of morality, a non-
judgemental acceptance of certain extreme positions is in itself immoral. 
This is not to say that clarifying the values that students hold is not an important part 
of moral education. It is difficult to engage in moral discourse if one's values are not 
clear to one. However, to just ask students to clarify their values and not to engage 
with others in evaluating and defending them, possibly even changing them for good 
reasons, is to risk ethical relativism of the most thoughtless kind. As Fraenkel (1977) 
comments: 
Values clarification does not help students to appraise critically their own or anyone 
else's views. Rather, it encourages them to accept uncritically the values of their 
society. In fact, it teaches that one value is as good as any other.... Values 
clarification does not provide student with any way to deal with the internal (and 
often external) conflict and uneasiness.., opposing values produce. (47) 
Hamlin and Simon (in Read and Simon 1975, 407) recommend small group 
discussions, but the only rationale for this they offer is to "allow everyone to get his 
two cents in." This is not the way to build the capabilities for critical appraisal of 
values. Nor, as Fraenkel points out, does it help students to weigh up the imperatives 
of clashing values, in situations where, say, the value of honesty demands a different 
reaction from the value of kindness. Clarifying a value gives little help in using it in 
specific situations. 
Now I shall turn to the position that moral education is no part of the school's brief. 
As I discussed in Chapter One, this view holds that moral education, or training, 
comes under the purview of the family and/or the church and/or some other institution. 
Schools (this view is particularly expressed in relation to government schools) are 
meant to be value neutral and not to promote any one moral code over another. We 
have seen that this is an unachievable aim, for schools promote, and must promote, 
some moral values if they are to work at all. 
Underlying this position is the view that schools ought not to promote partisan moral 
views on matters under current contention in society, and that therefore they ought not 
to raise such issues at all. But it is certainly possible to agree with the premise and 
dismiss the conclusion. If schools studiously avoid any engagement in any 
contentious social issue at all, especially ones in which students are likely to be 
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involved, then the implicit message is that such disagreements are not of any great 
value in the schools', or the teachers', eyes. While this may not be true at all - the 
teachers may individually and severally hold strong views on the matters - without any 
evidence to the contrary, this is the conclusion students are likely to draw, and may 
even internalize. This stance thus risks promoting moral indifference. This danger is 
the more acute if no other important element in a student's life is itself addressing such 
moral views. 
9.43 The Path Between 
Many moral matters are contentious: some, within our society and some between our 
and other societies. Many other moral matters are not contentious, but this is not 
necessarily a guarantee that we have come to a correct moral evaluation of them, as 
consideration of the widespread acceptance of slavery at one time shows. I have 
identified three dangers that can arise from attempts to morally educate students in the 
face of this diversity and uncertainty. 
The fear of illegitimately imposing views on students lies behind modern educational 
attempts to avoid indoctrination. Such a concern was not particularly evident when 
society was more uniform with regard to moral views. However, I have argued that 
these attempts to avoid indoctrination, important as they are, face the opposing 
dangers of ethical relativism and moral indifference. To avoid these, teachers need to 
help students to see that moral values are important, that they are held for reasons and 
that they can be defended against attack, or abandoned if the opposing reasons are 
good enough. Teachers need to demonstrate that they are committed to their own 
moral beliefs and are prepared to defend them thoughtfully, if they want students to 
turn out likewise. Nevertheless, teachers also need to be aware of the dangers that 
their epistemic authority will lead to students adopting their beliefs thoughtlessly. 
To walk the line between indoctrination and the encouragement of ethical relativism or 
moral indifference requires nuanced and situated judgement from the teacher. It is the 
open invitation to question, implicit in the whole community, that avoids the charge of 
indoctrination. Equally, it is the assumption that no view is immune from criticism, 
nor without reasonable defence against the criticism, that avoids ethical relativism. 
And it is the commitment to questioning and reasoned critique that avoids moral 
indifference. 
9.5 Towards Detailed Practice 
In Chapter Nine, I have taken a broad brush look at the place of the community of 
inquiry in the classroom. After initially making clear just exactly what I mean by the 
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phrase "community of inquiry," I addressed the reasons why such an approach might 
be expected to be a highly effective way of developing reasonableness in §9.1. In 
§9.2,1 turned to the development of ethical persons, and showed how the community 
of inquiry meshes with the virtue/discourse meta-ethical theory developed in Part It I 
showed that the community of ethical inquiry has the resources to avoid two 
weaknesses sometimes identified in overly rationalistic approaches to moral education: 
the lack of linkage of judgement to action; and the use of moral reasoning to engage in 
moral rationalization. My focus changed somewhat to the role of the teacher in §9.3, 
where I emphasized the delicate balance between the teacher's authority and the 
development of children's autonomy and reasonableness: a balance that requires 
nuanced pedagogical judgement and action. Finally, in §9.4, I looked more carefully 
at one of the major implications of the considerations of §9.3: the possibilities of 
indoctrination, ethical relativism and moral indifference that spring from various 
misunderstandings of the teacher's role. 
These broad brush accounts will, I hope, be of some assistance to classroom teachers 
who wish to run communities of ethical inquiry in their classrooms. However, they 
do lack some of the detail that teachers would be interested in. Chapter Ten will 
address the linking of my philosophical account from Parts I and II to the day-to-day 
organization of a community of ethical inquiry. 
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Chapter Ten: Practical Implications 
What are the practical implications of this discussion for teachers trying to assist their 
students to develop morally? This is possibly the most important question to be 
answered, for all the philosophical investigations I have carried out will be fruitless 
unless they offer guidance to the teacher in the classroom. In a phrase, the answer is 
simple: teachers ought to engage their students in a community of ethical inquiry. But 
such an answer is uninformative until I link the philosophical conclusions I have made 
to the specific features of the community of ethical inquiry. 
The community of ethical inquiry is a specific instance of the community of inquiry 
(see §9), in which the core content to be discussed concerns ethical and moral matters. 
As we saw there, such a community has five stages: the offering of the text; the 
construction of the agenda; solidifying of the community; using exercises and 
discussion plans; encouraging further responses. In this section, I will briefly reflect 
on the formation of the community of inquiry, then consider the implications of the 
thesis so far for each of these stages in turn, before finally stepping back to look at the 
wider picture. The focus of this discussion will be the teacher, and guiding it will be 
the notion developed in §4.141: pedagogic action. 
Pedagogic action, it will be recalled, is an indissoluble melding of open strategic action 
with communicative action and discourse, used by a more experienced person 
interacting with a less experienced person with the specific aim of developing the 
latter's competencies, particularly those needed to engage in communicative action and 
discourse. These latter competencies, it will be remembered, include reasonableness 
and communicative autonomy. What justifies this action is precisely the facts that the 
less experienced person or persons do not yet have the fully developed capacities, and 
that the more experienced person has a responsibility (in a role such as parent or 
teacher) to develop them. 
For teachers, the open strategic action includes such activities as planning for lessons, 
requiring certain behaviours from students, intervening into student activities in ways 
which may appear to the students to have one aim, but also have another (pedagogic) 
aim and so on. Choosing just which strategic action, at what particular time and in 
which circumstances, will assist in achieving pedagogic aims is an important part of 
the teacher's professional competence. 
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The first pedagogical act that teachers must engage in, once they decide that the 
community of inquiry is a suitable educational methodology for their class, is to 
constitute the community. As we saw in §8.21, a community can be tight or loose, 
but it needs to have some commonality. Communities can be constituted in a number 
of ways: for example, some communities form because their members jointly decide to 
form them, while people are born into other types of communities. In the case of the 
community of inquiry in the classroom, the community is formed solely at the behest 
of the teacher. In similar fashion to the community of the class itself, the students get 
little or no say in its formation. This is not to say that the community of inquiry is 
entered unwillingly by all students, although this will most likely be the case with 
some. Most students do have some commitment to education, and place their trust in 
the teacher to provide it (§4.14). 
However this may be, students do not have a say in the fact that they are being made 
members of a community of inquiry initially. Yet, if the community is to work, they 
have to decide to be an active member of that community, and this requires, as we saw 
in §8.21, some commonalities. An interest in doing as the teacher asks, and quite 
likely also an interest in becoming educated, are obvious first starting points, but as 
the community of inquiry develops, other interests ought to come to the fore. Chief 
amongst these, in a successful community, will be the interest in inquiry itself - 
inquiry into the concepts and puzzles of the community and inquiry into each other. A 
growing community of inquiry will become better able to inquire, as the members' 
reasonableness and autonomy develop. Allied to this development will be the growth 
of a trust in each other as fellow inquirers, and an awareness that inquiring well for 
oneself is dependent on being able to inquire well with others (§3.241). Part of that 
reliance on others will arise from the recognition and valuing of diversity within the 
community: diversity of views, of learning approaches, of styles of reasonableness. 
And finally, there may well come a recognition that the boundaries of the classroom 
community of inquiry are porous. Membership of this community (unlike some) does 
not exclude outsiders, or interaction with others. 
There is much more that could be said on the matter of the constitution and 
development of the community of inquiry, and even the possibility that a community 
might, under some conditions, start to break down and decay. Certainly, the 
community will evolve over time, and we cannot expect that it will exhibit its full 
power right from the start. As it evolves, the teacher will need to keep re-evaluating 
the appropriate ways in which to wield pedagogic power, for greater input, of a 
different character, will be needed for a newer community that for a well-established 
one. This is a matter for the professional judgement of the teacher. However, I will 
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not go any deeper into the formation and evolution of communities of inquiry here. I 
will turn instead to the already constituted community of inquiry. 
Under the general guidance of the idea of pedagogical action, I will consider the three 
main concepts that I have developed in this thesis: reasonableness (outlined in §3.1); 
communicative autonomy (summarized in §4.22); and the virtue ethics/discourse 
ethics account of moral development (outlined in Chapter Seven). To structure this 
discussion, I will consider, in §10.1, the preliminary phase of the community of 
inquiry - the offering of the text and the construction of the agenda (Lipman's stages I 
and II) - and then in §10.2 the discussion phase (Lipman's stages III, IV and V). 
10.1 The Preliminary Phase of the Community of Inquiry 
Let's turn then to the first two of the five stages of the community of inquiry: the 
offering of the text and the construction of the agenda (see §9). These form the 
preliminary phase in the sense that they provide the platform from which the dialogical 
inquiry can be launched. As can be seen from Lipman's phrase "setting the agenda," 
one of the major premises of the Philosophy for Children program is that the students 
drive the agenda. This is the advice offered in one of the teacher's manuals: "Your 
aim is to work with what the students themselves find interesting, rather than to set the 
agenda yourself" (Lipman, Sharp et al. 1984, ii, italics in original). 
Yet the agenda is constrained by the text that is offered. To talk of an offering of the 
text is perhaps to elide two important questions: who chooses to offer the text, and on 
what grounds do they choose (or write) just this text? The answer to the first is fairly 
obviously the teacher, but this fairly obvious answer is somewhat misleading. 
Teachers can choose the text in two senses. Firstly, they can choose an already 
collected set of Philosophy for Children texts, such as one of the Lipman novels (e.g., 
the ethical inquiry oriented Lisa, Lipman 1983), or another purpose written set of 
stories (e.g., Cam 1997), or a commercial picture book chosen from a list in a 
Philosophy for Children oriented program (e.g., Sprod 1993). Alternatively, they can 
identify or write a text themselves. Clearly, the possibilities available to the students 
in setting the agenda will be somewhat curtailed by this choice: I shall return to this 
later. 
While, in the first case, teachers in a sense choose the whole collection, they are taking 
on trust to some extent the choices made by the writer or editor of the collection. 
Teachers judge, or are assured, that the texts are suitable for the purpose of initiating 
the community of inquiry, but they are unlikely to look closely at the specific features 
of the texts which make them so. This job has been done by the writer or editor. In 
the second case, teachers take on (or ideally ought to take on) the responsibility borne 
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by the writer or editor in the first case. They ought to be aware of the grounds that 
underlie the choice of a particular text, or way to construct a suitable text. There are a 
number of grounds that arise from my discussion above. 
My account of reasonableness suggests that the stories chosen to be the triggers for a 
community of inquiry need to have a very rich narrative structure. Kohlberg's 
dilemmas are sketchy, lacking much in the way of contextualization and human 
character development, because they rely on a picture of moral reasoning which, being 
confined to rational moral judgement based on principles, is quite narrow. An 
appropriate text to offer to a community of ethical inquiry needs to contain the 
resources to allow engagement in not just thinking that is heavily biased to the critical 
aspect (important though this is), but also to the other aspects. 
The complex situations depicted in literary narratives provide contextualization for the 
events and reactions of the characters, and also provide numerous connections to the 
contexts of the lives of the readers, through analogy and anecdotal similarities, all of 
which will exercise the contextual aspect of thinking. Indeed, as the specific contexts 
of the texts change throughout the narrative, or from one narrative to another, yet the 
same or similar cognitive tools and concepts reappear in these different contexts, the 
conditions for transfer across contexts are created, especially when these tools and 
concepts are addressed meta-cognitively. 
A rich literary text contains invitations to imaginatively enter the text, extending 
through the creative aspect to thinking the background lifeworld of the characters, 
which can be explored collaboratively in discussion. Furthermore, the imaginative 
structures of moral thinking identified by Johnson (1993), such as the metaphorical 
extension of prototypical moral concepts to neighbouring ethical situations, can be 
practiced as this creative filling in of the context by different participants in the 
discussion produces slightly different scenarios. As we try to decide whether to call 
what a character said a lie, for example, different students might ask us to consider 
what our reaction would be if the character had himself been told the falsehood and 
(perhaps foolishly) believed it, or had been intending to do good by telling it, or had 
meant to be funny in saying it. 
Fleshed out characters have emotional reactions to the events in which they are 
involved. They act within their social community according to their commitments. In 
the Kohlbergian dilemmas, respondents must factor out these emotions in order to be 
assessed as being at the higher stages. Gilligan (1982, 100-103) discusses the 
tendency for female respondents to draw on what I have called the committed aspect of 
thinking, resulting in their being assessed as less morally developed. Stories in which 
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the emotional aspects of the characters' lives are portrayed enable participants in the 
community of ethical inquiry to engage with the committed aspect of thinking. 
Well drawn characters in a rich narrative are not disembodied presences; rather, they 
think and act as a whole person, mind and body. Their actions can often be said to be 
"thinking with their body" and they have visceral as well as intellectual reactions. 
Their embodiment influences their actions, thoughts and situation in the world. These 
are features which cannot be captured in sketchy scenarios, and they enable the 
participants in the community of ethical inquiry to raise questions related to the 
embodied aspect of thinking. In Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, for example, 
(Lipman and Splitter 1992, 11), the actions of the Aboriginal character Ankuna (an 
Afro-American called Fran in the original American version) are heavily influenced by 
both her ethnicity and her litheness, and make little sense if the reader is aware of 
neither these embodied facts about Ankuna, nor Ankuna's own knowledge of and 
attitude to these facts about herself. 
In dealing with the aspects of thinking separately here, I have possibly given the 
impression that they are separable in some sort of strong sense. This is not, as I made 
clear in §3.126, an accurate picture. All thinking involves each of these aspects to 
some degree, though particular instances of thinking may emphasize one or more 
aspects over the others. Narrative triggers for discussion have the advantage that, like 
real lives, they integrate all the aspects, in a way that Kohlbergian dilenunas, maths or 
physics problems, single teacher questions, conceptual puzzles, descriptions of 
situations and so on do not. After the presentation of the text, students will ask single 
questions, but because the questions are rooted in a rich narrative, the discussions will 
return again and again to this richness, ensuring that the multiple aspects of thinking 
are visited and revisited. 
Narrative texts are able to ensure richness in another way. I have talked of a 
community of ethical inquiry as a community of inquiry which takes moral and ethical 
matters as its content. Yet the use of a narrative as the trigger for such an inquiry 
ensures that moral and ethical matters are not the only ones that get addressed. A 
narrative, to make any sort of realistic sense, must set moral content in a realistic 
lifeworld. Many features of this lifeworld, not just the moral ones, may be 
problematized by the students. The upshot of this is that moral matters are not 
somewhat artificially separated off from the lived experience of the students, but are 
discussed in contexts that extend across the students' experiences. The 
marginalization of moral education that occurs when it is taught as a separate course 
can be counteracted in this way. 
287 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 10. Practical implications 
Indeed, the prospect of this marginalization can be further diminished in several ways. 
If the texts for the community of inquiry mix up ethical with epistemological, 
metaphysical, logical and aesthetic matters, then moral considerations will be further 
integrated into the broader lives of the students. The contexts for the narratives can be 
drawn from the school disciplines, so that ethical inquiry takes place in a scientific or a 
historical (Sprod 1997b) context. Thus a teacher can attempt to overcome the split 
between fact learning within a discipline and moral learning in separate (maybe 
religious education, health or personal and social education) classes, which can be 
blamed for the failure of many people to think morally within technocratic settings. 
One of the important features of the text is that the characters in the narrative ought to 
be models for the students in the community of inquiry. This is not to say that they 
need to be perfect, for this would make the text impossibly unrealistic. Hence it 
would not connect to the lifeworld of the readers, and the mobilizing power of the text 
would be lost. Nevertheless, the characters can by turns instantiate one or more 
aspects of reasonableness, so that the community can model their own thinking on it, 
or fall from reasonableness in some way that is then open to the community to 
criticize, or haltingly search after reasonableness in a way that enables the community 
to follow and extend the search (Lipman 1991, 214-219). 
In this modelling, the characters are modelling the approach towards communicative 
autonomy. Characters who are taking charge of their lives through jointly making 
sense of them with others, characters who are able to form judgements and take 
actions because they have learned to do so in interaction with each other, are again 
models for the students in the community of inquiry. 
An appropriate text will reflect the real, relatively ordinary, world in its account of the 
child characters and their setting. In a rich narrative, much of the background is 
somewhat taken for granted both by the characters within the story and by the reader 
reading it. Characters move easily against this background, and students will resist 
the narrative if they cannot, by and large, do so too. The characters will exhibit a 
narrative unity to their lives, as we usually see them act habitually in a coherent way. 
None of this is to deny a place to the unusual, the out of character, the surprising from 
time to time, for the world is like that. It will be these incidents, these realizations, 
both for the characters themselves, and for the students reading the narrative, that 
provide the opportunities for the problematization of the taken-for-granted. Within the 
story, as certain issues are problematized, the characters will investigate them 
dialogically, in ways indicated above. In this mixture of habituated action and 
reflection, the stories thus portray the development of children as ethical beings in a 
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way consistent with the account of virtue ethics modified by discourse ethics 
developed in Chapter Seven. 
I alluded at the start of this section to a tension between the aim of allowing the 
students to set the agenda for the community of inquiry, and the role of the text in 
curtailing that choice. By presenting a text to the class that contains certain material, 
leaving much of it as background and problematizing selected parts, while 
(necessarily) ignoring everything else, the teacher has restricted the students' ability to 
set the agenda considerably. Nevertheless, the students are still left with quite a range 
of subjects about which they can ask questions, and a good degree of latitude as to the 
specific questions to ask. This is, of course, considerably more latitude than is 
offered in most classroom activities. 
Both my account of how habituated, taken-for-granted knowledge is problematized 
and made the subject of reflection (§5.232 and §7.11), and my account of learning as 
a process of connecting new information into an existing construction of the world 
through social dialogue (§3.23) mandate that the agenda setting stage of the 
community of inquiry ought to give as much free rein to the students as possible. 
About the only restriction on questions would come from the necessity of the teacher 
to enforce respect as a foundational value for the community of inquiry (§6.24). In 
particular, the teacher ought not to reject questions on the grounds that they are 
unpromising or irrelevant, for to do so is to model a rejection of respect for the ideas 
of others. Further, the ideas that lie behind a question may not be obvious to the 
teacher, but may be explicable by the questioner when dialogue commences, or the 
community may well be able to find an interesting way of developing the inquiry from 
the question. 
In short, the question agenda must be the students' to set for three reasons: to ensure 
connection to their lifeworlds; to start inquiry at the edge of their zone of proximal 
development; and to show respect for the student members of the community. 
10.2 The Discussion Phase of the Community of Inquiry 
Once the text has been presented and the agenda set, a community of inquiry enters the 
discussion phase. This phase is said by Lipman to have three stages - solidifying the 
community (III); using exercises and discussion plans (IV); encouraging further 
responses (V) - but I think this is somewhat misleading. Unlike the preliminary 
phase, where reading the text does precede gathering student questions, the three 
stages of the discussion phase could be used in any order. Indeed, in almost all actual 
communities of inquiry, these three stages will be intertwined. 
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The focus in stage Ill is on group solidarity, with the greatest emphasis laid on the 
roles of the students. According to Lipman (1991, 242), they will, among other 
things, articulate disagreements, search for understanding, practice cognitive skills 
dialogically, join in cooperative reasoning, internalize overt cognitive behaviour, 
become sensitive to meaningful nuances of contextual differences and follow the 
argument where it leads. Such a description does not make reference to any leader or 
shaper of the inquiry, and it is quite possible (albeit not so likely in the classroom) for 
the processes Lipman lists to occur without any participant in the community taking on 
the leadership. Certainly, the teacher could join with the students in all these, but this 
would not require any special role. This is a list of some of the features of 
communicative action (see §4.122). 
On the other hand, though Lipman does not explicitly mention the teacher in listing the 
procedures in stage IV, the focus is clearly on the teacher's role. The exercises and 
discussion plans lead to employing questions from the academic tradition, opening 
students to philosophical alternatives, focusing on specific problems and compelling 
(Lipman's word) the inquiry to examine the key philosophical concepts (Lipman 
instances truth, community, personhood, beauty, justice and goodness). These are 
clearly the roles of a specific person (most likely the teacher) who is coordinating the 
community of inquiry. They call for certain actions on the part of the teacher, with 
certain educational goals in mind. The goals may or may not be shared with the other 
participants: a marker of open strategic action (see §4.121). 
Despite the use of the word "encouraging," Stage V mixes teacher and student action. 
The teacher is to elicit further responses, but the teacher and students together will 
recognize the synthesis of critical and creative, individual and community, as well as 
celebrate the deepened sense of meaning. Stage V thus seems to allude both to follow 
up activities for the community of inquiry, and to an evaluation of the community. As 
such, it shares some of the features of both stages DI and N. 
The tension I have identified between the communicative action of stage HI and the 
open strategic action employed by the teacher in stage IV merely echoes the inherent 
tension of pedagogic action, as I characterized it in §4.141. Stage DI plays the same 
role of solidifying the community in the classroom microcosm as communicative 
action does in intersubjectively constructing the lifeworld of society in general. The 
students achieve the behaviours and aims listed above through engagement with the 
other students and the teacher in the community of inquiry, but the explicitness with 
which they approach these aims is quite variable. While they will at times be quite 
aware of their thinking, and of the skills, tools and purposes which lie behind it, there 
will be many times when they are "just talking," unaware of the learning going on. 
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Even the times of awareness (i.e., of metacognition) will usually be at the teacher's 
behest. 
Stage IV underlines the teacher's strategic role in pedagogic action. The teacher joins 
in the dialogue in quite a different way from the student. While teachers can join in the 
communicative action, and make the sorts of contributions that any member of the 
community might make, they must also, simultaneously, be monitoring the 
conversation from a strategic point of view. The sorts of decisions that are being 
made as the conversation progresses are aimed at maintaining rigour in the discussion, 
thus encouraging the moves identified by the teacher as important to this purpose. 
These moves include process and content oriented moves (though commonly, process 
and content oriented moves are closely related). 
This implies that teachers' engagement in the community of inquiry is distinctly 
different from that of students. The differences are due to the different social roles 
played by teachers and students. Teachers are invested with pedagogic authority and 
the responsibilities that come with it. They are lengthily trained and prepared to 
exercise pedagogical judgement, just so that they can intervene strategically in the 
classroom at the appropriate times and in the appropriate way to enhance the induction 
of their students into society. As we have seen, in the modern West at least, an 
important part of this induction is the promotion of moral development and 
communicative autonomy. 
This last aim - the development of moral persons with communicative autonomy - 
implies that the teacher must exercise pedagogical action with an eye to the progress 
being made by the students. When the students have developed a high degree of 
communicative autonomy, the teacher can underplay the strategic aspect of pedagogic 
action and engage in the community more purely on the communicative level. 
Similarly, the strategic elements of the teacher's action ought gradually to become 
more transparent, through the students' growing ability to think metacognitively. 
This is not to say, however, that the focus of the conversation ought to be split 
between a metacognitive focus on the mechanics of the discussion and a 
communicative focus on the content of the discussion. To have such a twin focus 
would be to destroy the continuity of the substantive inquiry. The procedural elements 
of the inquiry usually form part of the background against which the inquiry can 
proceed. Hence the apparently deceptive action of the teacher, who will often (and 
who ought to) hide the strategic aim of an utterance. To the participants, the asking 
for a reason for a student's assertion sounds like it is advancing the inquiry (as it is), 
but the reason will also have been requested as a means of inducing the giving of 
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reasons for assertions as a matter of course. From time to time, this will need to be 
made more explicit, but for the most part, such concealed motives are legitimate if they 
are subsumed into pedagogical action. 
Indeed, as Lipman's reference to the teacher's role in employing questions from the 
philosophical tradition and compelling students to address philosophical themes 
emphasizes, I have drawn too sharp a distinction between process and content in this 
account so far. The teacher will not only intervene to provoke better thinking, but also 
to steer the inquiry into more promising conceptual waters. This is where, in a 
community of philosophical (including ethical) inquiry at least, the teacher needs to 
have at least some awareness of, and sensitivity to, the philosophical tradition. The 
exercises and discussion plans that accompany most Philosophy for Children texts 
assist the teacher in this task. 
That the two tasks - procedural and conceptual - are closely related can be shown by 
considering a few examples. The teacher ought not to ask students to give reasons for 
all assertions that they make, for some assertions will not be particularly 
philosophically interesting. So if a student offers the observation that "Essendon are a 
football team," we would be unlikely to ask for reasons. If the assertion was, rather, 
"Essendon are a good football team," then asking for reasons would be more 
philosophically fruitful, as we would be able to enter into a discussion of criteria for 
judgements of value. Similarly, if a student is relating a tale in which someone lies 
about an ice cream cone, we are unlikely to judge it worth asking whether distinctions 
can be drawn between different ice creams (chocolate, strawberry, vanilla), whereas 
the drawing of distinctions between different sorts of lies (white lies, self-serving lies, 
lies out of kindness or of malice etc.) would lead to many philosophically intriguing 
points. 
10.21 Following the Inquiry Where it Leads 
In the preamble of Chapter Nine, I foreshadowed the need to unpack Lipman's notion 
of "following the inquiry where it leads" and wondered what the implication of this 
phrase was for the coverage of curricular material. The phrase might be taken to imply 
that an inquiry has a purpose of its own, independent of the participants in the inquiry. 
In some tightly constrained cases, there might be some truth to this. For example, a 
mathematical inquiry might find that the manipulation of the symbols allows only a 
certain set of equations to be derived, one after the other. The logical nature of the 
inquiry compels the inquirers to follow the only path allowed, to a particular 
conclusion. Now, I am not claiming that this picture is accurate, for it seems to me 
that even such a tightly constrained inquiry does not lead down a pre-ordained path. 
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Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain how mathematical inquiries go wrong, and 
there would be little place for mathematical genius and discovery. But it will serve as 
a model for an inquiry forcefully leading the inquirers, even though this notion is 
somewhat problematic. 
Let's consider a much less constrained conversation, say around a dinner party table. 
In most such conversations, it would make sense to say that the discussion leads 
somewhere, in that it starts with a certain comment, ends with another, and there 
exists a connection between any one comment and the next, so that we could 
(sometimes after explanation) see what the connection is. Yet if one participant 
suddenly says "how did we get to be talking about this?" we will become aware in 
many cases that the conversation has wandered somewhat aimlessly and contingently 
about. Despite the fact that segments of the discussion may have made progress 
towards answering some problem that was raised, there does not seem to have been 
any overall purpose or direction. Nevertheless, due to the particular inputs made by 
the participants, the conversation went somewhere, and the participants went there 
too. In this very weak sense, they followed where the conversation led. 
The situation in a classroom community of inquiry ought to lie somewhere in between 
these two examples, but just where? Who is to be responsible for its direction? In 
that the community of inquiry starts with a particular question, chosen from the agenda 
set by the students, we can expect there to be more sense of direction than the dinner 
party conversation. Yet, as experience in a classroom community of inquiry will soon 
show, the dialogue there is not usually tightly focused just on answering that question. 
The inquiry soon throws up more questions, and veers off to address them. It is not 
uncommon at the end of the inquiry to realize that many of the questions on the agenda 
have been addressed in some way, and that few of them have been decisively 
answered. Indeed, students may complain that the discussion has gone round and 
round in circles. In Sprod (1994a), 20% of 93 Year 7 students made such comments 
in a survey of likes and dislikes of Philosophy for Children - by far the most 
commonly cited dislike. 5 
The discussion in a community of inquiry leads where it does under three influences: 
the impetus given it by the question, the communicative actions of the students, and 
the pedagogical actions of the teacher. The first of these, of course, has to be 
interpreted through the second two: it can have no direct input into the discussion. 
5  Given the training students have had throughout schooling to converge rapidly on right answers, 
this observation does not imply a weakness in the community of inquiry. Weaning students away 
from this expectation is an important part of Philosophy for Children. Nevertheless, teachers do need 
to be aware that some discussions can become somewhat aimless: monitoring the discussion for 
factors such as this is, of course, an important part of the teacher's pedagogic action. 
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The inputs of the students are made under two influences: in reaction to the 
immediately prior inputs of others (like in the dinner party conversation); and under 
the influence of the question being addressed (less common for the dinner party). It is 
likely that, for most students, the former influence is stronger than the latter and hence 
that, all things being equal, the discussion is more likely to meander than to lead. The 
less experienced the students are in the community of inquiry, the more likely this is to 
be so. 
The teacher, too, is subject to the same two influences, but also to a third: pedagogical 
concern for the students. Hence, if the inquiry is going to lead anywhere - either to an 
answer for the question raised; or to a consideration of philosophically important 
issues implied by the question - the teacher has both a greater responsibility and a 
greater ability than the students to ensure that it does. Gardner (1995) points out that a 
failure to realize this means that many teachers, inexperienced in the community of 
inquiry, preside over a rambling conversation much like my dinner table example. 
This is not to say that the teacher has to exert tight control over the inquiry, for to do 
so would subvert many of the pedagogical aims the teacher has in mind. Nor is it to 
say that the students cannot play an important role here as well. As they become more 
experienced members of the community, and as the community becomes more self-
correcting, they will increasingly do so. But it is to say that the responsibility for 
oversight of the inquiry does, in the end, remain with the teacher. The inquiry will 
lead, but only under the watchful eye of the teacher. 
Let's look a little more closely at what the pedagogical concern of the teacher entails. 
In my account of pedagogical action (§4.141), I have analysed the teacher's concern to 
develop the capacities of students (such as reasonableness and autonomy), but I have 
not considered pedagogic concern with respect to the content of education. Teachers, 
particularly in the higher grades, are often constrained somewhat by curricular 
demands. Yet the community of inquiry, being driven to a large degree by the 
interests, puzzles and questions of the students, will be, to a certain degree, led in 
directions that are not able to be pre-specified in curriculum documents. 
Does this mean that the teacher ought to exert pedagogical power in order to ensure the 
community of inquiry covers the ground mapped out by the curriculum? As I stated 
above, too tight a direction by the teacher will subvert some of the pedagogic aims of 
the community of inquiry, which rely on the direction, particularly in terms of content, 
arising from the students. The teacher may remain aware of opportunities to cover 
curricular ground, and give little nudges in these directions at times, but it does not 
seem that a community of inquiry could survive with its distinctive strengths intact 
under a more heavy handed approach. So it appears that there is a prima facie clash 
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between curriculum demands and the community of inquiry as a teaching 
methodology. 
In response to this, I will make two points. Firstly, the community of inquiry is, as I 
made clear in §9, not the only methodology that ought to be used in a classroom. 
Some of the other techniques - lecturing, individual research, essay writing, skills 
practice and so on - may well be better suited to curriculum coverage, when the teacher 
wants to keep a tight control on the material addressed. Each of these techniques has 
its advantages, of course, but it is well to be aware that they each also carry certain 
dangers. In particular, and this is the second point, techniques that are good at 
covering ground are not necessarily good at promoting real understanding, or 
motivating the move from understanding to action. This is precisely where the 
community of inquiry does hold an advantage (§9.21). And this point is, if anything, 
more important when the subject matter is ethics. It might just be acceptable for 
students to be able to parrot mathematical, scientific or historical knowledge without 
deep understanding, but, as Aristotle (1980) puts it, in ethical matters it is not enough 
for people to "take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will 
become good in this way" (II.4, 1105b13), especially if the theory is thin and poorly 
understood. 
Thus, an inquiring classroom community will incorporate many teaching 
methodologies, with the choice of exactly which need to be used when often (but not 
exclusively) made by the teacher. Yet there is a central place for the community of 
inquiry, for it is in such a community that students are best able to grapple with ideas 
and concepts, gaining a greater intersubjective understanding of them. The 
community need not be entered through the preliminary phase (§10.1), either. The 
puzzles and questions that lead into a discussion may well arise in the course of using 
one of the other teaching methodologies. Again, at these junctures, the final decision 
as to whether to enter the discussion phase of a community of inquiry lies firmly in the 
hands of the teacher, through pedagogical action. 
10.22 Reasonableness through and in the Community of Inquiry 
Morally good persons need a well-developed reasonableness (§3.1), for morality 
requires the ability to come to, and act on, a wide variety of moral judgements and 
understandings (§5.2). In §6.231, I distinguished presuppositional rationality - which 
we can, following Habermas, ascribe identically to all normal humans - from situated 
rationality, which is differentially developed in each human. In education, the 
question of how presuppositional rationality is transformed into an individual's 
reasonableness (a preferable term for situated rationality) is of vital importance. Of 
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course, this process is started long before the child arrives at school, but it continues 
throughout the years of compulsory education (and beyond, throughout life). 
Throughout this thesis, I have been defending the view that Vygotskian learning 
(outlined in §3.23 and §8.23) is the major basic mechanism by which the development 
of reasonableness takes place.6 Vygotsky, as we saw, claims that such learning leads 
development. As my account identified five aspects of reasonableness, I will now 
look in some detail at how the community of inquiry can strengthen each of these 
aspects, and the ways in which teachers conducting communities of inquiry can 
enhance this. 
In choosing or writing the texts to be used as triggers for the community of inquiry, 
the five aspects of thinking need to be considered, as I argued in §10.1. There I 
suggested that a rich narrative, incorporating complex naturalistic situations, 
opportunities for imaginative extension, varied emotional commitments from the 
characters and features of the character's embodiment in the world, as well as 
intellectual puzzles and discussions, was necessary to provoke the full range of 
reasonableness. Clearly, then, the discussion phase of the community of inquiry will 
need to build on these features of the text. 
10.221 The Critical Aspect of Reasonableness and Transfer 
Much attention has been paid in the Philosophy for Children literature to the critical 
aspect of thinking (see §3.121). Indeed, Lipman's magnum opus, Thinking in 
Education (1991) devotes the bulk of its discussion to critical thinking. With regard to 
critical thinking, Lipman analyses in detail the place of skills, schemata, operations, 
moves, criteria, megacriteria, metacriteria, logic, standards, reasons, relationships and 
judgements. I do not wish either to reproduce or to assess this work here, but I shall 
note a few points. 
Lipman, as we saw in §3.121, defines critical thinking as thinking that facilitates 
judgement because it relies on criteria, is self-correcting, and is sensitive to context. 
This is a wide and inclusive definition, covering in part the aspect of thinking I label 
contextual. With its emphasis on judgement, it also looks beyond the narrow skills 
taught in many versions of critical thinking towards a holistic approach of learning and 
practicing critical thinking through its naturalistic application within the community of 
inquiry. As Lipman says: 
6 This is not to say that there is no place for the sort of interaction with the world that Piaget 
identifies as important to development, especially in the pre-linguistic months (Kohlberg and Wertsch 
1987), but given the focus of this thesis, I shall not pursue this type of learning further. 
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Instead of directing most of our efforts towards the development of algorithms and 
heuristics, useful as this may be, we would do better to concentrate on the 
improvement of reasoning and judgement. The improvement of reasoning involves 
persistent practice in distinguishing logical from illogical discourse, the acquisition 
of logical principles, and learning how to apply such principles to actual practice in 
academic matters and in life generally. The improvement of judgement involves 
getting students to make and evaluate judgements of practice in a never-ending 
continuum of judgement, so that the judgements made gradually become more and 
more reliable and enlightening. (60) 
In this passage, there is not a narrow focus on the critical aspect of thinking, as the 
reference to application in a variety of contexts shows. It is clear that Lipman believes 
the improvement of critical reasoning is not a matter of isolated, decontextualized skills 
practice, but of the repeated appropriate use of critical thinking in a variety of contexts. 
McPeck (1981, 158) criticizes the Critical Thinking movement's approach of teaching 
thinking as a separate subject, saying that "analysis of critical thinking.., makes it 
abundantly clear that it can only be taught as part of a specific subject and never in 
isolation." In the community of ethical inquiry, of course, thinking (the critical and 
the other aspects) is being taught within a specific subject: ethics. As ethics is "the 
philosophy of morality," this is to follow McPeck's advice about the teaching of both 
the disciplines and thinking. 
One of the most pervasive shortcomings of the way that the traditional disciplines 
are taught is that they present their material in such a way that its facts and methods 
are regarded as non-problematic. It is as though the foundation of these disciplines 
was chiseled out of epistemic bedrock, and all one need learn is what the so-called 
facts are, and how to use its methods to find out more of them.... A plausible 
solution to this problem is to make the philosophy of X... an integral part of what 
it means to "learn X." (1990, 17) 
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that all practice of the critical aspect of 
thinking must be so situated in a specific context that there can be no consideration of 
its generalization. This is, of course, the mistake that many in the Critical Thinking 
movement have attributed to McPeck (all reprinted in McPeck 1990; see, for example, 
Norris 1990; Paul 1990; Siegel 1990). Indeed, the Critical Thinking movement is 
attacked by McPeck for claiming that the skills of thinking can be taught in a 
decontextuslized form at all. 
In [critical thinking's] effort to maximise the number of areas to which its general 
principles apply, this approach perforce sacrifices genuine effectiveness in all of 
them. While its prescriptions are generally true, they are also hollow, more truistic 
than true.... General heuristics are... hollow and virtually useless for specific 
problems.... Giving people very general principles for solving problems, even with 
extensive training in them, is like giving people a language with a syntax but no 
semantic. (1990, 14) 
This attack brings to mind the similar Hegelian attack on the emptiness of 
universalized moral principles I discussed in §7.24, and the approach developed there 
will also apply here. In both cases, the charge is laid that the more generally 
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applicable a principle is, the emptier it is. It seems correct to say that working at the 
highly abstract level makes the problem of application to context-bound particular 
situations problematic. Yet the thinking that works on specific problems can be 
generalized and systematized, leading to disciplines with considerable formal power 
(e.g., formal logic). Just as Benhabib calls for enlarged thinking in relation to general 
moral principles, I suggest that the answer to the apparent dichotomy between general 
critical thinking skills and domain-specific thinking skills lies in encouraging, within 
the community of inquiry, a constant movement between the two. 
Research into situated cognition supports this contention. Hennessy (1993), in a 
review article, avers that situated cognition studies make it 
obvious that merely presenting children with new information and experiences.., is 
insufficient to promote learning. To avoid confirmatory bias and to move pupils' 
primitive thinking forward, new experiences need to be articulated and reasoned 
about, related to their informal conceptions and generalized to other similar 
situations. An increasingly large body of research shows that social interaction 
contributes to children's cognitive development (11).... In sum, learning experiences 
and activities can be rendered useful and meaningful by the sense made of them by 
classroom talk (which is generally undervalued as a learning tool). (20) 
This explicit articulation and reasoning about new experiences makes the specific skills 
and abilities used more transparent to the students, and the generalization to similar 
situations encourages the separation of the abilities from a narrowly specific context. 
The call for social interaction and classroom talk points towards a pedagogy like the 
community of inquiry. Later, Hennessy gives more details of the type of classroom 
talk and social interaction the studies she is surveying recommend. 
A critical insight derived from the situated cognition research is that problems 
emerge out of dilemmas and learning arises when means are sought to resolve those 
dilemmas. The implications are that formal educational settings need to encourage 
active intellectual engagement in... thinking... We should encourage schoolchildren 
to formulate, attempt to solve and communicate their discoveries about questions 
arising in their classrooms, playgrounds and homes... Problems should be ones 
pupils want to solve, which are real and relevant to them, which engage their 
interest, and for which they can take responsibility. (33) 
With its emphasis on children formulating the problems, we are reminded of the 
preliminary stages of the community of inquiry, discussed in §10.1. Although these 
problems are drawn from fictional narratives rather than the lives of children (as 
Hennessy recommends), the use of anecdotes within the inquiry helps to bridge this 
gap. I will discuss this point further in §10.223. But while the teacher ought not to 
choose the problems and puzzles to be discussed, Hennessy sees a role for the teacher 
in the encouragement and scaffolding of the inquiry. Rogoff and Gardner (1984, 97- 
98) highlight the importance of the joint construction of the conditions for 
298 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 10. Practical implications 
generalization or transfer by the teacher and learner, in a way which supports my 
analysis of pedagogic action in §4.141: 
Inherent in instruction is the construction of a context in which the new information 
is made compatible with the learner's current knowledge and skills... [by means of 
which] the teacher is guiding the learner in the generalization to the new problem. 
It is the ability of the community of inquiry to focus in turn on the attempt to come to 
an understanding or a solution to a substantive problem, and then to focus 
metacognitively on the tools of inquiry which have been used in that attempt which 
provides the bridge between domain-specific engagement in inquiry and domain-
general transfer of the means of inquiry. The clear implication for teachers conducting 
a community of inquiry is that they ought to be constantly aware of opportunities to 
nudge the level of inquiry from the specific and relatively unreflective use of the 
critical aspect of reasoning to explicit metacognitive inquiry into the tools of reasoning 
and back again at appropriate times. The appropriate time is, of course, a matter for 
nuanced and situated judgement, and must be based on the students' contributions. 
The time to move to the metacognitive is when the use of tools is getting muddled, and 
the time to reapply the tools is when the metacognitive reflection is getting too 
disconnected from real examples. In the Philosophy for Children support materials 
(the manuals), many of the exercises are designed to assist teachers to make the moves 
in either direction. Perkins and Salomon (1989) claim that this sort of reflective 
addressing of the application of cognitive tools to other situations does enhance the 
possibility of transfer. 
In this discussion of transfer, I have concentrated mostly on the critical aspect of 
reasonableness, partly because this is also the focus of the authors discussed. But 
McPeck's critique, and the conclusions reached above concerning it, are applicable to 
all five aspects of reasonableness, especially as they are intertwined in any actual 
example of thinking. It is to this intertwining and the implications for the leader of the 
community of inquiry that I now turn. 
10.222 Admixture of the Aspects of Reasonableness in the Discussion 
Lipman, who defines creative thinking "as thinking conducive to judgement, guided 
by context, self-transcending, and sensitive to criteria" (193 - see §3.122), recognizes 
this intertwining with respect to the two aspects that form the focus of his book. 
There is no creative thinking that is not shot through with critical judgements, just 
as there is no critical judgement that is not shot through with creative judgements. 
We can, of course, construct abstract ideal types in which pure forms of thinking are 
delineated, but in actuality admixture is the rule. (194) 
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Likewise, I claim that thinking must be "shot through" with the committed aspect 
(without which there would be no motivation to think at all), the contextual aspect (as 
Lipman recognizes in his definitions of both critical and creative thinking), and the 
embodied aspect (which recognizes that it is we, as body-and-mind persons, who are 
situated within the context). Each of these aspects may come to the forefront of our 
thinking, depending on the details of our inquiry, and each may be turned to, 
reflexively, to become the "abstract, ideal type" that we consider for the moment, 
before it returns to the background as the inquiry progresses. I have discussed the 
theoretical underpinning for this claim in §3.126. 
Since the rich narrative of the texts chosen will also contain the same admixture, 
students will most likely raise questions which have the potential to access each of the 
aspects of reasonableness at different times. This will inevitably lead to a rich mix in 
the discussion that follows. However, different questions will highlight different 
aspects to varying degrees, and it should be one of the aims of the teacher to build on 
this by similarly foregrounciing each of the aspects at appropriate times, as well as 
facilitating inquiry into their interactions. 
Transcripts of discussions within a community of inquiry can be analysed in various 
ways. As presented in §8.23, I have outlined the structure of such discussions in 
previous work (Sprod 1994c; 1997d; 1998). They can be divided into segments, 
containing from a few to several dozen utterances, which I called "epistemic 
episodes." These I defined as "those distinct segments of a discussion that approach 
the pursuit of knowledge in a particular way" (1994, 2). While the focus in that work 
was mainly on the critical aspect of thinking and the dynamics of the discussion, I did 
look at the way in which the cognitive and affective aspects of the discussion 
intertwined. 
This empirical research into the structure and development of a community of inquiry 
within a Year 7 science classroom was completed well before I carried out the 
conceptual analysis of reasonableness presented in §3.1. Hence, the analytic 
categories I used in that study do not match those used here. The major distinction 
that I drew in that study was between cognitive and affective thinking. Roughly 
speaking, I would now further categorize thinking that I called cognitive in that study 
as displaying mainly either the critical, the creative or the contextual aspect of thinking, 
while episodes of affective thinking would most likely now be categorized as mainly 
displaying the committed aspect of thinking. Within the cognitive category, I made a 
distinction by noting whether the cognition was largely turned towards the process of 
the thinking or the substantive content. The latter are good candidates for 
classification as foregrounding the contextual aspect of thinking. With the benefit of 
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the more careful conceptual analysis I have carried out here, I would probably also 
have identified some episodes that displayed the embodied aspect of thinking. 
Leaving aside these analytical differences, there was clear evidence that different 
epistemic episodes tended to focus now more on the cognitive element (substantive or 
procedural), now more on the affective, and that some episodes combined both (Sprod 
1994c, Table 5.1). The close analysis of one discussion which is presented in that 
table illustrates this point. The discussion had been preceded by an experiment using a 
van der Graaff generator, and the broad content categories I used covered static 
electricity, current electricity, energy conservation and the mechanics of experiments. 
The process categories concerned testing, appeals to experience, reasons and 
deduction. Affective issues were not differentiated. 
Of the fifty seven epistemic episodes identified in the discussion, twenty eight were 
placed in one of these categories only. This does not imply that they contained only 
one element of thinking, but rather that the one element was clearly to the fore. For 
example, episode 20 (substantive) is concerned with what static electricity can do, 
episode 28 (procedural) addresses what a fair test is, episode 4 (classified affective, 
but I would now call it embodied) reports what it felt like to be charged by the 
generator. The other twenty nine episodes sufficiently displayed a combination of 
different elements of thinking that they were classified under two or more elements. 
In episode 12, for example, the class is trying to ascertain whether a generalization 
they have just made will apply to a particular unusual case, and thus they mix the 
contextualized aspect of thinking (about the specifics of the generalization and the 
application) with explicitly considered reasoning (procedural element = the critical 
aspect). In episode 29, a student explores the connection between the implications of 
an experiment (procedural element = critical aspect) and the harm it may do the student 
involved (affective element = committed aspect). 
This empirical research highlights the fact that the extent to which each of the five 
aspects of reasonableness dominates a particular socially constructed episode of overt 
thinking varies quite markedly. Sometimes, one aspect is clearly predominant; at other 
times, several of them are very closely combined. Yet, one of the marks of the 
epistemic episode is that it maintains, over several (maybe many) utterances from 
different participants in the dialogue, a consistency of aspectual mix. In engaging in a 
specific epistemic strategy, we engage the appropriate aspect(s) of reasonableness. As 
the strategy changes and the dialogue shifts into a new epistemic episode, so too may 
the aspects of reasonableness that are being wielded. Awareness of this episternic 
episodic structure of discussions, together with attention to the features that are being 
picked out in each episode, would enable teachers to focus their comments within an 
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episode on sustaining the aspectual nature of the inquiry within the episode, and to 
link it reflectively to other episodes. In this way, all the five aspects of reasonableness 
can be strengthened, students learn how to engage them appropriately in context, and 
the progress of the inquiry will be served. 
Of course, it is not necessarily true that all the features of any classroom discussion 
will serve inquiry and meet the pedagogical aims of the teacher. Clearly, teachers need 
to be vigilant to steer the discussion away from areas that have negative effects, such 
as loose free association of ideas, so that the students' comments do not connect to 
each other, or "tis!," "tisn't!" exchanges that do not engage in any reasoned 
argument. Yet to make such a judgement requires that teachers have a clear idea about 
what the threats to worthwhile dialogue are. I will now turn my attention to two 
threats that have been identified, and assess them in the light of my aspectual account 
of reasonableness. 
10.223 The Place of Anecdotes and Psychologizing in the Inquiry 
The distinction between a discussion within a community of inquiry which is inquiring 
properly and one which isn't has been marked in a number of different ways. Splitter 
and Sharp (1995, 34-40) mark it by calling the former "dialogue" and the latter 
"conversation" (see also Gardner 1995), though it is worth noting that some other 
authors (e.g., MacColl 1992; Reed 1992) have used "conversation" in a sense closer 
to the former. Without entering into this debate, I shall here use "dialogue" and 
"conversation" as a shorthand to mark this distinction. For Splitter and Sharp (op. 
cit., 34), the four "necessary and, perhaps, jointly sufficient" characteristics of a 
dialogue, are: a focus on a problematic or contestable topic; self-correction; an 
egalitarian structure; and guidance of the inquiry by the mutual interests of its 
members. 
In this section I want to concentrate on the first characteristic: the question of how 
teachers are to determine whether the discussion is sufficiently focused to count as a 
dialogue. Splitter and Sharp explicitly say that their first condition ought to be 
interpreted liberally, but they obviously wish to exclude features of a conversation that 
mean that it lacks the sort of focus they have identified. Philosophy for Children 
theorists commonly claim that the focus must be philosophical, and that this means 
teachers ought to discourage non-philosophical discussion in their community of 
inquiry. Two of the threats to the philosophical nature of the inquiry that have been 
identified are the telling of anecdotes and "psychologizing" (I shall document these 
claims and the reasons advanced for them below). Broadly speaking, I agree that a 
community of inquiry needs a philosophical focus, but I shall advance arguments that 
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these exclusions arise largely from a relatively narrow account of reasonableness, and 
that my broader characterization of reasonableness warrants their inclusion, provided 
certain precautions are observed. After considering the arguments for each in turn, I 
will turn to the claim that anecdotes and psychologizing are of special importance if the 
focus of the inquiry is on ethical matters. 
Students will commonly respond to an incident in the trigger text by telling an 
anecdote from their own experience. Other students will then want to tell their own 
anecdotes, in a sort of free association. The inquiry has the potential to degenerate 
into a string of unconnected anecdotes; a mere conversation. For this reason, the 
telling of anecdotes has been frowned upon in the community of inquiry, unless the 
anecdote can be tightly tied to the inquiry as an example or counterexample of the point 
at hand. Here is a cautionary note from Reed (1992, 154), concerning: 
the overuse of personal anecdotes. When we inquire together, it is almost impossible 
not to argue from personal experience, to relate bits and pieces of our histories. 
There is nothing wrong with using anecdotes to facilitate the process of inquiry. The 
problem, however, is that all too frequently inquiry tends to degenerate into a mere 
recitation of personal history. A good rule of thumb might be to eliminate all 
anecdotal reports unless there is a compelling reason to share them. 
Elsewhere, Reed (1992) has argued for the place of anecdotes as a means of 
producing a realignment of the dialogue, directing it into new avenues of exploration, 
but this again depends on the anecdote contributing directly to a fruitful direction for 
inquiry; Reed offers criteria by which it can be judged as such by the teacher. 
The thrust of these arguments against permitting the telling of anecdotes is that they 
interfere with the "process of inquiry," where inquiry is conceived narrowly as 
involving only the critical and creative aspects of thinking. By including consideration 
of the contextualized, committed and embodied aspects of reasonableness, I maintain 
that there is a larger role for the "recitation of personal history." 
Anecdotes are episodes from the lived histories of the students. They are thus rich in 
contextual detail. This benefits those who retell them, who through the telling connect 
the substance of the inquiry to their own experience and situatedness in the world. 
Anecdotes are also rich in emotional attachments. They are rarely mere recitations of 
the facts, usually providing a way for those telling them to work through and even, 
often enough, discover their emotional reactions to the events in their lives. They are 
motivational for the tellers, who discover in the telling of the anecdote that they are 
now personally connected to the discussion. In anecdotes, students bring themselves, 
as whole, embodied persons, to the inquiry, which becomes woven into their life's 
narrative. 
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To concentrate on the tellers of the anecdotes is to miss the greater part of their benefit. 
The telling of anecdotes also benefits the listeners, for they gain an insight into the 
world inhabited by others, which has the effect of changing their own worlds. The 
sharing of anecdotes is a part of the process of creating an intersubjective world, in 
which it is possible to understand others. In hearing of the way you see your 
surroundings, feel about the events in your life and react to them, I am not merely 
learning about you, but also envisaging for myself alternative possibilities for my own 
dwelling in the world. 
Anecdotes, even a series of somewhat loosely connected ones, can serve all these 
purposes, though it must be emphasized that the teacher needs to exercise pedagogical 
judgement as to whether the gains outweigh the disadvantages pointed out above. 
Clearly, an anecdote performs these services best when it meshes well into the inquiry 
and contributes to its further advancement, for these are the conditions under which 
the whole community is most likely to remain engaged and to explore the implications 
of the anecdotal narratives. These considerations speak against the allowing of "free 
associating" from one anecdote to another, for an open slather attitude to anecdotes has 
dangers of disconnection from the dynamics of the inquiry. Nevertheless, the 
"elimination of all anecdotal reports" has its own dangers, leading to the over-
formalization of the inquiry in terms of the critical (and perhaps creative) aspects of 
thinking, thus cutting the discourse free from the lives and concerns of the 
participants. One of the capacities that students have to learn is that of using anecdotes 
in a way that does not just connect their experience to the conversation, but also helps 
to advance the inquiry itself. In pursuit of this cause, teachers can ask students who 
are offering anecdotes to make clear the ways in which their anecdote sheds light on 
the topic in hand, or request that other students look for the connection. 
The second danger that teachers have been warned to avoid is "psychologizing." This 
phrase refers to allowing students to engage in amateur analysis, turning the 
community of inquiry into "encounter-like discussions which probe the personal 
details of one another's lives" (Splitter and Sharp 1995, 181). The warning is wise, 
for to engage in an intrusive exploration of students' deepest feelings in their presence 
without proper training does risk doing damage. Yet, while Splitter and Sharp see that 
"it might be philosophically appropriate to examine the thoughts, character and actions 
of a specific fictional character... [knowing] that such examination cannot be harmful 
or invasive" (185n40, italics added), there is a resistance to allowing a folk 
psychological analysis of the characters, on the grounds that it is inimical to inquiry. 
It is worth noting that psychologizing can be seen as an extension of the sharing of life 
experiences, be they anecdotes or fictional vignettes, in that the students in the inquiry 
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take up the anecdotal narrative and explore the psychological factors that lie behind it. 
Thus, in that psychologizing leads to an investigation into the events retold, it helps to 
induct the anecdote into the inquiry. As the benefits of anecdotes that I discussed 
above depend to some degree on the exploration of the anecdote within the inquiry, 
then allowing a psychological approach will enhance these benefits. 
There are two reasons commonly advanced why psychologizing is a bad thing. The 
first, mentioned by Splitter and Sharp, is that there are dangers of psychological 
damage to individuals within the community if the focus is turned on them. I certainly 
endorse the warning to be careful in these situations, and the advice that such probing 
should rather be done on fictional characters, so as to avoid this danger, is apposite. 
However, there is a distinction that can be drawn between everyday psychology and 
abnormal psychology. If the probing is into common psychological factors that are 
likely to be felt by most of the community, then psychologizing contributes to the 
building of an intersubjective knowledge of persons and their position in the world. It 
builds community. The dangers are much greater when the factors under discussion 
are seen by many in the community as unusual or "weird." It is then that teachers 
must exercise caution and care for the members of the community. 
The previous paragraph reads largely like a "tip for teachers," but my second point has 
more philosophical bite. The disapproval of psychologizing, whether it be based on 
anecdotes from the community or vignettes from the text, also arises from a feeling 
that the inquiry has been sidetracked and dissipated, forced away from philosophically 
interesting and worthwhile matters. I argue that this fear is based on the impoverished 
view of rationality as critical and creative thinking, and that my concept of 
reasonableness gives us philosophical reasons for incorporating psychologizing into 
the inquiry, as one of many approaches. As the first step, I will present an example of 
what an episode of psychologizing might look like, and the common arguments 
against allowing it. 
Students often ask questions about motivational factors that lie behind the actions of 
fictional characters. The reason for the reluctance to allow such inquiry I have heard 
given at Philosophy for Children training courses is that it leads to a barren listing of 
possible psychological motives, with no way to decide between the alternatives. The 
dialogue degenerates into a series of "maybes." Because such psychological questions 
are empirical and not conceptual, it is claimed, in the absence of textual clues, 
questions about motivation remain undecidable. 
The hidden premise of this argument is 	rationality is primarily about critical and 
creative thinking. In generating possibilities, students are admittedly exercising 
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creative thinking, but it is only in conceptual matters that possibilities can be critically 
discussed; in empirical matters, hard empirical evidence is needed for progress to be 
made in critical discussion. Therefore, in the absence of such evidence, such 
discussions should be avoided. In the light of a richer account of reasonableness, 
which recognizes the committed, contextual and embodied aspects, I argue that such 
discussions still have value for the community of inquiry. 
Although students have neither the empirical evidence, nor the psychological expertise 
to definitively answer the sorts of psychological questions I am referring to here, they 
still need to become capable folk psychologists in order to operate in the lifeworld. 
This entails building up their intersubjective knowledge of both themselves and others 
as agents within the world. This is especially true in the case of ethical (or practical) 
questions, as they will have to act in social situations where understanding both 
themselves and others will be of vital importance. They need thicken their 
understanding of how emotional, contextual and bodily factors frame situations. They 
need practice at imagining the situations and motivations of others (utilizing the 
creative, committed and contextual aspects of thinking), and of gaining greater insight 
into their own motivations (where the embodied aspect of their own thinking will also 
enter). 
Of course, ordinary immersion in the lifeworld makes children reasonably competent 
folk psychologists at quite a young age, but reflective engagement in psychological 
inquiry, especially when mixed with philosophical inquiry into the concepts of ethical 
personhood, will enable them to hone these lifeworld understandings. Indeed, given 
my richer conception of reasonableness, there are many links between philosophical 
and psychological inquiry. For example, speculative answers about psychological 
motivations may not be decidable, but are certainly criticizable on multiple criteria, 
such as likeliness, consistency with known character traits and so on. Finding and 
evaluating such criteria provides rich philosophical possibilities. More importantly, 
our key ethical concepts are not, as Kant and Kohlberg would have it, context-free 
principles of Reason, but rather reflectively constructed from paradigm scenarios, as 
described by Matthews and Johnson (see §5.1 and §6.2322 respectively). These 
scenarios are based on contextually situated, emotionally charged, embodied 
experiences, initially from our own lives but greatly enriched by consideration of, and 
engagement with, similar experiences in the lives of real or fictional others. The 
construction of ethical concepts thus requires some facility in both philosophical and 
psychological inquiry. 
This leads me to the claim that there are special reasons why anecdotes and 
psychologizing ought not to be excluded from a community of ethical inquiry. More 
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than many of the other subdisciplines of philosophy, ethics is centrally concerned with 
our relationships with others. While it might be claimed with some justice that logic, 
for example, draws most heavily on the critical aspect of reasonableness, my virtue 
ethics/discourse ethics account (Chapter Seven) shows that thinking about ethics has 
much to do with contexts, commitments and embodiment, especially in 
interrelationships with others. As I have shown, this provides a space for anecdotes 
and psychological inquiry. 
Glaser (1998) discusses the sort of imaginative projection that ethical thinking 
requires, referring to Arendt's "visiting imagination" and Nussbaum's "judicious 
spectatorship" (which Nussbaum in turn derives from Adam Smith's work). Both 
these concepts attempt to capture the sense in which we can make judgements about 
the experience and actions of another in ethical situations. It is not enough for me to 
put myself imaginatively in the shoes of the other, because as myself, I will not 
construe the situation as the other does. I will end up making a monological 
judgement. Nor can I imaginatively project myself onto the other, taking on all their 
views and beliefs. If I succeed, then the judgement I make is theirs, not mine, and 
again monological. In either case, the judgement is likely to be inappropriately biased 
through having the emotions of a participant, rather than a spectator who can "omit 
that portion of the emotion that derives from our personal interest in our own well-
being" (Nussbaum 1995, 74). 
Thus, I need to imaginatively place myself alongside the other as a friendly and 
sympathetic companion, knowledgable about their views but retaining my own 
judgement and a certain detachment from their predicament. As Smith says: "The 
compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he 
himself would feel if he were reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what is 
perhaps impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and 
judgment" (quoted by Nussbaum 1995, 73-74). To have this knowledge requires that 
I can "imaginatively construct the multiple ways a situation may present in order that 
[II may stand alongside them" (ibid, 20). It is this that can be practiced in the 
community of inquiry, where engagement with others in dialogue gives us the 
capability to gain an insight and understanding of others, whilst simultaneously 
strengthening our own ability to make judgements that take account of these 
understandings. Both anecdotes and psychologizing contribute to the insight and 
understanding, and incorporating them into the inquiry aids the development of 
judgement. 
In the engagement with literature (Nussbaum 1995) such as the texts that used as 
triggers for the community, these inquiries are opportunities for sharpening moral 
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discernment without potentially harmful consequences to real persons. As is not the 
case for solitary reading, however, ideas can be tested in the forge of intersubjective 
discussion and enriched by the input of others (Glaser 1998, 21). Nussbaum 
recognizes this, saying that "ideally the process of reading must be completed by a 
conversation among readers" (op. cit., 75). Indeed, in hearing and grappling with the 
anecdotes of others, a better grasp of the psychological reactions of real others, 
outside the fictional world, to situations can be gained (provided those others are 
protected from harm). 
In the foregoing, I have suggested that discussions within the community of inquiry 
may justifiably be widened beyond the scope normally allotted to them, and that this is 
especially so in an ethical inquiry. My account of reasonableness draws attention to 
the committed, contextual and embodied aspects of thinking. While these aspects have 
a role to play in all thinking, their role is more important when the focus of that 
thinking is not merely what to believe, but also what to do_ Therefore, in a 
community of ethical inquiry, those factors which mobilize commitment, tie the 
discussion more closely to real and imagined contexts, bring participants in as real 
embodied actors and connect the discussion to the motivations and experiences of 
action in the world will enhance the dialogue and increase the probability that its 
conclusions are carried through into the lived lives of the students. Thus they can 
develop not only reasonableness in thinking, but also reasonableness in action. 
10.23 Moral Correctness and the Community of Ethical Inquiry 
The major focus of the community of ethical inquiry, of course, is the development of 
ethical persons. Reasonableness is, as we have seen, an essential part of this, but 
there is a sense in which reasonableness is more process oriented, and ethical persons 
need also to have substantive moral views and beliefs. Hence I now turn to the 
question of how the community of ethical inquiry can lead to students acquiring 
adequate moral knowledge and beliefs. 
This, of course, raises the vexed question of how we can recognize moral knowledge 
as adequate, particularly in a pluralist society. For some, moral knowledge will only 
be adequate if it is correct; that is, if it corresponds to moral truth. The problem with 
this, of course, is determining which moral views are in fact true. 
In the course of this thesis (§6.24 and §7.21), I have sought to establish the position 
that an insistence on, and hence an inculcation of, procedural respect is not only 
justified, but also essential to the educative endeavour. This is especially true of the 
community of ethical inquiry. Such an insistence does not amount to indoctrination, 
partly because the substantive notions of respect that underlie the procedures are 
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potentially open to inquiry within the community, and this can lead to both discussion 
of, and modifications to, the procedures of the community (§9.4l3). 
Indeed, the inculcation of the procedures and values of respect for others within the 
community of inquiry is just a special case of the inculcation of values within the 
lifeworld. Lifeworld values can vary on several dimensions: their range of acceptance 
(they can be relatively widely accepted throughout the world, accepted only within a 
given society or particular to some smaller grouping such as a subculture or even a 
family); their specificity (they can apply to all persons, or only to particular persons); 
and their strength (from strict taboo to mild disapproval). What they all have in 
common is that they are taken-for-granted within their range. 
Lifeworld values in general can emerge from the background and become 
problematized at any time. In the community of ethical inquiry, this is more likely to 
happen to both the inculcated values and lifeworld values brought into the community 
by the participants, simply because the asking of questions about the problematic is so 
encouraged. To concentrate for a moment on the procedural values of the community, 
we can comment that the problematizing of a particular value, say, that one ought to 
listen when another is speaking, can take one of two directions, identified by 
Habermas in the distinction of discourses of justification from discourses of 
application (§7.24). In the former, the community will assess whether the overall 
value is a worthy one: is it ethically required to listen when another is speaking? In 
justification, we seek to redeem the general value. But even if we agree that, other 
things being equal, listening to a speaker is morally better than ignoring them, this 
does not decide the details of the application of the rule. Does it require that all present 
look at the speaker? On what grounds, if any, may another interrupt the speaker? 
Even if all present agree that one ought to listen to a speaker, there are grounds for 
much disagreement on the answers to questions such as these. 
The implication of this for the teacher leading a community of ethical inquiry is that all 
questions concerning norms - be they procedural or substantive - ought to be grist for 
the mill of the inquiry. Unlike in most classroom activities, the child who asks "Why 
are we doing this?" is not leading the class off on a wild goose chase (even if that 
might be the intention). If the question does raise a matter of value, and if the 
community is interested in following the inquiry in that direction, then the question is 
not only legitimate, but also quite central to the business of ethical inquiry. Indeed, 
even if the rest of the class is somewhat dismissive of the question, then the teacher 
might legitimately ask for one of them to explain to the questioner why the values that 
lie behind the question are justified. If they can easily do so, then the matter may be 
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passed over. It may, however, transpire that the matter is not as straightforward as the 
answerer assumes, and the ensuing discussion can easily be a fruitful one. 
This leads us into consideration of the question of tolerance: how we are to decide 
which views ought to be tolerated within the community of inquiry. That such a 
community ought to tolerate a considerable degree of difference of opinion is clear, for 
intolerance is inimical to the ethos of open inquiry. Nevertheless, there must be some 
limits to tolerance. A first answer to the question is to draw a distinction between lazy 
tolerance and critical tolerance. We tolerate a view lazily if we merely accept the right 
of someone else to express it. We show critical tolerance if we accept the right of 
someone else to express a view provided they are willing if required to defend the 
view (equally, we must be willing to consider seriously the reasons advanced in that 
defence). In Habermasian terms, we tolerate views where the holder of the view will 
honour this speech act immanent obligation (P.124). The obligation also extends to a 
willingness (on both sides) to change the view if the reasons for doing so are 
sufficiently compelling. 
But this first answer is not enough, for the holder of a view might be willing and able 
to defend it, yet the view itself might be "beyond the pale." We need an additional 
criterion for separating views that ought to be tolerated, even if they are bizarrely 
different, from those that ought not. Here, I turn again to the foundational value - 
respect (§6.24). We must tolerate a view which does not violate respect for others, 
and which is defended respectfully. The teacher (as well as any other student) has the 
right to demand that non-respectful views, or non-respectful defences of them, are 
withdrawn from the community, or recast in respectful terms. 
Students within the community of ethical inquiry can, though a consideration of the 
tractability of certain issues to approaches to consensus, strengthen their feel for the 
difference between what I have dubbed (in §7.24) rightish and goodish issues. As we 
saw there, some issues are more liable to result in consensus (the rightish), whereas 
others are prone to lead to agreements to disagree. Issues of the good life, they are 
liable to decide, call for a greater degree of tolerance than issues of justice. Yet, 
because there is no "sharp cut" to be made between the right and the good, even this 
conclusion can be contentious. In any case, a narrowly based consensus may arise 
merely because the students' views are embedded in similar background assumptions 
and lifeworlds. 
Let's leave aside cases where the community comes to a decision to tolerate a 
difference of views respectfully, and look further at the case where the community of 
ethical inquiry has come to consensus on a matter either of justification or of 
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application of a value (§6.21). There is still the question as to the weight that this 
agreement carries with respect to normative correctness (§6.22 and §7.23). A 
classroom community of ethical inquiry is an infinitesimally small discourse when 
compared to the ideal practical discourse that Habermas claims as the only warrant of 
normative correctness. Just because a class of (say) thirty 12 year old white middle 
class Australian students agrees after 30 minutes of discussion that the habitat of the 
bilbies ought not to be destroyed, does this provide any warrant for members of that 
class believing in the correctness of this norm? 
Clearly, whether there is a warrant or not, in the absence of any other input a student 
who does assent in discussion to this norm will as a matter of fact believe it. For us, 
the question is not about whether we are right to hold the values that we have come to 
hold (for we do in fact hold them), although others may question this. Rather, we 
need to be concerned about the manner in which we hold them. If the community of 
ethical inquiry is working well, one of the values that will be learned (possibly 
implicitly, but always with the potential for explicit discussion and endorsement) is 
that, while we must adhere to, and act on, our values, we ought also to be open to the 
possibility that further discussion might lead us to change our minds, provided the 
reasons for doing so are sufficiently compelling. 
Nevertheless, teachers ought to take seriously the homogeneity of such a classroom 
community of inquiry, and the potential that its homogeneity has for leading to a 
narrow, poorly considered moral consensus. For, even if the process of inquiry 
within the class is exemplary, in the absence of a sufficient degree of plurality of 
views, such a narrow consensus is the most likely outcome. In §7.23, I discussed the 
notions of progress in virtue ethics. Included in that discussion was a consideration of 
the "dark side of community" (Noddings 1996), with its potential for narrowness and 
oppressive conformity. This is precisely the situation that the classroom community 
of ethical inquiry can face. If the children are drawn from a particular social grouping, 
their deliberations are likely to consider only the lifeworld norms of that group. In the 
absence of diversity within the classroom community, this can lead to the easy 
acceptance of norms that would be much more problematic if discordant views had 
been introduced to the discussion. 
I have argued that progress in virtue ethics requires wider and wider consideration of 
views. The same applies to the classroom community of ethical inquiry: if we are to 
have any hope that the deliberations of the community are leading to progress in the 
students' moral outlooks, then it must be based on an increasingly wide consideration 
of alternative ideas. A classroom drawn from a narrow social grouping can instantiate 
many of the limitations that Benhabib (1992, 141) identifies in the isolated thinker: 
311 
Community of inquiry in moral education 	 10. Practical implications 
A major mistake of Kantian moral theory is to assume that the principles of 
enlarged thought can be realised via the isolated thought experiments of a thinker. 
These solitary thought experiments often substitute the standpoint of one privileged 
part for that of the whole.... we have to see that "to think from the standpoint of 
everyone else" entails sharing a public culture such that everyone else can articulate 
indeed what they think and what their perspectives are. 
If we are to encourage an "enlarged mentality" (a concept Benhabib, op. cit., 122-123, 
borrows from Arendt), then we need views injected into the community that might 
arise from beyond "one privileged part" of one society. Such an enlarged mentality 
(§6.23) is the road to a more universal perspective, and hence to a greater hope of 
moral correctness (Benhabib, op. cit., 136-137). But if the classroom community is 
not itself taking in new members, from a diversity of backgrounds, from where will 
this width come? There are two answers to this question. 
The first highlights again the role of the trigger text in the community. Fictional 
characters can express, or report, dissident views and thus introduce diversity into the 
community. However, there are two problems with this solution, and both problems 
limit the extent to which the text can overcome this difficulty. Firstly, the writer of the 
text, separated in space and time from the communities that will use the text, cannot 
easily anticipate the lacunae in the community's knowledge. Secondly, if the text is to 
retain the power of narrative, it must read reasonably naturally. It must represent a 
recognizable fragment of the lifeworld, and that lifeworld must be sufficiently familiar 
to the readers to enlist them. With the need to introduce philosophical considerations a 
central concern of the writer, there are already dangers of disconnection from the 
readership, who are liable to criticize the texts for being "all about schoolwork,... not 
natural, doesn't relate to our generation, uninteresting" (quotes from a survey reported 
in Sprod 1994a, 61, where 17% of Year 7s surveyed criticized the text in similar 
terms). Authors must be wary that the injection of too many divergent views into a 
text might destroy its aesthetic and narrative integrity. 
The second, and to my mind better, answer focuses on the teacher. Phillips (1994), in 
an article entitled A sincere word for the devil's advocate, points out that the 
community itself has interests that are not identical to the interests of the individuals in 
it. One of these interests, he says, is its "epistemic interest," which is served by 
ensuring that possible objections to the conclusions reached have been adequately 
considered. No member of the community has an interest in advancing positions 
opposed to their own position, for sincerity is an important attribute for individuals. 7 
7 This is too simplistic in several ways, and I will make a couple of observations. Firstly, this 
assumes that the interests and positions of the members of the community are fixed. In fact, these 
interests and positions, as well as wants, needs and so on, can themselves be modified through 
participation in the community of inquiry (§7.I1). Secondly, as Glaser points out (pers. comm.), 
there is a sense in which every member of the community has an interest in considering possible 
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Nevertheless, it is in the interests of the community as a whole that ideas are fully 
tested before gaining assent. Phillips says: 
We want a broad and generous devil's advocate who is not merely stung by her 
community's too-hasty acceptance of this or that position and who responds by 
raising objections to the popular view; we want one who responds by undertaking to 
lead the community into exploring alternative views. (18) 
I want to be clear about how I understand the notion of "a broad and generous devil's 
advocate." The phrase, as Phillips notes, derives from the Catholic Church: the 
devil's advocate (properly called the promoter fidei) is assigned the role of advancing 
all the reasons why a proposed saint ought not to be canonized. In more general 
usage, the phrase has come to denote someone who argues a case they do not hold. In 
my interpretation, it does not matter whether the view is argued hypothetically, or on 
behalf of a particular concrete other who is not present, or somewhat deceptively, by 
someone who pretends that they do hold a view that they do not in fact hold. Glaser 
(1998), whose views I will consider below, restricts the phrase to the last case only, 
but I think this is mistaken. Few would believe that the promoter fidei is personally 
committed to all the objections he raises, even though they are presented as if he did. 
The hypothetical nature of the role is no secret, so no deception is practiced. 
Generally, the only member of a classroom community of inquiry who can be counted 
on to come to it with a commitment to the interests of the community as a whole is the 
teacher. This is part of the pedagogical role. Students come into the community 
representing themselves, whereas the teacher has a mandated role as the representative 
of the community of inquiry itself. Any student may choose to take on the "devil's 
advocacy" if they wish, and it is certainly true that one of the aims of the community 
of inquiry that students do learn to take into account possible objections to their view. 
The teacher, however, has a duty to raise objections once it is obvious that none of the 
students are going to introduce material that throws doubt on the conclusions being 
reached. This will be true even if that conclusion is the one held by the teacher. 
Teachers, of course, need not, and generally ought not, to pretend that the objections 
are their own, but this does not mean that they cannot if there are good strategic 
reasons for doing so. 
As I indicated, one of the dispositions we would want students to learn is the 
somewhat difficult and counterintuitive one of overcoming confirmation bias by 
searching out and seriously considering objections to their views. Students will 
seldom be either disposed or able to do this when they enter the community of inquiry. 
In view of the Vygotslcian account of learning that underpins this thesis (§3.23), this 
objections to their position, if their aim is to find the best position, rather than to merely defend their 
present position. I shall return to this latter point in due course. 
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will be learned through participating in a community which does consider objections. 
This benefit accrues even if the person playing the devil's advocate does so 
deceptively, but other considerations speak in favour of a hypothetical or a 
representative role. The first has to do with trust. 
Glaser (1998, 316-317) analyses Phillips' article in terms of trust. She claims that no 
member of the community, including the teacher, can act in a way that violates the 
"stronger condition of trust that underpins dialogical action," and that playing the 
devil's advocate does betray trust because the devil's advocate argues a case that is not 
sincerely held. I have noted above that Glaser has a narrow interpretation of the role 
of the devil's advocate, but even if we for the moment accept her version, does this 
mean that the teacher can never advance arguments for a view they do not hold, as if 
they did hold it? In her analysis, I maintain that Glaser collapses the role of the teacher 
into that of any member of the community. She denies the pedagogical authority of 
the teacher: a role that entails, as I argued in §4.14, a different variety of trust from 
that which Glaser identifies. Her trust is the trust extended to a fellow member of the 
community - that they will be sincere - which ought to apply to the student members of 
the community. The teacher, on the other hand, is mandated to take open strategic 
action, and the trust that students extend to the teacher is the belief that the teacher's 
actions will be educational. The teacher has a duty to meet that trust. 
Yet, while it may be occasionally acceptable for the teacher to pretend to hold a view, 
so as to model diversity, other considerations speak against doing so. If the teacher is 
discovered arguing deceptively, it will break down the trust that Glaser identifies, and 
model "bush lawyerism" (§9.22). Further, such deceptive argumentation only allows 
an implicit Vygotskian inculcation of the consideration of objections. If we want 
students to obtain a more transparent and explicit understanding of the importance of 
taking possible counter-arguments into account, then it must be clear that the teacher is 
doing so despite not agreeing with them. This is only achieved if the teacher makes it 
clear that the objections are hypothetical, or derived from a concrete other who is not 
present to represent their own view. Generally, we can conclude, the devil's advocate 
ought not to be a deceptive devil's advocate. Nevertheless, there is an important role 
for the teacher as devil's advocate. 
Clearly, the duty to act as the devil's advocate does not override all other duties to the 
community. The teacher, as leader of the community, needs to exercise pedagogic 
action in balancing the competing interests of the community. For example, the 
discussion may have been going on for some time, and the introduction of yet another 
objection may pose the danger of making it too tedious, or the dynamics of the 
dialogue may have pushed it off on another, promising direction. In these and other 
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cases, the teacher needs to exercise judgement, and may decide that the duty of acting 
as the devil's advocate is outweighed by another imperative at this time. 
Nevertheless, the community of ethical inquiry can only claim to be achieving 
progress in ethical decisions if its members are enlarging their mentality through the 
consideration of the views of concrete others. If those others cannot be present to 
advance their views themselves, the teacher can do it by proxy. While the teacher 
cannot represent these others as well as they would themselves, students will have 
contact with contrary views and will both gain practice in taking them into 
consideration, and learn that what seems obvious to them from within their lifeworld 
may not seem so obvious to others, and for good reasons. 
10.24 Communicative Autonomy in the Community of Inquiry 
Benhabib (1992, 59n) claims that: 
In education we are always counterfactually presupposing the equality and autonomy 
of the beings ... whose body and mind we are caring for... or training. When this 
counterfactual presupposition of equality, certainly not an equality of ability but one 
of claims, fails then we have poor pedagogics. 
The presupposition of an equality of claims to which she refers seems quite 
reasonable. It is, if I interpret it aright, merely another way of asserting Habermas' 
presuppositional rationality, or the need for a procedural value of respect. However, 
despite the fact that she fails to expand on it, her original claim extends not just to 
equality but also to autonomy. In this section, I wish to address the place of 
autonomy in the classroom community of ethical inquiry. 
In §4.23, I developed the idea of communicative autonomy, claiming that it is "the 
ability of the self to engage fully in the ongoing conversational narrative of humanity." 
This, I said, is a developmental notion, that both develops only through, and retains as 
an essential part, engagement with others. It is a counterfactual ideal, in that the word 
"fully" sets a standard that not even the well educated can meet, for the range of the 
conversational narrative of humanity is beyond any one individual, and McPeck's 
point (§10.21) that the application of critical thinking is, in detail, context-specific, 
means that none of us has the wherewithal to participate fully in all conversations. 
Can teachers then, counterfactually presuppose the autonomy of the students in their 
classes? My answer is that they cannot. If they were to do so, then they would be led 
to conceiving of their task as excluding the development of communicative autonomy 
and the underlying capacities of reasonableness. A presupposition of autonomy 
would sharpen the fear of indoctrination, so that teachers would not be in a position to 
inculcate the necessary values of respect (§9.4). It would lead teachers to eschew the 
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wielding of the important strategic element to pedagogic action (§4.141). In short, it 
would undermine the educative endeavour. 
Presupposing autonomy would be equivalent to presupposing an equality of ability, a 
notion that Benhabib rightly rules out. Presupposing equality of claims is a different 
matter. The claims of all human beings to respect are equal, whether they have it or 
not. A claim to respect does not develop throughout life, although a need for greater 
respect obviously varies with the situation in which a person is found. What this 
suggests is that all persons have an equality of claim to autonomy: a claim to a place in 
the conversation. This is one of the key purposes of education, and it is an important 
reason why one of the Universal Human Rights declared by the United Nations is the 
right to an education. For while it is certainly true that an education (in the institutional 
sense) is not the only way for an individual to develop reasonableness and autonomy 
(a sufficiently rich upbringing would probably suffice), it is also true that the 
intellectually impoverished upbringing many would receive without institutional 
education would prevent them from developing communicative autonomy to any great 
degree. 
So, for some children, institutional education is not necessary for communicative 
autonomy, while for many others it is necessary. Even for these others, however, it is 
not sufficient. The nature of the education is of vital importance. I have argued 
throughout this thesis that the development of reasonableness is the central part of 
education that leads to communicative autonomy (Chapter Three), and that one of the 
most effective ways of developing reasonableness is through engagement in the 
community of inquiry. The community of inquiry is a construct of all those who 
participate in it, but the teacher has the most important role in this. The responsibility 
for looking after the interests of the community itself rests on the teacher's head. The 
students, as they become more reasonable and more autonomous, can begin to take on 
some of this responsibility, but the final responsibility, even if it reduces to merely 
keeping a watchful eye, always remains the teacher's. 
This responsibility is exercised through the practice of pedagogical action (§4.141). 
The teacher (or other person placed in a position of pedagogic power) has a justified 
reason for engaging in the strategic elements of pedagogic actions within the 
community, but with this licence comes the responsibility to justify this open strategic 
action if and when called upon to do so, either by students within the community of 
inquiry or adults within the wider outside community. The justification succeeds if the 
teacher is able to show how those actions contribute to the development of the 
reasonableness and hence autonomy of the students. 
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My Vygotsician account of learning (§3.23) applies to the development of autonomy. 
Students learn through engaging jointly in the actions that we wish them to later be 
able to do individually. In the community of inquiry, then, teachers need to be able to 
scaffold the inquiry so that students participate at a higher level of autonomy than that 
of which they would otherwise have been capable. Here is Kant's pedagogical 
paradox again (4.l3) - teachers have.to construct situations in which students are led 
to act autonomously in order to make them autonomous. But it is defused by the 
reali7ation that even the endpoint - full autonomy - cannot be exercised without 
interaction with others, even if this is at times only the implicit interaction of internal 
dialogue. 
10.3 Classroom Communities of Inquiry 
In Part III, I have turned from the broader philosophical investigation that 
characterized Parts I and H, and applied those results to the classroom. We have seen 
that having a clearer idea of the aims of moral education, in terms of the enabling 
capacities of a multi-aspectual reasonableness, a vision of an interdependent 
autonomy, and a rich account of a meta-ethical theory to provide a basis for my 
characterization of an ethical person, leads to many specific conclusions as to how a 
classroom ought to be organized in a moral education program. In the Afterword to 
follow, I will summarize the main themes of this thesis. 
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Chapter Eleven: Afterword 
I have argued that the community of ethical inquiry provides an excellent means for 
preparing students to be reasonable, knowledgable and virtuous moral agents. Moral 
agents have many other attributes, and other strands of a moral education package are 
required to assist children to develop them. Many of these additional attributes are 
also strengthened in the community of ethical inquiry, but I do not claim that the 
community of ethical inquiry is sufficient to establish them on its own. 
The community of ethical inquiry assists in a moral education program in three broad 
ways: by helping to develop reasonableness - one of the most important preconditions 
of thoughtful and reflective moral agency - and hence autonomy; by enhancing, 
through ethical inquiry, the reflective consideration of what it is that ethical living 
requires; and by providing the conditions in which these first two considerations can 
be linked to the way the students' lives are lived. 
In developing the philosophical positions upon which my analysis of moral education 
is based, I have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that an adequate philosophical 
account needs to draw on the realization that persons are always becoming-persons. 
We are never fully reasonable, fully autonomous, fully moral. I have been critical of 
philosophical systems that take rational, fully-formed adults as their starting point. An 
adequate philosophical account, I maintain, must take the philosophy of childhood 
seriously, for in considering children, we come face-to-face with the time in our lives 
when we are most clearly becoming-persons. 
Underlying the ability to develop morally, I argued in Chapter Two, are a suite of 
biological presuppositions. Infants are, amongst other things, predisposed to 
recognize others as agents, to feel empathy with others, and to be able to develop 
certain kinds of reasoning. These predispositions provide both positive impulses to 
development, and constraints on the possible outcomes of development. They do not, 
however, determine the outcomes, which rely heavily on environmental (physical and 
social) and historical factors. It is because of this that education can be such an 
important factor in the formation of persons. Both these biological roots, and the 
child's total history provide the "raw material" on which the community of ethical 
inquiry can build. 
11.1 Reasonableness and Autonomy 
The community of inquiry provides an environment in which to develop further a self- 
correcting reasonableness (§3.0. Though reasonableness is built through many other 
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interactions in the lifeworld and even other school activities, the community of inquiry 
offers some features to enhance this process. Since reasonableness is acquired 
through the Vygotslcian appropriation of jointly constructed competencies (§3.23), the 
teacher in the community of inquiry can deliberately construct, via pedagogical action 
(4.141), the conditions for a rich interplay of reasonableness within the discussions 
of the community. Together with the reflexive turning of this reasonableness onto 
aspects of itself, the community of inquiry enables students to become more able to 
inquire into their developing moral understanding and commitments. 
Moral agency requires more than the enhancement of "straight" as opposed to 
"crooked" thinking (Thouless 1946). Though important, the critical aspect of thinking 
(§3.121) is, I have argued, just one of five aspects to reasonableness. All the aspects 
play a role in thinking, especially moral thinking. The multi-aspectual account of 
reasonableness that I have developed (§3.12) highlights certain other preconditions for 
moral agency. Moral imagination plays a central role in our ethical lives (Johnson 
1993), and this is well served by the creative aspect to thinking (§3.122). The 
committed aspect of reasonableness supports the connection of ethical thinking to 
interactions with, and connections to, others within a society, and plays an important 
role in committing persons to link their judgements to their actions (§3.123). The 
ability to read situations for their moral salience, and to bring to bear appropriate 
modes of thinking is augmented by the development of the contextual aspect of 
reasonableness (§3.124). Finally, students' ability to understand the way they are 
physically situated within the world, interacting with it, and using embodied 
metaphors (such as high/low and inside/outside) which are so central to much of our 
moral deliberation, can be extended by attention to the embodied aspect of 
reasonableness (§3.125). These aspects of reasonableness, separable analytically, are 
intertwined in any actual thinking (§3.126) 
The rich nature of the community of inquiry, including its embedding in narrative 
structures, its open ended character and its drawing on the life experiences of the 
participants, make it a more powerful vehicle for the improvement of the multiple 
aspects of reasonableness than many other classroom techniques. The community of 
inquiry is a means of engaging students in critical discourse, drawing on the 
competencies of lifeworld communicative action to enter into philosophical inquiry 
(§4.123 and §7.3). Guiding the teacher's actions in managing the community of 
inquiry is the broad virtue of respect (§6.24), and the concept of an ideal speech 
situation (§4.124) acts as a regulative ideal to which the teacher can appeal in 
assessing whether respect is being instantiated within the community of inquiry. 
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In developing their reasonableness, students are becoming more communicatively 
autonomous (§3.3 and §4.2): able to act for reasons which they are able to publicly 
express and defend, and modify for good reasons, when called upon to do so. 
However, if we take for the moment the process/content distinction seriously (and we 
have seen in §4.14 and §9.4 that there are reasons for being cautious in this), then the 
reasonableness developed through participation in a community of inquiry provides a 
vital process component for ethical living. For the ethical content, I will now turn my 
attention to the community of ethical inquiry. 
11.2 Ethical Inquiry 
Despite the conclusions of formalist theories of moral development, it is not sufficient 
that a moral person be just a good reasoner, able to adjudicate conflicting claims using 
the right type of reasoning. Nor is the development of imagination, able to be turned 
on moral situations, sufficient. Matthews (1994, 62-65, see §5.1) reminds us that to 
develop morally also involves an expanding situated knowledge of moral paradigms, 
the ability to define more subtly the characteristics of complex moral terms, and an 
increasing ability to judge whether borderline cases fall under a particular moral term. 
Thus, our meta-ethical target within the community of ethical inquiry must be multi-
dimensional. 
I have argued that virtue ethics tells us that becoming a morally good person requires 
the development of morally good habits, and that good moral habits cannot be 
unreflective (§5.2). Discourse ethics has provided me with a theoretical basis for 
sharpening the meaning of reflection, and arguing that it takes place in communicative 
action and (especially) practical discourse (Chapters Six and Seven). Further, 
Vygotskian engagement in practical discourse is what makes it possible for the 
individual to reflect ethically (§3.23). 
In order to facilitate the development of ethical reflection, there is a need for more 
competent persons to engage in pedagogic action which, through a considered mix of 
open strategic action, communicative action and practical discourse, inducts younger 
persons into the capabilities needed for moral reflection and moral communicative 
autonomy (§4.141). Unavoidably underlying this pedagogic action we already find a 
substantive moral commitment - respect - which must be inculcated through the 
practice of practical discourse (§6.1). 
None of this is to argue that membership of a classroom community of ethical inquiry 
is essential to the production of ethically good persons. Such a position would be 
absurd, given the recent introduction of such communities, since it would imply that 
very few persons are ethically good. However, in Chapter Nine, I have argued that, 
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because such communities formalin and concentrate the elements of communicative 
action and practical discourse that are most powerful in the construction of moral 
communicative autonomy, and because teachers are explicitly delegated pedagogic 
power to do so, then engagement in communities of ethical inquiry will lead to the 
development of persons with greater moral capabilities. 
The classroom community of inquiry must therefore at regular intervals take ethical 
issues as its substantive focus. Within the communal inquiry, we have seen (§10.23) 
that both more abstract considerations of the justification of moral principles and 
terms, and more concrete considerations of their application in particular situations, 
need to be addressed, and that they should be linked together recursively. The trigger 
text can assist in this process by containing both specifically ethical situations and 
concerns, and episodes in which the characters engage in high-level conceptual 
puzzlement and clarification. It is then up to the teacher, acting pedagogically, to 
ensure that the community inquires in a similar fashion. 
The mere discussion of substantive ethical matters, however, might not be seen as 
leading students to proper ethical knowledge and beliefs. The matter of normative 
correctness is highly contentious, but I have shown in §6.22 and §7.23 that discourse 
ethics can add power to the virtue ethics account of moral progress, even if we are not 
able to guarantee once-and-for-all right answers. In particular, students can gain a 
greater appreciation of the differences between moral issues which are more of the 
rightish or the goodish variety - that is, more concerned with widespread questions of 
justice, or personally important issues of the good life. In §10.23, I was able to apply 
these conclusions to the classroom community of ethical inquiry, identifying 
implications to help guide the teacher's pedagogical action and conduct of the 
discussion. 
However, as I discussed in §9.21, even a well developed reasonableness and a 
sophisticated ethical knowledge is not sufficient to guarantee that students will live an 
ethical life, if their judgements and actions are divorced from one another. The final 
claim of this thesis is that the community of ethical inquiry does have resources that 
assist in marrying the two. 
11.3 Lived Lives 
To turn to the lived lives of students is to remind ourselves of the broader picture. A 
single pedagogical method used in a single classroom, no matter how good it is, will 
not be enough to guarantee the formation of moral persons. Even the efforts of the 
school as a whole may well not be enough. The other influences on becoming-
persons are also very powerful. Yet this does not absolve schools and teachers of a 
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responsibility to do the best they can. In this thesis, I have argued that the best, or at 
least a very good, method available to teachers is the community of ethical inquiry. 
The community of ethical inquiry, however, takes place in a restricted context - the 
classroom. It involves not just talk, but also action, because speech is itself a type of 
action, and because the participants in the community are involved in interpersonal 
interaction. These actions, however, like the community, are also restricted in their 
scope. Becoming-persons, and the persons into which they will grow, will need to 
act in much broader contexts. Given the difficulties I have identified (§3.1245 and 
§10.221) in transfer across contexts, we have some grounds for concern that even the 
most virtuous member of the community may not transfer that virtue into the 
remainder of their life. 
I have argued that, although we do not have a guarantee, we can have grounds for 
optimism that the community of ethical inquiry will encourage transfer. The 
community of ethical inquiry offers a rich narrative environment that links 
philosophical considerations to the lives of persons in two ways. Firstly, the texts 
provide models of persons who integrate their deliberations into their lives (§10.1). 
Secondly, the judicious encouragement of anecdotal reflection within the inquiry, 
when linked to the more abstract contemplations of the community, provides a path for 
the incorporation of the fruit of the community's meditations into the students' 
personal lives (§10.223). 
This is not the only contribution the community of ethical inquiry can make, for the 
points in the previous paragraph concentrate largely on the inquiry rather than the 
community. This latter aspect connects each member of the community to the other 
members. The community is, within a restricted context, a microcosm of larger 
communities. Each member learns within this community what it is to act with 
respect. Though there are, as I have noted in §10.221, problems with transfer from 
one context to another, the reflexive nature of the community of ethical inquiry does 
encourage such transfer. 
Nevertheless, we cannot escape the conclusion that I have been urging throughout. 
The community of ethical inquiry has special virtues, and provides particular 
advantages, in a program of moral education. But it cannot form the totality of that 
program. Moral education requires a broader, multi-dimensional approach, within 
which the community of ethical inquiry holds an important, but not a sole, place. 
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11.4 Conclusion 
In Chapter One, I referred to the state of global society and the need for each 
generation to bring up the next in such a way as to maintain what is morally 
worthwhile in society, to alter what is not, and to be able to both plan for, and react to, 
the rapid changes of society in morally acceptable ways. This is a complex task, and it 
requires multiple inputs from many social actors and sectors of society. 
Central to these endeavours are two particular institutions: the family and the education 
system. Within the education system, I have again narrowed my focus, to the 
classroom itself, and to the place of a particular pedagogical methodology: the 
community of ethical inquiry. I have made a series of recommendations to teachers as 
to how such a community should be set up, and what the benefits will be if this is 
done. 
My focus has been on the teacher and the classroom, but I believe that parents too 
could benefit from my work. For they too engage in pedagogical action with their 
children. Their actions are vital in the establishment of good moral habits which, as 
we have seen, also requires the habituation of reasonableness. If moral education is to 
be successful, and produce citizens who are reasonable, autonomous and ethical, then 
families and schools will need to assist each other in equipping children to inquire 
communally into ethical matters. 
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